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1. Introduction: A Performative Perspective on
Terrorism Trials
Beatrice de Graaf, in cooperation with Liesbeth van der Heide1
1.1. Introduction2
On 6May 2011,Washington Post journalist Jeff Greenfield painted a vivid picture of
what would have happened had operation Geronimo (which resulted in the killing of
Osama Bin Laden) resulted in capturing the leader of Al Qaeda alive. After the initial
congratulations, the consequences might soon have created problems. Putting Bin
Laden on trial for massmurder in a New York federal court—aside from the fact that it
is very unlikely that Congress would allow this in the first place—would have caused
major headaches:
… what if information about his location had been obtained through ‘enhanced
interrogation techniques’ and was ruled inadmissible? What if Bin Laden acted as his
own lawyer, turning the trial into a months-long denunciation of America? What if
one holdout resulted in a hung jury? […] A military commission at Guantánamo Bay,
then? The process was agonizingly slow (only five cases concluded in nine years), and a
death sentence for Bin Laden wouldmean years of appeals.3
Moreover, legal questions would, according to Greenfield, have been ‘nothing next to
the security consequences of taking Bin Laden alive’. What if any terrorist organisation
worldwide seized an elementary school, threatening to kill all of the children unless
Bin Laden were released?
Utilising criminal law and ultimatelymaking use of civilian courts to try, sentence
and imprison terrorists has often been criticised as a viable option in countering
terrorism. Former Vice President Dick Cheney vehemently opposed organising
terrorism trials in civilian courts in the United States (us). In a reaction to Attorney
General Eric Holder’s decision to prosecute Khalid SheikhMohammed (ksm) before a
civilian court in 2009, he lamented: ‘I can’t for the life of me figure out what Holder’s
intent here is in having Khalid SheikhMohammed tried in civilian court other than to
have some kind of show trial.’4 Cheney objected to this decision, arguing that giving
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ksm and other suspected terrorists a civilian trial in New York would be strategic
disaster: ‘they’ll simply use it as a platform to argue their cases—they don’t have
a defence to speak of—it’ll be a place for them to stand up and spread the terrible
ideology that they adhere to’.5
Indeed, even when the rule of law is strictly observed, terrorism trials can easily
turn into a show, a spectacle, run by the terrorist suspects in order to further their
cause by communicative means. Or trials may lead to a (partial) acquittal, legally
flawless but from a security perspective potentially disasterous. This concern, as
voiced by many executive professionals, has been corroborated by the outcome of the
first trial against a Guantánamo ‘ghost prisoner’, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, which
sparked off a heated political debate. The defendant was convicted in a federal court in
Manhattan for his role in the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, which
earned him a 20-year sentence. Republican critics objected to the fact that the jury
acquitted Ghailani of all other charges, more than 280 in total, including every single
count of murder. This outcome was used as proof that terrorism detainees should be
prosecuted solely by a military commission.6 It was not so much the final verdict that
was contested but the use of civilian courts—with all the unpredictability and risks
involved for combating terrorism.
Notwithstanding such criticism, terrorismtrials canbe an exceptional opportunity
better to understand and, hence, counter terrorism, since they are the only place
where most, if not all, of the actors in a terrorist incident meet again: terrorists, state
representatives, the judiciary, the audience, surviving victims, terrorist sympathisers,
etc. Themedia will report and broadcast their respective performances. Forming a
nexus between terrorist violence, law enforcement and public opinion, terrorism
trials thus offer the prospect of showcasing justice in progress, and in so doing of
demonstrating to the world how terrorist suspects are dealt with under the laws of
the land. Ideally, criminal investigation and prosecution result in bringing terrorist
suspects to court, where by solely legal and constitutional means, their purported
crimes are adjudicated and justice is restored. However, governments and security
officials are more often than not reluctant to put terrorist suspects in front of civilian
courts. This reluctance can be explained if we view terrorism trials as a form of
theatre, where the ‘show’ can develop its own, often unexpected, dynamics, which at
times might inconvenience the government, most notably when terrorist suspects
appropriate the trial to continue their struggle by communicative means. Terrorism
trials almost inevitably give rise to political controversies. The crime of terrorism
(not its direct effects—e.g. murder and hostage-taking) is a political construct and
an essentially contested one as well.7 Terrorism trials deal with suspects who are
introduction | 11
being charged with challenging the existing political system—or, at the very least,
are seen as posing a political threat. The government’s unease is owing to the fact
that it has to hand over control to the judiciary, which has its own criteria for dealing
with criminal offences (rather than viewing an act of terrorism primarily as a security
threat). Governments also face the reaction of national and international public
opinion, whichmight, in the worst case, even create new security threats.
In this volume,we are introducing a performative perspectiveon terrorismtrials: these
are viewed as a site of ongoing communicative struggle. The court room is a stage, not
of warfare, but lawfarewhere legal instruments are used (and abused) by prosecution
and defence and all kinds of performative acts are executed and (communicative)
strategies are adopted to convince the court and audiences outside the courtroom of
the validity of their respective narratives of (in)justice. In and outside the courtroom
democratic states have much to lose when combating terrorism; respect for the rule of
law, legitimacy and justice can become casualties. Therefore closer attention needs to
be paid to the communicative aspects, judicial and socio-political mechanisms and
effects of terrorism trials, especially with regard to their performative power which, in
turn, may create and bolster new narratives of justice and/or injustice.8
In this introductory chapter, by combining the notion of lawfare with that of
performance, we will present a new framework for analysing terrorism trials as sites of
communicative contestation of political, ideological, religious ánd legal aims, pivoting
around the concepts of (in)justice and legitimacy. At the end, we will briefly explain
the place of individual chapters in this volume.
1.2. Terrorism Trials as a Places of Lawfare
Research on political trials in contemporary history hasmatured over recent decades.
For instance, Awol Kassim Allo has analysed the show element in several political
trials.9 However, a specific focus on terrorism trials is still rare. As mentioned above,
in the present volume we use the concepts of lawfare and performance as general
frameworks for analysis.
The Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz described war as ‘merely
a continuation of politics by other means’.10 In the same way, terrorism trials can
be viewed as the continuation of political violence by other—legal and non-legal,
communicative means—in the courtroom.11 In such trials, both terrorists and their
defence lawyers on the one side and the government and its judiciary on the other
hand operate within the framework of the law and legal procedures, engage with this
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communicatively, and either uphold and confirm or attempt to break and replace it
with other sources of legitimacy to justify their actions. This process of waging war
through law—or ‘the art of managing law and war altogether’ is what David Kennedy
called lawfare.12 ‘Lawfare’ has been used inmore senses than one. The concept can be
traced back to Charles Dunlap, a usMajor General, who used the term as a ‘bumper
sticker’ to describe how law had altered warfare.13 In his view, lawfare denotes ‘the
use of the law as a weapon of war’ that can be used both for the greater good as well as
to do harm. Another aspect of lawfare has to do with the public support needed for
armed conflict and the dependence of that support on upholding the rule of law. Legal
scholar William Eckhardt, well-known for having prosecuted the My Lai cases during
his service as Judge Advocate, observed that ‘Knowing that our society so respects
the rule of law that it demands compliance with it, our enemies carefully attack our
military plans as illegal and immoral and our execution of those plans as contrary to
the laws of war. Our vulnerability here is what philosopher of war Carl von Clausewitz
would term our “center of gravity”.’14 From this perspective, lawfare can be seen as
ameans to claim legitimacy through the use (and abuse) of law and legal systems.
Thus, lawfare is a tool where legality and legitimacy (two concepts that do not always
overlap) can be used by either side, depending on political support, public opinion
and the constellation of forces in a given social context.
In our view, terrorism trials can indeed also be analysedwith thehelp of the concept
of lawfare. Such trials constitute political arenas where the struggle for justification
and legitimation continues bymeans of certain performative and communciative
strategies. Here, in adaptation of Wouter Werner (who in turn refers to The Lawfare
Project), we use the concept of lawfare as referring to the (ab)use of the law and legal
systems for communicative and strategic ends.15 It opens up a novel perspective on
terrorism trials, viewing these as a continuation of a political struggle by other—both
communicative andperformative—means, namely competingnarratives on the justice
of a cause. Terrorist trials can remain firmly squared within the existing framework of
law and legality, reinforce the authority of the state and communicate to the public at
large that terrorist crimes are not acceptable, even if the grievances underlying them
are real. Both the legal foundations and the communicative strategies adopted remain
attached to status quo principles and paradigms. However, problems may arise when
executive authorities try to divert from the aim of carrying out an open, transparent
and legally grounded process of truth finding and adjudication, and instead put
national security or protecting political order up front. The open, communicative
space of the courtroom becomes restricted when governments put pressure on the
judges, when populist politicians try to exert influence on court decisions and when
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judicial decisions run counter to government policies or when the general public
does not accept the judicial verdict as just. While the ultimate verdict of the court
might be considered as satisfactory by part of the public, another part may see it
as another instance of injustice—contributing to further conflict escalation. The
executive branch of the governmentmay view an acquittal by a court as a reason to
ask parliament to pass harsher laws. The terrorist’s constituencies may consider a
conviction as a reason to rally evenmore strongly behind those who have taken up
arms against the government.16
As Alex P. Schmid will further elaborate in chapter two, terrorism trials might
be turned into political trials, intended to evict (by legal, or illegal means) a political
foe from the scene. Politicisation of trials may occur when court proceedings are
deliberately manipulated for political reasons. The defendants can, however, also try
to politicise the trial by directly challenging the authority of the court or the laws on
the basis of which they are to be tried, to deny legitimacy to the court or disrepute the
authorities.17 In such cases, whether ‘equality of arms’ is involved or not, trials can
divide audiences and conflict parties and intensify the conflict—hence the idea of
‘lawfare’. Compared to the notion of political trials and political justice, where the
power of the executive dominates the scene, ‘lawfare’ enables us to bring into focus
the continuation of the struggle by communicative, legal and performative means of
all parties involved, including the defendants.
Ideally, even with the possibility of protracted ‘lawfare’ involved, terrorism trials
should be seen as themost fitting response of democratic states to terrorist attacks
or threats thereof in a framework of rule of law.18 Terrorist trials can be utilised to
address core issues such as the need for retribution and the need to restore trust and
stability and respect for the rule of law in society.19 Trials are cornerstones of the
criminal justice system in democratic societies that pride themselves on a tradition of
‘fair’ trials.20 This vital demonstrative, and communicative function of terrorism
trials is, however, often overlooked.
The existing body of research focusing on terrorism trials is limited and frag-
mented.21 A great deal of research has been conducted into the goals of public trials,22
and on changing attitudes with regard to accepting a system of global justice.23 Less
attention has been given to the role and place of terrorist trials in the framework
of global justice,24 or to the communicative, performative strategies and narratives
used in court25 and societal responses to terrorist trials.26 De Graaf and De Goede
have introduced a novel approach to terrorism trials, as sites where the precautionary
turn (a tendency in criminal law to revert to risk justice, and to apply the law as
precautionary measure rather than as a response to material evidence of terrorist
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attacks that have occurred) in criminal lawmanifests itself.27 But more workneeds to
be done. Research on radicalisation, the nature and effect of terrorism and ways and
means to counter terrorism has generally overlooked the function of criminal trials in
terrorism.28 A well-conducted trial cannot only bring closure for surviving victims
and their families, but can also bring some of those charged with terrorism to their
senses and re-direct the life paths of some who previously identified with the terrorist
cause.29 When the performance in the courtroom is over, some lessons may have been
learned by some audiences, if not the terrorists themselves. In a terrorism trial the
main stakeholders accept or reject the legal system, but in either case they have to
communicatively engage with the law in order to express their vision of what is just
and unjust, legal or illegal, legitimate or not in the given political context.30 Given
these high stakes in the effect and impact of terrorism trials, this volume argues for
adopting a new perspective on terrorism trials: The concept of lawfare allows us to
bring into focus both the strategies, performative acts and the rhetoric by means of which
themain stakeholders in a trial use the law and legal procedures to achieve an important
objective: convincing their target audiences of their political vision of justice/injustice.
Terrorist trials are the sites where the process of lawfare reaches its climax.
Witnessing audiences recognise, accept or reject the statements and the underlying
strategies employed by key players. The stakeholders’ visions of justice/injustice are
more or less openly presented, debated and re-negotiated. The conduct or outcome
of a trial can cause rupture (the rejection, obstruction or undermining of the legal
system),31 but it can also produce some forms of closure (solving a contentious issue
one way or the other in the public debate32) in the eyes of some of the stakeholders and
more distant audiences. Not infrequently, however, the outcome is an open-ended
process of ongoing social feuds with unmet demands that foster resentment which,
in turn, provides further ammunition for escalation. Given this situation, it is both
relevant and timely to develop a better understanding of the communicative and
performative aspects of terrorism trials.
Given our comments on the relevance of the performative element in terrorism
trials, a definition of the concept of performativity needs to be presented here, a
definition that refers to discursive efforts and actions to construct social realities,33 as
applied to terrorism trials:
Performativity in terrorism trials refers to acts or strategies (stated ormore incoherent)
adopted by parties with a stake in the trial to try to persuade their target audience (s)
in (and outside) the courtroom of the justice of their narrative(s) and the injustice of
the one on the opposite side of the bar.34
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The importance of studying communicative strategies and performative acts has
been argued before.35 Performative acts, according to Erika Fischer-Lichte, involve
unpredictable and often (but not always) spontaneous interactions and exchanges
between actors, spectators and others involved in the terrorism trial and do not leave
them unchanged.36 These transformative acts in the court room are based on explicit
or implicit, stated or more incoherent strategies that have the potential to mobilise
certain sectors of society, or certain groups outside it, by means of verbal statements
or non-verbal behaviour in and outside the courtroom, e.g. in the form of hunger
strikes. Their target audiences range from formal players within the legal system,
such as judges and juries, to various publics outside the courtroom.37
Performance is an act, a process and a product at the same time; it provides con-
solidation of norms, re-enactment of identity and can also involve the transformation
of these norms and identities. Performances are role plays, in which not only the
individual but the community at large is involved. Interestingly, in courtrooms,
performance takes place in a direct manner, in the art form of an Aristotelian drama:
there is unity of time, place and action. Yet it also transcends the courtroom. The
performances of the actors have a bearing on a broader audience, on the political
context, on a society’s culture and legal system as a whole, and this in three ways. First,
there ismimesis: a (mostly verbal) re-enactment of the offence, performed in the hope
of uncovering what actually happened. In addition tomimesis, there is poiesis as well,
i.e.making not faking. Performances, like a driving test, a wedding, an examination
or a defence in court, create identities, assert claims to selfhood and are part and
parcel of confirming and producing social relations. The truth is not out there to
uncover, but has to be (re)created in the courtroom. Moreover, apart from faking
andmaking, performances also amount to breaking and remaking. Some narratives
are upheld, others are disputed. In the end, often a new one emerges. This is called
kinesis: movement, motion, fluidity. Performance can transgress existing boundaries,
break structures and remake social and political rule. It intervenes and makes things
anew.38
Through a trial, themembers of the community participate in a possibly escalating
and divisive debate: not only on the question of culpability and adjudication, but
possibly also with respect to the communicative framework (the criminal law
paradigm, rule of law, and justice) as such. Paraphrasing Bell’s work on performative
theories: during trials audiences will be induced to take sides; they will be inclined to
be for or against the (alleged) rule breaker. Redress may be possible, when procedures
to repair or remedy the breach are employed—a role the judicial machinery itself often
plays. Trials not only involve re-establishment of the truth or stock-taking of the harm
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done; they also containmoments of liminality, a ‘betwixt and between’39 of suspended
knowledge about the outcome of the social drama. Courtroom verdicts—guilty or not
guilty—are exemplary of liminal moments in the redress phase of social drama. If the
repair works the rule breaker is removed, and later reintegrated into the community.
Every major social drama alters society to a certain extent. These alterations may not
be permanent, butmerely reflect a temporarymutual accommodation of interests.
If this does not work, community splits or breaks apart into factions. This could
be defined as a schism. In large scale complex communities continuous failure of
repressive institutionsmay lead to a revolutionary situation in which at least one
of the contending parties generates a programme of societal change, and the whole
framework of the law is transformed.40
One critical note needs to be made, however. A performative act is not the same as
a calculated strategy. And even if these two conflate, the exchange between actors and
spectators remains unpredictable. The actual outcome of the trial and the question
whose performance manages to mobilise or immobilise the public or more specific
target audiences, is hard to assess conclusively. The outcome depends on a number
of factors and may vary throughout the course of the trial. One major element of
uncertainty in establishing the likely effect of a communicative strategy is the level of
media coverage, and the degree of national public attention devoted to the trial.41
This can be invoked by the agents directly involved in the trial, but media attention
is—in some countries more than others—an autonomous factor in its own right.
Distal and proximate context, historical experiences, media logistics at a specific time
and place, other hypes on the political agenda, these all influence the way a trial
is covered and reported. While mass media can have an independent agenda and
independent interests, they are usually not just passive witnesses and conduits of
factual information. In fact, sometimes the media have tried the suspects long before
a case goes to court.
Like other political trials or media-saturated ordinary criminal trials (for example,
the O.J. Simpson trial in California), terrorism trials can thus also be considered to be
shows or, to use more accurate terminology, a dramaturgical play. This is not to say
that terrorism trials are in all respects fundamentally different from other politicised
trials, media-saturated trials or dramatic criminal trials. However, for terrorists and
counter-terrorists, the presentation of, and contest over, credible narratives of justice
and injustice are especially important. Compared to ordinary criminals who prefer a
low profile in public, terrorist suspects often challenge the existing communicative
frames and political rule or present contentious and violent views of justice and
repression, and do so for all to see.
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While combining these two concepts—lawfare and performativity—the guiding
question for analysing terrorism trials should, in our view, be this: How do the main
stakeholders in a terrorist trial (however coherently or incoherently) use the law
and legal systems to achieve their goal of convincing their target audiences of their
particular vision of justice/injustice? This question can be broken down into a number
of sub-questions:
– Who are the main stakeholders in a trial and what are their visions of justice/in-
justice? Main stakeholders include the opposite parties within the legal system of
criminal justice: the prosecutors and the defendant/legal counsel.
– Which performative acts and/or communicative strategies do they engage in
in court? Do they follow strategies of rupture, i.e. strategies that intend to
reject, obstruct or undermine the legal system? Strategies are defined as the
total sum of performative actions, including the legal language (charges, legal
paragraphs), narrative (either as a coherent plot line or explanation or as disparate
statements), non-verbal expressions, behaviour, self-portrayal, etc., used to advance
the stakeholder’s vision of justice/injustice. These strategies might be visible as
explicit attempts, or only to be perceived as post hoc rationalisations or implicit
articulations.
– Which target audiences (judge and/or jury, real or potential terrorist constituen-
cies, defendants, specific groups or society at large) are addressed, and how do
these respond? Target audiences are understood here as the audiences implicitly
or explicitly addressed by the stakeholder in the trial.
– To what extent do the stakeholders and/or their target audiences affirm closure?
What are their ideas of (in)justice, defined as the implicitly or explicitly formulated
goal and visions of moral rightness (or absence thereof)42 of the stakeholder in the
trial and his/her claim to legitimacy.
1.3. Outline of This Volume
In this volume a series of terrorism trials—some famous, others less so—are revisited.
While the main focus is on trials held since the Second World War, we also look
at two classical trials from Czarist Russia and the Soviet Union respectively. This
is due in part to the special Russian background of one of the editors but it can
also be justified in terms of their place in history; one taking place at the very
beginning of modern terrorism and arguably (co-)inspiring the first anarchist wave
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of modern terrorism, the other, a classical Stalinist trial that was, in a way, the
mother of all show trials. Somewhat closer to the present are the analysis of an
eta trial and the Stammheim trial of members from the German Red Army Faction.
Altogether, the volume covers nine case studies, half of them taken from the post-9/11
period.
Following this introduction is a theoretical chapter by Alex P. Schmid, which
focuses on thenotions of political crime andpolitical justice. Alex Schmid also authored
the case study on the trial of Vera Zasulich in 1878 and offers a detailed account of
the first of three Stalinist show trials in themid-1930s, where allegedmembers of a
‘Trotzkyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre’ stood trial. The subsequent chapters deal
with trials held in the 1970s. Joost Augusteijn analyses some of themore prominent ira
trials in the 1970s, while Jacco Pekelder and Klaus Weinhauer scrutinise the German
Stammheim trial.
The next set of chapters deals with post-9/11 trials. First, Geert-Jan Knoops,
international law scholar and practising lawyer, investigates the case of Zacarias
Moussaoui, who—often referred to as the 20th hijacker of 9/11—was convicted of
conspiring to kill us citizens. Knoops analyses the role of the theatre itself in setting the
stage for the performative strategies of the parties involved. A federal trial, according
to Knoops, is the best way to administer justice, and to conduct a fair trial. Next,
Fred Borch considers the Guantánamo trials between 2003 and 2004. As a former us
military prosecutor, he combines scholarly analysis with first-hand knowledge of
some of the Guantánamo tribunals. Beatrice de Graaf then covers a number of trials
against a group of jihadist terrorist suspects in the Netherlands. She notes that in
the case of the Hofstad group in 2005–2006 it was not somuch the thwarted attack,
but the risk of such an attack, that was adjudicated upon—a new phenomenon in
criminal justice. Carolijn Terwindt continues with an analysis of the support groups
and sympathiser movement to the Gestoras pro Amnistía in Spain (who stood trial in
2008), a highly under-researched area.
The last trial discussed is the 2012 trial of Anders Behring Breivik, the perpetrator
of a bomb plot and amassacre that cost the lives of 77mostly young people in Oslo and
Utøya. The authors of this last chapter, Tore Bjørgo, Beatrice de Graaf, Liesbeth van
der Heide, Cato Hemmingby and DaanWeggemans take a broad look at the process
timeline—from the time of Breivik’s arrest to his sentencing—to assess the full impact
of the trial on Norwegian society. Theymoreover carried out an investigation and
inquiry during the Oslo trial and developed a methodology for assessing the quality
of the trial in terms of closure or rupture for the different audiences involved and
present in and around the courtroom.
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In the conclusion, De Graaf will expand further on the insights drawn from these
and other trials and propose a tentative typology of terrorism trials based on the two
concepts of performativity and lawfare introduced briefly above, in order to prepare
the ground for further research.
At the very end of the volume there is an extensive bibliography on terrorist
trials and political justice which was prepared by Jaclyn Peterson, assisted by Susanne
Keesman, Hannah Joosse, Jorrit Steehouder, Mike Spaans, Alex Schmid and Daan
Weggemans.
Finally, the editors would like to thank the following persons: Susanne, Hannah
and Jorrit for their crucial assistance and tireless dedication in the final stage of this
project, and John Kok with his—as always—sound, swift and sensible editing. We
would also like to express explicit words of gratitude to the Netherlands Institute for
Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (nias) and its two consecutive
rectores, Wim Blockmans and Aafke Hulk, in Wassenaar for making this study possible.
The editors and some of the contributors to this volume were invited to spend time
at nias to conduct their research on terrorism trials in its wholesome halls. Leiden
University Press/Chicago University Press, as represented by AnniekMeinders and
Romy Uijen, similarly deserve our thanks for their interest in this project and their
dedication in publishing such a voluminous manuscript.
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2. Terrorism, Political Crime and Political Justice
Alex P. Schmid
Any trial is a contest of dueling frames of reference, of alternate explanations.
J. Post.1
2.1. Introduction
In the wake of the killing of Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, on 2May 2011,
there has beenmuch talk on the subject of ‘bringing terrorists to justice’. Yet such talk
generally does not refer to bringing the alleged terrorists to a trial in court.2 Debate
over the last decade has ranged between those who favour a criminal justice approach
to terrorism—based mainly on the use of the police and the judiciary—and those
who favour a military warfare approach. On the whole, and certainly in the United
States, the proponents of amilitary approach have dominated the field, even following
a change of government in the United States in 2008. Attempts to try terrorists in
civilian courts have oftenmet resistance from thosewhowould prefermilitary ‘justice’
or trial by amilitary commission. Underlying this debate is an uncertainty about
whether terrorists should be treated as (political) criminals or as (enemy) combatants.
In this chapter, I will address some conceptual issues on the subject of terrorism and
justice, focusing in particular on the issue of extradition when a perpetrator is to be
brought to trial frombeyond national borders, and politics enters legal considerations.
The post-Cold War process of globalisation has allowed terrorists to expand
the scope of their operations internationally, but justice is still largely a national
prerogative. The only existing international terrorist court, the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon in The Hague, still has to adhere to Lebanese national law.3 The Lockerbie
trial (2000–2001), held in the Netherlands, was conducted under Scottish national law.
This illustrates that justice basically remains linked to national political communities,
and is subject to national sovereignty. Terrorists, on the other hand, have traditionally
breached national sovereignty and crossed international borders.
Terrorist trials are often considered ‘political’. There is a widespread implicit
assumption that a ‘political trial’ also amounts to ‘political justice’, i.e. that such
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trials are partisan, like some trials held by victorious powers at the end of a war.
In this chapter, I will examine the notions of ‘terrorism’ and ‘crime’, and what we
actually mean when we call a crime or a trial ‘political’. I will also explore the notion
of ‘justice’ and its dark twin brother ‘revenge’. On closer inspection, all of these terms
are ambiguous.
2.2. Political Crime and the Political Offence Exception
Perhaps the least controversial of these concepts would seem to be the concept of
‘crime’. Yet even the notion of what is considered a crime varies greatly across time
and cultural space, as the laws that define an offence vary, and as what is and what is
not consideredmoral and legitimate varies. Crimes are often interpreted in terms
of a conflict between a ‘bad’ individual and a ‘good’ society—with the government
standing between the parties as the representative of society, bringing to trial those
who violate its norms.4 The state has the prerogative to proscribe an act against
persons or property it deems dangerous or merely undesirable, therebymaking it a
crime. Many prohibited acts are, however, ‘victimless’, like some traffic offences or
violations of migration law; these are crimesmerely because the state has declared
them to be punishable offences. They are defined as ‘wrong’ mainly or exclusively
because they are prohibited (mala prohibita). However, some criminal offences are so
harmful and serious that they are considered wrong in all civilised societies. They are
not just legally prohibited but also consideredmorally ‘evil’ (mala in se). In particular,
this applies to ‘murder’—the premeditated, unprovoked killing of a human being.
Inmurder cases, legal systems therefore tend to consider not only the criminal act
(actus reus), but also the guilty mindset (mens rea), the underlying intention of the
perpetrator.5
National courts deal with all sorts of crimes, while international criminal courts
most often deal with serious war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity. These
crime categories (and others like piracy and slavery) are acknowledged and defined in
international and humanitarian law; there is widespread transnational consensus as
to what these entail. But when offenders operate outside the context of inter-state war
and claim to have acted for ideological or religious reasons, our ability to distinguish
between political offences and criminal offences often becomes blurred.
How should we distinguish a ‘common crime’ from a ‘political crime’? The latter
can be considered either more or less serious than the former, depending partly on
where the crime takes place, and who claims jurisdiction over it. Political offenders
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often claim that the political nature of their deeds somehow decriminalises even
violent acts. However, state officials who are on the receiving end often consider
political crimes to be more serious than common crimes, even in cases where there
is equivalence in terms of the victimisation resulting from a crime. The grey area
between criminal and political offences is to some degree expressed in the following
typology developed by Lee Ellis and AnthonyWalsh.
Non-political crime: 1. Murder forcible rape, assault, kidnapping, robbery
2. Theft, burglary, fraud, vandalism, arson, shoplifting
3. Negligent manslaughter, driving while intoxicated
Quasi-political crime: 1. Violent rioting and pillaging
2. Destroying public property
3. Tax evasion, counterfeiting
4. Desertion of the armed forces, incitement to riot
Political crime: 1. Assassination political hostage-taking
2. Sabotage, desecration of national symbols
3. Advocating the violent overthrow of the government,
treason
Table 2.1. Typology of crime (adapted from Lee Ellis and AnthonyWalsh)6
This typology of crime, however, leaves no room for crimes typically performed by
governments, e.g. crimes ranging from illegal police operations and gross human
rights violations to ethnic cleansing and genocide.7 Nor does it explain the difference
between amurder and an assassination. The laws that outlaw these three types of
offences have, at least in representative democracies, been made or confirmed by
parliaments. In other words, political forces have been at the cradle of the creation of
most criminal statutes.8 In this sense,most crimes are ‘political’. Yet the term ‘political’
can mean so many things—e.g. non-private, public, of collective interest—that it is
difficult to nail down. Otto Kirchheimer’s perceptive reflections help to illustrate the
ambiguity of the term:
There are no universally valid criteria for what constitutes political action as distinct
from other types of social action. Something is called political if it is thought to relate
26 | alex p. schmid
in a particularly intensive way to the interests of the community. According to its own
estimate of its needs (which does not always coincide with its ‘objective’ needs), each
dominant group, class, or individual will develop criteria by which reprehensible acts,
when grave enough, will necessitate public action. Correspondingly, infinite numbers
of ‘political’ things might in the course of time enter, leave and re-enter the sphere of
formalized public reaction.9
At least when it comes to domestic crimes (i.e. crimes on the territory of one state),
most governments are reluctant to allow that domestic offences could be ‘political’
crimes. Former British PrimeMinister, Margret Thatcher, for instance, abolished
privileges such as wearing personal clothing for Provisional Irish Republican Army
(ira) prisoners in the 1970s, thereby portraying these militant nationalists as common
criminals. This motivated ira prisoners to engage in hunger strikes and ‘blanket’
protests. Thatcher’s move was in fact no break with British legal tradition. When
it comes to domestic crime, Anglo-American law does not recognise such crime as
‘political crime’ and, while it is prepared to consider the ‘intent’ behind a crime, it
does not recognise ‘motive’ as bearing on guilt.10
Acts of lethal violence against human beings can be viewed and judged differently,
depending on the frameworks used. This is most obvious when the perspective
switches from a crime model to a war model. In inter-state war, most (though not all)
acts of killing are viewed not as ‘murder’ but as legitimate acts of warfare. Those who
kill in war, and do so courageously and successfully when ordered to by the state,
can be rewarded withmedals and promotion. However in peacetime the situation
is altogether different. A decorated war veteran who comes home and continues
to do to fellow citizens what he is good at—killing people—becomes a ‘murderer’
again, andmay even receive the death penalty. Such a killing by the state, in turn, is
framed differently again; what would otherwise be murder becomes a legal ‘judicial
execution’.
One way of exploring the notion of ‘political crime’ is to look at it through the
lens of extradition practices between states in cases where killings and assassinations
are committed by individuals against citizens or political and religious leaders.11 If
the perpetrator of such a killing is a citizen from another state and staying on the
territory of a host country, a situation arises where one state might ask the other to
bring him (or her) to trial or to extradite the person suspected to be the offender.
However, such extradition requests are often refused for a variety of reasons when it
comes to political (and some other) offenders, because:
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– The suspect has dual citizenship, i.e. he/she is also national of the state fromwhich
extradition is requested;
– The crimemay be a crime in one country but not in the other;
– The person sought may be unlikely to get a fair trial in the requesting country;
– The person sought may be subjected to torture in the requesting country;
– The death penalty may exist in the requesting country but not in the country
fromwhich extradition is requested.
Hesitancy to grant extradition requests for some forms of crimes makes it clear
that while states are very reluctant to accept the category of ‘political crime’ for
offences committed on their own territory, they will more readily distinguish between
‘common’ and ‘political’ crimes when it comes to foreign offenders who flee to their
territory. There is greater consensus about what is a crime when it comes to war
crimes and crimes against humanity. Because such crimes tend to affect also the
peace and security of other states, the perpetrators can, in principle, be tried by any
state—irrespective of the perpetrators’ nationality or the location of the crime scene.
However transnational terrorism is not yet subject to such universal jurisdiction and
it is also not yet part of customary international law.12
Extradition is defined as ‘the surrender by one State, at the request of another,
of a person who is accused or has been accused of a crime committed within the
jurisdiction of the requesting State’.13 Most extradition treaties contain a ‘political
offence exception’ and attempts to limit or abolish such exceptions have been only
partly successful (for instance until quite recently, ira terrorists sought by Great
Britain were generally not extradited to Britain by the United States).14 The Council of
Europe tried to ‘depoliticise’ certain crimes (such as hijacking, bombing and hostage-
taking) in the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism in 1977. However,
the Council did not abolish the political offence exception itself. Nor did it define
what exactly a ‘political offence’ is. Member states therefore still have some discretion
to decide what they wish to consider a ‘political offence’,15 despite the introduction of
the European Arrest Warrant (2004) which recognises no political offence exception.16
Nevertheless, even after 2004, France, for instance, continued to refuse extradition of
fugitive Italian Red Brigade members.
This erratic use of the political offence exception can be better understood in
the light of the historical experiences of European states. In the 1830s and in the
decades thereafter, this exception was introduced by liberal democracies mainly
because they felt that individuals have a right to rebel against an unjust govern-
ment ruling through an undemocratic, autocratic regime.17 There was widespread
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agreement that people who had fought for a liberal democracy should not be ex-
tradited for justifiable acts of political rebellion—even when these acts could be
considered criminal in other contexts. Some states wanted tomaintain neutrality
in political conflicts affecting neighbouring states where they considered a revo-
lution was long overdue.18 Rather than extradition, many political offenders were
granted asylum by host countries. However the nagging question remained: where
to draw the line between a ‘pure’—that is largely victimless—political offence like
sedition, treason or espionage, and offences which included elements of violent
crime, but were perpetrated to promote a political cause. An offence like the killing
of a government official during an unsuccessful insurrection, leading to the per-
petrator escaping to a neighbouring country, has generally been judged differently
from an offence in which the link to a political goal was less direct.19 Offences in-
volving the assassination of a head of state (and family members), whether the
rulers were autocrats or democrats, have never been taken lightly by states con-
sidering extradition requests. The Belgian parliament in the 1850s introduced an
‘attentat clause’,20 which excluded the political offence exception for such seri-
ous crimes. Attentat clauses became quite common in extradition treaties after the
1850s.21
In the course of the 19th and 20th centuries a number of principleswere established
to determine how to evaluate a crime as a ‘political offence exception’.22 The points of
importance to be considered have been summarised in the Norgaard Principles,23
(named after the former Danish president of the European Commission of Human
Rights):
– Themotive of the offender (whether it was personal or political);
– The circumstances in which the act is committed (whether it was committed
during an uprising or not);
– The legal and factual nature of the act, including its gravity;
– The political objective of the act: at whom it was directed (against government
agents, property, or ordinary citizens);
– Whether it was committed following an order from a group of which the actor
was a member;
– The relationship between the offence and the political motive—specifically, the
proximity of the relationship and its proportionality.24
Despite theguidanceprovidedby these principles,manyoffendershavemixedmotives.
It is often difficult to draw a line between an offender who acts for private (selfish/
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profit) motives and one who is a convictional criminal (who acts on the basis of
altruistic motives or for ideological and political, collective ends).25
In recent years, there has been a clear trend towards reducing the definitional
scope of political offence exceptions for violent acts in political struggles, espe-
cially when it comes to terrorist offences. However a number of regional anti-
terrorism conventions still contain exception clauses for fighters engaged in armed
struggles for self-determination or national liberation. Where armed struggles
for national liberation are conducted in accordance with the principles of inter-
national law, and in particular international humanitarian law, this is, in the-
ory, less problematic.26 Nevertheless while certain types of political violence by
non-state actors are sometimes permissible under the laws of war (and/or can be
morally justifiable and considered by many as legitimate), certain other acts of
violence carried out by members of national liberation movements are not con-
sidered legal in terms of international law.27 An offence committed in the name of
self-determination, or in the name of a religion like Islam, or for some other po-
litical cause, may constitute a (war) crime depending on context, targets, method
and actors involved. References to ‘freedom fighters’ and ‘liberation struggles’ have
complicated the process of international legal cooperation. For instance, attempts
by the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (oic) to exempt Palestinians (fighting
Israel) and Kashmiris (fighting India) from being subject to anti-terrorist con-
ventions28 have inhibited reaching a consensus on a universal Comprehensive
Convention on International Terrorism in the United Nations General Assem-
bly.
Before we turn to the issues of political trial and political justice, it is important to
look at the concept of terrorism as discussed in the framework of the United Nations.
2.3. The Definition of ‘Terrorism’
The AdHoc Committee on Terrorism, a sub-committee of the Sixth (Legal) Committee
of theUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly, hasbeenattempting todraft aComprehensive
Convention on International Terrorism for more than a decade. The draft Article 2 of
that incomplete Convention focuses on the definition of terrorism, and characterises
‘terrorism’ in these terms:
Any person commits an offence within themeaning of this [the present] Convention
if that person, by anymeans, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:
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(a) Death or serious injury to any person; or
(b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a
State or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure
facility or to the environment; or
(c) Damage to property, places, facilities or systems referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of
this [the present] article, resulting or likely to result inmajor economic loss; when
the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population,
or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from
doing any act.29
This proposed draft definition of terrorism avoids the word ‘political’. The drafters,
representing a club of states, alsomake no reference to state terrorism (though this
issue is indirectly discussed in draft Article 18 which, like Article 2, is also subject
to continuing debate). Rather, the draft definition refers to ‘any person’ both as
perpetrator and as potential victim (and includes some attacks on property as falling
under terrorism). The ‘any person’ as victim could cover military personnel as well.
And the ‘any act’ at the end of sub-paragraph (c) opens the door to even wider
interpretations.
Recent developments, like the emergence of suicide bombings against civilians as
amajor new form of terrorism, are not reflected in this definition. The communicative
and performative aspect of terrorism (‘propaganda by the deed’—a concept that has
been developing since it was first invented in the second half of the 19th century),30 is
not reflected in any way in this un draft definition. This means the un definition, if
it ever passes the drafting stage, is likely to be obsolete and out of touch with reality
before it ever comes into force. To understand that, we only have to compare the above
draft definition to recent developments in terrorism:
– The intense and extensive use of new communication technologies;
– Weak and failed states operating as safe havens;
– The globalisation of terrorism aided by diaspora bridgeheads;
– Kamikaze-type suicide attacks;
– The expansion of targets considered licit (children, tourists, the Red Cross and
other ngos, the un);
– Attempts to engage in catastrophic terrorism (including Weapons of Mass
Destruction);
– Pronounced religious fanaticism.
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None of these aspects of terrorism are in any way reflected in the un draft
definition. This definition, with its broad vagueness—‘any person’, ‘any act’—lacks the
precision, objectivity and certainty required to make laws unequivocal (if it remains
unchanged in the final document presented to the General Assembly).31
I worked formerly for the United Nations, and before I joined the un full-time, I
acted as a consultant to the secretariat of the un Crime Commission. Back in 1992,
I was asked to look into the definition of terrorism issue. At that time I proposed
cutting through the Gordian knot of the definition issue by taking an existing,
generally accepted definition and extending its reach. I suggested that we take the
definition of ‘war crimes’ and extend it to analogue crimes committed in times of
peace and outside zones of conflict, so that ‘acts of terrorism’ could be simply defined
as ‘peacetime equivalents of war crimes’. When that proposal was unsuccessful with
the members of the international community (only one country, India, accepted it), I
turned to academia and attempted to create greater consensus at least in the world
of universities. The latest result of this effort is the Revised Academic Consensus
Definition of Terrorism (2011):
Terrorism refers on the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a
special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence, and on the other
hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action
without legal or moral restraints, targetingmainly civilians and non-combatants,
performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and
conflict parties. Terrorism as a tactic is employed in three main contexts: (i) to enforce
illegal state repression; (ii) as propagandistic agitation by non-state actors in times of
peace or outside zones of conflict; (iii) as an illicit tactic of irregular warfare employed
by state- and non-state actors.32
Unfortunately, this Academic Consensus Definition differs markedly from the draft
definition produced by the AdHoc Committee on Terrorism. The ‘academic consensus’
is also aspirational rather than fully realised. A related problem is that social and
political scientists still disagree on the delineation of ‘terrorism’ from other forms
of ‘political violence’. Some scholars limit political violence to violent events short
of war, while others do not.33 Some equate ‘political violence’ and ‘political terrorism’,
creating more confusion. Ted Hondrich, for instance, makes no distinction between
the two, including both in his definition of ‘violence with a political and social
intention’:
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Whether or not intended to put people in general in fear, and raising a question of its
moral justification—either illegal violence within a society or smaller-scale violence
than war between states or societies and not according to international law.34
In reality, there are many other forms of political violence short of war that are quite
different from terrorism as practised currently by armed civilians against defenceless
civilians for the purpose of intimidating, coercing or otherwise influencing other
conflict parties and audiences. To give a few examples of political violence (not all of
them are also political crimes) other than terrorism:
– Hunger strike/self-burning (political suicide)
– Blockade/public property damage/sabotage
– Hate crimes/lynching
– Violent demonstrations/mob violence/rioting
– Brigandry/warlordism
– Raids, razzia, pillage /pogroms
– Torture/mutilation/mass rape
– Tyrannicide
– Extra-judicial execution/massacre
– Ethnic cleansing/mass eviction, purge
– Guerrilla warfare/partisan warfare
– Subversion, intervention
– Revolt, coup d’ état rebellion, uprising, insurgency, revolution.35
Whether political violence is used offensively or defensively, as a means of provocation
or as a weapon of last resort, whether it is used against armed opponents or against de-
fenceless people—these are all important moral distinctions that bear on themorality,
legality and criminality of the act anddeterminewhether it is perceived as legitimate or
unjustified.We should distinguish terrorism from other forms of illegitimate political
violence—some, like genocide, worse than terrorism, and others, like tyrannicide, less
grave—though still criminal. On the other hand, we must acknowledge that there are
certain forms of violent resistance to political oppression that are legitimate; to some
extent these are already acknowledged in international humanitarian law. Terrorism
ought to be considered unacceptable behaviour when it takes the form of violence
without legal andmoral restraints—violence that does not recognise and respect the
existence of protected persons like unarmed non-combatants and defenceless civilians.
Such unacceptable behaviour should be criminalised whether it occurs in wartime
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or peacetime, in zones of armed conflict or outside them, whether performed by state-
or non-state actors and whether performed within or outside national jurisdictions.
While motive (as opposed to intent) should play no role in a legal definition of
terrorism, the Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism cited earlier includes a
causal element as a driving force—the terrorists’ belief in the effectiveness of their
tactic. If terrorism did not ‘work’ on one level or the other, terrorists would presumably
not engage in terrorism. However, since terrorists are no more rational than anyone
else, they may engage in it despite the fact that, in a strategic sense, terrorism is more
often than not counter-productive.36 The fact that acts of terrorism often have a large
impact does not mean that they are ‘effective’ in achieving the stated political goals
(national liberation, a caliphate, etc.). An act of terrorismmay satisfy the terrorists’
less-than-rational desire for ‘revenge’—vengeance to which they usually give the
muchmore acceptable label of ‘justice’. Revenge, inmy view, is an altogether under-
estimated cause of terrorism and probably also of much of counter-terrorism. Let us
have a closer look at it.
2.4. Revenge and Justice
When President Bush declared a Global War on Terror and pursued Al Qaeda and
the Taliban in Afghanistan from late 2001, this intervention was originally named
‘Operation Infinite Justice’.37 Later, when the President was told that ‘Infinite Justice’
is also a description of God in a certain religion, he had the intervention rebranded as
‘Operation Enduring Freedom—Afghanistan (oef-a)’.
The ‘justice’ label is one which—like the ‘freedom’ label in ‘freedom fighters’—has
widespread intuitive appeal. Unsurprisingly, terrorists too are all for ‘justice’. A close
associate of Bin Laden, the Egyptian Saif al-Adel, carried the nom de guerre ‘sword of jus-
tice’.38 History books also tell us that during the terror phase of the French Revolution
(1793–1794), the guillotine was labelled the ‘sword of justice’. Robespierre, the father of
modern state terrorism, directly equated ‘terror’ with ‘justice’, claiming that ‘Terror
is nothing else than justice, prompt, secure and inflexible; it is therefore an outflow
of virtue.’39 Other terrorists followed him in this understanding: Osama Bin Laden
declared in October 2004 that ‘We have been fighting you because we are freemenwho
do not remain silent in the face of injustice.’40 Shamil Basayev, the Chechen warlord,
claimed in 2005 ‘I have always fought for justice and justice has beenmy only goal.’41
Injustice—real or imagined—is widely seen as one of themost important social
causes of rebellion, whether it is a terrorist revolt by a self-appointed vanguard or a
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more broadly based popular insurrection.42 To give an example: after the attacks of
9/11, Bin Laden declared that he did not care if his life ended because his ‘work was
done’, namely, having ‘awokenMuslims around the world to the injustices imposed
upon them by the West and Israel’.43
The justice narrative resonates strongly with people who have been wronged
and crave revenge, but who label it justice because that word is more acceptable
than vengeance.44 From her study of the writings and pronouncements of terrorists,
Louise Richardson contends that the revenge motive figures very prominently in the
thinking of terrorists: ‘The most powerful theme in any conversation with terrorists
past or present, leader or follower, religious or secular, left wing or right wing, male or
female, young or old, is revenge.’45
‘Revenge’ can be interpreted as ‘primitive justice’, an archaic form of retribution
where the victim or his family or clan takes the law in their own hands and inflicts
punishment on those considered guilty of having wronged, injured or killed one of its
members. This desire to make someone pay for a transgression often manifests as an
obsessive urge to rectify a grievance at all costs. Passionate impulses that result in
revenge can be socially destructive, as a prolonged vendetta culture can break down
the fabric of society.
‘Revenge’ has figured as a major theme in world history and literature. Cervantes’
Don Quixote, for example, claimed that his mission was none other than that of
helping those who cannot help themselves, avenging those who have beenwronged.46
Some terrorist groups have defined themselves as vicarious defenders of a constituency
that cannot defend itself, ‘adopting’ a constituency and fighting on its behalf without
a clear mandate from those concerned. Bin Laden, for instance, repeatedly reiterated
the issue of Palestinian rights—but bothHamas and Al Fattah have rejected Al Qaeda’s
right to speak and act on their behalf.
Revenge can be seen as ‘wild justice’; an alternative system of self-help justice,
based on the archaic revenge framework. Nachman Ben-Yehuda’s analysis of Jewish
terrorists in the 1940s concluded that
… underlying vengeance is a very strongmoral character, guided by a simple principle
of justice that stipulates that symmetrymust be restored to what is perceived to be
an unbalanced situation. […] Political assassination, as a particular rhetorical device,
is invoked as a claim to explain and justify acts that the assassins want to project as
a case of ‘justice’ in situations where they felt that they could not get a fair justice
because of the opportunities for such ‘justice’ were felt to be blocked …47
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Uncomfortable as this thought may be, at least some of the violence of contempo-
rary terroristsmaybeunderstood as a formof ‘rough justice’. There are even similarities
between state courts and what some terrorists do in their kangaroo courts—courts
improperly constituted and illegal by the prevailing law. While an official state court,
especially one with a jury, is widely seen as acting on behalf of society, the kangaroo
court of the terrorist also professes to act on behalf of its constituency, for example:
– Some terrorist groups have guidelines for conducting trials within their own
ranks (the ‘Green Book’ of the ira) comparable to procedural codes for trials in
civil society;
– Terrorist deeds are oftenmeant to punish, e.g. ‘enemies of the people’;
– Terrorists seek to ‘justify’ their violence by referring to their ideological or religious
code, while civil courts refer to a documented legal code;
– Terrorist punishment is sometimes performed in public or delivered as ‘revolu-
tionary justice’ and documented on video.
Themost significant difference between a legally established court and a terrorist
kangaroo court is that in the latter the roles of prosecutor, judge, jury and executioner
are often combined. In addition, the verdict is generally executed immediately—giving
the defence not a semblance of the ‘equality of arms’—a balance that would give the
defendant at least the ‘fighting chance’ of a meaningful possibility of defence.
Terrorists have a different perception of justice, one that also includes ‘might is
right’. Historically, there have been a number of different bases of conceptualisations
of justice. Aristoteles (384–322bc), for instance, considered justice to be a personal
virtue like prudence or fortitude. Others use a sacred text as the basis for justice (as
do contemporary adherents to Sharia law). Some others equate justice simply with
conformity to the current existing law. As one legal scholar has put it: ‘Legal justice is
justice according to law. It is not about the justice of the law.’48 Democratic societies,
however, tend to link justice to the equity principle to make the law ‘fair’.
While terrorists and non-terrorists can agree that ‘justice’ is something positive,
unfortunately no agreement can be reached on which particular conceptualisation of
justice is just. ‘Justice has no universally valid definition’, lawyer Suri Ratnapala has
observed.49 His pronouncement is echoed in the social sciences: ‘There does not appear
to be universal consensus on what is considered to be just or unjust’, L. Montada
concludes in the International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences.50 When
determinations of justice are based on different foundations, a clash between different
notions of justices is a stark possibility. This is especially true where groups who claim
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to adhere to ‘divine law’ oppose more secular groups adhering to man-made laws
rather than the authority of religious scholars claiming to speak in the name of a
supreme being.
Aristotle posed a crucial question when he asked whether it is ‘more advantageous
to be ruled by the best man or by the best laws’.51 Over time, the latter option has
evolved into the concept of the Rule of Law. Most interpret the changing concept of
justice—from privately delivered revenge or subject to the arbitrary decisions of a
power-holder, to justice carried out by representatives of the community under the
Rule of Law—in terms of human progress. As the International Commission of Jurists
explains it, ‘The rule of law is more than the formal use of legal instruments, it is
also the rule of justice and of protection for all members of society against excessive
governmental power.’52 The Rule of Law, rather than rule by the personal preference
of an arbitrary ruler, or rule by brute force, generally includes these agreed principles:
– Supremacy of the law: all persons are subject to the law (including those holding
state power, who are also bound by a common law or constitution);
– The principle of habeas corpus: arbitrary or preventive detention is prohibited;
– Separation of powers: parliament exercises legislative power; there are restrictions
on the exercise of power by the executive;
– State protection for all: nobody should be above the law, nobody should be outside
the protection of the law;
– The principle of proportionality: only minimum force should be used to stop
law-breakers; punishment must be relative to the seriousness of the offence;
– Judicial independence: an independent and impartial judiciary, and no ‘special
courts’.53
It is the last of these core principles of the Rule of law that is often challenged in
terrorist court cases. Political offenders have often been tried in ‘special courts’—
e.g. Diplock courts with no jury, or military tribunals. This raises another issue for
discussion: whether terrorists should be tried by regular courts.
2.5. Terrorism and Fair Trial
Since in liberal democraticWestern legal systems, all citizens (and inmany regards also
denizens) are equal before the law, people accused of terrorism should, in principle,
have the same rights to a fair trial as others accused of a crime. Extensive fair trial
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guarantees are provided by human rights instruments such as those found in Article 14
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and in other un and
regional instruments. These cover, inter alia, these elements:
– The right to trial by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal;
– The right to defend oneself in person or through counsel;
– The right to be brought promptly before a judge or other judicial officer;
– The right to challenge the lawfulness of detention;
– The right to be tried without undue delay;
– The right to humane conditions of detention and freedom from torture;
– Exclusion of evidence elicited as a result of torture or other compulsion;
– The right to a public hearing;
– The right not to be compelled to testify or confess guilt;
– The right to call and examine witnesses;
– The right to appeal.54
Most of these rights are non-derogable—that is, even in armed conflict and in the face
of severe peacetime attacks from terrorists, they cannot be waived.55
While democratic societies based on the ‘one person-one vote’ principle continue
tomanifest great social and economic inequalities, they nevertheless maintain that
all persons are entitled to fair and equal treatment before the law. As a consequence,
fair trial rights are in principle extended even tomembers of terrorist organisations
who do not themselves respect the human rights of their adversaries.
Many terrorists who do not recognise the legitimacy of Western judicial systems
nevertheless try to use the procedural rules of such judicial systems not just to their
own advantage, but also to bring harm to others. Conversations between a defendant
and the defence lawyer, for example, are considered confidential to ensure that a proper
defence can be conducted, yet the instruments and safeguards of the legal system can
be turned against it. There have been cases of collusion where the defence lawyers for
terrorists have become de facto accomplices, smugglingmessages out of prison for
them, or smuggling weapons into prison—with often lethal consequences.56 Defence
lawyers have also successfully appealed to the European Court of Human Rights to
overturn British court rulings against Irish terrorists who chose not to respect human
rights. A number of problems arise in this context.
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2.6. Terrorist Confrontations with the Judicial System
Terrorismhas been characterised as an asymmetricmode of conflict waging. Terrorists
know the location of their adversaries, while their own location is generally not
known. Terrorists do not observe the humanitarian rules of warfare; their adversaries
generally do. Terrorists ignore human rights but expect adversaries to adhere to them.
What are the consequences when the democratic state respects the Rule of Law and the
terrorist does not? If the conflict parties belong to different moral communities and
play by different rules we are faced with the serious problem that there is no common
ground between a judge and the accused, and that the outcome of a trial will not
settle the case. Human rights lawyer Geoffrey Robertson has asked: ‘How do you give
fair trial to a person who does not accept your right to try him?’57 Paradoxically, while
a sentencemay not be considered ‘fair’ by the defendant, the outcome of a trial (for
example, punishment by the death penalty) may be welcomed by him or her when
operating under an entirely different value system, one in which he or she may desire
nothingmore than to become amartyr. On a certain reading of Islam,martyrdom
may offer ‘a direct passport to paradise’.58
There may be problems even before the terrorist is brought to trial. The basic legal
principle aut dedere aut judicare (extradite them or bring them to trial where they are)
may not work for certain terrorists. A community hiding a terrorist suspect to protect
him or her is unlikely to extradite the terrorist. After the attacks of 11 September 2011,
the United States demanded that the Taliban, as de facto ruler ofmuch of Afghanistan,
extradite Osama Bin Laden. But Taliban rulers insisted that Osama Bin Laden could be
tried only by a group of Islamic clerics committed to Sharia law.59
Terrorists have sought various other ways to attack the official justice systems of
their adversaries. In early 2011, Greek terrorists claimed responsibility for a powerful
explosion that damaged a court building in central Athens. They also threatened
to target the individual judges presiding at the court over the trial of 134 suspected
members of the ‘Conspiracy of the Cells of Fire’ organisation.60 Other terrorists have
threatened prosecutors with retaliation.61 In November 1985 insurgents from the
m-19 group in Colombia seized the Palace of Justice in Bogota, taking hostages. Over 70
peoplewere killed in the ensuing fire andgunbattle.62 InPakistan, courts regularly face
the situation that witnesses recant earlier inculpating statements, fearing retribution
by associates of the accused.63 In Northern Ireland in the 1970s, some perverse verdicts
resulted from clearly partisan juries. In other cases jurors were intimidated by
defendants and their associates outside the courtroom. As a consequence, the so-called
Diplock courts were established, with the jury replaced by judges.64
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2.7. Political Trials
The court trial system is under attack not only by terrorists or—as in the case of the
Stammheim trial (see case study in this volume)—by some of their defence lawyers.
Under pressure from public opinion, from another state, or from the executive branch
of government, attempts to bend the course of justice through unfair or illegal
practices have repeatedly beenmade.
These practices may include the accused being denied access to a defence lawyer
in a timely manner, or state prosecutors presenting unreliable or false confessions
produced under intense police pressure, or forensic evidence against the accused being
fabricated. In some cases, evidence exculpating those accused of a terrorist crime
has been withheld from the court. Sometimes the accused have been presented to
the jury in a prejudicial manner likely to influence them unduly.65 Errors of justice
based on such techniques have led to the conviction of innocent people as terrorist
criminals.66 Clive Walker has created a typology of miscarriages of justice, He explains
that these occur when defendants’ or suspects’ human rights are breached, ‘because
of
1. Deficient processes or,
2. The laws which are applied to them, or
3. Because there is no factual justification for the applied treatment or punishment;
4. Whenever suspects or defendant or convicts are treated adversely by the State to
a disproportionate extent in comparison with the need to protect the rights of
others;
5. Whenever the rights of others are not effectively or proportionately protected or
vindicated by State action against wrongdoers, or
6. By State law itself ’.67
Miscarriages of justice are not confined to political trials of course, but such trials are
probablymore prone to them. Yet it is possible for a political trial to take place without
violations of the Rule of law. It is a profoundmisunderstanding that a political trial
will, by definition, result in political justice.68 This perceptionhas arisen becausemany
political trials that stand out in collective historical memory were associated with
political, i.e. partisan justice. The perception is reflected in the classical definition of a
political trial elaborated half a century ago by Otto Kirchheimer, in his seminal work
Political Justice: The Use of Legal Procedures for Political Ends. Kirchheimer distinguished
three main categories of political trials:
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1. The trial involving a common crime committed for political purposes and
conducted with a view to the political benefits whichmight ultimately accrue
from successful prosecution;
2. The classical political trial: a regime’s attempt to incriminate its foe’s public
behaviour with a view to evicting him from the political scene; and
3. The derivative political trial, where the weapon of defamation, perjury, and
contempt are manipulated in an effort to bring disrepute upon a political foe.69
Kirchheimer recognised that courts are battlegrounds over legitimacy, where the
loyalty of the citizens is the ultimate prize. The narrative that wins over the jury and
gains public support outside the courtroom can indeed influence and sometimes
even shift the political balance of power—at least in high-profile cases. However,
where this battle is fought without ‘equality of arms’ and the defence side has no
‘fighting chance’, a political trial is likely to become the scene of political (parti-
san) justice. Typical circumstances where this is the case have been described by
Kirchheimer:
The aim of political justice is to enlarge the area of political action by enlisting the
services of courts on behalf of political goals. It is characterized by the submission to
court scrutiny of group and individual action. Those instrumental in such submission
seek to strengthen their own position and weaken that of their political foes. […]
If the foes should try to destroy the existing regime, the authority may conclude
that it has no choice but to eliminate them. This necessarily involves recourse to the
courts. In such circumstances the court proceedings will play a number of roles.
First, they will serve as a forum for publicizing the vileness of the challengers.
Second, they will conform and legitimize the power holders’ proposals for disposing
of their opponents. And finally, they might keep the power holders from giving
in to the temptation to utilize the occasion for a wholesale elimination of all
their political foes, even those unconnected with the group constituting the direct
threat.70
The main guarantee to prevent political trials resulting in partisan political justice is
the constitutional protection of the judiciary against encroachments by the executive
branch of government and, to a lesser extent, by the legislative branch of government.
This can be done by special provisions guaranteeing the judiciary’s impartiality and
independence. The importance of this guarantee was recognized in the 18th century
by Charles de Montesquieu, who argued for the separation of governmental powers
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between the judicial, legislative and executive arms to create a system of checks and
balances to prevent abuses of power. As he put it:
There is no liberty, if the judicial power be not separate from the legislative and
executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would
be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would be then the legislator. Were the
judicial power in a state joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with
violence and oppression.71
Terrorists and their defence lawyers are sometimes accused of ‘politicising’ trials, as
are governments. If both sides try to extend the process of seeking ‘justice’ to the court
of public opinion, the question arises: who profits more from ‘politicising’ a trial—the
prosecution or the defence? An American study (surveying hundreds of terrorist trials
over nearly a quarter of a century) came to some counter-intuitive findings:
– Themore politicised the prosecution strategy, the more likely the case will go to
trial and the more likely it will result in acquittal or dismissal;
– Treating terrorist defendants like traditional offenders results in the highest plea
and conviction rates;
– The most explicitly politicised prosecution strategies double the likelihood of
acquittal and dismissal;
– Highly politicised defence strategies are associated with an increase in the
likelihood of conviction72
If we are to believe these findings, the ‘politicisation’ of a trial is counterproductive for
both sides. However in the study cited above, ‘politicised’ is defined in terms of ‘tying
the defendant’s ideological motivation to the elements of the case’.73 In my view, this
is too narrow a definition of the performative manoeuvres engaged in by one or both
sides in the ‘lawfare’ taking place in court in certain terrorist trials.74
Another American study showed that it does not pay to be seen as a ‘terrorist’ when
it comes to sentencing since sentences for similar crimes are consistently harsher in
terrorist cases, as the following table makes clear:
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Average sentence for persons charged with terrorism 19.7 years
Average sentence for persons convicted of terrorism 16 years
Average sentence for persons charged with national security
violations but not terrorism
10.4 years
Average sentence for persons convicted of national security violations
but not terrorism
7.5 years
Average sentence for persons not charged with terrorism or national
security violations
1.2 years
Table 2.2. Severity of sentences for terrorism and other charges (usa) 2001–200975
Does this suggest that because terrorists are treated more harshly than others they
therefore are not getting a fair trial? Not necessarily. Judges and juries not only
assess the quality of the criminal deed (actus reus ‘guilty act’) itself, but also take into
account the underlying intent (mens rea ‘guilty mind’). In the case of terrorism, the
tactical intent of an act of terrorism is often especially reprehensible. It can involve
threatening to kill unarmed civilians to raise ransommoney, provoking the repression
of a sector of society in order to gain new recruits to a terrorist movement from
disgruntled rebelliousmembers of that sector of society, or instilling extreme fear
in a population to induce people to leave a conflict zone (ethnic cleansing). It is this
distinctive immorality which sets terrorism apart from other violent political crimes,
even those with greater numbers of victims. For this reason, harsher sentences are
justified although their deterrent value may not be great. However, they may go
some way in placating feelings of anger among victims and survivors and the general
public—thereby preventing acts of revenge.
2.8. Conclusion
When it comes to the question of how societies and governments should deal with
terrorists, a crucial question is whether the criminal justice approach is the right
one. Some argue that since jihadi terrorists declared ‘war’ onWestern societies, states
responding to terrorism also have to operate within a framework of war. Those taking
this position are often not inclined to allow terrorists their day in court, at least
not in a civilian court, and tend to prefer that captured terrorists be locked up until
the war on terrorism is over (as with prisoners of war). The United States took this
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approach under the Bush administration and largely continued it under the Obama
administration. Yet followingmore than ten years of fighting a global war on terror,
and spending in the process more than one trillion dollars,76 the results of the war
on terror are less than satisfactory. There are more terrorists around than before
as Al Qaeda mutated from a terrorist group to a conglomerate of jihadist groups
and an even broader ideological movement. Deterrence clearly has not worked and
terrorism has not been eradicated. Depending on the level of the terrorist challenge,
both approaches—the criminal justice approach and the military approach—may
indeed be needed side by side. However, given the less than persuasive results of the
military war on terrorism, a reconsideration of the merits of the criminal justice
approach to terrorism is warranted. Despite some apparent weaknesses which we
have highlighted above, the criminal justice approach has considerable benefits, as
Ben Saul has summarised:
Set against the vainhopeof pounding terrorists into oblivion throughwar, the criminal
law offers the promise of restraint: individual rather than collective responsibility;
a presumption of innocence; no detention without charge; proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt; due process; the right to prepare and present an adequate defence;
independent adjudication; and rational and proportionate punishment.77
These are the qualities that set the Rule of law apart from the ‘rule of the jungle’,
where ‘might is right’. Liberal democratic states adhering to these principles will
occupy a moral high ground in the fight against terrorism. Even when terrorists and
their defence lawyers abuse the legal system for tactical victories they do not deserve,
this is a price well worth paying in defence of freedom and justice.
Terrorist trials will almost always be ‘political’ because terrorism is inherently a
form of political violence. That the trials of those accused of terrorism are political
despite the independence and impartiality of the judiciary does not mean that they
are necessarily unfair. To be sure, many terrorist trials have fallen short of the highest
standards of justice—as illustrated in this volume. However, the idea that justice
should apply even to terrorists who deny justice to their opponents is one that makes
the criminal justice approach ultimately superior to other systems of dealing with
‘political crime’, including terrorism. Usedwithwisdom andmoderation, the criminal
justice approach has the potential to break the cycle of revenge actions that feed
terrorism.
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3. The Trial of Vera Zasulich in 18781
Alex P. Schmid
Vera Zasulich’s deed opened a new era of revolutionary terror … it is difficult to
imagine the now decisive turn of populism to terror without the Zasulich case.
Society seemed to say through the court: yes, it is legitimate and necessary to resort to
violence to shake up the autocracy. And the autocracy in turn gave up its last attempts
to appease the intelligentsia and observe its own laws in dealing with sedition.
A.B. Ulam (1977)2
3.1. Introduction
Trials sometimes becomemirrors of their times, providing a glimpse into the state
of a society.3 In the 1870s, Russian society was divided into an educated westernised
class (then called ‘the intelligentsia’—perhaps 20 per cent of the population) and
an illiterate, largely rural majority of 100 million common people, mostly peasants.
While 23 million of them had been released from serfdom in 1861, they were still
burdened by debts to their former owners; less than one third of Russia’s land was
in their hands; for many there was not enough land to make a decent living.4 Russian
government was divided into an autocratic executive (which also controlled the
hand-picked Senate) and a judiciary that was, thanks to the reforms of 1864, based
on democratic procedures.5 By the mid-1870s, Russia also saw the rise of a mass-
circulation press that was becoming commercially independent, less constrained
by censorship, reflecting and shaping public opinion in the capital of St. Peters-
burg.6 In 1877 and early 1878 Russia was at war with Turkey, initially against the
wishes of the Tsar, though the press had pushed him into defending orthodox Chris-
tians in the Balkans who suffered from atrocities by the Ottoman empire. The war
was costly, both in terms of finances and in terms of casualties, but Russia gained
the upper hand and Turkey had to sue for peace in early 1878. Yet the spoils of vic-
tory were largely lost by mid-1878 when the Western powers at the Congress of
Berlin forced Russia to make what many Russians considered humiliating conces-
sions.7
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It was against this general background that the assassination attempt by Vera
Zasulich on 24 January 1878 and her trial on 31 March 1878 took place. The Zasulich
trial has been called ‘themostmomentous trial in the history of imperial Russia’.8
Zasulich’s assassination attempt on the Governor of St. Petersburg and her acquittal
by an independent jury set an example that stimulated the emergence of assassination
as a form of ‘vigilante justice’ serving both as punishment and as ‘propaganda by the
deed’. At the end of a series of assassinations of government officials, on 1 March 1881,
the reformist Tsar Alexander ii was assassinated by the People’s Will (Narodnaya Volya),
a terrorist group led by another woman, Vera Figner. It was a moment when Russian
and European history took a decisive turn in one direction at the end of which stood
the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, the Austrian heir to the throne. This, in 1914,
triggered the First World War which, three years later, would lead to the Russian
Revolution. Indeed, to the extent that the emergence of ‘propaganda by the deed’
type terrorism can be linked to a single person and date, the assassination attempt by
Vera Zasulich on 24 January 1878 would be a good candidate. While her assault on
Governor Fyodor Trepov itself was unsuccessful—the governor survived—her trial
made her, thanks to the attention given to this assassination attempt by themass
media, a celebrity and, in the eyes of those inspired by her, a heroine.
In the District Court of St. Petersburg she and, evenmore so, her defence lawyer
‘out-performed’ the prosecution. On 31 March 1878 the female assassin managed
to gain the sympathy of the 18 jurors in the courtroom, captured the imagination
of the crowd outside and, thanks to the press, touched a chord with much of the
intelligentsia in Russia and beyond. How all this could happen to a shy woman with
no personal charisma, a person who was not very confident of herself, is due to a
confluence of circumstances in the peculiar historical context of the time. Before we
turn to the trial and its judicial, social and political consequences, some historical
background is in order for a better understanding.
3.1.1. What Happened before the Trial
Tsar Alexander ii not only abolished serfdom in Russia in the March 1861, he also
introduced a number of other reforms. Among these were judicial reforms that aimed
to bring the country’s judicial systemmore in line withWest European standards.9
Between 1864 and 1866 a unified court systemwas created formuch of Russia. The
judicial reforms also changed theway criminal trialswere held. An adversarial criminal
justice procedure was introduced, assigning to judges the role of acting as umpires
between the defence and the prosecution. The courtroom became the stage where a
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defence attorney and the state’s prosecutor would confront each other to establish
truth and guilt.10 Judges could, under the new reform scheme, no longer be removed
by the government and verdicts by the courts could not be overturned by the executive.
Professional advocates made their appearance, court hearings were held in public and
juries represented in the first instance civil society and not the government.11 This
judicial reformwas, however, not complete; a system of administrative justice co-
existed with the new system; it allowed police and gendarmes to re-arrest defendants
set free by the courts and exile them to the provinces—often Siberia. In addition,
certain crimes against the state were excluded from the competence of juries by the
new legislation.12Nevertheless, some quasi-political crimes, includingVera Zasulich’s,
were at times dealt with like common crimes.13 The great reforms of 1864 had created
a wave of expectation about further moves towards democratisation of the autocratic
regime. However, after he had survived an assassination attempt in 1866, the reformist
zeal of the Tsar declined sharply. The growing unrest among the educated part of the
youth wasmet by the regime with increased repression and would even lead to the
abrogation of some of the reforms of 1864.14
3.1.2. The Bogoliubov Affair as Cause
An example of this regression could be seen in the repression of a demonstration held
in December 1876 by radical students on the Nevsky Prospect in St. Petersburg. The
demonstration was led by Georgi Plechanov (who was later to become the founder of
the Russian Social-Democratic Party). While it wasmeant as a workers’ demonstration,
most of the 200 to 250 participants were in fact students.15 The police attacked them
within five minutes after the demonstration had begun. A fight developed in which
some constables were roughed up by some of the students. General Fydor Trepov,
Governor and police chief of St. Petersburg, arrived on the scene with his mounted
police to organise the arrests. Among those arrested was a 24-year-old man who had
not even been on the scene; he was picked up in the neighbourhood because one of the
policemen thought he recognised him as one of the students who had just fought
with the police outside the Kazan Cathedral on the Nevsky Prospect. He gave his name
as Arkhip Petrovich Bogoliubov (his real name was Aleksei Stepaniovich Emelianov)
and he had a gun in his pocket.
Bogoliubov was one of the thousands of idealistic narodniki (populist) youth who,
since 1874, had gone ‘to the people’, trying to incite the peasants to revolt against
the owners of the large estates and take their land.16 Many of these narodniki had
already been apprehended by the police in 1874 and 1875, not infrequently after being
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denounced by the very people they wanted to liberate. Many of these populists were
detained for years before they obtained their day in court, where they were charged
with revolutionary propaganda. That was also to be the fate of Bogoliubov; but the
charges brought against him were different. Based on the false testimony of six police
witnesses, he was, in January 1877, sentenced to 20 years’ hard labour.17 He had been
charged with resisting the police in the demonstration before the Kazan Cathedral
and for having made threats to the life of a police aide. It was a tragic case of mistaken
identity. Awaiting transportation to another prison, Bogoliubov was placed in the
House of Preliminary Detention, the country’s newest andmost modern prison in St.
Petersburg.18
Bogoliubov was still there inmid-1877 when General Trepov decided to inspect the
House of Detention, after having heard that discipline there had become a problem.
Trepov was a hardliner, widely known for taking bribes, often brutal but at times
also sentimental.19 Already in 1861, as police chief of Warsaw, he had ordered his
policemen to fire on peaceful Polish demonstrators. After 1866, when the first of some
ten attempts on the life of the Tsar failed, Alexander ii had become almost paranoid
about his personal security. Trepov was made Commandant of the St. Petersburg
police where he arranged for a special police section dedicated to the protection of the
Tsar.20 Everymorning Trepov would report directly to the Tsar about the security
situation. He was also in charge of a police section that was investigating political
crimes.21
Among these political crimes were also the revolutionary activities of the narodniki.
770 of these populists had been arrested in themid-1870s. Some 70 had already died
while in detention awaiting trial due to the unhealthy prison conditions. By October
1877, 193 of those arrested were brought to a trial in which Vladislav Zhelekhovskii
acted as prosecutor. That Trial of the 193 came to an end on 23 January 1878. The
defendants’ impassioned speeches, printed and distributed by the underground press,
stirred emotions among revolutionary students and were sympathetically received
bymuch of the reading public. These, mostly idealistic if somewhat naïve youths
(overwhelmingly the sons and daughters of the nobility, the clergy, burghers and
officials, including even the military) had agitated against the status quo, but most of
them had not engaged in violence themselves. That was ultimately also recognised in
court: the Senate’s court in the end acquitted 153 of the 193 accused andmost of the
rest appeared at first to get off with light sentences.22
As mentioned above, on 13 July 1877 the House of Preliminary Detention was
visited by the Governor of St. Petersburg, General Trepov.23 In the courtyard of the
prison Arkhip Bogoliubov apparently tried to speak to the Governor but was rebuked.
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Later when Trepov passed him again, Bogoliubov failed to tip his cap (something he
had done in the first encounter). Trepov was annoyed by this apparent lack of respect
and hit him so that the cap flew off his head. This was seen as a humiliating blow by
other prisoners who were watching the scene from their cell windows; they began to
shout in protest. Angered by this and Bogoliubov’s apparent insolence, Trepov ordered
that he be flogged with birch rods.
Flogging apolitical prisonerwas, in the viewofRussia’s intelligentia, unacceptable.
It was also widely considered unlawful—a shameful practice from Russia’s bad past.
As a form of punishment, it had been abolished by the reforms of 1863. Yet, there
were certain exceptions e.g. for soldiers and sailor and people who had lost their
civil rights—which included some categories of prisoners. Trepov had, according
to his own account, got permission for this particular act of corporal punishment
from Konstantin I. Pahlen, theMinister of Justice. Tomake a stronger case for the
punishment he also (falsely) claimed that Bogoliubov had given the other prisoners a
sign to riot.24
In the afternoon of 13 July 1877, the acting prison administrator announced that
Bogoliubov would be subjected to ‘birching’ for insubordination, which led to amajor
disturbance among the prisoners. It lasted 24 hours and 100 extra policemen had
to be brought in to quell the riot.25 The Minister of Justice had already approved
the flogging when he heard about the initial rioting. The punishment was, in this
particular case, apparently covered by law since Bogoliubov had lost his civil rights
when the sentence against him (20 years’ hard labour—itself unjust because based on
mistaken identity) had become legally binding on 24 June 1878.26 Bogoliubov was
stripped to his waist and flogged. Rumour had it that he was beaten unconscious but
he actually received only 13 of the 25 approved lashes; these he took bravely. Afterwards
he was moved to the Lithuanian castle, one of the capital’s worst prisons, where
prisoners waiting for deportation to distant labour camps were assembled.27 Trepov,
possibly feeling sorry about the whole affair, later claimed that he had sent tea and
sugar to Bogoliubov’s cell. Due to the selective censorship of the press, what the public
learned about the whole affair was limited; as a consequence rumours exaggerated
both the circumstances and the severity of the flogging. Vera Zasulich had read about
Bogoliubov’s punishment in Golos (The Voice) in late July 1877.28 As a former political
prisoner, she became obsessed by this case and decided that this insult to a political
prisonerwas unacceptable.Without knowing either Trepov or Bogoliubov, she decided
to take revenge.29
Here then we find, in an early manifestation, a familiar chain of events leading to
terrorism: an outsider identifies him- or herself with a victim (or a victimised group)
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incapable of obtaining justice for an alleged or real wrong. He (or she) then decides to
take vicarious revenge on the victim’s behalf—without being appointed by the victim
(group) and without a direct personal grudge against the original wrongdoer. Vera
Zasulich decided to act for Bogoliubov against Trepov in order to appeal with her deed
to a wider public. She had never personally met either of them.
3.2. The Unsuccessful Assassin
Before we proceed further to the terrorist act and the trial, we have to pause here and
look at the personality and the motives of Russia’s first female terrorist.
Like Bogoliubov, Vera Zasulich had been an unjustly condemned political prisoner
herself and that bond contributed to trigger her fateful deed of 24 January 1878. It
was her intent to use the court trial as a platform to bring an act of injustice to the
attention of the public.30 However, beyond that, there were other factors that set her
on the path to assassination.
She was the daughter of Captain Ivan Zasulich, a despotic person who had
been demoted for drunkenness in the army. Vera did not know her father; he died
when she was three years old. Her mother, Feoktista, an impoverished woman
from the lower nobility, could not afford to bring up all five of her children.
Therefore Vera was sent away from home to be raised by wealthier relatives—a
fact she deeply resented. Her education was strict, even when she was sent to a
private boarding school in Moscow: running and laughing were forbidden and
so was the use of Russian. Only German and French could be spoken. The only
employment prospect open to a poor girl like her from the gentry was becoming a
governess, a house teacher, for children of richer families than her own. It was not
something she wanted. Joining the revolutionary movement was a way out—a choice
also made by two of her sisters (the third had died). Vera was quite untypical of a
revolutionary: shy and introverted, often depressive and at times even suicidal.31
Originally very Christian, Vera later lost faith (Vera, in Russian, means ‘faith’) and
became, for a while, a nihilist, which, for her, hadmore to do with liberation than
with destruction—something that Sergei Nechaev had inmind.32 Later she would
write in her memoirs:
But the older I grew, the more I became convinced that I was indeed an alien: I didn’t
belong. No one ever held me, kissed me, or sat me on his knees; no one called me
pet names. The servants abusedme […] And then, the distant specter of revolution
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appeared, making me equal to a boy; I, too, could dream of ‘action’, of ‘exploits’, and of
the ‘great struggle’ […] I too could join those who perished for the great cause of love
[…] I could imagine no greater pleasure than serving the revolution. I had dared only
to dream of it, and yet now he [Sergei Nechaev,] was saying that he wanted to recruit
me.33
Nechaev was the author of the Catechism of a Revolutionary, a nihilist pamphlet
advocating ruthless assassination and shocking terrorism, a breakwith all conventions
andmorals that stood in the way of revolution—the end that justified all means. He
had written in the Catechism:
The Revolutionist is a doomedman. He has no private interests, no affairs, sentiments,
ties, property nor even a name of his own. His entire being is devoured by one purpose,
one thought, one passion—the revolution. Heart and soul, not merely by word but
by deed, he has severed every link with the social order and with the entire civilized
world: with the laws, goodmanners, conventions, andmorality of that world. He is
the merciless enemy and continues to inhabit it with only one purpose—to destroy
it.34
While the majority of the Russian revolutionaries of the 1860s and 1870s were of upper
middle class or noble origin,35 Nechaev was the son of a house painter.36 Through
his charisma, he managed to gain a following among students when he came to St.
Petersburg in 1868. There he set up the secret revolutionary society People’s Revenge
(Narodnaya Rasprava).37 Vera Zasulich was two years younger than Nechaev. In 1867
she had found her first employment in Serpukhov, just outsideMoscow, as a secretary.
Here the future terrorist became an assistant to a Justice of the Peace, an institution
introduced by the Judicial Reforms of 1864. Themain goal of a Justice of the Peace
was, according to the State Council, ‘to satisfy this elemental need of administration
of justice according to conscience’.38 That stress on ‘conscience’ rather thanmerely
‘the law’ was, as it turned out, to become a crucial element in Zasulich’s own trial
in 1878.
Zasulich had met Nechaev in January 1869 and, like her two sisters, fell under his
hypnotic spell. He declared his love for her (as he probably had donewith otherwomen
hewanted to recruit).WhileVeradidnot fall for this ruse ofhisMachiavellian character,
she somehow admired his strong personality and agreed to act as a conduit for letters
he planned to send from Switzerland to Vladimir Orlov, a fellow revolutionary who
could not receive them directly as he was under police surveillance.39 That cost her
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dearly. On 30 April 1869, while leaving for a holiday with her mother, she was arrested.
Without even being interrogated or charged with a crime, she was first put into a
cell in the Lithuanian Castle (a prison outside St. Petersburg) and then in the Peter
and Paul Fortress in St. Petersburg. There had been no court hearing of her case; it
was a routine administrative detention of a suspect. WhenNechaev was extradited
from Switzerland and charged withmurder, she was brought to the trial to serve as
witness. There she admitted to having passed on one of Nechaev’s letters, claiming
not to knowwhat was in it.
After she had spent almost two years in prison, in March 1871, Minister of Justice
K. Pahlen, decided to release her—there was not enough evidence to detain her
further. However, the police had, in such cases, the administrative power to send
suspects against whom there was not enough evidence into exile without a hearing
or trial.40 That was what happened to Vera Zasulich. She was exiled to the town
of Krestsy. Later she was allowed to move to Kharkov to take a midwife’s course
which she finished in 1875. However, due to the stigma of police supervision, she
could not find employment, although police surveillance had finally been lifted later
that year.41 Two years of prison and four years of exile, and the humiliations and
the experience of injustice that accompanied them had scarred Vera; but had not
broken her rebellious character. On the contrary, they turned her into a professional
revolutionary.42 Once free, equipped with false papers, in September 1875 shemoved
to Kiev. There she joined the ‘Southern Rebels’, a Bakuninist43 group of some 20
revolutionaries linked to the populist narodniki. In Kiev she alsometMasha (Maria)
Kolenkina with whom she would, three years later, plot a double assassination in
St. Petersburg.44
During those six years of prison and exile, she had become convinced that social
justice in Russia could only be achieved by the violent transformation of the state.45
She had also developed a keen sense of injustices suffered by others.46 Looking back at
this period, in 1883, five years after the infamous deed that brought her fame, she
reflected on what hadmotivated her:
I was a revolutionary, a Populist and, at the same time, always a great skeptic. The
substantial points of my views of that time in regard to revolution: the ownership of
the products of alien labor, and the authority of man over man are unjust, and hence it
is right to destroy them, [yet] they will reemerge again and there will appear new
destroyers: in no event will it be worse. That the revolutionary intelligentsia perish
protesting injustice seemed tome, at the time, the best outcome and an obligatory
one. […].47
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3.3. The Assassination Attempt on Governor Trepov
By the summer of 1877 Vera Zasulich had joined her mother in St. Petersburg, where
she worked in a printing shop and again became involved in revolutionary activities.
It was here that she learned about the beating of Bogoliubov. The accounts she heard
were exaggerated (e.g. Bogoliubov was not beaten until he lost consciousness, as she
believed). Vera apparently hoped that Governor Trepov would be punished, either
by the government (since the flogging was in the eyes of many illegal) or by the
revolutionaries. While her indignation at Boboliubov’s humiliation was shared by
many, nobody appeared prepared to do something about it. However, in reality she
was not the only one. AlexanderMikhailov, the leader of Land and Freedom (Zemlia I
Volia), a society of revolutionaries linked to the populists, had also decided that the
Governor should be ‘punished’.48 Zasulich was in touch withMikhailov andmust
have heard him discuss some plans. Yet apparently she hadmisunderstood him or,
more likely, he had, in the interest of secrecy, not been open with her about his plan to
make Trepov ‘pay’.49 In fact, among the revolutionaries of Land and Freedom in Kiev
a committee had already been formed; Valerian Osinskii and four comrades were
instructed to go to St. Petersburg and take revenge on Governor Trepov.50 As it later
turned out, there were twomore groups planning to ‘punish’ Fydor Trepov.51
As weeks and months had passed since Boboliubov’s flogging, Vera Zasulich
apparently thought the conspirators she knewhad lost their nerve; she and a girlfriend
of hers decided to act on their own.52 However, both the conspirators from Kiev and
Vera Zasulich and her friendMasha Kolenkina first wanted to await the outcome of
the so-called Trial of the 19353 which had begun in October 1877 and would end on 23
January 1878, one day before Vera Zasulich and her friend planned to act. The two
women had decided not only to shoot Trepov but also Vladislav Zhelikovskii, the
prosecutor of the Trial of the 193 as soon as that trial was over. It was thought that a
revolver with a short barrel of the English bulldog type would be best for the task; a
male friend of Vera acquired one for 21 roubles.54
Zasulich knew how to handle a gun. When with the ‘Southern Rebels’ between
1875 and 1877 and carrying out illegal propaganda among peasants, she had a pistol
and practised how to use it in shooting exercises. However, among those ‘Southern
Rebels’ she had been a marginal figure and, like most other women, was not invited
to participate in some of the more daring actions. Now, in St. Petersburg, Vera and
her comradeMasha decided on a very daring action indeed: two assassinations by
two women on one and the same day. They drew lots for who should kill whom. Vera
was to target Trepov.55 As luck would have it, of the two would-be assassins only one
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succeeded in carrying out their plan. On that fateful day in January 1878, prosecutor
Zhelekhovskii was not at home andMasha could not achieve her part in their plan to
get public attention by a double murder.56 Vera was luckier. Shemade it in time to
Governor Trepov’s residence where she found herself first in line among a dozen or so
petitioners. Under the assumed name of Elizaveta Kozlova she submitted a petition to
the Governor for a certificate of good conduct which she allegedly needed in order to
obtain a diploma enabling her to work as a governess.
While Trepov wrote something in themargin of her petition, she took the revolver
hidden under her cape and managed to fire one shot at the governor. The bullet
hit the Governor on the left side of his buttock where it got stuck in the pelvic
bone. Rather than firing another shot, Zasulich dropped her weapon on the floor,
making no attempt to escape. Asked later for the reason she did not try to flee, she
said: ‘I am a terrorist, not a murderer!’ Trepov whispered: ‘I’m wounded.’ Yet he
did not lose consciousness and would eventually survive this attempt on his life.
When arrested on the spot, Vera Zasulich was calm and polite, even helping the
police inspector, Alexander Kabat, to tie her on a chair in a room next door.57 But she
refused to provide any information beyond giving them her (false) name Elizaveta
Koslova. However, when asked why she had shot the Governor, she simply said ‘for
Bogoliubov’.58
In the meantime, Trepov was given first aid. With the physicians came well-
wishers, including D.A. Miliutin, the Minister of War, and even the Tsar himself.59
However, Alexander ii was not amused when Trepov told him: ‘This bullet might
have been meant for you and I was happy to take it for you.’60 In a memorandum
Trepov dictated while recovering from the shooting, he claimed, however, that he
did not know why he had been shot.61 After her assassination attempt, Elizaveta
Koslova’s true identity soon became known. The chairman of the District Court in St.
Petersburg learned the next day that her real name was ‘Usulich’ while the Chief of
Gendarmes reported that she belonged to the so-called ‘nihilists’ and that, in the past,
she had been detained as a defendant in the trial of Sergei Nechaev.62
The attemptedmurder was the talk of the town and the news spread with the
speed of the telegraph to the capitals of Europe and beyond. Governor Trepov was
widely loathed; there was considerable understanding and even sympathy for Vera’s
attack on him. Some sympathy for Vera Zasulich even reached the highest circles;
one Russian general even declared her to be nothing less than a ‘model of feminine
bravery and self-sacrifice’.63 The underground paper Free Russian Presswentmuch
further; it declared that Vera Zasulich had fired the shots in the struggle for ‘human
rights and the establishment of peace and humanity on earth’, as well as to show
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that ‘tyrants are not almighty’. The paper praised her further as ‘the fearless girl who
did not shrink from the awful bloody deed and her own ruin when no other means
remained for the defence of the rights of man’.64 By that time the revolutionaries had
managed to make the flogging of prisoner Boboliubov a cause célèbre. Russian’s first
female assassin was taken to the same House of Preliminary Detention where, until
recently, Bogoliubov had also been imprisoned. There she would have to wait for two
months for her trial. She fully expected to pay for her deed with her life.65
3.4. Preparation of the Trial
TheMinister of Justice, Count Konstantin Pahlen, wanted a fast conviction and was
confident of the outcome:
The jurors would deliver a guilty verdict and thereby teach a sobering lesson to the
insane, small coterie of revolutionaries; they would show all the Russian and foreign
admirers of Vera Zasulich’s ‘heroic exploit’ that the Russian people bow before the
Tsar, revere him, and are always ready to defend his faithful servants.66
When preparing for the trial of Vera Zasulich, the government had two basic options.
If the crime was judged to be ‘political’, the case would go to a Special Committee of
the Senate. The Trial of the 193 had been dealt with there. The alternative was trial by
jury, as was the rule for common crimes. Retrospectively, of course, it is clear that a
political crime had been committed and that was also clear to most contemporaries.
The fact that Zasulich knew neither Trepov nor Bogoliubov personally was indicative
of a political crime. However, there were still some speculations floating around that
Zasulich was Bogoliubov’s lover and that the shooting of Trepov was the revenge
of amistress whose lover had been wronged.67 Such an interpretation would have
made it look like a personal rather than political affair. Treating the matter as a crime
of moral indignation, an act of personal revenge had, from theMinister of Justice’s
point of view, certain advantages. The fact is that by March 1878 the Minister of
Justice had decided to have Zasulich tried in a criminal court. Maybe he argued that
in the event of a popular backlash against a harsh sentence, anger would not turn
against the government but against the jury—a body consisting of representatives of
society. Since the case appeared straightforward—there were plenty of witnesses to
the attemptedmurder—there could be little doubt that any jury had to convict the
would-be assassin.
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One other reason the Minister of Justice might have decided on a trial by jury was
that the alternative, trial by the Senate Committee, had not worked as well as he had
expected in the recent Trial of the 193. That trial had lastedmore than three months
and only a minority of some 20 per cent of the accused could, for lack of evidence, be
sentenced.68 A number of the accused had died in prison through disease or had gone
mad and committed suicide while waiting for months and years for their trial. The
government wanted to avoid a long trial in the case of Vera Zasulich at all costs. What
could go wrong?Minister Pahlen had discussed the case with Alexander Lopukhin,
until recently chairman of the St. Petersburg District Court. Anatoli Koni, the newly
installed chairman of the court, joined their conversation:
‘Yes, Anatoli Fedorovich [Koni] will handle it for us beautifully.’ ‘Why, is it already
so clear?’ [Koni asked]. ‘Oh yes’, Lopukhin answered for Pahlen. ‘Fully. This is a case
of personal vengeance, and the jurors will convict her, this is clear as daylight.’ To
[Koni’s] surprise, Pahlen, too, made some inherent predictions that the jurors will
prove themselves, that they must show severity, etc.69
Since Lopukhin had already been informed on 25 January in a telegram fromOdessa
that there was a police dossier on Zasulich,70 he should have known that the case was
politically inspired. Nevertheless it was announced on 3March 1878 that Zasulich
would be tried by jury.
Also inMarch, theMinister of Justice had asked A.F. Koni directly, ‘Can you, Anatoli
Fedorovich, guarantee that Zasulich will be convicted?’71 To his amazement Koni
said, ‘No, I cannot! […] How can I guarantee their [the jury’s] verdict? […] However,
I presume that common sense of the jury will suggest to them a decision that is
just and dispassionate. The fact is obvious and it is unlikely the jury will venture
to deny it. But I cannot guarantee a conviction!’ ‘You cannot? You cannot?’ Pahlen
[replied] agitatedly. ‘In that case, I will report to His Majesty that the chairman cannot
guarantee a conviction. I must report this to His Majesty!’ he repeated, with a vague
and pointless threat.’72
The Tsar himself also tried to exert pressure by expressing his hope to Koni that
he would ‘continue to serve successfully’.73 Yet Koni was aman of principle. He had
already told the Minister of Justice that ‘the function of a court is not to render
service but to pronounce judgment’, reminding Count Pahlen that as President of
the Court he, Koni, had to see to it that impartiality was maintained. TheMinister
called this all ‘theory’. He suggested that Koni phrase the instructions for the jury
in such a way that the conviction of the accused was inevitable. He even advised him
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to commit some technical violations of the procedural rules of the court so that, in
the event that the jury acquitted her, the verdict could be overturned in an appeal
court.74
Howdid things lookon the side of the accused?VeraZasulich firstwanted todefend
herself, yet she was told by her friends that it was important to get her acquitted,
not just for herself but for ‘the cause’. Her friends had collectedmoney to pay for a
good attorney. Peter A. Alexandrov, a defence lawyer who had distinguished himself
in the Trial of the 193, was chosen. Alexandrov, visiting Vera Zasulich in the House of
Preliminary Detention, tried to persuade her to tell the court that she had not wanted
to kill Trepov but only intended to fire into the air to alert public opinion to Trepov’s
treatment of Bogoliubov. She refused. She also did not want to appear in court in the
elegant coat Alexandrov had brought to her prison cell so that she would lookmore
like a noble woman when entering the courtroom. However, she did promise not to
bite her nails during the trial, something which at that time in Russia was considered
a sign of ‘evil’.75 Defence Attorney Alexandrov was confident that he could obtain
an acquittal for Vera Zasulich, and he said as much to his friends before the trial.76
Others, on the contrary, thought that a conviction was a foregone conclusion, given
the indisputable fact that an attempt at premeditated murder had taken place in
front of many witnesses.
Alexandrov’s opponent in the trial was Konstantin Kessel, the Deputy Prosecutor
of the St. Petersburg District Court. He was not Minister Pahlen’s first choice. Before
him twomore prominent prosecutors had been asked by the Ministry of Justice to
serve in this matter but had refused to take on the case. Maybe they thought that
there was not much to be gained in defending the widely disliked Governor Trepov;
maybe they thought that the case against Zasulich was ‘in the bag’ since the evidence
of the crime was there for all to see. Maybe they were afraid: several prosecutors in
the Trial of the 193 had learned about assassination plans being concocted against
them.77 Kessel was young and inexperienced. He did not make use of his right to
reject members of the jury whom hemight consider prejudiced. There was a pool of
some thirty jurors available for the case; up to twelve of them could be rejected by the
two sides combined. Since Kessel did not make use of his right to do so, Alexandrov
made full use of it, rejecting eleven potential jurors. He selected mainly civil servants,
plus one artist and one student, in the hope that they would bemore impressionable
than somemerchants on the list of potential jurors he was given. He feared that some
of those on the original list of jurors were more likely to cave in under government
pressure than others and selected those he thought would be most sympathetic to his
arguments.78
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That such pressure by the government existed was also evident from another
remark of the Minister of Justice to Anatoli Koni when the latter, just before the
trial, lectured about the impartiality of the judiciary, ‘Yes, justice, impartiality’, the
Minister said, ‘but in this damned case the government has the right to expect special
services from the court’.79 The date of the trial was set for the last day of March 1878.
3.5. What Happened in Court during the Trial
The trial in the St. Petersburg Circuit Court began on 31 March 1878 at 11a.m. It would
last eight hours. An hour before the trial the courtroom began to fill. Anatoli F. Koni
was the President of the Court. The prosecutor was Konstantin I. Kessel while counsel
for the defence was attorney Peter A. Alexandrov. The latter had, in the past, earned his
reputation on the other side of the bar as an able prosecutor; indeed he had been one
of the prosecutors in the trial of Sergei Nechaev when he was tried and convicted of
murder in 1871. However, after a trial in 1875 where Alexandrov had argued for the
freedom of the press while he was asked byMinister Pahlen to argue for the opposite,
he had changed sides and joined the bar to become a defence attorney.80 Alexandrov
had just played an outstanding role as defence council in the Trial of the 193. One of his
colleagues described him as ‘sharp like a razor blade, cold as ice and shining like a
hero’.81 In the impending trial he was to give the performance of his life. The jury
consisted, as mentioned before, mostly of low andmiddle level civil servants.82 Since
Alexandrov had carefully selected most of them, liberal-minded men were in the
majority among the 18 jurors.83
The courtroomwas crammed full. The President of the Court had distributed
at his discretion 136 of a total of 300 tickets for the seats in the courtroom. They
were sold out weeks before the trial began.84 Manymembers of the aristocratic elite
of Russia were curious to take a glimpse of someone from Russia’s revolutionary
underground. Present were, among other dignitaries, the Imperial State Chancellor,
Prince Gorchakov, the WarMinister Miliutin, Count Stroganoff, Secretary of State
Solsky as well as members of the State Council and senators. They took their seats
right behind the judges’ bench. There were many more dignitaries in glittering
gold-braided uniforms and high-society ladies loaded with jewels in the gallery. There
also were about one hundredmembers of the legal profession in the room as well as
foreign observers. When the trial began, some six hundred people were packed into
the courtroom.85 Tenmembers of the press, including F. Dostoyevsky, the writer,
had also been admitted. The Minister of the Interior had originally suggested to
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theMinister of Justice that press access to the trial be minimised. Yet Count Pahlen
thought this inadvisable, arguing that this would lead public opinion to suspect that
Vera Zasulich had been unjustly convicted. He hoped that press reports would ‘elicit
general indignation’.86
All the display of rank and name in the seats behind the judges stood in sharp
contrast to the defendant, Vera Zasulich. She was simply dressed, had an unassuming
appearance and was modest in her manners. One observer saw in her ‘pale, emaciated
features’ traces of ‘spiritual suffering and physical deprivations’. Another observer
thought that ‘She looked almost saintly.’87 Vera, then 29 years old, looked much
younger. She spoke in a barely audible voice; it was hard to believe that this shy
creature could be a threat to society.88
Not present at the trial was General Trepov himself. Although almost recovered
from the attack by Vera Zasulich, he claimed to be ill that day. It is not clear why
Alexandrov, the defence attorney, rather than the prosecutor had originally invited
him to appear as witness. Nor is it clear why Trepov had refused to turn up. Probably
he was afraid that he would, at least indirectly, also be judged. The fact is that he
had alreadymade public appearances, albeit in a wheelchair, telling everybody who
wanted to hear it that he had asked for Bogoliubov to be flogged on the orders of
Minister Pahlen. Stranger still, he was even reported to have expressed his hope that
Zasulich would be acquitted!89
The trial began exactly on time, at eleven o’clock. First the indictment was read,
recounting the events of 24 January 1878 in the residence of the Governor of St.
Petersburg. The charges brought against Vera Zasulich included planning of the
assassination in advance and the point blank shooting of General Fyodor F. Trepov
with a large-calibre revolver with the intent to deprive him of his life.90 The defendant
did not deny the crime and responded in a barely audible voice: ‘I admit that I shot
General Trepov but whether this would result in wounding or killing him was for me
amatter of indifference.’91
The first of four witnesses called by the Prosecutor was Major Fedor Kurneev,
Trepov’s assistant. He had been present when the shooting took place. He was, at that
time, also acting administrator of the House of Preliminary Detention. WhenMajor
Kurneev was interrogated by the Prosecutor, it surfaced that he was being investigated
(and might be liable for prosecution) over his responsibility for disturbances in
the prison which had accompanied the flogging of Bogoliubov. For a moment it
looked as if the state admitted that a crime had occurred in the House of Preliminary
Detention and that the state itself had been trying to seek and restore justice.92
However Alexandrov, the Defence Attorney, quickly followed up on the Prosecutor’s
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questioning of Kurneev and asked whether he was also responsible for the whipping
of Bogoliubov which had occurred under his watch. ‘Oh no’, Kurneev answered (he
had only announced the flogging to the prison population, not ordered it himself).
That put the blame for the flogging back on Trepov.93 The audience in the courtroom,
which by that time had largely taken Vera’s side, was audibly relieved. Another witness
presented by the prosecutor was the owner of the shop where the bulldog gun had
been bought. Kessel’s pedantic interrogation of this and other witnesses produced
nothing that grabbed the audience’s imagination and did little to strengthen the
prosecutor’s case.94
Prosecutor Kessel’s speech, while lacking passion, was logically compelling, but the
public wanted drama, not reason. Kessel spoke for 45 minutes in a monotonous voice.
He was handicapped in that he could or would not disclose the political motivation
for the deed, the revolutionary background of Zasulich and her links to the nihilist
Nechaev. This would have politicised the trial, something which the Minister of
Justice had been trying to avoid, portraying her deed as an act of personal revenge.95
Strangely, Kessel did not mention Bogoliubov at all.96 He reminded the jury that it
was not the duty of the court to judge Vera’s motives or to judge whether Trepov,
the victim, was guilty or innocent of anything. Nor was the court to adjudicate on
the legitimacy of her emotions. She had to be judged solely on the basis of her action.
Since she had bought one of the most powerful revolvers, it was clear that she did
not expect Governor Trepov to remain alive. ‘Every person’, Kessel said, ‘is free to love
or hate whomever they choose, but no one is free to violate another’s rights’.97 Kessel
depicted Zasulich’s deed as a perverted form of trial, a kind of vigilante justice, arguing
that:
Having created her own court, Zasulich joined in her own person the roles of
prosecutor, defendant, and judge: she, a young woman, thought it was possible
to decree a death sentence, which fortunately she did not succeed in carrying out. I do
not think for one minute that you will disagree that every public figure, whoever he
may be, has the right to a legal trial and not a trial by Zasulich.98
The public was paying little attention to Kessel’s dry reasoning; in fact his voice could
barely be heard in the galleries as the people made a considerable noise.
Yet when it was Vera’s turn to explain her case, the courtroom fell dead silent;
nobody wanted to miss a word as she spoke with such a thin voice. Her manners were
more those of a nun than a terrorist. She did notmake any propagandistic speeches like
many of those had done who stood accused in the Trial of the 193. She did not accuse the
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autocracy in her speech. Instead, she emphasised how humanitarian compassion for
Bogoliubov had driven her to this deed.99 Vera also recalled how, without ever having
been judged by a court, she herself had, by administrative order, been condemned to
spend years in prison and exile. Then she turned to the event that had triggered her
deed.100 It was, as she explained, an act of protest, a cry for justice:
I waited for some response, [to the flogging incident] but everyone remained silent. […]
There was nothing to stop Trepov, or someone just as powerful as he, from repeating
the same violence over and over. I resolved at that point, even if it cost my life, to prove
that no one who abused a human being that way could be sure of getting away with
it. I couldn’t find another way of drawing attention to what had happened. I saw no
other way […] It’s terrible to have to lift a hand against another person, but I felt that
it had to be done.101
The public took a liking to her as she sobbed quietly while she spoke. As it was clear to
everybody in the courtroom that her regret was real, compassion for her grew by the
hour.102 When it was the Defence Attorney’s turn, Alexandrov began by saying that he
was ‘completely in agreement withmuch of what he [Kessel] said. We differ only in a
few, small things.’ This understatement was just one of his many rhetorical devices.
The Defence Attorney had, at his own expense, brought four former political
prisoners as witnesses. They had been on the scene on 13 July 1878 when Governor
Trepov clashed with prisoner Bogoliubov in the court of the House of Preliminary
Detention.103 (Later the President of the Court was to be blamed for having allowed
Alexandrov to present such witnesses whose testimonies had no directly bearing
on the crime that had taken place in the Governor’s residence.) The sight of these
witnesses—pale, thin young students, just acquitted after years in prison for no good
reason—created a wave of compassion among the public. These narodniki idealists
made the prison regime and, by implication, the political system that supported it
look arbitrary and cruel.
Alexandrov used their testimonies to evaluate Trepov’s behaviour andmanaged
to place Trepov (and Kurneev) in the role of villains. He also lambasted a political
system that had for so long allowed the regime and the landlords to flog people. He
insinuated that there were still people in high places who felt that it was dangerous to
leave Russia without the knout—that instrument of sanction that, in his words, had
cemented the social foundations for so long. After giving a brief history of flogging in
Russia until 17 April 1863when ‘the rod passed into the realm of history’,104 Alexandrov
proceeded to say:
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Fifteen year after the abolition of corporal punishment a political prisoner was sub-
jected to the ignominious punishment of whipping […] The short newspaper accounts
of the punishment inflicted on Bogoliubov could not but have an overwhelming
impression on Zasulich […] ‘What terrible torture’, thought Zasulich, ‘what scornful
profanation of everythingwhich constitutes themost essential values of an intellectual
… of everyone to whom the sense of honour and human dignity are not foreign …’ […]
Bogoliubov was for Zasulich a political prisoner, and this wordmeant everything
[…] A political prisoner was for Zasulich the bitter recollection of her own sufferings,
of her terrible nervous excitement […] everlasting though: ‘[…] When will an end be
brought to all this?’105
Alexandrov then gave a dramatic description of the flogging as it must have appeared
in Zasulich’s mind. The audience began to applaud and shout ‘bravo’ at various points
in his exposition.106 He continued:
The fateful question confronted her: ‘Who will stand up for the insulted honour of a
defenceless political convict? […] Who will stand up for the fate of other wretches?’ […]
She expected, finally, aword of justice […] but justice remained silent. […] And suddenly,
an unexpected thought brightened hermind: ‘Oh, I myself! […] All is silent around
Bogoliubov! A shout is needed’ […] Instant determination responded to this thought
[…] ‘If I commit a crime’, Zasulich thought, ‘the silent question about Bogoliubov’s
punishment will arise; my crime will provoke a public trial, and Russia, in the person
of her people’s representatives, the jury, will be compelled to pronounce a verdict
not onme alone […] and in the sight of Europe, this Europe which likes to call us a
barbarian state, in which the attribute of the government is the knout […]’
Turning to the jurors, Alexandrov continued:
‘Gentlemen of the jury! It is not for the first time that a woman appears before the
court of the people’s conscience in this dock of crime and oppressive moral suffering.
[…] Women who have steeped their hands in the blood of their lovers or of their
more fortunate rivals, have been here. These women left this place acquitted. These
sentences were just, an echo of divine justice, which takes into consideration not only
the external side of an action, but also its innermeaning—the real guilt of the accused.
These women did bloody, summary justice, they fought for and avenged themselves.
But for the first time there appears here a woman who had no personal interest in
her crime, who linked her crime with the fight for an idea, for the sake of a man who
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was for her nomore than a companion in distress. If these reasons for crime prove
lighter on a scale of public justice, if she must be punished for the sake of the general
welfare, the triumph of justice and public safety—then let your chastising justice take
place! Indeed, she may leave this court condemned, but not disgraced, and one may
only wish that circumstances which provoke such actions and generate such culprits
should not be repeated. […] However somberly one looks at this deed, in themotives
themselves it is impossible not to see an honest and noble impulse.’107
At onepointAlexandrov compared the characters of the victim—Trepov—andZasulich,
the perpetrator. At another point, Alexandrov suggested that an acquittal of Zasulich
might counteract Russia’s reputation abroad as being a nation of barbarians.108
Alexandrov’s speech was a rhetorical masterpiece and, as we shall see, the jury fell into
the trap he had laid: judging her on her apparently noble character and unselfish
motives—not on the crime she had committed. In his account of what drove Vera
Zasulich to her deed, Alexandrov had not stuck fully to the facts.109 He completely
omitted Vera Zasulich’s revolutionary past and socialist convictions.110 However,
Alexandrov’s rhetoric swayed the jury and the publicmuchmore than themonotonous
speech of the Prosecutor had done. Zasulich herself was so impressed by her defence
lawyer’s account of her life story that she seemed to re-experience, while he spoke,
some of her past agonies in front of jury and public. One eyewitness noted:
[Her] head dropped on her hands, folded on the desk, and, concealing it in a crumpled
kerchief, the girl tried tomuffle and hide her sobs, but her thin, shuddering shoulders
betrayed her. One could hear her sobs here and in the hall. I also wiped the tears that
welled in my eyes. I looked behindme at the row of the public and saw the same tears
in many an eye.111
Alexandrov pleaded with the jurors to judge Zasulich not for the intentions attributed
to her by the prosecutor but for what she had actually done, the implication being
that she had, after all, not killed the Governor.
The public was visibly moved. Here was a woman, herself an innocent victim of
the unjust prison system, who identified with another political prisoner so much that
she wanted, with her deed, to confront the public with Trepov’s misdeed so that in
the future such humiliating treatment would no longer be accepted. Dostoyevsky, the
writer, whispered to his neighbour in the gallery: ‘She should not be convicted, and
punishment is inappropriate, superfluous; but one wishes one could say to her “go,
and do not do that again”.’112
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A.F. Koni, the President of the Court, then asked Zasuliuch if she wished to have
the last word. She declined. A wise decision: it could only have detracted from the
profound impression left on public and jurors by the brilliant, two-hour-long speech
of her defence lawyer.
The President of the Court then summarised the proceedings of the day, recapitu-
lating the arguments of both Prosecutor and Defence Attorney. He also told the jurors
that they should consider themselves ‘the conscience of society’,113 asking them to
answer three questions:
1. Was Zasulich guilty that, wanting to wreak vengeance on Commandant Trepov
for his punishment of Bogoliubov and having acquired for this purpose a revolver,
on January 24 with deliberate intent, inflicted on the General-Adjutant a wound
in the region of the pelvis with a bullet of large calibre?
2. If Zasulich carried out this act, did she intend to deprive Commander Trepov of
life? and
3. If Zasulich did intend to deprive Commander Fydor Trepov of life, did she do
everything in her power to attain this objective, given that death did not ensue for
reasons that did not depend on her?114
The balanced summing up by the Court’s president which preceded these questions
left much of the public—waiting in the corridors for the jury to return—in a gloomy
mood. It seemed inevitable that Vera would be convicted.115
The jurors had withdrawn for deliberation for less than half an hour.116 Then
they came back. In the words of Koni:
With pale faces, the jurors crowded around the corner of the judges’ table. There
was total silence in the court, everyone had bated breath. The foreman of the jurors,
an official in theMinistry of Finances, hurried rattled off the question: ‘Is Zasulich
guilty of wounding’ … and then loudly, so that the whole room could hear: ‘No! Not
guilty!’117
Then, pandemonium broke out. The President of the Court later recalled:
It is impossible for one who was not present to imagine the outburst of sounds
that drowned out the [jury] foreman’s voice and the movement that like an electric
shock sped through the entire room. The cries of unrestrained joy, hysterical sobbing,
desperate applause, the tread of feet, cries of ‘Bravo! Hurrah! Good girl! Vera! Verochka!
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Verochka!’ merged in one roar both moan and howl. Many crossed themselves; in the
upper, more democratic sections for the public, people embraced; even in the places
reserved for the judges there was enthusiastic applause.118
Another eyewitness from the audience, Elizabeth Naryshkin-Kurakin, confirmed
that ‘The judges, jury, dignitaries and officials grown grey in service, the whole
public—everyone was carried away by the mood of the moment. One could not
analyse it, but it swept over everyone, without exception, even the soberest of them,
in that dramatic moment.’119 Even Chancellor Gorchakov was clapping approvingly
in the light of the verdict as did other dignitaries sitting behind the judges.120 The
President of the Court, turning to Zasulich, made no attempt to calm the courtroom
down and simply said ‘You are acquitted.’ Then he told her to go to the House of
Temporary Detention and collect her belongings before announcing ‘The session
is closed!’121
The verdict took Zasulich by complete surprise.122 Upon hearing that she was
acquitted, it was not joy she experienced, but ‘extreme astonishment, immediately
followed by a feeling of sadness’, as she later told another, more successful, terrorist.123
She had expected to be hanged and now she was to be free. When asked two hours later
whether she was happy she said: ‘Not very.’124 That feeling persisted for the rest of her
life. She would refer to her attempt to assassinate Governor Trepov as ‘my crime’ and
experience much anguish when others tried to imitate her and succeed where she had
failed.125
3.6. A Miscarriage of Justice?
How could the jurors reach such a decision when the incriminating facts were
undisputed, plenty of witnesses to the crime were present and the defendant herself
had admitted her crime? There is no simple answer; several elements came together
on that day in court. The first element was that Governor Trepov was very unpopular
among St. Petersburg society, including amongst the jurors. Another element was
this: if a guilty verdict were to have been given by the jury, the consequences for the
defendant would have been very serious. Article 9 of the Russian Penal Code, applicable
in her case, would havemeant a conviction to hard labour for 15 to 20 years. It was
unlikely that she would have survived that. It was general knowledge that prisons in
Russia were unhealthy; even someonewho did not contract tuberculosis or some other
deadly disease would, after years of confinement, often gomad or commit suicide.
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Aware of this, juries like Zasulich’s were typically mild in their verdicts, especially
when it came to women.126
A third element was perhaps even more crucial: in the Russian legal system, guilt
alone was not the only criterion for a sentence. A jury was expected to judge the
defendant also according to ‘conscience’. Indeed, evidence alone could not prevent
acquittal.127 The Russian system of justice, established in 1864, allowed the jury
to acquit defendants considered guilty and even defendants who had confessed
to the crime when the jurors decided that their decision to acquit was based on
‘conscience’. An English observer of this trial, Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, offered
this explanation for the seemingly paradoxical behaviour of Russian juries:
[T]he juries often gave a verdict of ‘not guilty’ when the accusedmade a full and formal
confession to the court […] The Russian criminal law fixes minutely the punishment
for each category of crimes, and leaves almost no latitude to the judge. The jury knows
that if they give a verdict of guilty, the prisoner will inevitably be punished according
to the Code. Now the Code […] is found on conceptions very different from those of
the Russian people, and inmany cases it attaches heavy penalties to acts which the
ordinary Russian is wont to regard as mere peccadillos, or positively justifiable. Even
in those cases in which the Code is in harmony with the popular morality, there are
many exceptional cases in which summum jus is really summa injuria. In such cases
what is the jury to do? […] There remains but one issue out of the difficulty—a verdict
of acquittal; and Russian juries—to their honour be it said—generally adopt this
alternative.128
As mentioned before, it did not take the jurors long to reach their verdict. We do not
knowwhether the jury’s verdict was unanimous or split. However, if the jury was split
evenly in its opinion, a defendant was also acquitted.129 The jury had two, perhaps
three choices: (i) guilty, (ii) not guilty, and (iii) guilty but deserving leniency. Most
of the audience, as well as A.F. Koni, the President of the Court, had hoped for the
third outcome as themost likely. The law prescribed the severity of sentences; the jury
had no influence on that. Even a lenient sentence would have been severe andmight,
given the conditions in Russia’s prison system, cost Zasulich her life.
Yet the members of the jury were apparently concerned not only about Vera
Zasulich’s life but also about their own careers and even lives. Since all but two of the
jurors were officials working for the government, acquitting the defendant was not
without risk of retaliation from their employer. However, if they feared pressure from
that side they did not say so. On the contrary, one of the jurors later claimed that he and
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his fellow jurors had acquitted Zasulich for fear of assassination by revolutionaries.130
This is what he wrote in an anonymous letter to the Tsar, four days after the verdict:
We, the jurors, for all our indignation over [Zasulich’s] crime, were compelled to acquit
her: 1. From the sense of self-preservation, and 2. To spare the government a scandal
incomparably greater than that which, given the weakness of the police, inevitably
would have followed a conviction […] Had we convicted Zasulich then it is not only
highly probable that some of us would have been killed at the very entrance of the courtroom,
but for sure there would have been killed the prosecutor, the chairman and also, it
may be, some prominent guests.131
Were the jurors intimidated? Were they following their conscience? Were they swayed
by thedefence lawyer?Were they caughtby themoodof the audience in the courtroom?
All these elementsmust have played a role. Today, with a distance in time ofmore than
135 years, it is impossible to discern what moved themmost to reach their astonishing
verdict. It had been a day of high drama. One journalist noted two days later:
Only a few hours have passed, but it seems as if years have unfolded before you, as if a
long repressed and gathering moral storm broke upon our heads, demanding that we
evaluate everything that is good and bad within us, throwing open the doors of your
soul and bringing it to an impartial, merciless court. Not one theater can provide you
with this kind of drama.132
In a time span of eight hours, Vera Zasulich, the would-be assassin, had become a
heroine. Her defender, Alexandrov, had become a star whose brilliant performance
was even acknowledged by his adversaries.133 Trepov, the victim of the crime, looked
like the real culprit. Kessel, the prosecutor had been out-performed by Alexandrov.
The President of the Court, Anatoli Koni, later gave his own private judgment on the
outcome of this trial:
The jury’s verdict was, perhaps, not correct from the juridical point of view but it was
true to moral feeling: it dissented from the dead letter of the law but it resounded the
voice of living law; society cannot refuse it sympathy.134
However, the consequences of the jury’s decision were far-reaching and fatal. More
than a century later, with plenty of hindsight, Russian historian Edvard Radzinsky
concluded in 2005:
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The trial by justice (by liberal rights) won a crushing victory over trial by law. It created
a legal precedent for the right to shoot out of your convictions. From this moment of
the great humiliation of the law, the clock of the revolution started ticking.135
3.7. How the Trial and Its Outcome were Received Outside the Court
Outside the St. Petersburg Courthouse a crowd of thousand or more people (the
majority of them women) had been waiting for the outcome of the trial.136 Already in
the afternoon, the President of the Court had been informed by Alexander Lopukhin,
the chief prosecutor of the St. Petersburg Court of Appeals, that the crowd was restless
and that disorder could be expected.137 There was fear that the jurors might be
assaulted by the mob in the event of a conviction.138
When the acquittal became known, the crown welcomed it with shouts of joy
and applause. The victorious Defence Attorney, Alexandrov, was carried through
the streets all the way home on the shoulders of a jubilant crowd.139 Emerging
from the Courthouse, he told the waiting crowd that Vera Zasulich would soon be
released from the nearby remand prison on Shpalernaia Street. However, when the
crowd hadmoved there and Vera Zasulich was not seen for a long time, people got
restless and aggressive. Vera had first been taken to her cell where she collected
her belongings and had a cup of tea. When leaving, she took with her a candle
and a pencil which she thought she might need in a prison cell in case she was
re-arrested. That was, after all, what had happened tomany of those who had been
acquitted in the Trial of the 193. This almost happened to her that evening as well.
Alexander Lopukhin asked the commander of the remand prison, Fedorov, not
to release Zasulich until further written orders arrived. Indeed, one hour before
midnight an order from the Tsar was delivered to Fedorov, saying that he commanded
that spinster Vera Ivanova Zasulich be taken back to the House of Preliminary
Detention until a special instruction was given. Fedorov, however, had by that
time, on the authority of Koni, already let Zasulich go, despite Lopukhin’s oral
request to the contrary. This would soon cost him his post and earn him a week
of arrest.140
One reason Fedorov acted without waiting any longer was that when Vera did not
appear for almost an hour, the crowd actually tried to force the gates to liberate her.
At that point Fedorov decided to push her through the gate.141 The crowd greeted
her enthusiastically and oneman lifted her, despite her protests, on his shoulders
to shouts of ‘Long live Zasulich.’142 She was marched around in the dense crowd
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until a carriage was found by one of the witnesses Alexandrov had summoned to the
trial. Vera was then pushed into the carriage and the coachman began heading down
Voskresenskii Prospekt. Then amedical student, Grigorii Sidoratskii, jumped on her
carriage as a second carriage had come up next to hers. Vera Zasulich already feared
that it had been sent to take her back to prison. Apparently Sidoratskii thought the
same and began shooting—perhaps to distract attention from Vera so that she could
escape, perhaps because he sought martyrdom for himself.143 One shot hit a young
woman in the arm, and when the student saw blood and heard shouts that he had
also wounded Vera Zasulich he apparently lost his mind and shot himself through
the temple (which was later erroneously blamed on the police). In the tumult and
confusion, Zasulich’s carriage sped away. She disappeared from the scene andmade it
to the apartment of a sympathiser who hid her from the police. It later turned out
that the original address she was to be taken to had already been visited by the police
with an order to arrest her again.144
In themeantime, Vera Zasulich had become a European celebrity. At least one
newspaper in St. Petersburg came outwith an extra edition on the sensational outcome
of the trial. Not only St. Petersburg but, thanks to the telegraph, much of Europe was
served with the extraordinary news of her acquittal. In the words of Gustave Valbert, a
contemporary writing in the Revue des deux mondes:
For forty-eight hours Europe forgot everything about peace, war, Bismarck, Lord
Beaconsfield, Prince Gorchakov—so as to occupy itself with nothing except Vera
Zasulich and the strange judicial adventure of which this unknown woman was the
heroine.145
Many newspapers in the capital, St. Petersburg, gave ample coverage to the outcome
of the trial. One of them, the Telegraph, even decided to serialise the entire trial
proceedings in four instalments.146Most newspapers were supportive of the acquittal;
some suggested that itmight serve as a lesson to the autocratic regime. The St. Petersburg
Register declared that the verdict was ‘the voice of the people’.147 The New Times (Novoe
vremia) called the jurors’ decision ‘a verdict of social conscience not against state and
law, but in defence of lawfulness and consequently for state and law’.148 Not just
the revolutionaries, but also liberals and evenmembers of the aristocracy celebrated
her. Some compared her to William Tell, others to Charlotte Corday or even Jeanne
d’Arc.149
Few voices at that time were critical. Prince V.P. Meshchersky recalled in his
memoirs:
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The solemn acquittal of Vera Zasulich happened as in a nightmare […] Nobody could
understand how such a frightful mockery of the highest servant under the Tsar
and such an impudent triumph of faction could take place in the courtroom of an
autocratic empire. The sad and fateful acquittal of Vera Zasulich showed, alas, too
eloquently the disposition andmood of the contemporary society. […] I remember
how persons who later, under Alexander iii, spoke about this acquittal with loud
indignation, had quite forgotten that in 1878 they had joined those dignitaries who
had dared to shout ‘bravo’ when they heard about the acquittal of Vera Zasulich, and
lifted their glasses to the victory of justice at home and in their clubs.150
Much of public opinion in Russia and abroad was overwhelmingly pleased with the
verdict, except in some conservative circles. Dimitri Miliutin, theMinister of War who
had been watching the trial with his own eyes, later wrote:
The entire public split into two camps […] Any such case creates rumors and stirs up
protest in society, on the one hand against our new legal procedures and especially
against the institution of juries, and on the other hand against the arbitrariness and
despotism of the administrative authorities.151
Vera Zasulich, hearing about the police’s attempts to locate and arrest her, wrote
in a letter published four days after her acquittal in the newspaper Severnyi Vestnik:
‘I am prepared unquestioningly to submit to the judgment of the court, but I am
not prepared again to expose myself to endless and indeterminate administrative
prosecutions and I am compelled to hide until convinced that I have beenmistaken
and that I am not threatened by the danger of arrest.’152
Zasulich spent the next weeks in hiding, moving from location to location—
there was no shortage of people prepared to hide her—until, in late May 1878, she
finally decided, disguised as a peasant woman, to leave Russia secretly by train for
Switzerland. Vera Zasulich would spend much of her political life in exile, first
Switzerland, then France, thenGreat Britain and then Switzerland again. Her exile was
interrupted by at least one brief secret trip to Russia in 1880. Then, in 1905, a general
amnesty was proclaimed which allowed her to return legally and permanently to
her country.153
To go into exile was, for her and for many other revolutionaries, a sign of defeat
and not an easy decision to take. Yet the Tsarist regime, rather than accepting the
jury’s decision and trying to make the best out of it, reacted fiercely—with predictable
results. In the words of J. Bergman:
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Whatever moral capital the government might have gained from the trial was
irrevocably lost in its denouement. If Zasulich had been left alone by the authorities,
and Koni applauded by his superiors for his impartiality, the acquittal might have
been received as a vindication of the Russian legal system and proof that Russia was
evolving at last in the direction of a Rechtsstaat. But because the government reacted to
the acquittal inways thatmade its pretensions to judicial procedure seemhypocritical,
it made Zasulich the martyr she would have been if the jury had convicted her, and
imprinted her trial in people’s consciousness as evidence of its own brutality and
hypocrisy.154
3.8. Conclusion: Long-term Judicial, Social and Political Consequences
3.8.1. Judicial Consequences
Tsar Alexander ii was shocked and furious by the trial’s outcome.155 He immediately
issued, as mentioned above, a secret order to re-arrest Vera Zasulich.156 When, after a
massive search in the capital, Zasulich couldnot be found, the governmentwas looking
for scapegoats in its own ranks. In the following weeks several heads would roll. On 13
May 1878 Count Pahlenwas forced to resign for the ‘negligent handling of the Zasulich
case’, as the Tsar put it.157 Earlier Pahlen had tried, but failed, to fire Koni.158 The
safeguards of the reformmeasures of 1864 made Koni’s dismissal impossible. Koni had
sent a personal apology to the Tsar but had refused to resign.159 He was transferred to
the Civil Chamber and remained disgraced for seven years.160 Alexandrov, the defence
lawyer, was forced to leave St. Petersburg. Kessel, the Prosecutor was also sent to the
provinces. Andreevskii and Zhukovskii, the two prosecutors who had earlier refused
to take on the assignment to prosecute Zasulich (a task that then went to the less
experienced Kessel) were equally punished and resigned.161 For a brief moment the
government even considered punishing the jurors for their acquittal of Zasulich; but
the idea was soon dropped.162
What about Governor Trepov, who had decided to stay at home during this trial?
He felt that he had beenmaligned in the courtroomandby the press, accused of a crime
which he felt he had not committed. In a memorandum submitted on 11 April to the
Ministry of the Interior, he offered proof that the flogging of a convicted criminal had,
in this case, after all been legal according to existing law, citing article and paragraph.
Zasulich’s assault on him, he said, had nothing to do with the Bogoliubov affair,
adding, ‘At issue, therefore, is not the security of a single person, but the security
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of entire society, the entire state and state authority.’ Trepov also accused Koni of
sympathising with the defendant.163 TheMinisterial Council and the Tsar did not
want to act publicly on his memorandum, but Trepov would not take ‘No’ for an
answer. Three weeks later he sent another, lengthier memorandum to the Tsar, with
copies to other dignitaries, complaining, inter alia, about the democratic tendencies
in the courts.164 But this was to no avail: when he was not publicly rehabilitated
he offered his resignation to the Tsar. He was unpleasantly surprised that it was
accepted.
Three days after the trial had ended, on 2 April 1878, Count Pahlen submitted a
proposal to the State Council to enact a law that would place all assassinations and
acts of terrorism under the jurisdiction of military tribunals. On 9May the new law
came into force.165 From then on, all cases of ‘resistance to the authorities, rebellion,
assassination or attempts on the lives of officials’ would be dealt with bymilitary
courts.166 In addition, theMinistry of Justice submitted, on 21 April, new legislation to
the State Council which would allow it to supervise the activities of lawyers and give it
the authority to prohibit individual lawyers from practising law if their behaviourwas
judged to be incompatible with their duties.167
The Prosecutor, Kessel, on 24 April submitted an appeal to the Senate’s Cassation
Court, citing seven reasons why the verdict should be dismissed. He suggested that
another court outside St. Petersburg should start a new trial of Zasulich. One of the
reasons he gave for a re-trial was that in his view the jurors had been influenced by
applause from the public and thereby had lost their objectivity. He also complained
that the prosecution and defence were not given equal treatment by the President
of the Court. On 20 May the Senate decided in Kessel’s favour.168 It declared the
trial of Vera Zasulich on 31 March 1878 invalid and ordered a retrial of the case far
away from the capital in the Novgorod Circuit Court.169 Yet that new trial never
took place. When it became known that Zasulich had escaped to Switzerland the
Tsar first wanted her extradited (as had happened in the case of Nechaev who also
had fled to Switzerland and was extradited in 1872). Yet in the end the Russian
government only placed advertisements in foreign newspapers, ordering Vera Zasulich
to present herself to the district court in Novgorod.170 It was a vain gesture; in
October 1878 the regime decided to give up the pursuit of Vera Zasulich in court.171
Others than her had to pay a price. Those narodnikiwho had been tried and found
guilty in the Trial of the 193 but had hoped for leniency in an appeal could no longer
hope for mercy. Indeed many of those who had been acquitted in that trial were
arrested again and sent to the provinces in the usual procedure of administrative
detention.172
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As a consequence of the miscarriage of justice in the case of Vera Zasulich, Russia’s
legal system, especially the jury part of it, was weakened and some of the reforms of
1864 were in fact undone. The Zasulich case was to remain the only major case where
jurors had been given an opportunity to decide on a political crime.173
3.8.2. Social and Political Consequences
It is, in this case, difficult to separate social from political consequences. We will
therefore look at them together. Everybody agreed that the acquittal of Vera Zasulich
was a ‘slap in the face’ for the autocratic regime.174 As A. Koni, the President of the
Court put it: ‘The trial of Zasulich […] showed the profound dissatisfaction of society
with the government and its indifference to the government’s fate.’175 While that
might have been true for the capital andmajor towns like Kiev and Odessa, it was far
less true for the countryside where support for the Tsar had not eroded to the same
extent as in the cities.
The trial of Vera Zasulich in late March 1878 had coincided with the return of the
Tsar from the front. His armies, after a difficult campaign, had been victorious against
the Ottoman Empire. The anti-government mood in the capital’s press was not what
he expected. He was not willing to compromise but wanted to show a firm hand.
His reaction to the outcome of the trial of Vera Zasulich thereforemeant renewed
repression and enlarged police control.176 A number ofmeasureswere taken to prevent
a repetition of the events. One of them was that civilians were forbidden to carry
weapons.177 In the light of the backlash, the dreams of liberals for further reforms
and a constitution for Russia vanished. Many of them gave up their hope for reforms
from this Tsar andmany liberals began tomove closer to the revolutionaries in the
aftermath of 1878.178
The government also cracked down on universities as many of the revolutionaries
were students. 600 students were banned from St. Petersburg, 140 from Kiev, while in
Charkov Cossaks were brought in to beat up demonstrating students.179 Another
casualty of the reaction to the Zasulich acquittal was press freedom. Under Tsar
Alexander ii the universities and the press had both enjoyed considerable freedom
by the mid-1870s.180 The press in St. Petersburg had given maximum coverage to
Zasulich’s attempt on Trepov’s life and, evenmore so, to the subsequent trial of the
would-be female assassin. Several newspapers reprinted in full Defence Attorney
Alexandrov’s eloquent speech in her defence. Two newspapers were punished for
spreading ‘false news’; one of them, Severnyi Vestnik (NorthernHerald) had to close down.
In its last issue of 4 April 1978 Severnyi Vestnik had printed Alexandrov’s speech in court
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and a letter written by Vera Zasulich from her hideout.181 Since the press had been
largely sympathetic to Zasulich and critical of the government, censorship, which had
become relaxed in recent years, was strengthened again, although in a haphazard way.
A limitation of the freedom of expression was one social consequence of the Zasulich
trial, or, perhaps, the press’ extensive coverage of it.182
The press, reflecting urban public opinion, showed that there was much support
for Vera Zasulich in the capital. However, in the provinces, common folk were more
conservative. They could not understand how someone who would try to kill a
Governor could get away with attempted murder. The people in the countryside,
admonished by the Orthodox Church, were by and large still loyal to the Tsar and, by
extension, to his servants.
Many political commentators interpreted the outcome of the trial as confirmation
of what they wanted to believe. G.V. Plechanov, the father of RussianMarxism, as he
would later be called, for instance, wrote with considerable exaggeration and wishful
thinking, ‘On the 31 of March 1878 the prologue of a great historical drama began for
Russia, one can call it the judgment of the people over the government. On this day
the split of Russian society from the government was de facto executed.’183
The shift from rural propaganda to urban terrorism was inspired, or at least
speeded up, by the assassination attempt by Vera Zasulich. Her deed and, evenmore
than that, her trial received extensive coverage in Russia and abroad. It had, in amatter
of weeks, a greater propagandistic effect that the work of more than 20,000 narodniki in
the years from 1874 to 1877. As a consequence, the Russian Socialists themselves split.
Some young revolutionaries from the Land and Freedom party wanted to continue the
approach of the populists who had gone to the people; others wanted to build on the
momentum created by Vera Zasulich and go down the terrorist path.184 The second,
violence-oriented group later organised itself intoNarodnaya Volya (and later evolved
into the Socialist-Revolutionary Party). The first, more peaceful, group became known
as the Black Partition group (and later evolved into the Marxist Social-Democratic
Party). This split of the original Land and Freedom party was arguably an outflow of
the polarisation brought about by Vera Zasulich’s assassination attempt and her
trial.185
Zasulich soon found imitators, especially among the revolutionaries who in early
1879 formed Narodnaya Volya (People’s Will).186 Acting in urban rather than rural
surroundings, a series of terrorist assassins from the People’s Willmanaged to capture
the attention of the press and thereby achieved, at least among the urban educated
classes, much bigger propaganda successes than the populists in their rural face-to-
face campaigns could ever hope to enjoy. The terrorists were not concentrating on
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organising the peasants against the landlords. They were concentrating more on
‘disorganisation’, the assassination of what were in their eyes the most dangerous or
harmful individuals in the government.187
Vera Zasulich’s pivotal role in triggering with her deed and her trial a wave of
terrorist assassinations in Russia is widely acknowledged by contemporaries and
confirmed by historians.188 Lev Deich, a fellow revolutionary, claimed, ‘Quite rightly
Vera Zasulich is celebrated as the founder of the terrorist struggle in Russia.’189 Sergei
Kravchinskii, in 1882, made this judgment of her:
Vera Zasulich was not a terrorist. She was an angel of vengeance, and not of terror. She
was a victimwho voluntarily threw herself into the jaws of the monster in order to
cleanse the honour of the party from amoral outrage. Yet this occurrence gave to the
Terrorism amost powerful impulse. It illuminated it with its divine aureola, and gave
to it the sanction of sacrifice and of public opinion.190
Kravchinskii held that Zasulich’s assassination attempt on Trepov ‘gave such a strong
impetus to the [revolutionary] movement, that this step, which otherwise would
perhaps have required several years, was taken at a single bound’.191
The new type of revolutionary, modelled after Vera Zasulich as much as after what
revolutionaries preferred to see in her, was ‘the terrorist’. Kravchinskii described him
in these exalted words:
He is noble, terrible, irresistibly fascinating, for he combines in himself the two
sublimes of human grandeur: the martyr and the hero. […] Alone, obscure, poor,
he undertook to be the defender of outraged humanity, of right trampled under
foot, and he challenged to the death the most powerful Empire in the world, and for
years and years confronted all its immense forces. Proud as Satan rebelling against
God, he opposed his own will to that of the man who alone, amid a nation of slaves,
claimed the right of having a will. […] And if the people, ill-counseled, say to him ‘Be
a slave’, he will exclaim ‘No’; and he will march onward, defying their imprecations
and their fury, certain that justice will be rendered to him in his tomb. Such is the
Terrorist.192
Kravchinskii (‘Stepniak’) was himself inspired by Vera Zasulich. In the summer of
1878 he assassinated with a dagger General Mezentsev, the chief of the political police
(Third Section) in St. Petersburg. He was not the only one who drew inspiration from
Zasulich’s deed and trial. N.I. Kibalchich, the explosives expert and bomb-maker of
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Narodny Volya, whose bomb would kill the Tsar three years later, was also directly
inspired by Zasulich’s attempt on Trepov and because of her joined the underground
group of urban terrorists.193
A whole series of other copycat crimes were triggered by Zasulich’s example and
the outcome of her trial: on 23 February 1878 an unsuccessful attempt on the life of an
assistant prosecutor Kotljarevskii was made in Kiev by Verian Osinsky; on 25May 1978
Baron F.E. Geiking, chief gendarme, was assassinated in Kiev; in February 1879 there
was the assassination of Governor Dimitri Kropotkin in Khrakov; inMarch 1879 an
unsuccessful attempt on the life of Alexander Drenteln, Mezentsev’s successor, was
made; on 19 November 1879 a bomb exploded prematurely close to the Tsar’s railway
carriage as he travelled near Moscow; on 2 April 1879 an assassination attempt by
A.K. Soloviev on Alexander ii failed; on February 1880 an unsuccessful attempt on the
life ofMinister of Interior, General Count Loris-Melikov, took place; on 5 February 1880
one hundred pounds of dynamite placed by the carpenter Stephan Khalturin exploded
in the Winter Palace under the Tsar’s dining room but Alexander ii survived; on 1
March 1881 Narodnaya Volya finally managed after six failed attempts to assassinate
Tsar Alexander ii, with the help of a nitroglycerine grenade.194
The ‘Russianmethod’, as it became known, was soonmaking its way abroad. It
even inspired a number of attempted regicides. Soon after Zasulich’s trial, there were
two attempts on the life of William i, the German emperor, one attempt on the Italian
King Umberto i in November 1878 and, themonth before, in October one on King
Alfonso xii of Spain.195 Without Zasulich’s example and the broad publicity given to
her in the press, some of these and other assassination attempts would probably not
have occurred. Vera Zasulich herself felt guilty about this chain of assassinations and,
in late 1880, she secretly returned to Russia and tried to persuade the revolutionaries
to stop terrorism and refocus on the struggle in the countryside. She came too late and
did not succeed; terrorism had become the newmode of political struggle.196 When,
after several failed attempts, the Tsar was killed on 1 March 1881, she was dismayed.197
She would spend more than 25 years abroad and spoke out repeatedly against
the systematic terror of revolutionary organisations from the underground by self-
appointed ‘heroes’. Her own ‘terror’, in the case of Trepov, was later described by her as
an instinctive reaction to evil acts by government officials: ‘When it is impossible to
avert villainy perpetrated before one’s eyes, then the feeling of revenge becomes the
most legitimate social emotion.’198 After her final return to Russia in 1905 she gave
up politics and workedmainly as a translator. Between 1909 and 1919 she lived in the
Writer’s House in St. Petersburg fromwhere she was evicted by Bolshevik soldiers.
She did not survive this eviction and died on 8May 1919 from pneumonia.199 The
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Russian Revolution—in reality more of a coup d’ etat consolidated by Red Terror—had
not brought the revolution she had fought for in her youth. She died disillusioned,
writing in her last year, ‘The Russia I knew and loved is gone.’200
Let us, after this glimpse into the future, return to the late 1870s and the 1880s.
The unfortunate result of the Zasulich trial’s outcome was, as indicated above, the
impression prevailing in revolutionary circles that one could get away withmurder
and be applauded for it by the people. Her trial seemed to give political terrorism a
semblance of legitimacy.201 Many would-be terrorists thought they had a licence to
kill, hoping to get a similar degree of understanding from society as Vera Zasulich had
received from her jurors and the press. While Zasulich’s own attempt on Governor
Trepov was born out of a personal feeling of moral indignation and a desire to take
revenge, those who followed in her footsteps tried to elevate assassination to an
impersonal political doctrine. As a Russian counter-terrorist official from theMinistry
of the Interior wrote perceptively in the late 1880s:
Encouraged by the success of the first terrorist outbreaks, the devotees of anarchism
from then on considered the principle of ‘terror’ as the most propitious mode of
action and the most rational slogan for their plots and their agitations. They busied
themselves with creating ‘theories’ and ‘systems’, seeking to convince the government
and the public of the legitimacy of their crimes. The origin of the terrorist principles
is thus explainedmore logically by consideration of an opportunistic character.202
The emergence of terrorism as a doctrine—the ‘philosophy of the bomb’—was
advanced by the writings ofNarodnaya Volya. It was born out of the apparent failure
of the populists tomobilise the peasants and from the absence of a sizeable urban
working class ready to rise against the state. The populist revolutionaries’ inability
to mobilise the masses led some of them to have recourse to murderous attacks
on government officials.203 Amplified by the press, the impression was created by
spectacular acts of terrorism that there was a sizeable and growing revolutionary
movement, willing and able successfully to challenge the state. However, in reality the
Russian terrorists were weak—estimates vary from a few dozen to a few hundred at
best, with a few hundred (some say thousands) more sympathisers actively supporting
their efforts. In a country of hundredmillion people they were nomore than a drop in
the ocean. The Tsarist police managed to round upmost of them—somuch so that
the first wave of Russian terrorism, triggered by Vera Zasulich, practically came to
an end with themassive crackdown following the assassination of Alexander ii on 1
March 1881.204
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Deborah Hardy, who studied the origins of Russian Terrorism in the years 1876–
1879 concluded:
Terrorism was too often a state of mind. It grew from feeding on its own danger,
daring, and heroics. […] Too many […] were dominated by their emotional reac-
tions to the magnetism of violence: by their need to act, their drives to become
heroes, a strange attraction to martyrdom, their feeling for each other, their fer-
vor about something that was ‘contagious’ or ‘in the air’ or ‘inevitable’. Few of
them, according to their memoirs, did much careful analyzing at all, beyond the
intricate planning of the next, ever more spectacular and gruesome, terrorist deed.
Their ultimate failure to attain their goal […] became a personal tragedy for many
of them.205
That was certainly true for Vera Zasulich. Her search for ‘justice’ for Bogoliubov
brought her before a Court of Justice which, despite her crime, showedmercy towards
her. Yet by side-stepping the provisions of the law for her crime, the court involuntarily
legitimised, at least in the eyes of fellow revolutionaries, others to go and take the
pursuit of ‘justice’, as they understood it, into their own hands. The consequences of
that decision of 31 March 1878 were far-reaching. Her deed inspired, as mentioned
above, the bomb-maker whose bomb killed the Tsar to join ‘The People’s Will’. The
killing of the Tsar in 1881 in turn led to pogroms against Jews who were (wrongly)
blamed for the conspiracy that led to the assassination. Such pogroms involving
murder, rape and plunder would continue until 1884. In 1891, the systematic expulsion
of most Jews fromMoscow set in. These developments forced many Jews to move to
Central andWestern Europe. However, anti-Semitism followed them andmet them
in full force in post-World War i Germany.
There can be no doubt that Zazulich’s crime had consequences that were far-
reaching. Some of the consequences are still with us today. Where one wants to draw
the line of her ebbing influence is a fascinating question. Yet there can be no doubt
that her example set in motion a newmodel of political violence.
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4. Stalin’s 1936 Show Trial against the
‘Trotzkyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre’
Alex P. Schmid
The show trial is a propaganda arm of political terror. It aims to personalize an abstract
political enemy, to place it in the dock in flesh andblood and,with the aid of a perverted
system of justice, to transform abstract political-ideological differences into easily
intelligible common crimes. It both incites the masses against the evil embodied by
the defendants and frightens them away from supporting any potential opposition.
George H. Hodos (1987)1
4.1. Introduction
This chapter on the first of the three show trials staged in the Soviet Union in the years
1936–1938 offers a comprehensive reconstruction of an enormous travesty of justice.
Recounting a complex ‘Orwellian’ conspiracy, in which perceptions and realities stood
far apart, it is longer than the other chapters in this volume. In part this is also due
to the fact that it goes beyond amere description of the trial itself, a trial that was
the catalyst to a tragedy leading to the death of hundreds of thousands of innocent
people. A broad contextualisation of events that preceded, accompanied and followed
the trial that took place more than three quarters of a century ago in a closed society
is necessary for its full understanding. Given the fact that this trial was one of the
most brazenmiscarriages of justice in the 20th century and its consequences have
nevertheless been largely forgotten, this chapter also serves as a reminder of what
totalitarianism can do to individuals and whole societies, using the justice system to
enable and ‘legitimise’ injustices on a large scale.
In our previous case study on the trial of Vera Zasulich, it was demonstrated that
the defence had the greater ‘performative power’. In this chapter the balance of power is
altogether on the side of the prosecutor. The real target of the trial, Lev Trotzky, called it
‘thegreatest frame-up in thepolitical history of theworld’.2Hewasnot far off themark.
In the Zasulich case, the perpetrator was declared innocent of the alleged crime,
although her crime had been objectively established and, as such, was not contested.
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In the present case study, those accused were de facto innocent, at least of the
crimes they were charged with. The real perpetrators were Joseph Stalin, General
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
and somemembers of his innermost circle—Nikolai I. Yezhov, Andrei Y. Vyshinsky
and Genrikh G. Yagoda. The trial was set up as part of a campaign to eliminate the
‘Old Bolsheviks’. The outcome was that Stalin won the trial, justice was denied, truth
was trampled upon andmuch of the world fooled. Many local and foreign observers,
especially those who stood on the left side of the political spectrum, professed that
this trial against Kamenev and Zinoviev—Lenin’s closest comrades, according to
Lenin’s wife3—and their co-defendants was fair and that the confessionsmade by
those accused were genuine. The showwas so well orchestrated that the term ‘show
trial’ was later invented to describe this and subsequent trials that were perversions
of justice.
Jeremy Peterson wrote that a ‘show trial’ requires two essential elements: a
heightened probability of the defendant’s conviction, and a focus on the audience
observing the trial rather than on the defendant.4 Peterson’s characterisation applies
here but does not go far enough. Instead of ‘a hightened probablility’ of conviction
the verdicts in theMoscow show trials were a foregone conclusion.5 Show trials are
often characterised by apparently unforced and completely unexpected confessions by
defendants to improbable crimes.6
Between 1936 and 1938, three major show trials were held in Moscow. The key
crime in the first trial was ‘terrorism’, in the second trial it was ‘wrecking’ and ‘high
treason’, and in the third it was ‘espionage’.7 Those accused in the first Moscow trial
in August 1936 were Grigory Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev and 14 others; in the second, held
in late January 1937, Levid Pyatakov, Karl Radek and 15 others stood in front of the
bench. The third trial saw Nikolai Bukharin, Alexei I. Rykov and 19 others accused in
March 1938.8 Of the 54 people accused in these three trials, 47 were sentenced to death;
the others received long prison sentences.9
Here the focus is on the first of these three show trials. Between 19 and 24 August
1936, the trial against the so-called ‘Trotzkyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre’ was
conducted at a Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the ussr in Moscow
and given great publicity.10 Those accused were charged, inter alia, with forming a
terrorist organisation with the purpose of killing Joseph Stalin and other members of
the Soviet government. Before their trial, there had been a secret trial of a disturbed
young Communist, Leonid Nikolayev, who had been charged with killing Sergei
Kirov on 1 December 1934. In some respects, his case was comparable to that of Dutch
Communist Marinus van der Lubbe, who allegedly set fire to the German Reichstag
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building on 27 February 1933. The Nazis implicated Van der Lubbe in a Comintern
(Communist International) plot and staged a trial in Leipzig. In both cases—Stalin’s
and Hitler’s—there are indications of a false flag operation where those accused were
pawns in a larger game. Their crimes and the trials were designed to consolidate power
for each leader. The trial against Van der Lubbe and other alleged conspirators was
public anddidnot quite play out thewayHitler had intended—onlyVander Lubbewas
sentenced to death, not his alleged Comintern comrades. The Zinoviev-Kamenev trial
was staged more successfully, despite the fact that the prosecutor, Andrei Vyshinsky,
had practically no evidence to prove his case—only the coerced confessions of the
accused and those of equally coerced witnesses.11 Nevertheless the Soviet prosecutor
managed to persuade (or fool) most of the public and, incredibly, to some extent, even
some of the defendants themselves. They played their roles completely against their
own best interests, for reasons to be explored later.
The Kirov murder, the three Moscow show trials and the Great Purges that
accompanied them still baffle historians—though not as much as those who lived
through them. The chain of events is complex, and many documents relating to them
have been hidden, destroyed or falsified.12 Thosewriting about these events have often
had political, ideological and personal motives to stress one interpretation over the
other—for example, to whitewash Communist policies or to place most of the blame
exclusively on Stalin. Not all archives are accessible and what they have yielded so far
is complex and often confusing. As one recent Stalin biographer put it ‘The events of
1935–1938, which led to the total destruction of the Leninist Party, remain the greatest
riddle of Stalin’s reign. Why did he destroy the Party, now completely subservient
to him, with such inordinate cruelty?’13 The interpretation presented here is based
on a broad reading of secondary sources; it is also based on the official ‘Report of the
Court Proceedings’ of the first show trial. These texts from the trial sometimes only
offer summaries of what was said, while at other times reproducing the courtroom
dialogues verbatim. The Report is the only officially approved version of the recordings
as they were published in 1936; it is neither complete nor fully accurate. The original
protocols were apparently destroyed in a fire.14
The first Moscow show trial was a political trial, that is, legal procedures were
used for political ends by a regime that did not recognise the separation of powers
between legislative, executive and judicative branches of government as it evolved in
Europe since the 18th century. The classical political trial involves, in the words of Otto
Kirchheimer, ‘a regime’s attempt to incriminate its foe’s public behaviour with a view
to evicting him from the political scene’. A variant on this, the ‘derivative political
trial’, Kirchheimer identifies as one ‘where the weapon of defamation, perjury, and
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contempt are manipulated in an effort to bring disrepute upon a political foe’.15 Both
definitions are fully applicable in this case.
The trial under consideration was also ‘political’ in a peculiarly Marxist sense,
explained by George Katkov:
Law, being like the state, only a superstructure in the organization of human society,
was interpreted as one of the instruments of the class struggle, an instrumentwhich in
the hands of the property-owning classes served tomaintain their privileges butwhich
in the hands of a proletarian dictatorship (in the period of transition to socialism and
Communism) was to be a revolutionary weapon to bring about the desired historical
changes. Not merely legislation itself, but its practical application in court was to
serve themilitant purpose of the Party. It would be self-contradictory, un-Marxist
and counter-revolutionary for aMarxist to object to the use of legal procedures for
political ends.16
While in the beginning of Soviet rule the judiciary was politically instrumentalised
mainly against class enemies, under Stalin it was also used against rivals, enemies and
deviationists in the ruling Bolshevik Party as we shall see in the unfolding of events
between 1934 and 1936.
4.2. What Happened before the Trial
4.2.1. The Stalin–Trotzky Rivalry
It has been said that all history is biography. To the extent that this is true, the present
case reflects also a clash of two biographies, those of Joseph Stalin and Lev Trotzky. The
Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 was, initially, little more than a coup d’état themain
architect of which was Lev Trotzky. Joseph Stalin, writing about the seizure of power
in St. Petersburg on the first anniversary of the revolution in the Pravda (the Party
newspaper), acknowledged this:
All practical work in connection with the organization of the uprising was done under
the immediate direction of Comrade Trotzky, the president of the Petrograd Soviet.
It can be stated with certainty that the Party is indebted primarily and principally
to Comrade Trotzky for the rapid defection of the garrison to the Soviet side and for
efficiently organizing the work of theMilitary-Revolutionary Committee.17
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The origins of the conflict between Josef Stalin and Lev Trotzky go back to the
civil war (1918–1920). Trotzky was the founder of the Red Army and the leading force
in the civil war victory against the ‘White Guards’.18 Stalin played a very minor role
in these events but later rewrote history to enhance his place in it. By the early 1920s
that civil war, and a war with Poland, had come to an end and an internal power
struggle within the Bolshevik cadres took shape. The struggle for control of the
Bolshevik Party intensified from 1922 onwards, when Lenin had his first incapacitating
stroke. In that year Stalin became Secretary of the Party, a position for which Ivan
N. Smirnov had also been proposed. By 1923 the Politburo consisted of V. Lenin,
L. Kamenev, A. Rykov, M. Tomsky, G. Zinoviev, L. Trotzky and J. Stalin.19 The struggle
for leadership which followed Lenin’s death in January 1924 lasted more than three
years. At the end Trotzky (and others) were defeated and Stalin had consolidated his
power by 1927. In the beginning, this power struggle had not been overtly violent.
After Lenin’s death, as one of the six remaining Politburo members, Stalin proclaimed
in 1924:
It is the task of the Party to bury Trotzkyism as an ideological trend. There is talk
about measures of repression against the opposition and of the possibility of a split.
This is all nonsense, comrades. Our Party …will not allow any splits. As for repressions,
I am decidedly opposed to them. What we want now is not repressions, but a[n] …
ideological struggle against … Trotzkyism.20
That was his declaratory policy, but Stalin’s vindictiveness already surfaced in
a conversation he had in the summer of 1923 with Felix Dzerzhinski, the chief
of the Cheka, the political police (later renamed nkvd)21—a conversation Lev
Kamenev also witnessed. Stalin: ‘To choose one’s enemy, to prepare every detail of
the blow, to slake an implacable vengeance, and then go to bed. […] There is nothing
sweeter in the world!’22 Stalin developed a simple conflict resolution model early
in his career: ‘Death solves all problems. Where there are no people, there are no
problems.’23
Stalin was a master ‘technician of power’, his love of political intrigue driven by a
thirst for revenge, and haunted by constant suspicion, bordering on paranoia in later
life.24 He could not forgive past insults and humiliations. In 1926 Trotzky had called
Stalin the ‘gravedigger’ of the Party and the revolution. Pyatakov (who was to be tried
ten years later in the second show trial), told Trotzky ‘[Stalin] will never forgive you for
this, neither you nor your children, nor your grandchildren’.25 During the 14th Party
Congress in 1926, Kamenev and Zinoviev had also broken with Stalin, who formed a
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new coalition with the ‘Party’s favourite’ (as Lenin called him) Nikolai Bukharin.26
The following year, in August 1927, Stalin had Trotzky and Zinoviev expelled from
the Central Committee. Numerically, the Trotzkyists were only a very small faction
in the Party: out of 854,000 Party members only 4,000 voted for the Trotzkyists and
only about 12,000 Partymembers at that time openly sympathised with Trotzky.27
Trotzky tried to regain lost ground by revealing the existence (but not the content) of
Lenin’s testament in public in October 1927.28 In this document Lenin had discussed
five possible successors: Trotzky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin and Pyatakov; at the
same time he had suggested the removal of Stalin who was judged to be too brutal.29
However, that did not help Trotzky; he was exiled to Alma Ati in 1927. Later he fled to
Norway where he stayed during the first show trial. When Stalin put pressure on
Norway, he sailed to Mexico.
After Lenin’s death, there were shifting coalitions among themain actors in the
Communist Party’s power struggles. The events of 1936–1938 were in part a replay of
these alliances and splits.30 Yet at the same time, by themid-1930s, the power struggles
of the 1920s were largely history; Stalin was the acknowledged supreme leader of the
Party and the Soviet state.31 He had implemented his first Five-Year Plan (1928–1933)
with an emphasis on heavy industrialisation and arms production on the one hand
and a collectivisation of agriculture on the other. The human costs, especially in the
countryside, were enormous: six million died in 1932–1933 alone, as collectivisation
led to repression through forced deportations, and to famine.32 As a consequence, in
the late 1920s and early 1930s criticism of Party politics was widespread, but subdued
and unorganised.33 Throughout the 1920s, the Bolshevik Party had not been held
in high esteem bymost of the workers, let alone the peasants. They experienced a
continuation of repressive tactics used during the Red Terror and the civil war. These
tactics had kept the Bolsheviks in power.34
By the early 1930s, those Party members (and common people) who took issue
with the brutality of collectivisation created more problems for Stalin than the
Trotzkyists.35 To escape deportation and starvation, some 12 million peasants had fled
to the cities.36 Reflections of widespread social unrest surfaced at the Party Congress in
1933. The grossmismanagement of the economymotivated some Congress delegates to
discuss among themselves the possibility of replacing Stalin with the Party’s chief in
Leningrad, who was Zinoviev’s successor. Kirov was more popular among the workers
thanmost other Party bosses. He actually ventured into the factories, spoke to and
listened to workers—somethingmost Party bosses did not dare or care to do anymore,
except in tightly controlled settings. Kirov was asked privately whether he would
accept Stalin’s position if it was offered to him. Yet Kirov informed Stalin about this
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exploratorymove to replace him, and said he had no interest in becoming leader of the
Party.37 Stalin was nevertheless anxious about this challenge. Kirov in turn became
worried too as now he felt threatened.38
In order to address the latent revolt by those who had wanted to see Kirov replace
him, Stalin came up with the idea of bringing Kirov from Leningrad toMoscow to be
appointed as one of the four Party secretaries. On the surface, this would appear to be
a concession to the wishes of many in the CommunistParty. In reality, it would bring
Kirov under the direct control of Stalin, his bodyguards and his secret police. Kirov
tried to avoid and then postpone the promotion. A compromise was reached: Kirov
became third secretary of the Party but would stay for the time being in Leningrad.
Stalin and Kirov had once been friends, but now Stalin saw Kirov as his rival. The
events that follow are difficult to understand without acknowledging the duality of
this love/hate relationship. Sergei Kirov had a number of qualities Stalin admired—
popularity, eloquence, charisma—and Stalin was also jealous of Kirov. Ominously,
when Kirov postponed his move toMoscow, Stalin tried to replace some of Kirov’s
personal security personnel in Leningrad.
Events taking place in Germany around this timemay have influenced Stalin. On
30 June 1934, Adolf Hitler arranged what has become known as the ‘Night of the Long
Knives’. With his close allies Hermann Goering, (PrimeMinister of Prussia), Joseph
Goebbels (Propaganda) and ss chief Heinrich Himmler and his Deputy Reinhard
Heydrich, Hitler had manufactured false evidence, implicating the chief of the Sturm
Abteilung sa—a paramilitary unit of Hitler’s party, Ernst Röhm, in a conspiracy to
organise a Putsch and execute the Fuehrer and his closest allies. On 30 June, when all
the sa leaders weremeeting in BadWiessee, Hitler ordered a commando action to
have them arrested, purged and, as in Röhm’s case, killed (after he refused to commit
suicide). Altogether some 130 samembers aswell as some otherswere executed.Hitler’s
bold move to get rid of his rivals impressed Stalin, who commented to Politburo
member Anastas Mikoyan, ‘Did you hear what happened in Germany? Some fellow
that Hitler! Splendid. That’s a deed of some skill!’39
What Stalin did to his own Old Bolsheviks in the coming years was many times
‘bolder’ (and deadlier) than Hitler’s purge of the rival sa leaders. It was a nightmare
that engulfed the Party, then the country and even the Comintern (the Communist
International Organisation), for more than four years. We know that he conceived the
idea to purge the Party of oppositionists and rivals in the summer of 1934,40 at the
same time as the sa purge took place in Germany. There is an ongoing controversy
among historians as to the planning for each consecutive step in Stalin’s ascent to
total power in the ussr. Some argue that he followed a diabolical strategy; others see
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him stumbling from one deadly game of chess to another, sometime retreating, then
attacking again.41 Newly released sources tend to support the first view.
What triggered the Great Purge and the first Stalinist show trial was themurder
of the Leningrad Party chief Sergei Kirov, on 1 December 1934. The apparent murderer
was Leonid Nikolayev, but there is an ongoing controversy as to whether or not Stalin
personally ordered Kirov’s assassination. Some questions remain unanswered, such
as who tipped off Nikolayev that Kirov was making an unplanned visit to his office
at the Smolny Institute? Khrushchev later thought that Stalin had a hand in this,
andMikoyan also believed that Stalin ‘was somehow involved in the death’.42 The
murderer andkeywitnesses conveniently disappearedunder dubious circumstances,43
evidence was lost or altered,44 and different interest groups, then and later, pushed or
prevented interpretations as to who was behind Kirov’s murder. Kirov’s bodyguard
(M.D. Borisov) was killed the next day in a contrived car accident. On the afternoon of
themurder, as Borisov had accompanied Kirov to his office on the third floor of the
Smolny Institute, he lagged behind him on the staircase—either because he could not
keep pace with the more agile Kirov or because he was apparently held back for a few
moments by some Chekists fromMoscow. This gave Nikolayev, who was waiting for
Kirov in the corridor on the third floor, the opportunity to approach him from behind
and shoot him in the neck. A second shot was fired in the corridor shortly afterwards
and hit the ceiling. It is unclear whether this shot was a bungled attempt at suicide by
the assassin, perhaps prevented by the interference of an electrician who happened to
step into the corridor. When Borisov arrived moments later with his pistol drawn,
Kirov was alreadymortally wounded.45
The assassin was a disgruntled young Communist who felt mistreated by the
Party bosses. In this he was not alone; feelings of resentment were widespread among
the population, as revealed by secret reports the nkvd produced on reactions to Kirov’s
murder.46 In the month before the murder, Nikolayev had lost his job, and was first
excluded but then reinstated in the Party. He had written to both Stalin and Kirov
in desperation, saying, ‘I am ready to do anything if no one responds.’ Perhaps this
gave Stalin the idea of using him as his instrument to get rid of Kirov.47 However,
no ‘smoking gun’ points directly to Stalin. Some pieces of the evidence puzzle are
difficult to reconcile, perhaps also because evidence was altered in the aftermath of
the murder, but the case against Stalin is a strong one.48 Philip Medved, Leningrad
nkvd chief, later held that Stalin had suggested the assassination of Kirov to Yagoda.
He did not survive the purges, probably because he knew toomuch.49
Themurder of Kirov marks the beginning of a chain of events that cost the lives
of hundreds of thousands of people, and affected countless others who were exiled
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to Siberia or placed in camps.50 The Great Terror of 1936–1938 wasmainly a purge of
the Bolshevik Party. The Party had grown considerably during the First Five-Year
plan, more than doubling between 1929 and 1933 to 3.5 millionmembers. Communist
Party insiders enjoyed privileges and protection from persecution, somembership
was sought not only by true believers, but by opportunists and careerists of all hues.
Attempts were made to control the influx into the Party, for example by withdrawing
old Party cards and issuing new ones, and in 1933 alone more than 18 per cent of
Partymembers lost their membership. This process of purging Partymembership
continued throughout the 1930s.51 Until 1936, exclusion from the Partymeant at worst
exile, prison or labour camp. In the 1920s, a show of regret had often been sufficient for
re-admission to the Party, certainly for Old Bolsheviks (who had been Party members
before 1917, or had distinguished themselves in the civil war against the ‘White Guard’
counter-revolutionaries). Zinoviev and Kamenev, who had been expelled twice from
the Party, were readmitted in the late 1920s after showing repentance.52
By the mid-1930s the Communist Party was the new elite, far removed from the
proletariat it was supposed to represent. In reality, the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’
meant rule by cliques of local bosses with their patronage networks. Party discipline
had brought the Bolsheviks to power in 1917. Stalin and others considered the Party as
the instrument to bring about a new society. But first the Party had to be cleansed of
parasites, opportunists and ‘double-dealers’ (those who professed Bolshevik principles
but secretly advanced their own careers). Vigilance was called for to keep the Party
‘pure’. Those who deviated from the Party line had to be purged. Although Kirov had
not openly deviated from the Party line, he wanted reconciliation within the Party, as
well as between the Party and the 165 million citizens of the Soviet Union.53 He was
also, as we have seen, Stalin’s potential rival. His murder marked the beginning of a
catastrophic series of events. To understand the show trial that began on 19 August 1936
some additional background information—provided here in the following paragraphs
in chronological fashion—is necessary.
On 1 December 1934, within hours of learning of the Kirovmurder, Stalin drafted
a new law, published in Pravda on 5 December; it stipulated rapid procedures for
processing cases involving terrorism. Investigations of terrorist cases were to be
completed within ten days; the accused would be informed of the charges only
24 hours before the trial, and the trial would take place without the presence of
the defendant or counsel. Appeals for clemency would not be permitted and death
sentences would be carried out immediately. This decree was soon to be included
under Article 58 of the Penal Code (1927) and gave the nkvd a licence to kill suspects
without due process. This fateful decree was to provide the legal basis for the arrest,
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trial and execution or deportation to labour camps of up to twomillion people over
the next four years.54 On the same day he drafted the draconian new law, Stalin
travelled to Leningrad in order to supervise the investigation into Kirov’s murder.
He personally spoke with the assassin Nikolayev, seeking to link him to a group
of Zinovievites, an allegation Nikolayev denied.55Following Kirov’s state funeral
on 3 December 1934, Stalin created a personality cult around the fallen comrade;
within a week, several books in praise of Kirov were published.56 Bymid-December,
Kamenev and Zinoviev, already confined in a ‘political isolator’ (a procedure similar
to house arrest) since 1932, were arrested inMoscow;57 In Leningrad, 843 others were
arrested in the two and a half months after the murder. Until 1938, more than 90,000
others were to follow them in the Leningrad district alone.58 By 22 December 1934,
the nkvd announced that investigations had shown that Nikolayev was a member
of an underground terrorist organisation established by Zinoviev oppositionists in
Leningrad.59 Stalin instructed that all involved should be condemned to death.60
A week later Soviet newspapers reported that Nikolayev and 13 ‘young Zinovievites’
associated with a Leningrad terrorist Centre had been sentenced in a closed trial
and executed.61 Neither the indictment nor the verdict mentioned Zinoviev and
Kamenev.62 During December, 6,501 people were shot, many of them from Kirov’s
entourage.63
At the beginning of 1935, Stalin instructed the nkvd to find and bring to trial
any members of the Zinovievite ‘Moscow Centre’. In a secret trial, 19 accused persons
were found guilty of ‘objectively contributing to inflaming terrorist moods’ among
adherents in Leningrad. Theywere tried on 15–16 January; Kamenev received a five-year
prison sentence and Zinoviev ten years.64 Yezhov, speaking on behalf of Stalin, had
assured Zinoviev that the secret trial would be the last sacrifice he would have tomake
‘for the sake of the Party’.65 No death sentences were issued. In a secret letter Stalin
ordered that all opposition had to be treated like White Guards, i.e. were to be arrested
and taken to camps.66 On 16 January it was announced that further investigations had
produced ‘newmaterial relating to the underground counter-revolutionary activities
of G.Y. Zinoviev, G.E. Evdokimov, L.B. Kamenev and G.F. Fedorov’.67 Two days later
Stalin drafted a letter on the lessons of the events connected to the Kirov murder,
calling the Zinoviev oppositional group ‘the most treacherous and despicable of all
fractional groups in the history of our country’, adding that ‘with such double-dealers
we cannot restrict ourselves to their exclusion from the Party’.68 Stalin also demanded
a check of all Partymembership cards by the Party. It was alleged that Kirov’smurderer
had entered the Smolny Institute with a falsified Party card. Some 250,000members
were subsequently deprived of Party membership.69
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On 23 February 1935, after a series of arrests, during which part of Trotzky’s archive
from the 1927 period was recovered (from I.I. Trusov), Stalin asked Yezhov to build
a case against a ‘Trotzky–Zinoviev Centre’.70 By late April or early May, Yagoda,
Commissar-General of State Security, in a text edited by Stalin and entitled ‘From
Factionalism to Open Counter-revolution’, ‘proof ’ was offered that in its struggle
against the Party the former opposition around Zinoviev had resorted to methods of
terror.71 On 13 May, a secret Central Committee decree led to the creation of a Special
Security Commission of Politburomembers charged with directing the liquidation
of ‘enemies of the people’. Its members included Stalin, Yezhov, Vyshinsky, Zhdanov,
Malenkov and Shkiryatov.72 In mid-1935, Yezhov announced the existence of a Centre
of Trotzkyists. Yezhov said that he was sanctioned to carry out operations against
Trotzkyists in Moscow.73 Towards the end of the year Yezhov, by now the deputy chief
of the nkvd, reported to the Central Committee that 33 per cent of all those purged
from the Party since July 1935 had been spies, White Guards and Trotzkyists.74 Yezhov
initiated an investigation into the case of a ‘United Trotzky–Zinoviev center’.75 In
early 1936, Valentine Olberg, a former Trotzky associate, was arrested in Gorky. Under
interrogation, Olberg ‘confessed’ to being a Trotzky emissary.76 On the last day of
March 1936, Stalin ordered Yagoda and Vyshinsky to submit a concrete proposal for the
trial of 82 Trotzkyists. Among those interrogated during April in preparation of such
a trial were Smirnov, Mrachkovsky and Ter-Vaganyan.77 When Yagoda, Commissar-
General of State Security, looked at the evidence, he came to the conclusion that
the charge that Trotzky had ordered terrorism in the ussr was ‘nonsense’.78 Stalin
threatened to ‘punch him in the nose’ if he continued to drag his feet with the
investigations.79
Inmid-May,Molchanov, annkvd investigator, presented to Stalin, Yezhov, Yagoda
and others a diagram depicting Trotzky as part of a ‘terrorist conspiracy’ in the ussr.80
By 20May the Politburo decided that Trotzkyists already in prison were to be handed
over to the nkvd so that death sentences could be passed on them.81 By 19 June 1936
Yagoda and Vyshinsky, the State Prosecutor, presented to Stalin the requested list
of 82 Trotzkyists who could be brought to trial for participating in terrorist activity.
Stalin suggested that a combined case against Trotzkyists and Zinovievites should be
prepared for an open trial.82 In preparation of a public trial, by mid-July ‘confessions’
were obtained from Kamenev, Zinoviev, Bakayev, Dreitzer andMrachkovsky.83 On
29 July 1936, just before going on holiday to Sochi, Stalin sent a secret letter, which
had been drafted by Yezhov, to the Politburo, the Central Committee and the Party
organisations. This letter, ‘On the Terrorist Activity of the Trotzky–Zinoviev Counter-
revolutionary Bloc’, came as a total surprise tomost of the recipients.84 It claimed
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that plans to assassinate Stalin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze, Zhdanov,
Kosior and Postyshev were the ‘main and principal task of the [Trotzky–Zinoviev]
Centre’.85 A week later, on 7 August 1936, Vyshinsky sent Stalin a draft indictment for
the forthcoming trial of Zinoviev, Kamenev et al.; Stalin edited it twice and accepted
the third version.86 In preparation of the trial a further decree was issued with regard
to terrorist trials, apparently to create the illusion for those accused that all would
be window dressing and that in the end they would be spared the full weight of the
verdict. To achieve this, on 11 August 1936, partly undoing the decree of 1December 1934,
a further decreewas issued re-establishing public hearings for terrorist trials. Contrary
to the decree of 1 December (which had entered the Penal Code under article 58),
appeals from the accused were allowed for three days after a sentence had been passed,
and the use of defence lawyers was again permitted.87 This opened the possibility
of a public show trial. Four days later, on 15 August 1936, Pravda announced that
the nkvd had uncovered a Trotzkyist–Zinoviev plot to murder Stalin and other
leaders, and that these ‘enemies of the people’ were the same who had also killed
Kirov.88
Three days later, on 19 August 1936—which, by coincidence, was also the day the
official theatre season inMoscow began89—the show trial could begin. The person
who had done the mise en scène, Stalin, had, in the meantime, left the scene; on 13
August he arrived at the Black Sea where he would spent the coming six weeks on
holiday in Sochi. However, howwell he prepared the show can be gathered from his
involvement in the preparations, including the production of ‘confessions’.
4.2.2. How ‘Confessions’ were Secured
In 1939 chief prosecutor Andrei Vyshinsky published a book with the title The Theory of
LegalEvidence in Soviet Law. In thisworkhe postulated that ‘confession is a queen over all
sorts of evidence’.90 Confession also happens to be the essence of show trials. Before we
turn to the trial itself, it is important to examine the way the evidence for the trial was
collected. It consisted almost exclusively of self-incriminating ‘confessions’. Howwere
these astounding confessions obtained? At the time, some suggested the defendants
had been given chemical substances, or were hypnotised. Another theory was that
actors (who resembled the more well-known defendants) sat in the courtroom, rather
than the Old Bolshevik heroes themselves. Others thought that torture had elicited
the confessions.91 There is some substance to this last charge, but the issue depends
on how torture is defined. According to Khrushchev, extreme torture only became, on
Stalin’s initiative, standard practice by 1937.92However the defendants of the 1936 show
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trial were certainly under great pressure. The key defendants, Zinoviev and Kamenev,
were brokenmen after years of imprisonment. They had been twice excluded from the
Party and then readmitted after submitting to the Party line. Theymay have hoped
that the trial was the final humiliation to undergo before they were welcomed back
into the arms of the Party. Or theymay have hoped that if the death sentence was
pronounced, it would be commuted immediately to a lesser penalty. There is some
dispute as to whether or not they were tortured to extract confessions. Yet this does
not seem to have been the case, at least for these two defendants. Yet those arrested
and prepared for trial were certainly placed under enormous psychological pressure.
Originally, some 300 ‘Trotzkyists’ had been rounded up from prisons and the Gulag
and brought toMoscowwhere they had been prepared for possible use in the trial.93
Within such a large group, some prisoners would inevitably be prepared to confess
anything and denounce anybody if it would help to save themselves, or at least the
lives of their family members. Some of those brought to trial were actually, as we shall
see, provocateurs—pseudo-defendants working for the nkvd who were instructed to
denounce some of the real defendants.
When the usual interrogative methods (sleep deprivation, sub-standard food
and general bullying) used on Kamenev did not produce the desired result, Stalin
was annoyed. He reprimanded one of the interrogators, Mironov: ‘Now, then, don’t
tell me anymore that Kamenev, or this or that prisoner, is able to withstand that
pressure. Don’t come to report to me until you have Kamenev’s confession in this
briefcase!’94 Further ‘pressure’ was brought on Kamenev, including Yezhov’s threat to
shoot Kamenev’s son if he did not submit. During a critical phase of the interrogations,
Stalin’s secretary would phone every two hours to find out whether Kamenev and
Mrachkovsky had been ‘broken’ (had confessed).95 Stalin’s instructions on how to
obtain a confession on another occasion had been: ‘Mount your prisoners and don’t
dismount till they have given you the testimony!’96 At one point in the summer of
1936, Kamenev and Zinovievwere allowed to consult with each other. As a consequence,
they ‘agreed to go on trial on condition that Stalin would confirm his promise to
them of executing neither themselves nor their followers, in the presence of the
whole Politburo’.97 According to Orlov, an nkvd chief, they were then brought to
the Kremlin, but instead of the full Politburo only Stalin, Voroshilov and Yezhov
were present. Stalin explained that they formed the special ‘commission’ of the
Politburo authorised to hear the case. The two defendants asked for a guarantee that
their lives would be spared in exchange for confessions. Stalin made it clear that
they were in no position to make demands, but also gave them false hope, telling
them:
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First: that the trial is directed not against them, but against Trotzky, the principal
enemy of the Party; Second: if we did not shoot them [Zinoviev and Kamenev] when
they fought actively against the Central Committee, then why should we shoot them
after they have helped the Central Committee in the struggle against Trotzky? Third,
the comrades forget also … that we are Bolsheviks, disciples and followers of Lenin,
and that we don’t want to shed the blood of Old Bolsheviks, nomatter how grave their
past sins against the Party.
Zinoviev and Kamenev consented to go on trial ‘if it were promised that none of
the Old Bolsheviks would be executed, that their families would not be persecuted
and that in the future the death sentence would not be applied to any of the former
members of the opposition’. Stalin’s reply was, according to Orlov, ‘That goes without
saying.’98 As soon as Zinoviev and Kamenev hadmade what they thought was a deal
with Stalin, their surrender was rewarded: by mid-July 1936, they were held in much
better conditions of detention—more like a sanatorium than a prison.99 They were
no longer subject to the ‘conveyor belt’ (non-stop interrogations by a series of nkvd
interrogators) that had deprived them of sleep.100 The other main defendants—
Bakayev, Dreitzer, Mrachkovsky—confessed between 13 and 21 July. Mrachkovsky
had endured the ‘conveyor belt’ for hours in a row.101 In the end, all but Smirnov
confessed, and even he seemed to be close to a confession by the 5th of August.102 Two
days later, the prosecutor, Andrei Vyshinsky, felt confident that he had a sufficiently
large pool of ‘confessing’ oppositionists to present a list of twelve to be indicted. Stalin
changed parts of Vyshinsky’s draft indictment and added twomore names (Moissei
Lurye and Nathan Lurye). A revised indictment draft reached Stalin on 10 August, and
Stalin again added twomore names—Ter-Vaganyan and Evdokimov.103
These men were all Old Bolsheviks for whom the Party was sacred. For the sake of
the Party, they were expected to make great personal sacrifices. Zinoviev was asked by
Molotov:
Howmany times have you lied to the Party? Howmany times have your lies damaged
the Party? You are now asked to calumniate yourself for the good of the Party. At a
time when Trotzky is trying to split the workers’ movement, and the Germans are
preparing to attack us, your lies will undoubtedly be of help to the Party. That is
undeniable. So what is there to discuss? If the interests of the Party demand it, it is
our duty to sacrifice not only our miserable reputations but our very lives. Although,
objectively, you are not being asked to lie. Objectively, everything you did was [a]
betrayal of the Party’s interest.104
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Molotov assumed that if Zinoviev and Kamenev played the game in the show trial
well, they would be pardoned and he told Stalin so.105 That belief would putMolotov
himself for a while in the danger zone.106
The scriptwriter for the trial was Stalin, who followed the interrogations in every
detail.107 Russian historian Roman Brackman, author of a recent biography of Stalin,
writes:
The interrogators had to force the defendants to confess their roles in the plot, the de-
tails ofwhichhadbeenprovidedby Stalinwhoprobably convincedhimself that theplot
indeed existed. But to buttress his conviction, he felt the need to force the defendants
to confess their involvement in it. When some of his subordinates dared to suggest
that many people at home or abroad would not believe these accusations against Old
Bolsheviks, Stalin’s contemptuous reply was: ‘Never mind, they’ll swallow it.’108
Not only was the audience to be fooled; the accused were also misled. Before the
trial began, Yagoda and Yezhovmet with the chief defendants—Zinoviev, Kamenev,
Evdikomov, Mrachkovsky, Bakayev and Ter-Vaganyan. They were reminded of Stalin’s
promise that their lives would be spared if they all played their roles as expected.
Yezhov also warned them that the whole group would suffer if there was a single
attempt at ‘treachery’.109
During the trial, Yagoda would monitor the performance of the accused through
a loudspeaker from an adjacent room.110 In the Kremlin, Lazar Kaganovich (‘Iron
Lazar’, the Politburo member who had been one of the chief people responsible for the
genocidal famine in the Ukraine) was entrusted with controlling the course of the
trial.111 Each day, protocols of the court proceedings were brought or transmitted to
Stalin.His handhad been in almost every detail of the trial, including selecting the cast
of defendants, rewording the indictment prepared by Vyshinsky, and pre-determining
the sentences to be meted out by the court.112 His invented plot for this play was
guided by his paranoia and a desire for revenge against Trotsky and others who had
crossed his path, rather than on credible evidence.
One would have expected that Stalin would want to be close to the trial and watch
the show. Indeed, there was a story circulating that Stalin watched the show trials
from behind a curtained window overlooking the October Hall where the trials took
place. Stalin could also listen to the trial, transmitted frommicrophones placed in
the October Hall through a loudspeaker in his office in the Kremlin.113 This was
probably true for the show trials of 1937 and 1938, but in August 1936114 Stalin was far
away fromMoscow. This may have been a deliberate tactic to obscure his role in the
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trial. Neither the Central Committee nor most members of the Politburo were really
aware of what was going on. Many were also away on summer holidays. Stalin had,
in the preparations, worked closely with an eager Yezhov, a reluctant Yagoda and a
servile Vyshinsky. But Stalin himself was the stage manager, he ‘personally conceived,
initiated, and directed the entire process, including the planning, preparation, and
actual conduct of the purge trials’, as Tucker and Cohen concluded in their study.115
Recent research has made this even clearer. Simon S. Montefiore, for instance, found
that ‘Stalin set to work on the script for the Zinoviev trial, reveling in his hyperbolic
talents as a hack playwright. The new archives reveal how he even dictated the words
of the new Procurator-General, Andrei Vyshinsky, who kept notes of his leader’s
perorations.’116
The trial was to be a travesty of justice. As one historian put it, ‘The spectacle
about to be performed would not be a trial with elements of a show, but a show
with elements of a trial.’117 As in real theatre performances, there were rehearsals.
An nkvd chief (who later defected) wrote, ‘The last week before the opening of the
trial was spent in giving detailed instructions to the defendants, who were made
to rehearse their parts under the direction of ProsecutorVyshinsky and the nkvd
interrogators.’118 We do not know in detail what they were told, but we know that
in the third show trial the defendants were instructed that if they did not give the
necessary testimony, torture would continue even after the trial.119 Similar pressure
may have also played a role in the first show trial.
Press coverage had been fixed by Yezhov andKaganovich: every day both Pravda and
Izvestiyawould publish a full-page account of the trial. Stalin had instructed that the
trial should begin on 19 August 1936.He could rely onVyshinsky—they had once shared
a prison cell together in their underground days before the revolution. Vyshinsky had
already conducted a successful show trial for Stalin in 1928.120 Now, in August 1936,
Yezhov and Kaganovich reported the trial’s progress to Stalin every day—altogether 87
packages of trial-relatedmaterials were sent to Sochi.121 Stalin had been involved in
every phase of the trial’s preparations. As Vishinsky’s biographer, A. Vaksberg, noted:
‘The final version of the Prosecutor-General’s speech for the prosecution—amodel of
impassioned eloquence by a great orator—was edited and approved by the Leader and
Teacher [Stalin] before he set off on holiday to the shores of the Black Sea.’122
The script was Stalin’s, based on drafts from the prosecutor, Vyshinsky, and Lev
Sheinin, chief investigator at the Procurator’s office, who, ironically, was also the
author of various real plays for theatre performances.123 The sixteen players in the
show trial belonged to two different groups andwere not all known to each other. One
group of eleven defendants belonged to a ‘united opposition bloc’ of Old Bolsheviks
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who had opposed Stalin mainly in the 1926–1927 period. A younger group of five
defendants were members of the German Communist Party who had emigrated to
the Soviet Union, and worked in the Comintern department where they had been
writing anti-Trotzkyist articles. Yet in the trial it was implied that they constituted
the link between the Zinoviev group and Trotzky in exile, with the German Gestapo
acting as go-between and facilitator.124
4.3. What Happened in Court during the Trial
For the trial itself, our main source is a much condensed printed version of the court
proceedings, edited to fit the propaganda needs of Stalin and his entourage.125 For
example in this official document all sixteen defendants are identified simply as
‘employees’. In fact, many had held outstanding positions and it is worth recalling
some biographical data here:
1. Grigory Y. Zinoviev, chairman of the Comintern (1919), editor of Pravda (1917), full
member of the Politburo since 1921, member of the ruling triumvirate with Stalin
and Kamenev, 1923–1924, head of the Leningrad Soviet before Kirov. Close friend of
Lenin.
2. Lev B. Kamenev, head of theMoscow Soviet section (1919–1925), foundingmember
and later chairman of the Politburo, member of the ruling triumvirate with Stalin
and Zinoviev, 1923–1924. Close friend of Lenin.
3. Sergei V. Mrachkovsky: hero of the Russian Civil War in Siberia and the Far East;
Deputy People’s Commissar for Agriculture.
4. Vagarshak A. Ter-Vaganyan: former leader of the Military Department of the
Moscow Committee of the Party, leader of the Armenian Communist Party;
founding editor of the Party’s scientific monthlyUnder the Banner ofMarxism.
5. Ivan N. Smirnov: founder of the Bolshevik Party; leader of the 5th Army that
defeated Kolchak’s White Guards in the civil war; member of the Executive
Committee of the Russian Communist Party (1920–1923), People’s Commissar for
Communications (1923–1927); expelled from Party in 1927.
6. Ivan F. Bakayev: former chairman of the Petrograd (Leningrad) Cheka, a major
figure in the civil war who was also a member of the Central Committee.
These ‘employees’—like some of those who would be facing similar show trials in
1937 and 1938—were the cream of the Old Bolsheviks. Zinoview, Kamenev and the
110 | alex p. schmid
absent Trotzky had been named in Lenin’s will as his potential successors126 The
remaining ten defendants were a mixed group, including Old Bolsheviks and the five
youngmembers of the German Communist Party.127 Three, perhaps four, among
the sixteen accused were pseudo-defendants—accomplices of the nkvdmobilised as
provocateurs and false witnesses for the judicial frame-up: Valentine Olberg, Fritz
David and Berman-Yurin and, to a lesser extent, Isak Reingold, a former acquaintance
of Kamenev, and Richard V. Pickel, the former head of the secretariat of Zinoviev in
Leningrad (before Kirov succeeded Zinoviev).128 At least three of them saw themselves
more as actors executing secret nkvd directives rather than as genuine defendants
in this trial.129 The real defendants had been carefully selected. As an nkvd insider
explained later:
At the beginning Stalin planned to stage the first Moscow trial with at least fifty
defendants; then, as the investigation progressed, that figure had been decreased
several times and finally reduced by Stalin to sixteenmen. For the trial only those
of the accused were selected who promised to repeat in court the false testimony
which they had signed at the nkvd. Even some of those who agreed to play the part of
conspirators and terrorists were not admitted to the trial, because the nkvd chiefs
were not completely sure that they would scrupulously carry out their promises.130
The chief target of this trial was not in court: Lev Trotzky was in exile in Norway.131
Some of those in the dock who had been associated in the past with Trotzky had to
serve as scapegoats for the absent Trotzky.
The show trial opened on 19 August 1936. The scene of the trial was the House of
Trade Unions, where in early December 1934 the slain Sergei Kirov had laid in state.
While there were larger halls in the building, the sixteen defendants were tried in the
October Room, a small hall able to accommodate only three hundred people. The
roomwas re-decorated in various shades of red for the purpose of the trial. The judge’s
desk was covered with bright red cloth and the chairs were embossed with the Soviet
Union’s coat of arms. The three judges and the court’s president, Military Jurist Vasiliy
Ulrich, sat in the centre on throne-like, decorated chairs.132 Zinoviev, Kamenev and
the other 14 defendants sat in four rows, within a fenced wooden dock on the right
side. Opposite them, near the left wall, Prosecutor Vyshinsky sat at a small table.133
At the back stood uniformed guards, their rifles fixed with bayonets. There was no
jury,134 and no defence lawyer was present. Before the trial, the defendants had been
made to promise that theywould defend themselves.135 President of the Court, Ulrich,
consequently announced that ‘all the accused [had] declined the services of counsel for
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defence’. They would, he said, defend themselves personally.136 No relatives of the
defendants were allowed among the public in the hall.137
In fact, the public consisted predominantly of nkvd personnel in civilian
clothes.138 On Stalin’s orders, nomember of the Central Committee of the Party or the
government was admitted.139 There were a few carefully selected guests of honour—
some 30 foreign journalists and diplomats.140 The International Association of Lawyers
had been invited by the authorities to attend and it had sent Joseph Edelman (an
American) and Denis Noel Pritt, Dudley Collard and Robert Lazarus (all British) to
the trial.141 Many of the foreigners may not have understood Russian. One wonders
whether they could, as they entered the courtroom, read the writing on the wall: a
banner, allegedly from the ‘Workers of Moscow’, which read ‘To the mad dogs—a
dog’s death.’142
This sloganwould at the end of the trial be alluded to by Andrei Vyshinsky, Stalin’s
Prosecutor. He had already helped shape the pre-trial interrogations. Years later, after
de-Stalinisation, a historical commission of the Politburowould conclude that this son
of Polishnobility fromOdessa,whowas a formerMenshevik, nowplayed a ‘provocative
role in the judicial inquiries’. Like Nikolai Yezhov from the nkvd, the chief prosecutor
had pressured the investigators to obtain direct evidence from the accused. As a report
to the Politburo in the 1950s found, ‘When the evidence was analysed, he demanded
sharper political conclusions and generalizations and, essentially, the falsification of
cases.’143 Vyshinsky’s biographer wrote on this trial:
… Vyshinsky was himself the principal falsifier. In the most important cases the
indictments were compiled by him personally before the investigation was even over,
and the drafts were then presented to Stalin so that he could edit them, ascribing to
the accused other ‘crimes’ as he saw fit. […] Vyshinsky fulfilled his wish by making an
appropriate entry in the indictment, after which the investigators had no difficulty in
obtaining the necessary confession from the ‘assassin’.144
The trial began shortly after noon with the reading of the indictment by the secretary
of the court. The indictment was partly based on the charges issued at a previous
secret trial held in January 1935 against Zinoviev and Kamenev. At that closed January
trial there had been 19 defendants. Of these, only four were at this new trial; the
rest were not even there as witnesses,145 probably because they had already been
executed. The indictment was based on Article 58 of the Criminal Code of the Russian
Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (rsfsr), drawn from the 1 December 1934 decree
Stalin had drafted immediately upon hearing of the assassination of Sergei Kirov.
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The relevant paragraph in the article (58.8) referred to ‘The perpetration of terrorist
acts, directed against representatives of Soviet authority or activists of revolutionary
workers’ and peasants’ organizations, and participation in the performance of such
acts, even by persons not belonging to a counter-revolutionary organization …’146
The underlying charge was ‘terrorism’, a code word for anti-Stalinism. As one
of Stalin’s biographers explained: ‘ “terrorism” simply signified “any doubt about
the policies or character of Stalin”. All his political opponents were per se assassins.
More than two “terrorists” was a “conspiracy” and, putting together such killers from
different factions created a “Unified Centre” of astonishing global … reach.’147
The indictment claimed that the preliminary and court investigations of that
secret trial held in January 1935 had ‘established that for a number of years this
so-called “Moscow Centre” guided the counter-revolutionary activities of diverse
underground groups of Zinovievites, including the counter-revolutionary activities
of the Leningrad group ofNikolayev-Kotolynovwhich on Dec. 1, 1934, foully murdered
Comrade S.M. Kirov’. At that secret trial Zinoviev and Kamenev had denied that they
had any part in the murder, but in the end accepted that they bore moral and political
responsibility for the assassination.
The long indictment read out on the afternoon of 19 August 1936 claimed that since
January 1935 new facts had surfaced which showed that the accused not only ‘knew
their adherents in Leningrad were inclined towards terrorism’, but ‘were the direct
organizers of the assassination of Comrade S.M. Kirov’. According to the indictment,
the investigation also revealed that Zinoviev, Kamenev and others accused in this
court were the ‘initiators and organizers of attempts on the lives of other leaders of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet Government’. In particular, it
named Stalin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Orzhonikidze, Zhdanov, Kosior and Postyshev
as their targets. Furthermore the indictment claimed that the Zinovievites had acted
in conjunction with Trotzkyites and with L. Trotzky himself since 1932. The alleged
goal of the Trotzkyite–Zinovievite bloc, according to the indictment, was ‘to seize
power at all costs’, by terrorist means—‘the most detestable method of fighting’. The
conspirators chose the strategy of political assassination due to lack of support from the
working class, it claimed, and due to their own ideological bankruptcy. The indictment
quoted from a ‘confession’ which Zinoviev, ‘compelled by the weight of evidence’,
had allegedly made, namely that ‘The main object which the Trotzkyite–Zinovievite
Centre pursued was the assassination of the leaders of the cpsu [Communist Party
of the Soviet Union], and in the first place the assassination of Stalin and Kirov.’148
‘Confessions’ along the same linesmade by others during the investigation phase were
also quoted, including a statement, attributed to Kamenev, stressing the necessity of
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killing Stalin, the head of the Party and state. Kamenev was quoted as saying that
‘heads are peculiar in that they do not grow back again’. The indictment concluded
that ‘there is no doubt left that the Trotzkyite–Zinovievite bloc had turned into a
group of unprincipled, political adventurers and assassins striving at only one thing,
namely, tomake their way to power even through terrorism’. The chief instigator
behind this was, according to the indictment, Lev Trotzky. His son, Lev Sedov, was
said to have acted as go-between and liaison to the conspirators in the Soviet Union,
including the ‘Trotzkyite agent’ Olberg, who allegedly was arrested travelling with
a Honduran passport, which he had obtained ‘with the aid of the German Secret
Police (Gestapo)’. This passport was presented as an ‘exhibit’ during the trial—the
only material evidence in the case against the sixteen.
The case rested almost exclusively on the confessions of the accused about their
ownmisdeeds, and those of their alleged fellow conspirators. Some witnesses, under
threat of being accused themselves, also testified against those in the dock. This group
includedMs. Safonova, who testified against her former husband I. Smirnov. After
Khrushchev had informed the 20th Party Congress about the true nature of Stalinism
(on 25 February 1956), she would explain that her testimony, like that of others who
had testified at the trial and the pre-trial investigation, ‘did not correspond to reality
90 percent of the time’.149
The link with fascist Germany and its Gestapo (roughly the equivalent of the
nkvd) was a side theme in the indictment. Two of the accused, M. Lurye and N. Lurye
in particular, were included in the cast of defendants by Stalin himself to suggest
a plausible link to the German Secret State Police. Yet the main tie, the indictment
stressed, was the one between Trotzky and the ‘Moscow Centre’ of Zinoviev et al.
Both were now linked to the assassination of Kirov. Kirov’s murder was portrayed as
a first blow in a planned series of assassinations to eliminate the leadership of the
ussr.150 Zinoviev was quoted from pre-trial testimony as saying, ‘while speaking of
the necessity of assassinating Comrade Kirov as Comrade Stalin’s closest assistant … It
is not enough to fell the oak; all the young oaks growing around it must be felled too.’
These words were dictated by Stalin himself.151 Later in the trial another of Stalin’s
own additions was again spoken by Kamenev: ‘Stalin’s leadership has become as solid
as granite, and it would be foolish to hope that this granite will begin to crack.’152
The indictment charged the 16 accused of organising ‘in the period 1932–1936
a united Trotzkyite–Zinovievite Centre … in the city of Moscowwith the object of
committing a number of terroristic acts against the leaders of the cpsu and the Soviet
Government for the purpose of seizing power’ and of having ‘carried out the foul
murder of Comrade S.M. Kirov on December 1, 1934’. It ended by stating that all but
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one of the accused ‘have fully admitted their guilt of the charges preferred against
them’. The exception was Ivan N. Smirnov who ‘categorically denies that he took part
in the terroristic activities of the united Trotzkyite–Zinovievite Centre’. However, the
indictment listed statements made by his ex-wife A.N. Safonova, and by his alleged
fellow conspirators, that served to incriminate him as well. The indictment, signed
by Vyshinsky, also instructed that Trotzky and his son, ‘in the event of their being
discovered on the territory of the u.s.s.r., are subject to immediate arrest and trial’.
While Trotzky and son were not in the courtroom, E.A. Dreitzer, the former chief of
Trotzky’s bodyguard, was in the dock to suggest proximity and guilt by association.
The opening session concluded with the President asking the accused whether
they pleaded guilty as charged. All but Smirnov and Holtzman accepted the charges,
although they denied ‘personal participation in the preparation of terroristic acts’.
When such apparent dissent arose, some defendants would pitch in to denounce
others. Dreitzer, according to the Report of Court Proceedings, objected to Smirnov’s
denial: ‘I am surprised at the assertions of Smirnov, who, according to his words, both
knew and did not know, spoke and did not speak, acted and did not act. This is not
true!’153 Some defendants also tried to shift blame to other defendants. Zinoviev, for
instance, said at one point, ‘Smirnov, inmy opinion, displayedmore activity than
anyone else, and we regarded him as the undisputed lead[er] of the Trotzkyite part
of the bloc, as theman best informed about Trotzky’s views, and fully sharing these
views.’154
After a 15 minute break—it was already late afternoon—the examination of the
accused followed. Mrachkovsky, the first to be interrogated in public, was accused
of conducting ‘Trotzkyite anti-Soviet work’ since 1923.155 However, according to
his testimony, ‘The terrorist bloc of the Trotzkyites and the Zinovievites was only
formed at the end of 1932.’ There was reference to a ‘letter of Trotzky’s, written in
invisible ink’—but no such letter was produced as evidence in court. It was said
that Mrachkovsky, ‘after reading it, burnt it for reasons of secrecy’.156 Part of the
proceedings took the form of a defendant being asked to read passages from his own
‘confession’ as laid down in the signed interrogation protocols (which in some cases
had been prepared for signature before the interrogations had even begun!). The
prosecutor would also quote from pre-trial examinations and the defendants, except
forminor details, confirmed now in public—to the extent that the predominantly
nkvd audience could be considered ‘the public’—what was ‘agreed upon’ behind
closed doors. Sometimes the accused gave only very brief, self-incriminating answers.
We do not know whether the explanations offered in court are summaries or directly
transcribed. A typical excerpt reads:
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Vyshinsky: Did you receive from Trotzky instructions on terrorism as a means of
struggle?
Smirnov: Yes157
Mrachkovsky then goes on to tell the Court about the activities of the Trotzkyite–
Zinovievite terrorist Centre.
Vyshinsky: In that centre there were you, Kamenev, Smirnov, Mrachkovsky and
Ter-Vaganyan?
Zinoviev: Yes.
Vyshinsky: So you all organized the assassination of Kirov?
Zinoviev: Yes.
Vyshinsky: So you all assassinated Comrade Kirov.
Zinoviev: Yes.
Vyshinsky: Sit down.158
What the Report of Proceedings tells us and what actually happened in court may
not be quite the same.159 That even Smirnov confessed with amonosyllabic ‘Yes’ is
doubtful, as reports on his behaviour in court showed that he used irony and other
devices to distance himself from the mechanical routines prescribed by the prepared
script. Precautions had been taken in case one of the accused should attempt to deviate
from the script. The following strategy was agreed upon, as one nkvd chief later
revealed:
In the courtroom, among the ‘public’ were seated several groups of specially trained
officers of thenkvd. At the first attempt of a defendant to expose the judicial frame-up,
these groups were ready, at a signal from the prosecutor, to spring up from their
chairs and with loud outcries drown the words of the rebellious defendant. The
commotion was then to be used by the President of the Court as a pretext for declaring
a recess.160
The culprit who had deviated from the script could then be given the necessary
‘treatment’ in an adjacent room. Failing that to achieve the desired result, he would
not be brought back into the court. Judging from the available transcripts we have,
this measure was not necessary. The interrogators had done their work well. Almost
everybody ‘played’ their role as Stalin had script it.
One of the accused, Bakayev, admitted to having met Nikolayev, Kirov’s murderer,
in Leningrad, and to having discussed details of the crime with him. Kamenev also
admitted to having been involved in the plot, saying ‘The blow [against Kirov] was
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planned and prepared on the order of the centre of which I was a member, and I
regarded it as the fulfilment of the task we had set ourselves.’161
The choice of assassination as a tactic was portrayed in the examination as weapon
of last resort. Reingold ‘recalled’ that back in 1932 Zinoviev had argued that ‘although
terror is incompatible withMarxism, at the present moment these considerations
must be abandoned. There are no other methods available of fighting the leaders
of the Party and the Government … Stalin combines in himself all the strength and
firmness of the present Party leadership. Therefore Stalin must be put out of the
way in the first place.’ Kamenev enlarged on this ‘theory’, adding that the former
oppositional methods, namely, attempts to win the masses, combining with the
Rightists, and banking on economic problems, had failed. That left only terroristic
acts against ‘Stalin and his closest comrades-in-arms, Kirov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich,
Orjonikidze, Postyshev, Kosior and the others’ as a means of struggle.162
According to Reingold’s testimony, summarised in the available proceedings,
Zinoviev and Kamenev insisted that ‘every advantage be … taken of legal possibilities
for the purpose of “crawling on the belly into the Party”—this he said was Zinoviev’s
favourite expression—and of winning the confidence of the Party, particularly Stalin’s.
After this confidence had been restored, strictly secret terroristic workwas to be carried
out inparallelwithopenwork.’163 (Reingoldwasprobably apseudo-defendant, planted
among the 16 defendants due to his former close ties with Kamenev). Both Kamenev
and Zinoviev admitted to this ‘monstrous plan’ (Vyshinsky’s words), portrayed as
a coup d’état. According to Reingold’s summarised testimony, this would lead to a
seizure of power after which Trotzky would be recalled from exile abroad, and with
his support ‘all those who were most devoted to Stalin were to be removed from Party
and Soviet posts’.164
Eachof the cross-examinations revealedmore details of an allegedplot or sub-plots.
Bakayev, for instance, testified that in October 1934 Kamenev had already organised an
attempt on Stalin’s life inMoscow—a ‘failure’, like another attempt (equally fictional),
the year before, ‘confessed’ by another probable pseudo-defendant, Richard Pickel.165
Pickel, a member of the Soviet Writers’ Union, had visited Spitzbergen ‘for creative
work’ in 1934—hardly the place to conspire against the Kremlin. However, at the trial
even such an innocent ‘fact’ was turned by the prosecutor against the accused. In this
case, Pickel’s sojourn close to the North Pole was said to serve ‘to wipe out all traces
and save their terrorist organization’.166
The morning session of the second day began with the examination of Lev
Borisovich Kamenev, the former head of the Moscow Soviet and, briefly in late 1917,
nominally the first President of the Soviet Union. When he gave his ‘evidence’, he still
stalin’s 1936 show trial against the ‘trotzkyite-zinovievite terrorist centre | 117
displayed a certain dignity but soon lost it in the cross-examination.167 His opening
sentence must have come straight out of the ‘script’: ‘The terrorist conspiracy was
organized and guided bymyself, Zinoviev and Trotzky.’168 Vyshinsky then set out to
expose Kamenev’s apparent ‘double-dealing’ in his attempt to regain a central place in
the Communist Party. Here is a typical extract from the pre-arranged exchange of
words:
Vyshinsky: What appraisal should be given of the articles and statements you wrote
in 1933, in which you expressed loyalty to the Party? Deception?
Kamenev: No, worse than deception.
Vyshinsky: Perfidy?
Kamenev: Worse.
Vyshinsky: Worse than deception, worse than perfidy—find the word. Treason.
Kamenev: You have found it.
Vyshinsky: Accused Zinoviev, do you confirm this?
Zinoviev: Yes.169
In this courtroom spectacle, past Bolshevik heroes had become present anti-Soviet
villains. Themain defendant in the dock was Grigory Zinoviev. Previously a great
orator, he now appeared cowed after years of imprisonment, gasping for air due to his
asthma.170 He ‘confessed’ that at the secret trial in January 1935 he had not told the
court the ‘whole truth’, adding that he was prepared to do so now. In self-accusations
he ‘revealed’ that ‘After the murder of Sergei Mironovich Kirov our perfidy went
to such lengths that I sent an obituary about Kirov to Pravda’ (a text that had not
been published).171 Zinoviev’s cross-examination added little to the accusations in
the indictment, except for references to alleged links with the German Gestapo and
its chief Heinrich Himmler. More ominous was Zinoviev’s name-dropping of Old
Bolsheviks, listing them as potential allies he had hoped to win against Stalin. Many
of themwould soon also appear in show trials. Zinoviev’s public examination by the
prosecutor was relatively short, if we can believe the transcripts in the Report of Court
Proceedings.
Zinoviev was followed by a witness, Smirnov’s former wife, A. Safonova. Smirnov’s
denials about the extent of his involvement with the ‘Trotzkyite centre’ required the
testimony of his former wife to fill the gaps and implicate him in the plot, which she
did.172 Smirnov’s own turn came in the evening session of 20 August. He, a former
leader of the Red Army who had defeated Admiral Kolchak and the ‘White Guards’
on the eastern front in the civil war, and who later had become a member of the
118 | alex p. schmid
praesidium of the eleventh Bolshevik Conference, was now portrayed as ‘the closest
friend of Trotzky and the actual organiser and leader of the underground Trotzkyite
counter-revolutionary activities in the u.s.s.r.’.173 Smirnov apparently put up some
verbal resistance during the public trial. As a consequence, much of his testimony was
abridged and only summarised in the published proceedings.174 Nevertheless, traces
of his resistance remain in his testimony—for example when he was interrogated
about the ‘Trotzkyite centre’. His sarcasmmust have kept Vyshinsky on guard.175 An
example:
Vyshinky: So when did you leave the centre?
Smirnov: I did not intend to resign; there was nothing to resign from.
Vyshinsky: Did the centre exist?
Smirnov: What sort of a centre …
Vyshinsky: Mrachkovsky, did the centre exist?
Mrachkovsky: Yes.
Vyshinsky: Zinoviev, did the centre exist?
Zinoviev: Yes.
Vyshinsky: Evdokimov, did the centre exist?
Edokimov: Yes.
Vyshinsky: Bakayev, did the centre exist?
Bakayev: Yes.
Vyshinsky: How, then, Smirnov, can you take the liberty to maintain that no centre
existed?176
The trial record noted that ‘Under the weight of all these irrefutable facts, Smirnov
at last admits that it was he and no one else who was the head of the Trotzkyite
organization.’177 As Smirnov had been in prison since January 1933, it was not very
credible to suggest he was a leader of a terrorist centre supposedly operating for the
past four years. At one point, when a fellow defendant incriminated him as the leader
of the conspiracy, Smirnov turned on him sardonically: ‘You want a leader! Well, take
me!’ Vyshinsky interjected by explaining that this was said ‘in rather a jocular way’.178
Of all the defendants, Smirnovmanaged, within the little room for manoeuvre that
was granted to them, to sow confusion; his public confession was only partial.179
Next in line was pseudo-defendant Valentine Olberg. He ‘confessed’ his personal
connection with the Gestapo, saying that ‘in 1933 there began organized systematic
connection between the German Trotzkyites and the German fascist police’.180 He
admitted to travelling on a Honduran passport into the ussr. Oddly, the passport was
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allegedly given to him by the Gestapo, but according to the proceedings he also had to
pay a large sum of money for it. Olberg admitted to being directly involved in a plan
for the assassination of Stalin inMoscow on 1May 1936.181
The second day closed with the cross-examination of yet another pseudo-
defendant, Berman-Yurin. He admitted to yet another failed (because fictional) at-
tempt on Comrade Stalin’s life and also claimed to have been inspired by Trotzky:
‘He [Trotzky] said that the terroristic act should, if possible, be timed to take place
at a plenum or at the congress of the Comintern, so that the shot at Stalin would
ring out in a large assembly. This would have a tremendous repercussion far beyond
the borders of the Soviet Union and would give rise to a mass movement all over the
world. This would be an historical political event of world significance.’182
The third day began with the ritualistic examination of E.S. Holtzman, a genuine
ex-Trotzkyite and former friend of Smirnov. He recalled meetings in Berlin with
Trotzky’s son Sedov who was said to have invited him to accompany him to Copen-
hagen to see his father (there in exile before moving to Norway). Holtzman: ‘I agreed,
but told him that we could not go together for reasons of secrecy. I arranged with
Sedov to be in Copenhagen within two or three days, to put up at the Hotel Bristol
andmeet him there. I went to the hotel straight from the station and in the lounge
met Sedov. About 10 a.m. we went to Trotzky.’183 Vyshinsky prodded him: ‘So Trotzky
plainly told you that the fundamental task now (that is in the autumn of 1932) was to
assassinate Comrade Stalin? You remember for sure?’ Holtzman: Yes.184
Probablyneither the audiencenor the rest of those present in the courtroom (except
Holtzman who knew it was a lie) were aware that the Hotel Bristol in Copenhagen—
the alleged venue of the 1932 conspiratorial meeting—had been demolished in 1917,
a fact which also demolished this story (but only after the trial was long over).185 In
addition, it later turned out that he could not possibly havemet Sedov in Copenhagen,
as Sedov was taking examinations at that same time in a technical institute in
Berlin.186 When a Danish Social-Democratic newspaper revealed that the Bristol
Hotel had ceased to exist 19 years before the trial, the defendants had already been
executed.187 Apart from Smirnov’s, Holtzman’s was the only confession that was
incomplete. Perhaps he was inspired by Smirnov’s subliminal resistance. Despite his
claim not to share Trotzky’s view about the necessity of terror, Vyshinskymanaged
to get him to confess that he nevertheless remained a member of the Trotzkyite
organisation.188
In the evening session of 21 August the examination of the pseudo-defendant Fritz
David (aka I.I. Kruglansky) followed. He declared, inter alia, that in allegedmeetings
with Trotzky he learned from him that ‘the advent of the Trotzkyites to power in the
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u.s.s.r. was possible only if Stalin was physically destroyed’.189 He confessed that he
had been unable to commit the terroristic act ‘because it was impossible to get near
Comrade Stalin’.190
Some ominous name-dropping occurred during the trial. Zinoviev had been the
first to implicate others in his testimony, and later Reingold ‘confessed’ that not only
had the Trotzkyites and the Zinovievites joined forces, but negotiations were carried
on about joint activity with ‘Leftists’ like Shatskin, Lominadze and Sten, as well as
with representatives of the Right like Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky.191 In total, 123
individuals were incriminated in this trial, not counting those already in the court
who often incriminated each other.192
At the end of the 21 August session, Vyshinsky cultivated these cues when he
announced:
At preceding sessions some of the accused (Kamenev, Zinoviev and Reingold) in
their testimony referred to Tomsky, Bukharin, Rykov, Uglanov, Radek, Pyatakov,
Serebryakov and Sokolnikov as being to a greater or lesser degree involved in the
criminal counter-revolutionary activities for which the accused in the present case are
being tried. I consider it necessary to inform the Court that yesterday I have orders to
institute an investigation of these statements of the accused in regard to Tomsky,
Rykov, Bukharin, Uglanov, Radek and Pyatakov, and that in accordancewith the results
of this investigation the office of the State Attorney will institute legal proceedings in
this matter.193
Vyshinsky’s statement at the end of the day’s session was printed in the newspapers
the next morning, together with a demand from a workers’ meeting at the Dynamo
Factory that this should be ‘pitilessly investigated’.194 Vyshinsky’s words (‘I have
orders …’) did not make explicit fromwhom the State Attorney of the ussr took his
orders. But it could be only from Stalin.
This list of names was a time bomb, pointing to events to come in the next two
years—presaging the purge of almost the entire Old Bolshevik elite. Mikhail Tomsky,
the head of the Combined State Publishing House and a former civil war hero, saw the
writing on the wall and shot himself the same day, leaving behind a letter in which
he tried to prove his innocence.195 Stalin learned of this suicide the next morning.
Kaganovich, Yezhov and Ordzhonikidze wrote to him, with a cynicism typical for
Stalin and his entourage, ‘We have no doubt that Tomsky … knowing that now it
is no longer possible to hide his place in the Zinoviev–Trotzkyite band had decided
to dissimulate … by suicide …’ Alexei Rykov (the former Premier who had ruled the
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Soviet Union from 1925 to 1928 together with Bukharin and Stalin) having read this
list in Pravda and heard about Tomsky’s fate, was also on the point of committing
suicide but his family held him back.196 Not all of thosementioned by Vyshinsky
were arrested immediately. Stalin decided that Karl Radek, a German revolutionary
who had become secretary of the Comintern, could be a ‘useful idiot’ (to use one of
Lenin’s terms) and ordered on 19 August ‘… to delay for the moment the question of
Radek’s arrest and to let him publish in Izvestiya a signed article …’197 Radek duly
complied, writing in support of the liquidation of the 16 defendants in the dock.198
The climax of the trial was Vyshinsky’s long rhetorical summary of the ‘crimes’. As
one of Stalin’s biographers puts it:
Procurator-General Vyshinsky brilliantly combined the indignant humbug of a
Victorian preacher and the diabolic curses of a witch doctor. Small, with ‘bright black
eyes’ behind horn-rimmed spectacles, thinning reddish hair, pointed nose, and dapper
in ‘white collar, checked tie, well-cut suit, trimmed greymoustache’, aWesternwitness
thought he resembled ‘a prosperous stockbroker accustomed to lunching at Simpson’s
and playing golf at Sunningdale’.199
On 22 August in the morning session, the prosecutor summarised what had emerged
so far: ‘Horrible and monstrous is the chain of these crimes against our socialist
fatherland; and each one of these crimes deserves the severest condemnation and
severest punishment.’ He then referred to the murder of Kirov, eulogising Kirov as
‘one of the best sons of the working class, one of the most devoted to the cause of
socialism, one of the most loved disciples of the great Stalin, the fiery tribune of the
proletarian revolution, the unforgettable Sergei Minronovich Kirov’.200 Vyshinsky
then referred to Comrade Stalin, quoting him as saying that ‘Wemust bear in mind
that the growth of the power of the Soviet state will increase the resistance of the last
remnants of the dying class.’ He also complimented Comrade Stalin for his foresight:
‘Three years ago Comrade Stalin not only foretold the inevitable resistance of elements
hostile to the cause of socialism, but also foretold the possibility of the revival of
Trotzkyite counter-revolutionary groups. This trial has fully and distinctly proved the
great wisdom of this forecast.’201 The prosecutor’s rhetoric, including phrases directly
dictated by Stalin himself, was becomingmore exaggerated:
This contemptible, insignificant group of adventurers tried with their mud-stained
feet to trample upon themost fragrant flowers in our socialist garden. These mad
dogs of capitalism tried to tear limb from limb the best of the best of our Soviet land.
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[…] They killed our Kirov; they wounded us close to our very heart. To the murderers’
treacherous shot of December 1, 1934, the whole country replied with unanimous
execration. The whole country, millions and tens of millions of people, were aroused
and once again proved their solidarity, their unity, their loyalty to the great banner of
the Party of Lenin–Stalin. The land of Soviets rose up like an unshakable, iron wall in
defence of its leaders, its guides, for every hair of whose heads these criminal madmen
will answer with their lives.202
The prosecutor then went into overdrive in his praise of Stalin: ‘With great and
unsurpassed love, the toilers of the whole world utter the name of the great teacher
and leader of the peoples of the u.s.s.r.—Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin!’203 Vyshinsky
lauded the victories of the ‘great Stalin’: ‘These victories have brought our whole
country, every factoryworker and collective farmer, every officeworker and intellectual,
a happy and a well-to-do life. And these victories are the guarantee of the unity of
all the Soviet people with our government, with our Party, and with its Central
Committee.’204
Vyshinsky juxtaposed the genius Stalin with the ‘gang of contemptible terrorists’
who ‘tried to pose as genuine political figures in the Court’, calling them ‘Liars and
clowns, insignificant pygmies, little dogs snarling at an elephant.’205 Vyshinsky
continued:
After this, can we speak with these people in any sort of political language? Have we
not the right to say that we can speak with these people in one language only, the
language of the Criminal Code, and regard them as common criminals, as incorrigible
and hardened murderers. […] They came to terrorism, because their position had
become hopeless, because they realized that they were isolated from power, from the
working class. They came to terrorism because of the complete absence of favourable
prospects for them in the fight for power by other methods and by other means.
Turning to the judges, the prosecutor proceeded:
Comrade judges, in drawing up your verdict in your council chamber, you will
carefully—I have no doubt about that—once again go over not only thematerial of the
court investigation but also the records of the preliminary investigation and you will
become convinced of the animal fear with which the accused tried to avoid admitting
that terrorismwas precisely the basis of their criminal activities. That is why Smirnov
wriggled so much here.206
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At one point Vyshinsky even invoked Lenin’s last will and testament:
All their bestial rage and hatred were directed against the leaders of our Party, against
the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, against Comrade Stalin, against
his glorious comrades-in-arms. It was upon them, headed by Comrade Stalin, that
the main burden of the struggle against the Zinovievite-Trotzkyite underground
organization lay. It was under their leadership, under the leadership of Comrade
Stalin, that great executor and keeper of Lenin’s will and testament, that the counter-
revolutionary Trotzkyite organization was routed.207
This was a somewhat risky manoeuvre since Lenin’s will had been a sore point
with Stalin. Apparently the trial also provided Stalin with an opportunity to rewrite
Lenin’s secret testament. Lenin’s political testament, written in 1922 and 1923 after
his incapacitating strokes, said something quite different, namely: ‘Stalin, having
become General Secretary has concentrated enormous power in his hands, and I am
not sure that he always knows how to use that power with sufficient caution.’ In a
postscript Lenin had added, ‘I propose to comrades to find a way to remove Stalin
from that position and appoint to it another man’ who would be ‘more loyal, more
courteous andmore considerate to comrades, less capricious, etc.’208 It was Kamenev
who hadmade the testament known to the Central Committee and, at the time, a
secretary of Stalin noted that ‘Terrible embarrassment paralyzed all those present.
Stalin, sitting on the steps of the praesidium’s rostrum, felt small andmiserable. I
studied him closely: notwithstanding his self-possession and show of calm, it was
clearly evident that his fate was at stake …’209
Lenin’s testament had never reached the public, but for Kamenev and Zinoviev,
who knew of its contents, this reference must have been especially hurtful. However,
there can be no doubt that this passage entered the prosecutor’s speech with Stalin’s
approval. We know that the final version of the Prosecutor General’s summing up
speech had been edited by Stalin before he left Moscow for his holiday on the Black
Sea.210 Then, the prosecutor asked:
I would like now to get a straight answer from Zinoviev to the following question:
Does Zinoviev now accept only moral responsibility [as he had done in the January
1935 trial behind closed doors], or the whole criminal responsibility, full responsibility,
for preparing, organizing and committing the murder of Sergei Mironovich Kirov?211
Not waiting for the defendant’s response Vyshinksy provided the answer himself:
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Of course, Zinoviev will say ‘yes’. He cannot say anything else. He said this on the
very first day of this trial when caught in the grip of the iron chain of evidence and
proof.212
In fact there was no proof, beyond false witness testimonies and coerced confessions—
except for that oddHonduran passport which was shown during the trial.213 The
passport in itself, of course, did not prove the existence of a ‘terrorist centre’ or
the responsibility of anyone for the Kirovmurder. Yet Vyshinsky repeated inmany
variations in his long statement that ‘This centre existed, and, what ismost important,
it was formed on the direct instructions of Trotzky, Zinoviev and Kamenev’, adding:
‘I take it as absolutely proven by the personal evidence of literally all the accused,
including Smirnov on this point, that this centre was organized on a terroristic basis
….’214
How this centre could have existed was hard to understand. Even the prosecutor
admitted at one point during the trial that ‘In 1932–1933 Kamenev and Zinoviev
were in exile … It is known that in 1934 Smirnov, too, was not at liberty; he was
arrested in January 1933 …’ His conclusion was a kind of conclusio ad absurdum. Despite
the absence of the central players—Kamenev, Zinoviev and Smirnov—the centre
was there: ‘I draw the conclusion that if the centre functioned it was because of
the well-organized technique of communication which enabled even those who
were not at liberty, Smirnov, for example, to take part in guiding the work of this
centre’.215
Turning to Kamenev, the Prosecutor reminded the court that in 1934 Kamenev
was head of the ‘Academia’ Publishing House, which had printed a translation of The
Prince by Niccolo Machiavelli. Kamenev had written a preface to the Russian edition,
calling the Italian political thinker ‘A master of political aphorism and a brilliant
dialectician.’ Vyshinsky, turning to the accused, claimed, ‘You, Kamenev, adopted the
rules of Machiavelli, you developed them to the utmost point of unscrupulousness
and immorality, you modernized them and perfected them.’216 In his preface to
the Russian edition, Kamenev had apparently called Machiavelli’s book ‘a shell of
enormous explosive force’. Twisting these words, Vyshinsky concluded that ‘Evidently
Kamenev and Zinoviev wanted to use this shell to blow up our socialist fatherland. […]
They miscalculated!’ he announced triumphantly, ‘Their program of home policy was
confined to murder; their program of foreign policy was confined to defeat of the
u.s.s.r. in war; their method was perfidy, cunning and treason.’217 Generously, he
added that he did not ask the comrade judges to regard this book as material evidence
in this case. With hindsight, we might add that if anyone was a pupil of Machiavelli
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in the Moscow of 1936, it was Stalin. In fact, Machiavelli could have learned a lesson or
two from Stalin rather than the other way round.
Vyshinsky emphasised the highlights of previous days and the ‘confessions’ of
the accused and their mutual ‘denunciations’ (either in the pre-trial phase or in
court) to build a case: that they deserved the penalty provided for by Article 58 of
the Penal Code. In the case of Moissei and Nathan Lurye, for example, he used the
formula of guilt by association, elaborating on their alleged link to a certain Franz
Weiss, ‘the fascist agent and a trusted man of Himmler, chief of the fascist black secret
service, chief of the German s.s. detachments and subsequently, chief of the German
Gestapo’.218
Coming to the end of his final speech, the Prosecutor turned to Russia’s terrorist
heyday in the 1880s and noted that some of the accused tried to draw a parallel with
the historical past, with the period of theNarodnaya Volya (the People’s Will). He said
that they tried to compare some people with the heroic terrorists who in the last
century entered into combat with the ‘terrible, cunning and ruthlessly cruel enemy,
the tsarist government’. But the prosecutor concluded that ‘This argument does not
hold water’, explaining:
That was a struggle by a handful of self-sacrificing enthusiasts against the gendarme
giant: it was a fight in the interests of the people. We Bolsheviks have always
opposed terrorism, but wemust pay our tribute to the sincerity and heroism of the
members of the Narodnaya Volya […]. You, however, a handful of downright counter-
revolutionaries … you took up arms against the vanguard of the world proletarian
revolution! You took up arms against the liberty and happiness of the peoples. The
comparison with the period of Narodnaya Volya terrorism is shameless.219 […] I
empathetically reject this sacrilegious parallel. I repeat this parallel is out of place
here. Before us are criminal, dangerous, hardened, cruel and ruthless towards our
people, towards our ideals, towards the leaders of our struggle, the leaders of the land
of Soviets, the leaders of the toilers of the whole world!220
What the prosecutor did not and could not mention was that both he and Stalin had,
at one time, actually been working, before the revolution, as agents or informers for
the same Tsarist secret police that was fighting Narodnaya Volya.221 Incidentally, the
defendants themselves, at least in the Report of the Proceedings, did not mention
Narodnaya Volya—one of the many inconsistencies of the official report.
In conclusion, the prosecutor reminded the comrade judges of those demands the
lawmakes in cases of the gravest crimes against the state. He reminded the court to
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apply to the accused in full measure the articles of the law, ending with a reference
to the slogan written on a large banner on the wall hanging in the court room: ‘I
demand that dogs gonemad should be shot—every one of them!’222
The next day, 22 August, there was nomorning session. In the evening session
the court began hearing the last pleas of the accused. The texts of these pleas had been
revised by Yezhov,223 and the protocol we have here is very thin, probably because
the accused tried to elaborate on their past services to the Party—something they
had been instructed to avoid. We glimpse this where the protocol notes that ‘The
accused Mrachkovsky starts his last plea by relating his autobiography.’ Mrachkovsky
went on to say, ‘In 1923 I became a Trotzkyite. I took a despicable path, the path of
deception of the Party […] I am a counter-revolutionary … I do not ask for mitigation
of my punishment. […] I want to depart from life without carrying any filth with
me. […] I depart as a traitor to my Party, as a traitor who should be shot’. While the
official minutes in the Report of Court Proceedings of the session provide us with
few details of the ‘last pleas’, Alexander Orlov (then an nkvd official) later gave us
these details:
He [Mrachkovsky] recounted that his grandfather had been an organizer of the famous
Southern RussianWorkers Union, that his father andmother, both factory workers,
had served prison sentences for revolutionary activities, and that he himself, at the
age of thirteen, had been arrested for disseminating revolutionary leaflets. ‘And here I
stand before you as a counter-revolutionary!’ exclaimed he with bitter resentment
and irony in his voice.224
Next came Evdokimov. Rather than trying to defend himself, he too was self-
incriminating: ‘Who will believe us, who played so detestable a comedy at the fresh
grave of Kirov whomwe had killed; who will believe us, who only by accident, not
through any fault of our own, did not become the assassins of Stalin and other leaders
of the people?’ […] He finished by saying that ‘Our crimes against the proletarian
state and against the international revolutionary movement are too great to make it
possible for us to expect clemency.’225 For those who could read between the lines at
the trial, Evdokimov’s exclamation, ‘Who will believe us …?’ hinted at the show being
put on.226
Isak Reingold, one of the pseudo-defendants, came next, saying, ‘Whatever our
fate may be, we have been already shot politically’, and then went to quote the
representative of the state Prosecution who, ‘speaking with the voice of 170,000,000
Soviet people, demanded that we be shot like mad dogs’. He ended by saying, ‘I fully
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admitted my guilty. It is not for me to plead for mercy.’227 Reingold was the best actor
among the pseudo-defendants, Orlov recalled:
Assisting Vyshinsky during the whole trial, he displayed a remarkable ability as a
prosecutor and a brilliant memory. Every time when he noticed in the testimony
of some other defendant a slight deviation from the approved scenario, he would
jump up from his seat and angrily correct him, as if that defendant wanted to conceal
something. If Reingold noticed that the prosecutor made an error, he would get up
and respectfully ask permission to add something to what the prosecutor had just
said, using that pretext for the purpose of correcting him. Vyshinsky would rein up
quickly and accept Reingold’s prompting with a smile of gratitude.228
After Reingold came I.F. Bakayev, the former Cheka chief of Leningrad. He began by
saying, ‘I am guilty of the assassination of Kirov’, and ended by declaring that he
awaited ‘the deserved and just verdict of the proletarian court’.229 Richard Pickel was
next to plead. The former head of Zinoviev’s secretariat when the latter was Party boss
in Leningrad, Pickel was the other probable pseudo-defendant. He too concluded by
saying ‘I must bear my deserved punishment’.230
It had been a perverse performance of those who said they would need no defence
counsel: rather than defending themselves, they used the opportunity of the last plea
to accuse themselves, no doubt hoping that such a performance would be rewarded
rather than used against themwhen it came to the court’s sentence.
Themorning session of 23 August continued with Kamenev’s plea. His too, was
a full confession. He ended by saying, ‘Thus we served fascism, thus we organized
counter-revolution against socialism, prepared, paved theway for the interventionists.
Such was the path we took, and such was the pit of contemptible treachery and all
that is loathsome into which we have fallen.’
Having spoken whatmust have been his prescribed lines, Kamenev rose again
from his chair andmade a desperate attempt to save at least the lives of his children:
I should like to say a fewwords tomy children … I have no other way of addressing
them. I have two children: one is amilitary pilot, the other a Pioneer. Standing, maybe,
with one foot in the grave, I want to tell them: nomatter what my sentence will be, I
in advance consider it just. Don’t look back. Go forward. Together with the Soviet
people follow Stalin.231
Orlov continued, explaining that:
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Having spoken these simple words, Kamenev sat down and shielded his eyes with his
hand. Those who were present in the courtroomwere shaken by this tragic moment.
Even the faces of the judges lost the studied expression of stony indifference.232
Kamenev’s plea for his children—the elder a pilot (already in prison), the younger,
Yuri, only 16—was in vain; both would be shot, like their father.233
Then it was Grigory Zinoviev’s turn. Again, we have only Orlov’s account beyond
the censored words of the official minutes of proceedings:
When he began to speak, it was impossible to recognize the brilliant orator, who in
the old times charmed huge audiences at Party conferences and congresses of the
Comintern. Breathing with difficulty, he began to speak incoherently and without
emotion. Zinoviev didn’t look at the audience and did not seek contact with it, as
he used to do in his famous appearances of the past. But within a fewminutes he
regained his self-possession and skill, and his speech began to flow easily. Standing in
the dock and speaking the words which were written for him by Stalin’s inquisitors,
he was like a superb actor, using the oratorical technique of the great Zinoviev in
order to give a new interpretation of the personality of the Old Bolshevik Zinoviev and
to demonstrate that Zinoviev’s revolutionary past was a myth and that in reality he
had always been an enemy of socialism and a traitor. Zinoviev’s speech was patterned
along the same lines as Kamenev’s. He also defended not himself but the Party and
Stalin. Zinoviev concluded his speech with an involved syllogism, the literary form of
which resembled very much the clumsy style of Stalin, but by nomeans the refined
style of Zinoviev. ‘My defective Bolshevism became transformed into anti-Bolshevism,
and through Trotzkyism i arrived at fascism. Trotzkyism is a variety of fascism and
Zinovievism is a variety of Trotzkyism.’234
Zinoviev, also pleaded ‘fully and completely guilty … of having been an organizer of
the Trotzkyite–Zinovievite bloc second only to Trotzky, the blocwhich set itself the aim
of assassinating Stalin, Voroshilov and a number of other leaders of the Party and the
government. I plead guilty to having been the principal organizer of the assassination
of Kirov.’235
Ivan Smirnov, in turn, was dealing ‘in detail with the history of his struggle
against the Party leadership after he was forgiven by the Party and reinstated into
its ranks in 1929’, as the protocol summarises. However, Smirnov apparently did not
make a full guilty plea. The protocol notes that ‘Smirnov continues, just as during
the preliminary investigation and the trial, to deny responsibility for the crimes
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committed by the Trotskite–Zinovievite terrorist centre after his arrest.’ Smirnov did
turn against Trotzky, appealing ‘to all his adherents resolutely to break with the past,
to fight Trotzkyism and Trotzky’.236 But his testimony during nearly three hours of
interrogation by Vyshinsky, is reduced to only a very brief record in the transcript.237
The pseudo-defendants’ pleas contained no drama. As an nkvdwitness recalled
later, ‘As fictitious defendants, they were sure their lives were not in danger.’238 The
last two pleas were made in the evening session of 23 August 1936. The testimonies
of Fritz David, a pseudo-defendant, and Ter-Vaganyan, a real defendant, take only
twelve lines in the protocol. Ter-Vaganyan claimed to be ‘crushed by the speech of the
State Prosecutor’ and assured the Court that whatever its decisionmay be, ‘I accept
it as deserved’. Due to the short preparation time before the trial (he had not been
on the original list of those accused), there was no evidence against Ter-Vaganyan,
not even falsified evidence. However, Vyshinsky, following Stalin’s instructions, also
‘substantiated’ his guilt: ‘… all the investigators could do was to obtain the necessary
“confession” from the accused at lightning speed’, Vyshinsky’s biographer found.239
Even in their last pleas, the defendants were prohibited from saying what they
wanted to say. Their final words were edited by Yagoda or Stalin. References to their
closeness to Lenin, their past positions in the Soviet government and the Party, and
their revolutionary credentials were replaced in the final script prepared for the session
with words like ‘traitors andmurderers’.240
Why would the defendants engage in suchmasochistic self-accusations even to
the end?We have no better answer than Orlov’s: ‘The defendants were struggling
for their lives with desperation, but they did it not by trying to prove their innocence,
as is done in genuine and impartial courts of law, but by striving to carry out with
the utmost precision the conditions which Stalin had laid down for them: to slander
themselves and glorify him.’241 The pseudo-defendants, on the other hand, testified
as they did because they thought they were ‘on a secret assignment of the Party’.242
In a similar way, the main defendants, Zinoviev and Kamenev, also thought they had
struck a bargain with Stalin, namely, that in return for playing their role in court their
lives would be saved. They now stuck to their side of the bargain. But Stalin would not.
The verdict had already been written before the trial was completed, but a decent
interval was created before it was announced.243 On the afternoon of the following
day, 24 August 1936, Ulrich, the president of the Court, read the verdict. Ulrich
again summarised what would pass as ‘evidence’ against the accused. His focus,
however, was more on the distant target of the trial, Lev Trotzky, and his influence
on the international workers’ movement. According to Ulrich, Trotzky had been ‘…
systematically sending a number of terrorists into the u.s.s.r. from abroad’, to target
130 | alex p. schmid
‘the leaders of the SovietGovernment and thec.p.s.u.’. Among these emissary terrorists
were, according to the verdict, Berman-Yurin, Fritz David, Dr. Nathan Lurye and
Moissei Lurye, as well as Valentine Olberg. Seven of the accused, including Zinoviev,
Kamenev and Smirnov, were found guilty of having organised the ‘united Trotzkyite–
Zinovievite terrorist centre’, having prepared and perpetrated themurder of Kirov, and
having organised a number of terrorist groups whomade preparations to assassinate
seven Communist leaders, including Stalin, Voroshilov, Zhdanov and Kaganovich—
crimes covered by one or several of the 14 paragraphs of Article 58 of the Criminal
Code of the rsfsr.244 The remaining nine, including David, Olberg and Berman-
Yurin, were found guilty of having been ‘active participants in the preparations for
the assassination of the leaders of the Party and the Government, Comrades Stalin,
Voroshilov, Zhdanov, Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze, Kosior and Postyshev’. In addition,
the president of the Court also ordered that Trotzky and his son Sedov, who were in
exile, were ‘convicted by the evidence of the accused’.245
When Ulrich finally announced that all were sentenced to ‘the supreme penalty—
to be shot—there was silence and consternation, even among the nkvd employees
who formedmost of the audience. They had expected the President to add: ‘…. but
taking into consideration the past revolutionary services of the defendants, the court
has decided to commute the death penalty’. When these expected words did not
come, one of those just condemned to death, broke the silence—it was either M. or
N. Lurye—and rose to shout hysterically, ‘Long live the cause of Marx, Engels, Lenin
and Stalin!’ ’246
The trial had come to an end after six days. Those sentenced were taken back to
prison, where they began to work on their appeals for mercy.247 It was the customary
rule at the time that when an appeal formercy wasmade, any death sentence would be
suspended for 72 hours, even when no pardon was granted.248 Those just condemned
to death still had one last hope. After all, Stalin had promised them in camera that, as
Old Bolsheviks, their lives would be spared.
Stalin did not keep his word.249 Still on holiday, he was informed shortly before
nine on the evening of 24 August 1936 in a telegram sent by Kaganovich, Yezhov and
two others. They wrote, ‘The Politburo proposed to reject the demands and execute
the verdict tonight.’250 Stalin waited until almost midnight before he gave his one
word reply: ‘okay’. The execution of the three main ‘terrorists’, Zinoviev, Kamenev and
Smirnov, took place in the Lubianka prison. Yezhov and Yagoda were present. Stalin
had also sent Voroshilov to the headquarters of the nkvd’s slaughter chamber to
supervise the execution. A dignified Smirnov apparently said, ‘We deserve this because
of our unworthy attitude at the trial.’251 Kamenev was said to be calm, walking as if
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in a dreamwhen he was shot from behind. Zinoviev, however, was hysterical and,
according to one account, shouted, ‘This is a fascist coup!’252 To silence his screams an
nkvd officer reportedly took him to a separate cell and shot him in the back of the
head. Later, that officer received a citation for ‘acting expeditiously under difficult
conditions’.253 Yagoda apparently kept the bullets that killed Zinoviev and Kamenev
as trophies.254 The other defendants—except three planted nkvd agents—David,
Olberg and Berman-Yurin—were also shot that night.255 Their families would soon
suffered similar fates; they were either shot or sent to labour camps.256
This tragedy was turned into a macabre comedy show four months later. At the
end of 1936, on 20 December, on the occasion of the anniversary of the founding of
the secret police, Stalin gave a small banquet for the heads of the nkvd. After much
drinking by the party, the head of Stalin’s personal security, Karl Pauker, who had
personally witnessed the execution of Zinoviev and Kamenev, put on a show for Stalin.
Assisted by two officers who played the parts of warders dragging Zinoviev to the site
of execution, Pauker is said to have dramatised Zinoviev’s last desperate moments,
falling on his knees and clinging to the boots of one of the warders: ‘Please, for God’s
sake, Comrade, call Yosif Vissarionovich!’ Yosif Vissarionovich Stalin liked the parody
somuch that Pauker had to re-enact the scene once more. This time he added new
elements to the role, raising his hands and crying, ‘Hear, Israel, our God is the only
God!’ Choking with laughter, Stalin had to wave Pauker to stop.257
4.4. What Happened outside the Courtroom
In parallel with the show trial, a press campaign had been set up by the authorities
in the Kremlin. A secret letter sent from Stalin to all Party organs, dispatched on
29 July 1936, called for extra vigilance: ‘The indelible mark of every Bolshevik in the
current situation ought to be the ability to recognize and identify the enemies of
the Party, no matter how well they may have camouflaged their identity.’258 Two
weeks later, Pravda carried the announcement from Procurator Andrei Vyshinsky,
stating that a case on ‘the United Trotzky–Zinoviev Centre’ had been transferred
to theMilitary Collegium of the Supreme Court of the ussr. The trials were given
saturation coverage in the Soviet media. The press contained what purported to be
verbatim reports of the daily proceedings, parts of which were broadcast by radio and
filmed for cinema audiences.259 The newspapers reproducedmultiple resolutions
from ‘workers’ meetings’ demanding, to quote from one, ‘Nomercy, no leniency for
enemies of the people who have tried to deprive the people of its leaders.’ One telegram
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from the Dagestani Party organisation inMakhachkala, insisted ‘… that the Supreme
Court execute the three-time contemptible degenerates, who have slid into themire of
fascism and aimed their guns at the heart of our Party, the great Stalin’.260 Directives
from the Kremlin hadmobilised such propaganda support, which resulted in local
Party resolutions as well as letters purporting to come from ordinary citizens.261
Well-known public figures were also pressed to publish press statements of
support for the prosecutor.262 The poet Demian Bedny was forced by Kaganovich
and Khrushchev to write some verses for Pravdawhich played on the theme of ‘no
mercy’.263 Editorials with titles like ‘Trotzky-Zinoviev-Kamenev-Gestapo’ and ‘The
People’s Wrath is Mighty and Terrible’ appeared.264 Karl Radek, the former secretary
of the Comintern, wrote (prodded by Stalin) a piece in the Izvestia of 21 August 1936,
demanding that ‘The peoplewho raised their weapons against the lives of the favourite
leaders of the proletariat must pay with their heads for their boundless guilt.’265
(Maybe he did so hoping to avoid arrest, but 28 days later he too was apprehended).
Another prominent Party figure who raised his voice against Zinoviev and his co-
defendants was Pyatakov, the former first President of the Government of the Soviet
Ukraine. Like Radek, he too would soon be subject to a show trial. In many cases we do
not know where pressure was applied, where pre-emptive opportunism was at work,
or whether they really believed what they wrote.
However, we know that Pyatakov was motivated by fear. When his former wife
was arrested by the nkvd, some old correspondence found in the apartment linked
him to the opposition of the 1920s. In an attempt to save himself, he wrote an article
in Pravda demanding the accused ‘be destroyed like carrion’.266 He even asked Yezhov
that he, Pyatakov, be allowed to shoot all those sentenced to death in the trial, as
well as his former wife [sic!].267 Amonth later he was arrested and prepared for the
second show trial to be held the following year, in January 1937. Alexei Rykov, former
Premier and Lenin’s successor as Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars,
and K. Rakovsky, former head of the Ukrainian Government and a well-known figure
in the international workers’ movement, also turned against their former colleagues,
demanding in the press that no pity be shown towards Kamenev and Zinoviev.268
Even Lenin’s widow, Nadezhda Krupskaya, was mobilised. She lent her name to an
article entitled ‘Why the Second International Defends Trotzky’, asserting that ‘It
is also no accident that the Second International rants and raves, raises the Trotzky–
Zinoviev gang of killers on its shield, and tries to break up the [anti-fascist] Popular
Front.’269
These orchestrated endorsements of the trial and calls for the death penalty were
meant to give a semblance of legitimacy to the trial. The charges which surfaced in the
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trial were given more credence with the endorsement of respected commentators like
Lenin’s widow. Their voices, and the resolutions from local Party organisations that
were flooding the newspapers, created amomentum and rationale for the nightly
arrests by the nkvd. As Tucker and Cohen’s study of the thirdMoscow trial points
out:
… the purge trials had, in the first place, a political symbolic function, which was
to provide a rationale for the purge, to make publicly meaningful the campaign of
arrests that was going on night after night. The underlying assumption of the Great
Purge was that treason was abroad in the land, especially among Party members, and
that it had to be cleaned out and exterminated on themassive scale that this treason
itself had assumed. The three great Moscow show trials and a number of lesser local
trials held at this time were designed to dramatize this idea, to show the existence,
enormity, and scope of the purported treasonable activity, which had—it was thus
made to appear—been organized and directed by men at the pinnacle of the Party and
state as well as their counterparts at the provincial level.270
There was no civil society in Russia at the time. All public opinion was controlled by
Party and state. While many people must have been shocked to see that the former
Bolshevik heroes were exposed as traitors andmurderers, they could not articulate
this in public. The nkvd, however, did report anonymous protests to Stalin: messages
like ‘Down with the murderers of the leaders of October’ and ‘Too bad they didn’t
finish off the Georgian snake’, appeared on the walls of several factories in Moscow.271
Yet such voices did not reach a wider public. The voice of ‘the people’ was expressed
by Pravda, Stalin’s official mouthpiece. Pravda stated on 25 August 1936, for example,
reporting on the execution of sixteen ‘terrorists’, that millions of working people
were starting their day with the joyful feeling that a loathsome creature had been
crushed.272 By the time of the second show trial, in January 1937, against Pyatakov,
Radek and twelve others, themobilisation of the public to support the court’s decision
(‘The court’s verdict is the people’s verdict’) was evenmore frenetic. On 29 January
1937, a crowd of 200,000 people gathered in Red Square despite sub-zero temperatures,
denouncing ‘Judas-Trotzky’. They were addressed by amember of the Politburo in
these words, ‘By raising their hand against Comrade Stalin, they raised their hand
against all the best that humanity has, because Stalin is hope … Stalin is our banner.
Stalin is our will, Stalin is our victory.’273 The public speaker was none other than
Nikita Khrushchev, who in 1956 would denounce Stalin in a ‘secret speech’ to the
Twentieth Party Congress.
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Why did themasses acquiesce to Stalin and his colleagues in the Politburo? The
First Five-Year Plan and its aftermath had created great confusion in the country. The
massive forced social and economic changes—and the traumatic disruptions these
triggered in people’s lives—called for an explanation. To blame the regime was risky.
In this situation the regime offered scapegoats to blame: economic saboteurs termed
‘wreckers’ and political saboteurs called by various other names—White Guards,
Trotzkyists, or simply ‘enemies of the people’. As historians Getty andNaumov put
it:
From peasant to Politburomember, the language about evil conspirators served a
purpose. For the plebeians, it provided a possible explanation for the daily chaos and
misery of life. For the many committed enthusiasts it explained why their Herculean
efforts to build socialism often produced bad results. For the nomenklaturamember, it
was an excuse to destroy their only challengers. For local Party chiefs, it was a rationale
for again expelling inconvenient people from the local machines. For the Politburo
member, it provided a means to avoid self-questioning about Party police and a
vehicle for closing ranks. The image of evil, conspiring Trotzkyists was convenient for
everybody …274
However, many foreign observers inMoscow and abroad were also accepting the trials
as real, rather than as a parody of justice. Great care had been taken to prepare the
defendants and witnesses for the trial. As a consequence, the fake character of the first
Moscow trial was missed bymany, if not most, especially if they had no command
of the Russian language. The American ambassador to Moscow, Joseph Davis, for
instance, held that the treason charges—in particular the collaboration of the accused
with the Gestapo—were factually true.275
Wedonot knowwhether hewas among the few foreign observerswhowere invited
to attend the first Moscow trial. However, the delegation from the International
Association of Lawyers, who had attended the trial, issued this statement:
We consider the claim that the proceedings were summary and unlawful to be totally
unfounded. The accusedwere given the opportunity of taking counsel; every counsel in
the SovietUnion is independent of theGovernment. The accused, however, preferred to
be defended individually.Hardly a state exists inwhich people involved in terrorist acts
are not given the death penalty. […] We hereby categorically declare that the accused
were sentenced quite lawfully. It was fully proven that there were links between them
and the Gestapo. They quite rightly deserved the death penalty.276
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One of the delegation’s members, British Labour PartyMember of Parliament
Denis Pritt, added in a newspaper article, ‘What first struck me as a British lawyer was
the defendants’ completely free and unconstrained conduct. They all looked well;
they all stood up and spoke when they wanted to … I consider the entire trial and
themanner of addressing the defendants to be an example for the whole world in
a case where the defendants are charged with the conspiracy to assassinate leading
statesmen and to overthrow the government, which the defendants confessed to’.277
Pritt’s article for the BritishNews Chroniclewas entitled ‘The Moscow Trial was a Fair
Trial’. Pravda did notmiss the opportunity to reprint such an endorsement in block
letters.278
The International Human Rights League also took the confessions at face value,
calling the trial lawful. Left-wing intellectuals in Europe were fooled, among them
Bernard Shaw, AndréMalraux and Romain Rolland. In public they all took Stalin’s
side—although at least one of them (Rolland) privately held grave concerns about the
conduct of the trial.279
However not everybody was fooled. In the United States a Commission of Inquiry
was set up in May 1937, chaired by 78-year-old philosopher John Dewey, to investigate
theMoscow show trial. The Inquiry was responding to appeals from an American
Committee for the Defence of Lev Trotzky, and from French intellectuals, trade
unionists and some parliamentarians. Trotzky and his son Sedov provided the Dewey
Commission (of eighteenmen) with documents and evidence. At the same time, Soviet
diplomats abroad worked hard to discredit this fact-finding exercise.280 Journalists
from a number of countries had covered hearings in Cocoyan, Mexico, where Trotzky
had been given asylum by theMexican president after pressure was put on Norway
to have him extradited to the Soviet Union. Since most charges of theMoscow trial
were linked to a conspiracy allegedly masterminded by Trotzky, his explanations and
refutations were crucial in determining the truthfulness of such accusations. Trotzky
defended himself forcefully on this and other occasions. Here he replies to accusations
from theMoscow trials in his own words:
According to the statements in both trials [the first and the second], the content
of my criminal work was as follows: Three meetings in Copenhagen, two letters
of Mrachkovsky and others, three letters to Radek, a letter to Pyatakov, another to
Muralov, a meeting with Romm lasting twenty to twenty-five minutes, a meeting
with Pyatakov lasting two hours … Altogether, the conversations and correspondence
of the conspirators, according to their own testimony, did not take more than twelve
or thirteen hours of my time. I do not know howmuch time was taken up by my
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conversations with Hess and the Japanese diplomats. Let us add twelve more hours.
Altogether, this totals a maximum of three working days … the eight years of mymost
recent exile comprise two thousand nine hundred and twenty possible working days
… During two thousand nine hundred and seventeen working days I wrote books,
articles and letter and held conversations devoted to the defence of Socialism … On the
other hand, I devoted three days … to a conspiracy in the interests of fascism.281
The report of the Cocoyan hearings was six hundred pages long and managed to
question many of the assertions made during the Moscow trial.282 The Dewey
Commission’s final report was 422 pages long and published in 1937 under the title
Not Guilty, with the conclusion, ‘We therefore find theMoscow Trials to be frame-
ups.’283 That conclusion did not reach many in the Soviet Union, nor did it manage to
convincemany on the political Left, outside the inquiry. Although part of the less
doctrinaire democratic intelligentsia did have second thoughts about the character of
the Soviet regime following the publication of the Dewey report, those on the political
Right tended to accept the veracity of the charges brought against Trotzky and his
followers.284
The sad truth about the reaction to the trial was that many people in the Soviet
Union believed what they were told to believe, while others outside Russia believed
what they wished to believe. Evidence and counter-evidence were accepted or ignored
based on ideology, convenience or short-term self-interest. That said, however, most
people were simply confused about what was going on. As Robert Tucker put it, ‘…
even politically literate people were [far] from understanding what was happening in
the country, who was behind it, and “why” ’.285 In many ways, what happened was
simply beyond comprehension.
4.5. Judicial, Social and Political Consequences
4.5.1. Judicial Consequences
On 5 December 1936, the Soviet Union received a new Constitution from the Commu-
nist Party, the product of a commission set up in February 1935. This Constitution
had been drafted mainly by Nikolai Bucharin, with the help of Karl Radek. They
would be among the main defendants in the second (January 1937) and third (March
1938) Moscow trials. The new Constitution ‘guaranteed’ freedom of speech, freedom
of assembly, freedom of the press and freedom of religious worship as well as the
stalin’s 1936 show trial against the ‘trotzkyite-zinovievite terrorist centre | 137
inviolability of individuals, their homes and their correspondence.More to the point, it
also ‘guaranteed’ Soviet citizens freedom from arbitrary arrest and the right to defence
in a public trial before an independent judge286 The Constitution was supposed to
identify the superior democratic and humanistic features separating Communism
from Fascism.287 Yet the contrast between the ‘theory’ of the Constitution and the
practice, manifested in the show trials and the purges, could not have been greater.288
On 1 September 1935, one week after the execution of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and the
other defendants, Stalin issued an order to Yagoda and Yezhov. Five thousandmembers
of the former opposition, who were already held in concentration camps, were to
be secretly executed. Former nkvd chief Orlov remembered this as an order ‘which
shocked even the most callous of the nkvd chiefs’. That order was soon followed
by another, asking the nkvd to prepare a further list of five thousand opponents
destined to be executed.289 Compiling such lists of names would become a frequent
occurrence. On some evenings, Stalin would sign off onmore than thousand names.
Thiswas the beginning of a purge thatwould, according to a conservative estimate,
cost some 700,000 lives over the next two years.290 What were the ‘crimes’ of those
who were executed? Perhaps they had, somewhere in the past, abstained from voting
in a resolution against Trotzky, or made a careless remark that was recorded by
nkvd informers. Others may have shown a perceived lack of faith in the Party line.
‘Trotzkyism’ was not specifically named as a crime in the Penal Code. The definition of
Trotzkyismwas very fluid and included not only opponents left and right of Stalin’s
line in the past, but also ‘wreckers’ and ‘fascist spies’.291 In November 1937, during
a toast for the twentieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Stalin told the
Politburo members and a few select others, ‘We will destroy every enemy, even if he is
an Old Bolshevik, we will destroy his kin, his family. Anyone who by his actions or
thoughts encroaches on the unity of the socialist state, we shall destroy relentlessly.’292
It was Stalin and the nkvd who decided what was a crime, not the Constitution, the
Penal Code or theMinistry of Justice.
Show trials like those held inMoscowwere also conducted in the republics, regions
and districts of the Soviet Union in the following two years. They served to provide
the rationale for local purges.293 The following two major show trials held in Moscow
in 1937 and 1938 clearly indicated that Stalin must have considered the first show
trial a success. While that trial had been targeting the Trotskyist Left, and the second
targeted Trotzkyist ‘wreckers’, the third trial focused mainly on the ‘Bloc of Rightists
and Trotzkyists’, with Bukharin as the most prominent representative.294
Legal safeguards, which existed at least on paper, had gravely deteriorated since
Kirov’smurder and the firstMoscowtrial.UntilDecember 1934, for example, executions
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of political opponents had to be confirmed by a commission of the Politburo. However,
by September 1934 in some regions of the Soviet Union, the death penalty no longer
had to be confirmed byMoscow if thematter was judged to be only of local concern.295
Until early 1936, Vyshinsky had advocated reducing the nkvd’s powers to impose
sentences directly. We must assume that he did this mainly to preserve this power for
the judiciary rather than the nkvd.296 Vyshinsky was not averse to drastic measures—
in 1937 he said that ‘One has to remember Comrade Stalin’s instruction that there are
sometimes periods, moments in the life of a society and in our life in particular, when
the laws prove obsolete and have to be set aside.’297 In April 1938 he instructed his
procurators not to obstruct the ‘mass operations’ of the nkvd.298 ‘Troikas’ (consisting
of the local Party boss, the local nkvd chief and the local procurator) were at that
time arranging and supervising mass arrests and executions in the provinces.299
Often, the representative from Vyshinky’s office was not even consulted. In late
1938, Vyshinskymanaged to regain some lost ground in that regard. The activities
of the ‘troikas’ were in practice brought to an end by mid-November 1938 by a
Politburo decree.300 Some dubious cases of nkvd arrests were even reopened and
some of those unjustly sent to labour camps were freed. But this affected only a
minority of the nearly twomillion people who had been sent to the camps by that
time.301
The purges that followed did not stop when it came to the Soviet criminal justice
system itself. The search for political enemies meant that ordinary criminal justice
cases became political cases, and the standards for issuing convictions were lowered.
The judiciarywas also purged. Thosewithin its rankswho did not sufficiently facilitate
the work of the nkvd became objects of persecution themselves. Almost half of all
judges and prosecutors lost their jobs in 1937 and 1938; many of themwere arrested.
Some two thousand new investigators and prosecutors hired in early 1938 could not
fill all the vacancies created by the purges.302
The Military Collegium of the Supreme Court which had sentenced Zinoviev,
Kamenev and the others would, in the next two years, rubber-stamp the death
sentences and other sentences not only for tens of thousands of old Party members,
but also bring death to young Komsomol (Communist Youth Organisation) members,
economic andmilitary functionaries, writers, artists and others. The Committee of
Justice of the Politburo, which included Nikolai Yezhov, would draw up hundreds
of lists of names. Stalin and a few colleagues from his inner circle in the Politburo
would sign them, often dealing with thousands in a single day; de facto pronouncing
the sentence—death or camp. Stalin signed 362 such lists, Molotov 373, Voroshilov
195, Kaganovich 191, Zhdanov 177 andMikojan 63. In this way, lists containing 44,000
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names passed through their hands and were forwarded to theMilitary Collegium.
39,000 thousand of the 44,000 were then sentenced to death by the Collegium.303
This procedure did not apply to the ‘national operations’ which paralleled the
Party purges. The Soviet Union was home to people of more than hundred different
nationalities. From this large pool of non-ethnic Russians, large numbers of people
were sent to the camps or sentenced to death. According to one nkvd document dated
December 1938, between 1 October 1936 and 1 November 1938, 1,565,041 people had
been arrested in national and other operations.304 Of these, 1,336,863 were sentenced.
The first category of punishment was death, the second was being sent to camps.
Of those arrested, more than 90,000 people died in camps in 1938,305 and 668,305 of
them were given the death sentence.306 These figures are incomplete; there were
also other operations. Operational order No. 00486, dated 15 August 1937, for instance,
ordered the ‘Liquidation of the families of arrested enemies of the people.’307 When
Yezhov sent Stalin a list with the names of wives of ‘enemies of the people’, he signed
that list as well.308 The slaughter was on an almost industrial scale. In one instance,
between August 1937 andOctober 1938, twelve nkvdmen in a special facility for killing
people by neck-shots in Butovo, outside Moscow, killed 20,000 people. As the volume
of liquidations increased, gassing in carriages was also said to have occurred.309 The
purges gradually shifted focus, from Old Bolsheviks to members of non-Russian
nationalities. This continued until at least late 1938. In addition, the nkvd also
operated abroad. Itsmost prominent target was Trotsky himself, whowas assassinated
inMexico in 1940 at Stalin’s order.
It took the Soviet Union a long time to admit to the miscarriage of justice in
this trial. In 1956 Khrushchev admitted to ‘glaring abuses of Socialist legality which
resulted in the death of innocent people’ in his secret speech to the twentieth Party
Congress. However, it would take 32more years before at least some symbolicmeasures
were taken to address some of the damage. In 1988, the ussr Supreme Court reviewed
the evidence against Zinoviev and Kamenev and others tried in August 1936, and
rehabilitated them, declaring that all the defendants in the first Moscow trial had
been innocent of the charges.310
4.5.2. Social and Political Consequences
With hindsight, it seems astounding that nobody realised what would stem from the
Kirov murder—nobody except Trotzky. Yet even he did not attribute Kirov’s murder
in December 1936 to Stalin. Yet he had suggested in the samemonth that Stalin’s goal
was ‘to terrorize completely all his critics and oppositionists, and this not by expulsion
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from the Party nor by depriving them of their daily bread, not even by imprisonment
or exile, but by the firing squad. To the terrorist act of Nikolayev, Stalin replies by
redoubling the terror against the Party.’311
Despite the breadth and the horror of the purges, they were smaller in terms of
casualties than the deaths accompanying the forced collectivisation of the peasantry
in the late 1920s and early 1930s. According to the highest estimates, twomillion people
were killed or sent to the camps during the Great Purge. At least three times as many
people had perished through hunger or shootings during the forced collectivisations.
The common people were affected by the purges less than Party members and
the middle levels of society. In fact, Stalin tried to tap into the discontent of the
common man, including those at the bottom of the Party pyramid, using their
dissatisfactions and denunciations as the rationale and engine for his purges against
the Old Bolsheviks.312
When the death sentences against Zinoviev and Kamenev were carried out in the
early hours of 25 August 1936, and Pravda had announced this,many in the Communist
Party were shocked. An unwritten contract had been broken: Party members do
not kill Party members and, above all, Old Bolsheviks do not kill Old Bolsheviks.313
While Stalin was still in Sochi (where he stayed until the end of September), the
Politburo discussed the trial on 27 August 1936. While nothing could now be done
about Zinoviev’s, Kamenev’s, Smirnov’s and Tomsky’s deaths (Tomsky had committed
suicide), many worried as their names had also been mentioned by defendants or
by the prosecutor during the trial. Rykov and Bukharin were themost prominent
members named—and two days after the executions, most Politburomembers were
not ready to let them share the same fate. Confronted with a false witness Yezhov had
presented to denounce Bukharin (editor of Izvestia), Lazar Kaganovich reportedly told
Bukharin, ‘He’s lying, the whore, from beginning to end! Go back to the newspaper,
Nikolai Ivanovich and work in peace.’314 The wide-ranging purge Stalin had inmind
for even the top ranks of the Party was still alien to many Politburo and Central
Committee members. Their instincts told them, ‘Repression was something we did
to them [the enemies of the Party] … and it was inconceivable that wewould repress
us.’315 Due to this resistance, Stalin, still away fromMoscow, had to take a step back.
On 10 September 1936 Vyshinsky announced in Pravda the closure of investigations
against the two ‘Rightists’ (Bukharin and Rykov—both non-votingmembers of the
Central Committee) for lack of evidence.316
Stalin blamed Yagoda for this setback in going after the ‘enemies of the people’, a
termsoonapplied, asKhrushchev later explained, to all ‘thosewho inanywaydisagreed
with Stalin’ as well as to ‘those who were only suspected of hostile intent’. Khrushchev
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called Stalin ‘a very distrustful man, sickly suspicious’.317 In Stalin’s dictionary ‘anti-
Stalin’ meant ‘counter-revolutionary’, ‘oppositional activity’ meant ‘treason’, and
‘anti-Stalin grouping’ meant ‘conspiratorial terrorist centre’. In short, anyone who
engaged in criticising or opposing Stalin’s policies could be charged with ‘counter-
revolutionary terrorism’.318 Few claims that surfaced in the first show trial had been
true, although therewas an undercurrent of opposition in the Bolshevik Party, and this
opposition had been linked with Trotzky and one of his sons abroad in the past. All the
evidence we have indicates that they planned no terrorist assassinations.319 Yagoda,
the nkvd chief who studied the pre-trial ‘confessions’ and ‘evidence’ of Pickel, Dreitzer
and others in the first show trial, annotated one report supposedly documenting
Trotzky’s terrorist orders with words like: ‘untrue’, ‘nonsense’, ‘rubbish’ and ‘this
cannot be’.320 Yagoda’s unwillingness to purge Old Bolsheviks on the basis of blatant
lieswould soon cost himhis job and, in the third show trial, his own life. Perhaps Stalin
was ‘inventing new enemies to intimidate his real opponents’ and to ‘destroy not only
his opponents but the less radical among his allies’, as Montefiore has suggested.321
Given Yagoda’s reluctance to act on false evidence, Stalinwas determined to replace
himwith the more aggressive Nikolai Yezhov. In a telegram of 25 September 1936, co-
signed by Andrei Zhdanov, Secretary of the Central Committee, Stalin demanded that
Yezhov bemade People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs, blaming Yagoda for handling
the trial poorly.322 Yagoda, like Molotov, had probably expected that Zinoviev and
Kamenev would be pardoned. An Old Bolshevik himself (he had joined the Party in
1907), he was sceptical about the widening of the purges, knowing that the charges
were fabricated and supported only by false confessions.323 Nikolai Yezhov became
Yagoda’s successor by the end of September 1936.
When Yezhov became chief of the secret police, he quadrupled nkvd salaries,
making them higher than those of others who worked in comparable positions in
government or the Party.324 Yezhov took with him from the staff of the Central
Committee three hundred men loyal to him. These men were the inner core to
administer the purges to come—purges that would include the old Chekist Bolsheviks
in the nkvd as well.325 With their help Yezhov would soon purge another 14,000
people. Why did they have to go? Perhaps because Stalin thought they knew too
much about the crimes he had ordered them to commit in the past. The purge of the
Old Chekists in 1937 occurred without trials.326 Yezhov, the ‘poison dwarf ’ (he was
just 151 cm tall, about 10cm shorter than Stalin) was notorious for his ruthlessness.
On one occasion, he claimed it was ‘better that ten innocent people should suffer
than one spy get away’, and on another he declared, ‘If during this operation an
extra thousand people will be shot, that is not such a big deal.’327 He participated
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personally in shootings, and also engaged in torture, sometimes cutting off the ears
and noses of his victims.328 In 1937, Stalin promoted Yezhov, the ‘Iron Commissar’, to
the position of candidate member of the Politburo.329 Except for Molotov, who was a
full member of the Politburo, Yezhov was Stalin’s most frequent visitor at that time;
Stalin’s appointment book records 278 of his visits, averaging three hours in length
each, during 1937–1938.330 Stalin told Yezhov on the occasion of his appointment as
head of the nkvd that there was a four-year backlog of ‘work’ to be done (presumably
a hint at the insufficient punishmentmeted out to the 1932 supporters of the Ryutin
platform).331 Stalin authorised Yezhov to impose death sentences when it came to
‘national operations’. But he kept the ‘political’ Party purges under his own tight
control.332
The show trials provided sensational confessions which, when publicised, created
an atmosphere of crisis, tension and suspicion—enemies could be everywhere, even
in the Party, and the utmost vigilance was called for. In this sense, the trials served
to ‘legitimise’ the purges, suggesting an enormous conspiracy that justified drastic
measures.333
The second Moscow trial (also known as the Pyatakov–Radek trial) in January
1937 was ostensibly ‘necessitated’ by the fact that, in addition to the ‘Leningrad
Centre’ (consisting of Nikolayev and others) and the ‘Moscow Centre’ (Zinovievites
and Trotzkyites), a third, ‘Parallel Centre’ (or ‘Reserve Centre’) had been ‘discovered’
by the nkvd investigators. Among those arrested and brought to trial were, in
addition to the Party’s renowned theorist Bukharin, Karl Radek, former secretary
of the Comintern, Leonid Serebriakov, former secretary of the Central Committee,
andMikhail Sokolnikov, former candidatemember of the Politburo. This ‘Parallel
Centre’ was said to have organised since 1933 sabotage and terrorist groups engaged
in ‘wrecking’ at industrial plants, especially those of the defence industry. It was
claimed they had been preparing terrorist attacks against Soviet leaders and engaged
in spying for foreign states, ultimately aiming to overthrow the Soviet regime and
restore capitalism.334 The outcome of the secondMoscow trial was that 13 out of 17
defendants were sentenced to death; the remainder received lesser sentences. Pyatakov
(whom Lenin had described in his testament as ‘undoubtedly a person of outstanding
strength of purpose and abilities’335) was executed, while Radek was given ten years
in the camps. He did not survive; Lavrentiy Beria who became chief of the nkvd
following Yezhov ordered his murder despite the fact that Radek was already in a
prison camp.336
InMarch 1938 the largest of the show trials was held, against Nikolai Bukharin, the
former head of the Communist International andmember of the Politburo (according
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to Lenin ‘the darling of the Party’),337 Alexei Rykov (Lenin’s deputy and later head of
the Soviet government), andmore than a dozen others.338 Among those others was
Arel Yenukidze, the Secretary of the Central Executive Committee, who had helped
Stalin in drafting the 1 December 1934 decree and Yagoda, who had prepared the
first show trial together with Yezhov. Yagoda was accused of belonging to a ‘Bloc of
Rightists and Trotzkyists’ who had allegedly conspired with foreign powers; he was
also accused of complicity in the murder of Kirov. He had allegedly instructed his
deputy in Leningrad ‘not to place any obstacles in the way of the terrorist act against
Kirov’.339 This may have been the only true charge made at this trial. However, if it
was true, Yagoda could not have done it without the approval of Joseph Stalin.340As
Stalin’s biographer, Montefiore, found: ‘Stalin sometimes accused others of his own
crimes’.341
It goes beyond the scope of this chapter to give a detailed account of the Great
Terror that followed the show trials. It engulfed ever widening circles. Quotas were
set on howmany ‘former kulaks and criminals’ had to be arrested in ‘mass operations’
and the specific selection of the victims was often left to lower level officials who were
even encouraged to exceed their quotas.342
To create the right public atmosphere for the country-wide purges, local show
trials were organised across the Soviet Union. The audiencewas no longernkvdpeople
only, as in the first Moscow trial. Workers and farmers were brought in to attend the
trials and local newspapers published full accounts. There was also a spin-off into real
theatre, as Sheila Fitzpatrick writes:
The show trials, which were themselves political theater, spawned imitations in the
regular theater, both professional and amateur. Lev Sheinin, whose cross-over activities
between criminal investigation and journalismwe have already encountered, was
coauthor of one of themost popular theatricalworks on the themes of theGreat Purges,
a play called The Confrontation, which played in a number of theaters throughout the
Soviet Union in 1937. Since Sheinin was reputed to be the author also of the scenarios of
the big Moscow show trials, this switch to ‘legitimate’ theater, using the same themes
of spies and their unmasking and interrogation, is intriguing.343
The purges also affected the nkvd and the Red Army, the two wings of government
with the largest capacity for organised violence. Here Stalin did not dare to use
a show trial as the instrument of bringing the Army under his full control The
Red Army, created and led by Trotzky in the years of the Civil War, still contained
many who had served under his command and who now risked being labelled as
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‘Trotskyists’. On 1May 1937, after the annualMay Day parade, Stalin told his inner
circle that it was time ‘to finish with our enemies because they are in the army, in the
staff, even in the Kremlin’.344 And indeed, in 1937 an ‘Anti-Soviet Trotzkyist Military
Organization in the Red Army’, allegedly led by Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky,
was ‘discovered’.345Tukhachevsky, the Deputy Commissar, was arrested on 22 May
1937, and admitted under torture to both having been a German agent and having
tried to seize power together with Bukharin. The charismatic commander of the
Red Army was secretly tried by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court and
shot on 12 June 1937.346 The people of the ussr learned of his death in a brief
newspaper notification.347 About 10,000 officers of the Red Army were purged,
including three (out of five) marshals, fifteen army commanders, fifteen army
commissars, 63 commanders of corps and an equal number of their commissars,
151 division commanders and 86 division commissars, 243 commanders of brigades
and 143 respective commissars, 318 commanders of regiments and 163 of their
commissars.
The purges in the Party were equally drastic. In the spring of 1937 Stalin had
told nkvd leaders that the entire pre-revolution and civil war generations of the
Old Bolsheviks were a millstone around the neck of the revolution.348 While he
did not destroy them all, his purge was extensive: the Central Committee, formally
the supreme authority in the Party, saw 70 per cent of its members and candidate
members—98men in total—arrested and shot in 1937–1938.349 The purges did not
stop at the Politburo either: five of its members—Rudzutak, Eiche, Cubar, Kosior
and Postyshev—were arrested and shot.350 When the eighteenth Party Congress
began on 10 March 1939, 90 per cent of the 1,900 attending were under 40 years
of age. The Old Bolsheviks—apart from Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich,
Zhdanov and a few others—had all gone. They were replaced by rising stars like
Andrei Gromyko, Yuri Andropov and Leonid Brezhnev. Nearly 60 per cent of those who
had belonged to the Party in 1933 were no longer part of it.351 Of the regional Party
leaders, 293 out of 333 had been replaced. Altogether half a million new appointments
had beenmade in the Party and the state, as the Party Congress learned from ‘the
wisest man of the epoch’, the ‘genius’ Stalin.352 Speaking at the opening of the
Congress, Stalin, with characteristic duplicity, also referred to the Old Bolsheviks,
saying ‘… there are never enough Old cadres, there are far less than required, and
they are already partly going out of commission owing to the operation of the laws
of nature’.353
By early 1939 the purges had practically come to an end. From January 1938 onwards,
the Central Committee had begun to criticise ‘false’ or ‘excessive’ vigilance.354 But
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this referred more to unrestrained repression from below, especially in the provinces,
which was often fuelled by denunciations and personal vendettas by Party bosses.355
On 17 November 1938 the Politburo had abolished the ‘Troikas’ that had been so
active identifying and trying ‘enemies of the people’ in the country, often exceeding
quotas set by the Kremlin.356 Yezhov was first side-lined and later arrested. He was
replaced in December 1939 by Lavrentiy Beria, the Stalin confidant from Georgia.
What had Yezhov done wrong? His biographers, Marc Jansen and Nikita Petrov,
hold that ‘there are no indications that Yezhov ever exceeded the role of Stalin’s
instrument’.357 However, Stalin was now eager to shift the blame onto him: ‘Yezhov
was a scoundrel. He ruined our best cadres. He had morally degenerated.’358 The
manoeuvre of blaming Yezhov for ‘excesses’ was successful. The Great Terror of 1937–
1938 is still referred to in Russian history as ‘Yezhovshchina’, the ‘time of Yezhov’,359
as if it was principally Yehzhov’s crime and not Stalin’s. The General Secretary claimed
in March 1939 at the Party Congress that ‘serious mistakes’ had been made by the
nkvd.360 On 10 April 1939, Yezhov was arrested by Beria at a meeting Stalin had
ordered Yezhov to attend.361 Yezhov was to be accused of planning a coup d’état
on the 21st anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. He was accused of treasonable
espionage for Poland, Germany, England and Japan. Under torture Yezhov admitted
it all, and much more readily than many of his own victims. He was shot on 4
February 1940, probably at the same special execution site near the Lubianka nkvd
headquarters he had built for some of his victims: a declining concrete floor with
wooden logs at one end to absorb the bullets and a hose to flush away the blood.
Yezhov’s last request reportedly was ‘Tell Stalin I shall die with his name on my
lips.’362 However after his death, when his personal safe was opened, materials
about Stalin’s pre-1917 past were allegedly found, including police records which
contained incriminating evidence of Stalin’s relationship with the Tsarist secret
police, the Okhrana.363 Yezhov’s relatives and close collaborators as well as their
wives and children—altogether 346 people—were also shot.364 His divorced wife had
already committed suicide before she could be arrested (she was accused of being an
English spy) andmade to testify against Yezhov, as Stalin and Beria reportedly had
planned.365
Yezhov’s successor, L. Beria, managed to survive Stalin (andmay even have had a
hand in his death by poisoning him in 1953).366 He also succeeded in killing Stalin’s
distant rival, Trotzky, the author of the volume The Revolution Betrayed. Stalin’s order
to Beria in 1939 was that ‘Trotzky should be eliminated within a year.’367 Beria set up
a special team, giving them three floors at nkvd headquarters. It required several
attempts before Beria succeeded. Trotzky had fled Norway for Mexico in 1937. In 1938,
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Trotzky’s son Sergei was arrested and his older son Sedov was killed.368 Beria managed
to infiltrate Ramon Mercader into Trotzky’s inner circle. Mercader was an nkvd
recruit from the Spanish civil war. He killed Trotzky inMexico City at his desk with
an ice axe on 20 August 1940.369 The previous day Stalin hadMolotov, his Minister of
Foreign Affairs, sign a non-aggression pact with Hitler—the fascist leader Stalin had
accused Trotzky of conspiring with.370
4.6. Conclusion
Following the Kirov murder, there were two secret trials (in December 1934 and
January 1935) and three show trials (in 1936, 1937 and 1938). We have focused here in
some detail on the first of the public Moscow trials and its consequences. Today we
knowmuchmore about what happened behind the scenes thanmost contempo-
raries did in August 1936. During the Great Purge, even otherwise well-informed
people like the writers Ilya Ehrenburg and Boris Pasternak thought that Stalin had
nothing to do with themass violence. ‘If only someone would tell Stalin about it’,
Pasternak said at the time—and he was not alone.371 Those who were at the re-
ceiving end of the terror wanted to know the reason for it all. ‘Koba, [Koba was
Stalin’s name from the days in the underground before the revolution] why do
you need me to die?’, wrote Nikolai Bukharin on 13 March 1938, after he (who had
saved Stalin in the 1920s from being politically side-lined) was also condemned
to death.372 Could someone with paranoia have acted the way Stalin did? While
there is considerable evidence of paranoia in Stalin’s last phase of life after the
Second World War, pathological paranoia does not conform well with the preci-
sion of his manoeuvres during the years of the Great Purge, as Vadim Rogovin,
and, before him, Boris Nicolaevsky have pointed out.373 Rogovin rightly observes
that:
Stalin was not mad, and he conducted a precisely determined line. He arrived at the
conclusion about the need to destroy the layer of Old Bolsheviks not later than the
summer of 1934, and then he began to prepare this operation. […] in 1937 Stalin held
the entire grandiosemechanism of state terror under his unwavering and effective
control. Without weakening or losing this control for even aminute, he displayed
in his actions not the nervousness and alarm of a paranoiac, but on the contrary, a
surprising, almost superhuman self-control and the most refined calculation. During
the 1930s, he conducted the ‘Yezhov’ operation very precisely (from his point of view),
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since he prepared everything and seized his enemies unawares; they didn’t understand
him … Evenmany of his supporters didn’t understand him.374
It is clear that Stalin wanted to maintain a ‘monolithic structure of the Party’375 with
himself undisputedly at the top. The Old Bolsheviks were the only ones who could
combine and challenge him, and in that sense they posed a potential danger. However,
they were divided and had in fact already lost their battle by the late 1920s. In the end
one has to search for explanations within Stalin himself. Bukharin found one possible
answer:
He [Stalin] is ever unhappy because he cannot convince everyone, even himself, that he
is greater than everybody else, and this is hismisfortune, perhaps his only human trait
…. But what is no longer human, but something diabolical is that for his ‘misfortune’
he cannot help but get revenge over people, all people, and particularly those who are
higher in some way, or better than him.376
How did Stalin manage to lead his closest allies and countless others he did not
even know, to the Gulag camps and the execution sites? Perhaps themain reason he
succeeded was that he was a good actor. As Robert Tucker observed, ‘… noteworthy
is the extraordinary cunning and duplicity that Stalin showed in his dealings with
various individuals who were condemned in his ownmind to destruction. He would
convincingly reassure them that they had nothing to worry about.’377 InMarch 1937,
when the purges he had ordered were already in full swing, he could sanctimoniously
caution other members of the Central Committee against ‘a heartless attitude toward
people’ and blame those who ‘think it is a mere bagatelle to expel thousands and ten
thousands of people from the Party’.378 His ability to manipulate his colleagues and
subordinates was extraordinary.379 While it is true that he needed helpers and willing
executioners, one year after the first Moscow show trial, by mid-1937, as Robert Tucker
put it, ‘… he effectively was the regime’.380
New evidence which has surfaced since the Soviet Union came to an end basically
corroborates (for the first show trial) what Tucker and Cohen concluded in 1965 when
they wrote about the thirdMoscow trial:
As we re-examine the problem of theMoscow show trials, then, it is essential to bear in
mind that these were basically one-man shows of which Stalin himself was organizer,
chief producer, and stagemanager as well as an appreciative spectator from a darkened
room at the rear of the Hall of Columns, where the trial was held. Vyshinsky spoke
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for the prosecution, but wemust understand that he spoke with the voice of Stalin.
Although he did not claim personal authorship, Stalin was the chief playwright of the
case of the ‘Anti-Soviet Bloc of Rights and Trotzkyites’ and the other cases enacted in
the show trials.381
With his show trials, Stalin managed to frighten his enemies, punish his former
opponents in the Party, mobilise the public to be ‘vigilant’ and expose and denounce
‘enemies of the people’, while at the same time shifting the blame for the crimes he
committed to others. Perhaps that was also the deeper purpose of the ‘confessions’—if
he was at all capable of feelings of guilt, the confessions of others to his crimes could
serve to take away that guilt. This is the interpretation proposed by Robert Tucker:
For Stalin, the execution of Zinoviev and Kamenev, in violation of his promise to
spare their lives, represented the final measure of vindictive triumph over loathsome
enemies. He not only humiliated, exploited, and destroyed them, but he caused
them to die knowing they had publicly abased and besmirched themselves and very
many others, taken on the guilt for hismurder of Kirov, his duplicity, and his terrorist
conspiracy against the Party state. They had confessed to representing a variety of
fascismwhen he was introducing just that in Russia by, among other things, this very
pseudo-trial; and they wound up groveling at their murderer’s feet and glorifying
him—all for nothing but to serve his purposes.382
The ‘show’ trial was, if we follow this line of interpretation, perhaps first of all a show
for himself, and then only one for the 165 million people in the Soviet Union and
the workers’ movement beyond the ussr. Of his opponents, only Trotzky stood up
to challenge him from abroad, for which he paid the same price as those who had
‘crawled on their bellies’ during the trial in an attempt to save their lives.383 Not only
are the ruthlessness and vindictiveness of Stalin reflected in the crimes he attributed
to his enemies in the show trial. The trials also became the model for the kind of
society the Soviet Union became under Stalin after he seized on the Kirovmurder to
shape Russia in his own image. Amy Knight has correctly observed that:
The Kirov case—not just the murder, but the investigation, trials, and propaganda
that followed—served as a prototype for all future cases that the secret police would
investigate. Marking the beginning of a collusion between Party leadership and the
secret police in a travesty of justice for the Soviet people, it incorporated all the elements
of the Soviet system of repression that would be refined in the decades to come—
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falsified testimonies, scapegoats, arbitrary punishments, physical and psychological
torture, intimidation and threats, andmeaningless judicial jargon.384
Before the advent of electricity (and even thereafter), theatres in Russia and elsewhere
had to have an ‘iron curtain’, a barrier that could separate the stage, with its petrol
lamp illumination, from the audience. In case of fire the curtain could be lowered to
the edge of the stage, allowing the audience to escape unharmed. After the Second
World War, Stalin put up an Iron Curtain around the Soviet Union and its satellites. It
served the opposite purpose, namely to prevent the audience from escaping. Those
in the Soviet Union who did not like his ‘show’ were put away and, inmany cases,
were worked to death in labour colonies and camps. By 1939 the camp population
numbered 1.7 million people (not all of them political prisoners). By 1941 some seven
million people had passed through the Gulag and labour colony system since 1934. By
the time Stalin died, in 1953, there were 12 million in the Gulag system.385 In the years
1937–1938 alone, 680,000 people had died following themonstrous trials and special
tribunals at the hands of the nkvd. To this day, even these figures are incomplete and
provisional.386
The chain of events that had led to this national tragedy began on 1 December 1934
with the assassination of Sergei Kirov and the decree that Stalin drafted in response,
which became the heart of Article 58 of the Soviet Penal Code. The Great Purge ended
four years later on 17 November 1938 with a decree of the Central Committee that
put a stop to the extensive arrest and deportation operations. As Nikolaus Werth has
observed, ‘The Great Terror ended as it had begun, with an order of Stalin.’387 He
had never lost control of the ‘show’. Stalin’s compelling performative power has been
unmatched to this day—as has his moral depravity.
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5. ‘Is There any Justice Left in this Country?’
The ira on Trial in the 1970s
Joost Augusteijn
5.1. Introduction
In the course of their long-standing struggle for independence, Irish Republicans
have become well aware of the performative power of trials. The rebellion of 1803, for
instance, is best remembered not for its somewhat farcical military exploits, but for
the speech given by its leader Robert Emmet after his conviction. Indeed, statements
deliveredby Irishdefendants in the courts became akeymobilising tool for nationalists
in the nineteenth century. This is attested to by the popularity of publications like
Speeches from the Dock, first published in 1867, which contained arguments made in
court by men like Wolfe Tone, the leader of the first Republican uprising in 1798, up to
those who had been involved in the Fenian rebellion in the year of publication. The
influence of these speeches on the formation of the Irish Republican Army (ira) in
1913 was acknowledged by one of the first ira leaders.1
Speeches by imprisoned leaders declined in significance in the twentieth century,
but court cases and the imprisonment of ira activists did not. The outcome of some
ira campaigns, beginning with the execution of the leaders of the 1916 rebellion,
had a substantial impact on society. After southern Ireland gained independence
following a guerrilla war in 1920–1921, the ira was involved in further violence during
the short-lived but vicious civil war of 1922–1923, and in low-key campaigns against
Britain and Northern Ireland between 1939 and 1944 and from 1956 to 1962. After
the ira acknowledged in 1962 that the Border Campaign had failed it shifted to a
peaceful strategy in conjunction with a quest for civil rights engaged in by large
sections of the Catholic population in the North. However, this generated such
extreme anxiety among Protestants that at the end of the 1960s communal violence
erupted, threatening to lead to a civil war. In these circumstances, the ira was called
upon to help protect Catholic neighbourhoods against attacks from Protestant
civilians. A section of the ira that responded to this call set up the Provisional
ira in December 1969, leading to a long period of conflict lasting to the end of the
century.
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At the same time as the formation of the Provisionals, British troops were brought
out onto the streets of Northern Ireland to prevent further escalation. They helped
to bring relative safety to Catholic areas, but conflict now developed between the
ira and the British army. In 1971 the ira convinced itself that it could force the
British to leave Northern Ireland by military means, and turned to a confrontational
strategy. Thanks to the militarisation of the conflict by both sides, 1972 became the
most violent year of ‘The Troubles’, with hundreds of bombs exploding in Northern
Ireland and thousands of shooting incidents. To put a stop to this, peace negotiations
between the ira and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland were held in the
summer of 1972, but these failed over ira demands for British withdrawal. When the
desired results did not materialise, the ira extended its activities to Great Britain’s
mainland, where car and parcel bombs became frequent occurrences from 1973
onwards. This offensive continued until 1975, when a cease-fire (which lasted from
February 1975 until January 1976) initiated the turn to the so-called LongWar strategy.
The willingness of the British government to remain in Northern Ireland, the ira
now thought, could be undermined by sustained low-intensity violence. This soon
created a deadlock, with neither side making substantial progress. Eventually this
gave rise to the peace process which culminated in the Good Friday Agreement of
1998. Throughout this period, the survival of the ira was dependent on the support it
received from nationalists in Northern Ireland as well as in the Republic of Ireland. In
the Republic the dominant ideology favoured a united Ireland, but an overwhelming
majority of citizens were against the methods used by the Provisionals. An important
element in generating and maintaining public support for them was the plight
of prisoners. Their willingness to suffer for the shared ideal of a united Ireland,
which came particularly sharply in focus during court cases, was able to mobilise
many.
The four court cases investigated in this chapter, held against the backdrop of the
Troubles of the early 1970s, represent conditions in the three jurisdictions involved in
the conflict: Northern Ireland, England and the Republic of Ireland.
(i) the trial of two leading Belfast Republicans, WilliamMcKee and Francis Card,
which took place in Northern Ireland on 16May 1971;
(ii) the case of the chief of staff of the ira, Sean MacStiofáin, in Dublin on 24–
25 November 1972;
(iii) the case against ten ira operatives from Belfast responsible for the first London
bombings in the Provisionals’ campaign, which was held in Winchester from
10 September to 14 November 1973;
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(iv) the case of Bobby Sands, who was tried in Belfast on 8 September 1977, following
the introduction inNorthern Ireland of the Diplock courts system, which replaced
jury trials.
Apart from the last case, these trials generated substantial media attention, and
on occasion controversy and debate. This applied in particular to the cases against
MacStiofáin and the ‘Belfast Ten’. The former signalled the start of a confrontational
policy of the southern authorities vis-à-vis the Provisional ira, after a period when
they had been essentially left alone. The trial of the Belfast Ten struck a raw nerve
as the first major trial against iramembers in England. Far less attention was paid
to cases tried in Northern Ireland, where the scale of violence was so vast that the
impact of any one trial was relatively minor. The case against McKee and Card was
an exception, in that it witnessed a change in policy by the authorities, a deliberate
attempt to use the legal system to lock up known leaders of the ira. The impact of
this trial was augmented when the defendants went on a hunger strike, as all the
other condemned Republicans in the cases under scrutiny here eventually did. The
trial of prominent hunger striker Bobby Sands was chosen to serve as an example of
how the Diplock courts, introduced in 1973, reduced the public impact of ira trials in
the North.
The performative power of these trials will be assessed according to the framework
provided in this volume’s theoretical chapters in the introduction and the conclusion
by Beatrice de Graaf (and Liesbeth van der Heide). Trials are here seen as a stage where
the different actors adopt and act out strategies with the aim of convincing their target
audience(s) in and outside the courtroom of their narrative of (in)justice. Particular
attention is paid to the way in which the various parties framed their positions and
those of the opposing parties, as well as to the relative success of these attempts in
convincing the general public. The focus lies not only on the intentions of those
involved but also on effects on the ground. It will therefore look into proceedings
during the trials as well as at the reactions of politicians and the general public in
Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and Great Britain. The analysis is based
primarily on newspaper reports and parliamentary debates during and after the
arrests and trials. The underlying premise is that a performative strategy that fails to
make it into the public arena lacks resonance in society and can therefore be largely
discounted. An attendant circumstance is that there is very little other sourcematerial
on the trials, as proceedings were generally not recorded verbatim. The newspapers
used for this chapter were chosen from among those searchable on the Internet.
Within the Irish Republic the choice fell on the middle-class and traditionally slightly
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Unionist Irish Times; the nationalist Irish Press; the more populist Irish Independent and
Sunday Independent; and a number of provincial newspapers.2 Those in Britain included
themiddle-class, fairly non-partisanObserver and the left-leaning Guardian. To gain
insight into the Republican perspective, the hardcopy files of the southern-based
weekly An Phoblacht and the northern-based RepublicanNewswere also consulted.
5.2. The Trial of WilliamMcKee and Francis Card (1971)
The first case pertains to WilliamMcKee and Francis Card, who were arrested after a
car chase in Belfast on 14 April 1971. Both were known leaders of the Belfast ira and
they seem to have been targeted for arrest. McKee was commanding officer of the
Belfast Brigade and Card was in charge of propaganda in the city, having previously
served 13 years in detention. According to the Irish Times, they had been challenged
in recent months by the British army to state whether they were in fact members
of the Provisionals. As this was not the first arrest of known Republicans in unclear
circumstances, the newspaper reported that there was much talk in Republican areas
that the security forces
were carrying out a policy of virtual internment: they were arresting known suspects
and holding them, thereby hoping to capture the ringleaders of the Provisional i.r.a.
[…] Certainly the absence of any major outbreak of i.r.a. activity against the troops
could suggest that this policy is working and the arrest of Card andMcKee could be
seen as further evidence of this policy in action.3
The openly pro-ira Republican News, one of the few other papers that reported on
the case, paid no attention to the reasons for the arrest itself but highlighted the
subsequent raid on the home of Pronnsias McAirt, as Francis Card called himself in
an attempt to show his commitment to a Gaelic Ireland. They painted a picture of
police brutality by printing photographs of his house and saying that it had been
‘violated’ in a raid executed with ‘force of military jack-boots and padded shoulders
and of course rifle butts’. As the Republican News put it, the ‘assault on privacy clearly
shows that we, the Nationalist people of the North, can expect no regard to our lives,
limbs or property, by these monsters. No house in any Nationalist area is exempt
from this brutal and hideous treatment.’4
At the remand hearing, Card was presented as a 47-year-old unemployed clerk
andMcKee as a 49-year-old unemployed labourer. Together with Bernard Burns, a
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shop owner of 33 who had driven the car and had been arrested with them, they were
charged with unlawful possession of an explosive substance and a loaded firearm.5
The three men were remanded in custody repeatedly, each period lasting a week
before a next hearing was held, until their trial twomonths later. During one of the
remand hearings, Burns, who was only a minor figure in the ira, was released due to
lack of evidence.6 In the run-up to the actual trial, the charges against McKee and
Card were modified; they were now accused of possession of a .45 revolver and one
round of ammunition with intent to endanger life; possessing them under suspicious
circumstances andwithout a licence; and having a stolen car and driving it knowingly.
Card faced additional charges because he was serving a suspended sentence, and for
possessing documents found in his home relating to the republican party, Sinn Fein,
and the ira. During the trial it became clear that the arrest of the twomen took place
after they were seen visiting a house in Belfast that was under police observation.
The car in which they travelled was halted after they left the house, upon which they
reversed direction and eventually fled on foot. During the pursuit they called upon
people on the street to block the road to stop the police following them. Some of them
did, and the police car was held up temporarily. The escape car was later found a
few streets away, empty, with the doors open. When the police tried to investigate
it they were forced to withdraw by a threatening crowd. Upon their return with
reinforcements they found a revolver under the back seat. There were no fingerprints
of the defendants on the gun—or for that matter in the car. What was found, on the
gunwas a combination of fibres thatmatchedMcKee’s jacket pocket. However, during
the trial the forensic expert agreed with Card that another coat of similar material
would have shown the same results.7
Apart from some instructions to the jury, there were no reports of specific
interventions by the judge in the case, which was conducted in the regular format
of the British criminal justice system. Proceedings were overseen by a judge who
determined the appropriate measure of punishment. The public prosecutor argued
the case against the defendants and lawyers would normally speak in their defence.
All of this took place in front of a jury that determined guilt or innocence. In the
media, the impression one gets of the prosecution is that it simply presented evidence
in court and questioned witnesses. However, the prosecution also emphasised that
the defendants had portrayed themselves as leadingmen in their neighbourhoods,
apparently in an attempt to make their convictionmore urgent. This was in line with
the policy that the Irish Times attributed to the authorities. Card was stated to have
said during his interrogation, ‘No one will say they saw us in that Cortina. We are the
leaders in our area.’ When asked whether it was the ira to which he was referring he
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did not answer. WhenMcKee was interviewed later he was reported to have said, ‘We
were up there because we heard there was trouble, so we went to see about it. When
there is trouble we organise things and help defend our people.’8
The defendants also attempted to influence the way the case was perceived by the
outside world. In keeping with the long-standing tradition among Irish Republicans,
they refused to recognise the court and consequently rejected any form of legal
counsel, nor did they enter a plea after the charges were read. They did, however,
defend themselveswhen they felt it was opportune.9 During the remandhearings they
tried to undermine the case of the prosecution, playing to a courtroom audience that
was apparently generally packed with sympathisers. One simple ploy was to initiate a
positive response by waving at the audience, but amore elaborate tactic would involve
the ridiculing of witnesses for the prosecution. The court erupted in laughter when
Detective Chief Inspector Robert Wilson of the LondonMetropolitan Police could not
recall howmany cars the defendants had been driving when caught because he had
not been there. The judge threatened to clear the courtroom, instructing the officers
to remove one woman who then shouted, ‘This is no court!’ She was sentenced on the
spot to three days’ imprisonment for contempt of court, but this punishment was
waived after she apologised.10
In their defence themen tried to brush off the case as a ‘frameup’ and ‘legalised in-
ternment’. In the history of the Irish struggle for independence the term ‘internment’
carried a strong negative ring, implying the exercise of injustice. Tarring the trialwith
that brush undoubtedly resonated with a large part of the nationalist population
in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The defendants demanded to know
where the gun, which did not have any fingerprints on it, was found. They argued
that the fibres on the gun that matched McKee’s coat were put on the gun later.
McKee stated that it would have been very conspicuous had he carried a gun in his
coat pocket: ‘No fool would walk about the streets of Belfast with such a gun in an
outside pocket’, even climbing onto a seat to demonstrate the truth of this statement.
Card finished up by dismissing all the evidence connecting him to any of the charges.
He denied ever having stated they were leaders in the area and reminded the court
that the onus was on the prosecution to prove their guilt, not on them to prove their
innocence. McKee concurred, adding for goodmeasure that a critical examination
would reveal that there was no case whatsoever.11 The defendants’ arguments did
not convince jury or judge. Card andMcKee were both found guilty and sentenced
to five years for the gun-related charges. The judge had instructed the jury to ex-
onerate them of the charges linking them to the stolen car, for which there was no
evidence.12
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Outside the court the portrayal of the case as a set-up had somewhat more impact.
In what seems to have been a staged reaction to the arrest, already during the second
remand hearing, a dozenmen carrying placards protested outside the court building
against ‘State repression’.13 The ira made its presence known immediately after the
first hearing by bombing the house of the presiding judge, damaging the windows,
car and garage door. This was the only aspect of developments prior to the court case
itself reported in any of the papers besides the Irish Times.14 Although the Irish Press
only referred to the case during the trial, it claimed that the impact of the arrests had
been widespread: ‘The recent bombing campaign began in earnest after the arrest of
these men—the Provisional ira wanted tomake the point that the imprisonment
of two of their leaders did not in any way incapacitate the organisation or diminish
its effectiveness.’ The Irish Presswas the onlymainstream paper that considered the
sentence ‘unexpectedly heavy’ and that detected amood of dismay and despondency
in Republican circles, fromwhom they expected agitated reactions.15
Republican newspapers indeed picked up on the suggestion that the two were
framed and that there was no justice for nationalists in Northern Ireland. The main
headline in An Phoblacht—‘Belfast Men Framed’—referred to the claim that the pistol
found in the car was planted: ‘What Scotland Yard liars did not say was that the car
had been searched previously by a British Army Patrol and that the back seat had
been removed by the British Troops who found nothing.’ The absence of real evidence
should in their minds have led to an acquittal, and the fact that this did not happen
supported their narrative of injustice. ‘In any impartial court the case would have
been stopped by the judge. But in the corrupt Judicial system inOrangist Ireland there
is no justice for anyone who cherishes Republican or Nationalist aspirations.’ They
contrasted the heavy sentence with what they considered the light sentences handed
down to Loyalist paramilitary men found in possession of arms or ammunition,
ending their argument with a call to each and every one to domore to support the
cause.16 The Irish Press reported that at meetings organised by Sinn Fein in Belfast
speakers and placards referred to the case as based on ‘thrumped [sic] up charges’. In
the end it was not just the immediate friends and supporters of the defendants and
the ira who were convinced by these claims. Frank Gogarty, the vice-chairman of the
non-violent Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, also credited the accusation
that Card andMcKee had been framed by Scotland Yard detectives.17
From the reports in the newspapers it appears that at this stage the ira was more
aware than the other participants of the publicity value of a court case. Because the
court system tried to maintain the rule of law and legal standards in a traditional way,
the prosecution assumed that everybody would be against what they saw as crime.
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That being the case, there was little need to domore than to identify the defendants as
leading iramembers. Thismay have had little impact on the Republican constituency,
but in Unionist circles it was enough to justify a harsh sentence. What seems to have
happened is that the authorities, in an attempt to stem the sudden rise of anti-state
violence, resorted to the tactic of putting the accused away for as long as possible.
Heavy sentences were handed down even in cases where the charges were minor
and the evidence not particularly strong. In a period in which violence was flaring
up with hitherto unknown intensity, this seemed an understandable reaction. The
ira and the defendants involved had a great deal of experience with the impact of
violence and court cases. This applied particularly toMcKee, who had been involved in
campaigns in the 1940s and 1950s and, like Card, had spent long periods in prison. The
Republicans were out to frame the case for its public impact, while the authorities
seemed to treat it as a simple security issue. The Irish Timeswas the only paper to pay
extensive attention to the legal process from arrest to trial. The only othermainstream
paper that reported on the trial itself, the Irish Press, seemed to address the Republican
constituency in Ireland. The Irish Independent, the local papers in the Republic in the
south and the English papers did not pay any attention to it, indicating that the
performative quality of the trial of McKee and Card was limited and largely confined
to Republicans and the southern elite.
5.3. The Trial of SeanMacStiofáin (1972)
The arrest in Dublin of SeanMacStiofáin on 19 November 1972 and his subsequent
trial had a great deal more performative power than the conviction of Card andMcKee
the year before. In 1972 the violence in Northern Ireland escalated to new heights.
MacStiofáin had become widely known as the chief of staff of the Provisional ira
and essentially acknowledged this in his conversations with the press. His speech
to the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis, the annual conference, of October 1972, where he had
been openly described as such, had badly irked both Irish and English politicians.
On 1 November, opposition politicians in the Dáil, the Irish parliament, asked why
MacStiofáin was not arrested following this appearance.18 Similar questions were
raised in Great Britain. The Guardian wondered how it was possible that until recently
people had been allowed to describe themselves openly on television and radio as ira
leaders without consequences. TheObserver called upon the Irish government ‘to
make a conciliatory gesture’ following the British government’s recent Green Paper,
which acknowledged the need for a role of the South in the future of Northern Ireland.
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It was time for the Irish to act, they argued: ‘The Irish police so often seem to blow hot
and cold, one day closing Sinn Fein’s Dublin headquarters and the next permitting a
Sinn Fein meeting, at whichMrMac Stiofáin made a well-publicised andmarkedly
unhelpful address.’ It was clear that pressure was building on the Irish Government
to act against the ira andMacStiofáin in particular.19
However, due to the fraught historic relationship with Britain and its precarious
majority in parliament, the Irish government felt unable to take on MacStiofáin
directly; put bluntly, the government was afraid to be seen to act on the bidding of the
British. The very suspicion would lead to repercussions in their own Fianna Fáil party,
which had strong historic connections with the ira. TheMinister of Justice, Desmond
O’Malley, went only so far as to say in a radio interview that he would like to arrest
MacStiofáin but that he had nothing to charge himwith. He added that he would
introduce fresh legislation to deal with violence.20 The Guardian reacted positively:
‘The problem of locking up Fenians,21 which seems to concern almost every politician
in Ireland, might be solved later this month.’22 The opposition td (member of the
Dáil) Gerald L’Estrange was less optimistic. The next day he countered, ‘Surely we are
entitled to know how aman could have a bodyguard around him, a man who is a
wanted member of the council of the ira. These people were not apprehended. We are
entitled to ask what is happening in this country at present. Is there any justice left in
the country?’23
Increasedpressurenonetheless had its effect. Twoweeks later, before therewas time
to enact new legislation, the government detained MacStiofáin. The arrest followed a
pre-arranged interview with the well-known rte journalist and broadcaster Kevin
O’Kelly in the very early hours of Sunday, 19 November 1972. They spoke to each other
in O’Kelly’s house, which was apparently watched by Irish policemen waiting for an
opportunity to pounce. When O’Kelly went to the studio to report on the interview
MacStiofáin got into his car to drive home. At 3:15 a.m. he was captured, apparently
at gunpoint, on the charge of membership of an unlawful organisation. The arrest
was headline news in all the Irish newspapers. In their initial response even the Irish
Press, which had strong ties to the government party, questioned the legality of the
arrest. Asking rhetorically whether the legal system had been changed or whether
MacStiofáin had broken any laws since the recent statement byMinister O’Malley, the
Irish Press hinted at other reasons when it asked, ‘or was his arrest the direct result of
pressure from Britain’?24
MacStiofáin was tried by the Special Criminal Court established earlier that year
to deal with cases where ‘the ordinary courts were deemed inadequate to secure the
effective administration of justice’. Juries in these courts were replaced with a panel of
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three judges; verdictswere delivered bymajority vote. At the start of the trial, on Friday,
24November 1972,MacStiofáin was described as a 44-year-oldman born in London. He
was arraigned on two charges: membership of an unlawful organisation that raised or
maintained an armed force, andmembership of an unlawful organisation, namely
the ira. In line with official ira policy, MacStiofáin refused to recognise the court and
chose to represent himself, just likeMcKee andCard had done the previous year. One of
his first allegations, which was reported in the more nationalist-minded newspapers,
was that thewhole proceedingswere only initiated because the governmentwas under
pressure from the British—in particular the British press—and the northernUnionists
to arrest him. TheGuardian later acknowledged that the intensive discussions between
the British and Irish governments following the abolition of the separate Northern
Irish government seemed to justify this claim: ‘Eachmove by the Irish Government
has been followed by discussions with the British leaders, which has created in the
minds of Irish Republicans the suspicion that, to say the least, actions and talks have
somehow been connected.’25 This idea was pressed particularly vigorously in the
Republican press. Republican News opened its front page with the headline ‘Lynch acts
at Heath’s Orders’, arguing that the Irish Taoiseach (prime minister), Jack Lynch, had
been instructed to arrest MacStiofáin by the British PrimeMinister, Edward Heath.
‘Herod Heath has called for a head on a plate. Saoirse Lynch will tell him the victim
is already imprisoned.’26 The newspaper further inferred that the government was
only holding Ireland for the British Conservative Party by calling the governenment
members ‘quislings’. The Irish-based Sunday Independent followed this line of argument
to some extent by claiming that in a jury trial the case would have been stopped dead
in its tracks.27
Like Card and McKee, MacStiofáin challenged the legality of the proceedings
and claimed that the court could not deliver proper justice. The main grounds
for these protests were that the evidence lacked viability and that the court was
prejudiced against him due to all the reporting in themedia. ‘It seems to him that
the wells of justice had been staunched before beginning to flow.’28 One weakness
of the case was that the charges against MacStiofáin were laid after themandatory
deadline of 48 hours following arrest. The impression had been given byMinister
O’Malley that the prosecution had no evidence againstMacStiofáin. The Republican
News put it succinctly, ‘The man is held unjustly, no evidence being preferred against
him, and no grounds for his detention.’29 The English papers, theObserver and the
Guardian, paid no attention to MacStiofáin’s claims of injustice. They honed in on the
peculiar position of the journalist Kevin O’Kelly, who stated in court that recordings
played at the hearing represented an accurate and authentic representation of
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MacStiofáin’s position but refused to testify that it wasMacStiofáin himself who could
be heard on the tape. This got O’Kelly a sentence of three months’ imprisonment for
contempt of court. Kelly’s assertion nevertheless formed the sole basis forMacStiofáin’s
conviction as it was the sole piece of concrete evidence. MacStiofáin’s narrative of
injustice also led him to state that although he did not doubt the integrity of those
involved, as a Republican he had ‘very very little chance of getting justice in a Free
State Court’ that had ‘been set up by the most obnoxious piece of legislation’ and
that was being abused to serve the ends of the British government.30 This charge
was only reported in the Irish papers. The Guardian made reference to the lack of
evidence andMacStiofáin’s ‘outrage’ over the court system being abused by some
members of the government, but did not refer to the accusation that he could get
no justice in an Irish court. This may be because the journalist involved did not
understand the implication of the use of the term Free State, which referred to the
dominion status Britain had granted in 1921 and which had led to the Irish civil
war of 1922–1923. The government party had fought against the Free State in this
war and referring to it implicitly charged the government party with betrayal of
their Republican principles.31 Later in the trial MacStiofáin tried to undermine the
perceived objectivity of the court further: ‘It’s a waste of timemaking objections. I
am taking no further interest in these proceedings.’ He nevertheless continued to
debate with the judges on the value of the evidence presented and the competence
of the witnesses.32
Public attention to the case, which was already considerable givenMacStiofáin’s
high public profile, was further augmented by the hunger and thirst strike he started
after his arrest. As this put him in danger of death within two weeks or less, the stakes
for all parties became extremely high. MacStiofáin played upon this to get the court to
speed up proceedings and to heighten public awareness of his situation. When he
appeared before the court for the first time, on a Tuesday, the prosecution argued
that it needed two weeks to prepare its case and that it needed the tapes O’Kelly had
made of the interview. MacStiofáin argued that he had less than twelve days to live,
so it was agreed to have the tapes heard three days later on the Friday and have the
obligatory transcripts made afterwards. Whether taped interviews were admissible as
evidence would yet have to be established, as this had never before been accepted in
an Irish court.33 During the Saturday it was decided, uponMacStiofáin’s insistence,
to continue late into the night to make sure the case was completed as quickly as
possible. When a five-hour break was inserted to allow for the transcripts to be made,
he publicly asked for a warm room, fromwhich when proceedings were resumed
he was carried back on a chair. Even before the case started, reports on his physical
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condition were brought out through his friendMyles Shevlin, a solicitor who seems
to have been advising him. On Thursday, for instance, Shevlin stated that MacStiofáin
had lost fifteen pounds in weight and was suffering from kidney pains. The Irish Press
opened its Friday edition with this story on its front page and continued to pay a lot of
attention toMacStiofáin’s physical condition.34 Despite the administration ofmedical
treatment, the complaints worsened during the trial. After his sentence was read out
on Sunday morningMacStiofáin was described as being ‘determined and defiant,
and, in spite of his weakness, he struck the bench in front of himwith his fist and
shouted to the three judges: “I will be dead in six days. Live with that.” ’35 The less
sympathetic Irish Times also dealt with the effects on the body of a hunger and thirst
strike, reporting that a thirst strike carried a maximum survival period of eighteen
days.36
While the judges were willing to take the physical effects of MacStiofáin’s hunger
and thirst strike into account and never put restrictions on reporting the case, they
were less lenient concerning his attempts to put across his narrative of injustice. On
the one hand the president of the court, Justice Frank Griffin, assuredMacStiofáin that
nothing written or said outside the court would have a bearing on the case, he also
refused to allow any evidence regarding MacStiofáin’s membership of the ira beyond
the date mentioned in the charge. On the other hand, he cut MacStiofáin off when
he characterised the act establishing the Special Criminal Courts as obnoxious. In a
move withmajor implications, apparently inspired by partisan considerations, Griffin
pointed out to the prosecution that it could recall O’Kelly to take the stand again even
after his conviction for contempt of court. Griffin added that if O’Kelly would then
nameMacStiofáin he would be allowed to negotiate the extent of his sentence with
the authorities. In effect, in a move described by the Guardian as ‘extraordinary’, he
invited the prosecution to make a deal with O’Kelly in order to get the main piece of
evidence approved in court. O’Kelly was indeed recalled, the tape was admitted as
evidence, and a conviction was handed down, based on the court’s acceptance that
the tape was a recording of the voice of MacStiofáin on the date alleged.37 Not much
attention was paid to the role of the prosecution, but even the Guardian felt it had put
in a poor performance. The dismissal of all the evidence it presented except for a set of
tapes the content of which was unknown to it until five hours before the trial opened
was seen as particularly weak. This led the Irish Press to conclude that the prosecution
had set out to frameMacStiofáin as a man of violence.38
Although the sudden arrest of its leader took the ira by surprise, it was quick to
respond. Since the introduction of the Special Criminal Court a fewmonths earlier,
about hundred Republicans had been convicted in the South for various, oftenminor,
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offences. The onset of this high profile case gave the movement the hope of using it to
generate opposition to the court system. A public statement deploring the arrest of
MacStiofáin was reported in the Irish Times:
His arrest ‘at this critical and most hopeful’ stage of the struggle for over 50 years
was calculated to give aid and comfort to the forces of British imperialismwhich he
had relentlessly opposed. Equally his arrest is intended to strike at the morale of the
beleaguered people of the North whose cause he so unselfishly espoused and who
are now engaged in a fight for their very existence. ‘The Leinster House politicians
[Southern Irish politicians, ja] have nothing to offer the people of the Six Counties,
neither Unionists nor Nationalists. Instead of bread they give them stones.’39
Provisional Sinn Fein, in a statement that emphasised the theme of injustice, called
the arrest ‘a blatant act of collaboration with the British army’. This reaction was the
first item in the Irish Press’s coverage of the story. Both the ira and the Provisional Sinn
Fein called for awave of protest against this ‘latest act of appeasement of the enemies of
Ireland’.40 The movement expressed its conviction that the arrest would show up the
corruptness of the Irish government and its lack of willingness to aid the nationalist
community in the North in its fight against oppression. As painful as it was to them
to accuse fellow countrymen of collaboration, they portrayed ‘[PrimeMinister Jack]
Lynch and [Minister Desmond] O’Malley as arch-collaborators; arch-quislings; and
arch-traitors of the Irish people’. Lynch was ‘a puppet on a string’.41 TheMacStiofáin
case, they believed, would ultimately lead to the end of his rule. ‘The sentence sums
up the corruptness of the Free State regime, a regime soon to be given its marching
orders by a risen Irish people.’ ‘Will the proud people of Ireland stand for this? Half a
million northerners will shortly give Lynch his answer for he can nomore stop the
revolution which will now gainmomentum, then he could stop the flowing tide.’ The
Irish government would soon go the way of the Unionist government in the North,
which had just been abolished by Britain following the escalation of violence in 1972,
‘ground down by themills of justice. Themills of justice which grind exceedingly
slow but exceedingly small.’42
The English newspapers were less sanguine than the Irish Times in their coverage
of the ira response. In a front-page article, the Guardian drew attention to the storm
of protest in England and Ireland promised by the ira. This had already begun, in a
picket on the Irish embassy in London and a series of meetings in Dublin, including a
picket on the Bridewell police station, a large photo of which appeared in the Irish Press.
The next day 2,000 people headed bymaskedmenmarched through the rain in Dublin
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carrying a coffin draped in the tricolour with the inscription ‘Justice is dead.’ A violent
response took place in Londonderry, ‘when a crowd incensed by the arrest’ attacked
the police, who responded with rubber bullets and cs tear gas. ‘Republicans in the
North see the arrest as the betrayal of their cause by the authorities in the South, and
many nationalists are convinced that the Dublin Government and police are working
to the instructions of the British.’43 The weekly Republican News recounted how Sinn
Fein called upon the legal profession to protest vigorously against the attempt to
subvert the cause of justice. People should ‘recoil in revulsion’, the paper argued, if the
state could pick up any person it liked while looking around for evidence to justify the
arrest.44 In the beginning of DecemberMacStiofáin tried to reinvigorate the injustice
narrative by writing to the Incorporated Law Society asking them to have the three
judges who sentenced him struck off the roll for having let down the profession.45
Leading Republicans reiterated the accusation that the arrest was made either at
the behest of the British government or to force the Dáil to enact further repressive
legislation, statements tantamount to accusing the Irish government of collaboration
and treachery. In a speech during a protest meeting on the day of his arrest, praise was
lavished onMacStiofáin’s long career in the Republicanmovement, for which he had
been jailed in England from 1953 to 1959. Even the civil rights leader Aidan Corrigan
proclaimed thatMacStiofáin had donemore for Irish freedom and unity than the
governing party, Fianna Fáil, which claimed to be the Republican party, had done in 50
years. Corrigan called MacStiofáin the manmost maligned in Ireland by press, radio
and television, a man who deserved to stand proudly beside Jomo Kenyatta46 and
DesmondGreaves47 as the leader of a great guerrillamovement. ‘The fact of thematter
is that SeanMacStiofáin has headed the movement which brought down Stormont
[the Northern Irish Unionist Government].’48
Similar plaudits for MacStiofáin could be found in Republican News. ‘To Sean
McStiofain, as to all previous men of his calibre, we pledge our support in your stand.
We will tread your way side by side and we will never desert you. Long live the cause of
Freedom enshrined in your sacrifice.’49 An Phoblacht tried to counteract the deliberate
campaign of character assassination which it argued had found its way into the Irish
and British press: ‘never were such depraved, cowardly and untruthful methods used
in the attempts to assassinate the character of an Irish leader. The real Sean Mac
Stíofáin already belongs to the pages of history; nothing indeed the yellow Fleet Street
or Seoinin Abbey Street press can spew forth will ever tarnish that Pearse-like image.’50
Needless to say, the framing of MacStiofáin as a better Irishman than the government
could only work in an Irish context where every politician had to show his or her
nationalist credentials. To allay fears among its supporters of the repercussions of
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MacStiofáin’s arrest for the ira, a movement spokesman found it necessary to add,
‘Of course, we are concerned thatMacStiofáin has been arrested but we are just as
concerned when a young volunteer gets picked up in Derry or wounded in Belfast.
There are leaders of the Republicanmovement andMacStiofáin happens to be one of
them, but the movement doesn’t stop when he gets lifted.’ The Guardian claimed that
the timing of the arrest was a surprise to the ira, which had expected the announced
new legislation to be introduced first. The newspaper added however that they had
naturally prepared for it and it was ‘unlikely therefore to pose any great organisational
problems for the ira’.51
The Irishgovernment,manoeuvred into adifficult position, took resolutemeasures
to counter the way it was being framed by Republicans. Following the broadcast of
the interviewwithMacStiofáin, the government, possibly in an attempt to distract
attention, dismissed the rte Authority, which overlooked the running of the public
television service, for giving airtime to a terrorist, and it introduced a bill that included
stringent security measures. rte authorities, it argued, had contravened section
31 of the Broadcasting Act, enacted the previous year, that forbade the airing of
live interviews with Sinn Féin members. To counter the sympathy generated by
the reporting onMacStiofáin’s physical suffering, stories were put out that he was
breaking his thirst strike by drinking water. Apparently he had at one stage tried to
take an aspirin with water and hemight have drunk somewhile taking a shower.
MacStiofáin’s spokesmen responded by declaring that he had vomited immediately
upon taking the aspirin.52
British politicians publicly expressed their contentment with the Irish govern-
ment’s response. Even the Labour leader, Harold Wilson, who backed the Conservative
British government in its Irish policies, said on television that the Irish had been
acting on inadequate laws in its dealings with the ira, but that it was now taking
them on properly.53 Opposition politicians in Ireland were less enthusiastic. Although
most supported the arrest of MacStiofáin, there was much criticism of the sacking of
the rte Authority, which was seen as an attack on the independence of the public
media. They argued that the rte interviewer had done everything he could to show
up the ira. The hunger and thirst strike also generated concern in the Dáil, where
questions were asked on the floor about MacStiofáin’s health.54
The English press was not always convinced by the actions and intentions of
the Irish government. The leftish Guardian shared concern for the threat to freedom
of speech in the Republic after the sacking of the rte Authority. It felt that the
interview had been used to get not only at MacStiofáin but also at the rte Authority,
which the government felt had been acting against its interests.55 In relation to
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the ira, it referred in particular to the charge of ‘collaboration with enemies of the
Irish people’, a frequent accusation in public protests in Ireland. In response to this
charge the Association of Legal Justice had recently urged the government to revoke
the 1965 extradition agreement with Britain, in order to prevent the expulsion of
three Republican prisoners to the North. Some commentators, the paper argued,
believed the Irish government was sensitive to this issue. They considered the arrest
and an attendant minor wave of extraditions to be nothingmore than a pr exercise
to show the British government and the Unionists of Belfast that they had done
everything they could to ‘rid the Republic of the ira menace and cooperate with
the British Army and the ruc [the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the Northern Irish
police]’. The paper moreover surmised that the government secretly had hoped
that the courts, by refusing the extradition orders and by finding that no evidence
existed to convict MacStiofáin, would help them off a political hook. The great
importance the Guardian attached to the arrest of MacStiofáin was clear from the
start, when it reported on the original charge on the front page.56 To explain the
predicament of the Irish government, it speculated on the public impact that a
hunger strike by MacStiofáin would have in Ireland. Many who would not normally
sympathise with the ira, the paper supposed, would bemoved by a hunger strike.
Emotional reactions of this kind could have consequences with which the authorities
would find it hard to deal. The paper took a comparable line in explaining the
attitude taken by MacStiofáin in court: ‘Many probably expected Mr MacStiofáin
to turn his back on the court and say nothing.’ Although he did not recognise the
court, did not submit a plea and refused to apply for bail, he did defend himself,
which was allowed under ira policy. At the same time the paper tried to play down
MacStiofáin’s opposition to the systembymentioning that he addressed Justice Griffin
as ‘Sir’.57
The public response to the plight of MacStiofáin was much stronger than in the
case of Card andMcKee. Even the Irish Times painted a picture of a heroic man who in
the 1950s had been imprisoned for years for the cause, a man who had an eye damaged
when a bomb exploded at his house the previous March and who was one of five
Republicans flown by the British to England for negotiations during the recent ira
ceasefire.58 MacStiofáin’s physical condition was reported on with sympathy in most
major newspapers in Ireland and England. The Guardian expressed doubt that he
would survive, adding that in Ireland—contrary to the situation in Britain—forced
feedingwas not allowed before a prisoner was convicted. Themost detailed description
of MacStiofáin’s condition was offered by theObserver, clearly ringing a sympathetic
note:
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When he heard the sentence he dragged himself from the blanket in which he had
been covered during the trial, and said ‘I will be dead in six days’ time’ […] his voice
trailed off and he had to drag himself into a sitting position before he could go on:
[…] before falling back to be cradled in the arms of a prison officer. […] Earlier he had
collapsed in court. He was given painkilling injections. His shoes were removed and
his feet massaged. A hot-water bottle was called for and a doctor took his pulse.
Hisweak voicewas remarkedupon in the IrishTimes and itwas stated that he ‘staggered
slightly, spoke with difficulty, eyes glazed, scarcely audible and pale’. The intended
effect of this writing is not unambiguous. It might have been designed to portray
him as a weakling. This was also implied in the description of MacStiofáin’s physical
reaction to the verdict in the Irish papers: ‘as he lay wrapped in a rug with a hot-water
bottle clutched to his chest, he shouted with a sobbing voice at the three members of
the court: “It might as well be six years. I’m going to die in six days.” The presiding
judge retorted by stating this was something over which they unfortunately had no
control.’ The Irish Independent gave most detail. According to the story in that paper,
the incident described took place after themembers of the court began to leave. Rather
than being proudly defiant, he is described as prostrated and weeping, to be joined
‘by sobbing wife who hugged and kissed him as he lay cradled in the arms of a male
nurse. He embraced her for several minutes. It was a moving moment in an otherwise
tense and dramatic day.’ More simply, theObserver stated that his wife rushed crying
into the arms of her husband. The seriousness of his condition was indicated by the
fact that MacStiofáin was taken to intensive care in theMater Hospital immediately
following the sentencing.59
There was s strong public response to the framing of the case. On the night
of MacStiofáin’s arrest, there were riots in Derry which lasted for more than two
hours, and a number of relatively small public protests in other places both in the
North and the South, each attended by fifty to two hundred people—probably Sinn
Fein supporters for the most part.60 Three former ira chiefs of staff, Tom Barry,
Sean Cronin andMaurice Twomey, who all had become well-known public figures,
issued a joint statement calling for MacStiofáin’s release. They argued that his death
would only please Britain and lead to further oppression in the North: ‘No Irish
person, irrespective of position, should assist Britain inmaintaining her grip on this
country.’61 There was also support from less partisan quarters. The largest Irish trade
union, the itgwu, sent a telegram to the Irish president asking for clemency, and a
few days after the arrest the most famous English university debating society, the
Oxford Union, voted for a reunification of Ireland. During the debate, attended by the
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Irish Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, JohnHume, the new leader of the sdlp (themoderate
nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party ofNorthern Ireland), andRoy Bradford,
a former Unionist minister, appeals were also voiced for the release of MacStiofáin.62
After being convicted and sentenced to (the minimum term of) six months’
imprisonment, MacStiofáin continued his hunger and thirst strike. The prospect of
his death generated growing public attention and support. After the verdict was read
there were shouts of ‘British traitor’ from the public gallery, directed at the judge. One
man, accused him of fighting a war for the English, and threw a handful of coins that
according to theObserver ‘smashed a chandelier and glass rained over the court room’;
the Irish Independent less dramatically reported that the coins ‘broke a light’. In his
memoirs MacStiofáin stated that ‘splinters fell aroundMary andme as she came over
to embrace me’.63 There were scuffles outside the courtroom and outside theMater
Hospital in Dublin, to whichMacStiofáin was taken in what An Phoblacht described
as ‘inclement weather’, no fewer than seven thousand people were reported to have
come out in protest. There was some bottle-throwing, injuring four policemen and
two civilians, while the crowd chanted, ‘We want Sean out.’ They were addressed by
opposition tds (members of parliament), civil rights activists fromNorthern Ireland
and prominent Republicans. Sinn Fein leader Daithi O Connaill called for a large
protest meeting onWednesday or Thursday, optimistically arguing, ‘We are going to
bring this government down and we will not finish until we do so.’ In response to
the violence on the street and a bomb attack on a nearby cinema, MacStiofáin had a
message read out in which he called for peaceful protest in the South and to take the
fight to the North. During the protest at the hospital an attempt wasmade to free
MacStiofáin by eight armedmen, two dressed as priests and six as hospital staff. The
rescue failed, and after a shoot-out in the corridors of the hospital four of themen
were arrested. The crowd remained outside until the early hours of Monday morning,
when the last three hundred protesters moved to the General Post Office in O’Connell
Street.64
In a personal response, another Sinn Fein leader, Ruari O Bradaigh, summarised
the movement’s attitude to the case, saying that the English had instigated the
prosecution of MacStiofáin and thereby had effectively signed his death warrant. He
further accused the Irish government of trying to provoke a confrontation with the
Republican movement on the streets. The entire affair betrayed a pattern that he
asked people to recognise. The connected pieces included themuzzling of the media
to prevent people from hearing the news; the closure of Sinn Fein offices; the issuing
of extradition orders ‘to hand over gallant Republicans to the ruc and British army
who are investigated by human rights court’; and the meetings between the two
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primeministers prior to the action against MacStiofáin. ‘All these pieces of the jigsaw
indicated the coming to a head of an attempt to impose the latest British “settlement”
to the “Irish problem” because southern politicians realised that they could not last
in a 32-county context but needed a British created state to survive.’ He hoped the
newspapers would deliver this message to the country.65
FollowingMacStiofáin’s conviction there were also protest meetings in other parts
of Ireland. The Aer Lingus office in London was occupied bymembers of Sinn Fein.
The Cork command of the Republican splinter group Saor Eire threatened retaliatory
action against the people responsible if MacStiofáin died. There were protests from
tradeunion officials, the SocialistWorkersMovement, theNationalGraves Association,
a branch of the Gaelic Athletic Association (gaa) and Republican Clubs in Northern
Ireland. Resolutions were passed, a black coffin with ‘Justice is Dead’ was again carried
around, some short strikes broke out in various companies, pickets were staged,
petitions were signed and masses were said in church. Nevertheless, the scale of
protect in Ireland was insufficient to bring the country to a standstill.66 Although a
small peaceful protest against MacStiofáin’s conviction led to a gun battle in Belfast
between the ira and Loyalist gunmen, the Guardian claimed that:
apart from diehard Republicans, there was surprising little sympathy forMrMac-
Stiofáin’s physical plight among Belfast Catholics. Martyrs appear out of fashion in
the city, and although there was a good deal of general sympathy for MrMacStiofáin
and his principles, his behaviour, to many, appeared a needless sacrifice.67
In contrast, the Irish Press observed many reactions in the North, with hundred people
goingonhunger strike inAndersonstownandothers picketingruc stations.Generally
they reported on the appeal for MacStiofáin’s release issued by several organisations,
including trade unions and gaa clubs.68
The bungled rescue attempt in the hospital and the bomb attack on the Dublin
cinema did not doMacStiofáin’s case much good in the public eye. In a front-page
article, the Guardian reported on the rescue attempt in quite neutral tones before
remarking, ‘The attempt showed by its suicidal nature the length towhich some of the
Provisionals are prepared to go to try and freeMrMacStiofáin.’ The Irish Press, whose
entire front page was dedicated to theMacStiofáin case, agreed that the rescue was
bad publicity for the ira. The ira denied responsibility for the attack on the cinema,
instead accusing ‘agents provocateurs’, and even openly suggesting it was done by the
Irish security forces: ‘In the North such action by the s.a.s is commonplace and the
Special Branch in the South have always been quick to learn from their counterparts
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in the North.’69 The Guardian and the Sunday Independent agreed that the attack
aided the passing of new repressive legislation through the Dáil.70 In a government
investigation conducted after the peace process in the 1990s it was concluded that
ira members from Derry had been involved in the bombing and that there was
probably no sanction for it from their central command. Possibly to divert attention,
MacStiofáin’s wife produced telegrams of sympathy and support allegedly from two
sons of the late Robert Kennedy at a press conference. The only paper to report this
was the Guardian, which added that Joseph Kennedy, one of the two sons, described
the claim as ‘absolute rubbish’.71
TheGuardian recognised the performative power of the hunger strike in Ireland
but made a point of warning people against it:
Themartyred Republican hero goes deep in the Irish—not least in the Fianna Fáil—
tradition. Yet itmust not be forgotten thatMrMacStiofáin is the unashamed advocate,
organiser, and defender of a vicious campaign that has killed hundreds of his fellow
Irishmen and Englishmen. The ira is not on the side of democracy or humane
behaviour either in the North or the South. The plight in whichMrMacStiofáin has
voluntarily placed himself will arouse human pity. But it is not a cause for criticising
Mr. Lynch’s government, which cannot allow the methods of a Gandhi to be used for
the objectives of a Franco.72
In an attempt to marginalise opposition, the Irish government expressed confidence
that even if MacStiofáin died, trouble would only come from the ira, not from the
people.73 Nevertheless, after the conviction the hospital was protected like a fortress,
surrounded by 150 policemen, with another six hundred soldiers kept in readiness.74
In a rare move, Brian Faulkner, the Unionist leader in the North, supported the Irish
government’s approach: ‘If someone was breaking the law, a Government had to act,
even at the risk of producingmartyrs.’75 To some extent, the reaction of Sinn Fein
leaders—that they had no desire to seek confrontation with the Irish police, only with
politicians—indicated that the government assessment of limited potential popular
support for Republicanism in the South was on the mark. During the protest meeting
at the hospital, the ira called for discipline and restraint, telling the protesters that
‘the government would love the media to be able to report that a crowd of hooligans
and hoodlums came up fromO’Connell Street and desecrated a hospital’.76 Instead
they continued to project a picture of MacStiofáin as a strong, heroic figure suffering
for the cause. When, following the failed rescue attempt, MacStiofáin was moved by
helicopter from theMater to a military hospital inside military barracks, his wife
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had it be known that ‘One of the hospital staff said he put up a tremendous struggle
which “must have taxed his strength immensely.” ’77
In the following days numerous demonstrations and demands for MacStiofáin’s
release were reported in Ireland, Britain and the usa. Republicans attributed the
strong reactions to the absence of justice in the trial, but many others involved in the
protests argued they came out on humanitarian grounds. Representatives of the latter
group concentrated less on Republicanism andmore on the issue of press freedom, a
predilection that was also reflected in newspaper reporting.78 Resolutions were passed
by local authorities with the support of Fianna Fáil councillors, branches of political
parties, sports clubs and schools. The teaching staff of Presentation Secondary School
in Cashel held a prayer meeting in church and put out a statement saying that ‘they
upheld the principle of truth, justice and freedom and could therefore not accept that
any Irishmen in 1972 should be allowed to die on hunger strike for those principles by
the consent of our government’. Spontaneous strikes broke out in various parts of the
country. Dockers and Ford plant workers in Cork as well as hundreds of workers in
Monaghan walked out in protest, and in Tralee most businesses, including banks,
were closed. MacStiofáin was even visited in hospita by the sitting archbishop of
Dublin, Dr. Dermot Ryan, and his predecessor, Dr. John Charles McQuaid.79
The idea that the English were somehow behind the events did strike a chord
with some papers. The local Kerryman picked up on the Republican narrative and
criticised the positive reaction in English newspapers to the arrest of MacStiofáin and
the new legislation brought in against the ira. This, said the Kerryman, was simply an
attempt by the government to keep control over the South and aid the British to do
the same in the North. It was rare, it argued, for the British press to be so positive
about Ireland, particularly in support of legislation they would never accept in their
own country. ‘But then in ultra-British terms, we were always just wogs anyway.’80
The Republican interpretation also got a measure of credence in the Dáil, in particular
from Sean Sherwin, a deputy of the government party, Fianna Fáil, who repeatedly
raised the issue of MacStiofáin’s plight. On 29 November, he read out a petition signed
by 13,867 people, presented to him by a group of Derry women. It protested against
the setting up of military courts, the introduction of repressive legislation and the
imprisonment of Irish men and women at the bidding of the British government.
Sherwin concurred. As far as he was concerned it was a lie to argue, as was being done
by the government and the opposition, that the ira was a threat to the Irish state.
It was only a threat to the security of what he called the Six County Area, which, he
implied, was a good thing. Far from being a threat to the Irish, MacStiofáin was enemy
no. 1 for the British; his arrest was on instruction of their government.81 When asked
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in the Dáil whether it would not be right to releaseMacStiofáin in light of his physical
condition, Taoiseach Jack Lynchmade clear that to his party the maintenance of the
Rule of law was at stake and they were therefore not going to give in:
Mr. Mac Stiofáin has been given a fair trial before the courts and has been found
guilty. It is open to him to serve his sentence or to appeal against it or his conviction.
Nothing can be gained by continuing the hunger strike in an attempt to frustrate the
course of justice. If a member of such an organisation, and especially a self-confessed
leader, could secure his release from prison through resort to a hunger or thirst strike,
the inevitable consequence would be that not only he but all his associates would
be effectively above the law of the land and free to act as they choose and would be
seen to be so. This is so for the obvious reason that other prisoners, now or in the
future, need only adopt the same tactics to ensure that they, too, would be released.
Accordingly, the issue in the present case is nothing less than whether Parliament,
Government, the courts and the law are all to surrender to an unlawful organisation.
The challenge to the institutions of the State is direct, deliberate and unmistakable.
The Government have no choice but tomeet it. The consequences thatmay ensue
are regretted by themembers of the Government as they no doubt are regretted by
everybody with a normal human concern for human life. The consequences, however,
are not of the Government’s making.82
MacStiofáin continued his hunger strike for the next seven weeks, but abandoned his
immediately life-threatening thirst strike a few days after the trial. Public support
and attention to his plight in the newspapers clearly declined in this period, except
during Christmas, when 150 ira supporters marched on the Irish embassy in London
stating, ‘We will stand withMacStiofáin and the Provisional RepublicanMovement
even if we have to die.’83 The Sunday Independent attributed the declining attention to
the smart tactics of the Irish primeminister, Jack Lynch. Lynch had been using the
unpopularity of the growing violence in Northern Ireland to gain support for a move
not only against the ira but also against the independence of the public broadcasting
company, rte, which had been very critical of corruption in government. The response
of the Republican movement had also played into the hands of the government. The
rescue attempt and the bomb attack only showed their political naiveté. ‘At no stage
was there any fear that the MacStiofáin hunger and thirst strike would actually create
chaos within the State.’84 Ultimately the Republicans took this message to heart.
Although the Sinn Fein leader Ruari O Bradaigh had initially said that it was up to
MacStiofáin to decide whether or not to continue his hunger and thirst strike, he was
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eventually ordered by the ira leadership on 16 January to abandon his fast. ‘After 57
days of hunger strike no useful purpose will be served byMrMac Stiofáin continuing
his protest against his unjust imprisonment.’85 After serving his sentence he was
released twomonths later on 16 March 1973.
In the meantime, attempts to undermineMacStiofáin’s credibility continued,
particularly in the English press and with the support of the Irish government. A few
days after his conviction, theGuardian openedwith a headline stating thatMacStiofáin
had ended his hunger and thirst strike. Although mentioning further down the
article that MacStiofáin’s wife denied it, they sided with those who argued that
taking tea put a hunger strike to an end. ‘But the fact that he has, as the Government
information bureau put it, “taken tea” does not mean that he has definitely decided to
end his strike. It could be that the tea was taken in amoment of weakness, although
judging by his previous behaviour it seemsmore likely that it was a definite and fully
understood decision by him.’ The Irish Independent was the only newspaper to report
that according to the doctor the tea was necessary to prevent MacStiofáin’s veins from
collapsing.86 The inducement for giving up the thirst strike seems to have been a
request by MacStiofáin’s friend Father SeanMacManus. MacManus later said he had
persuaded him to take some water by arguing that if he died there was ‘going to be
bloodshed in the South of Ireland’. The Irish Independent also claimed that he was given
oxygen and was in a state of semi-collapse, doing nothing except repeating the phrase
‘I love Ireland’ and asking to see some of his friends. These included Cathal Goulding.
The leader of the rival Marxist Official ira, an old friend with whom he had fallen out
in 1969 over Republican policy.87 Although an undertone of admiration rings through
in the piece, the overall message tended to undermineMacStiofáin’s credibility.
The reports questioning MacStiofáin’s commitment and sincerity in maintaining
his hunger strike continued until his release. The Guardian followed the allegations
up with an article entitled ‘MacStiofáin thirst strike suspicions’, reporting that ‘more
than one source claimed last night that he had been drinking during the early days
of his thirst strike’. The article quoted the opinion of many doctors that he could
not have survived that long otherwise; the reports on his poor condition and his
continued strike came from visitors and not from the authorities. The hunger and
thirst strike, wrote the Guardian, had been purely tactical. It was ‘significant that the
announcement that MrMacStiofáin had drunk half a cup of tea came shortly after Mr
Lynch had announced that he would not consider releasing him. The Provisionals had
hoped that a wave of public sympathywould secure his release and the announcement
that he had drunk tea came when this hope had finally disappeared.’ The paper also
discounted Father MacManus’s claim that he had asked MacStiofáin to drink in order
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to forestall future bloodshed.88 The next day the Guardian acknowledged that his
death would ‘cause a great wave of political emotion’ and reported that the names of
Republicans who had died on hunger strike in the past were beingmentioned widely.
The same concerns were shared in Ireland, where police andmilitary were kept on
standby in case of rioting.89 In response, MacStiofáin issued an appeal calling for
peaceful protest—‘no rioting, stonethrowing or abuse’—and reiteratingMacManus’
claim that ‘the fight is in theNorth andmust be kept there. I don’t want anybody hurt
or any blood spilt onmy behalf in the 26 counties. That is why I am taking liquids.’90
Against this background theObserver as well as the Irish Sunday Independent did
feature stories onMacStiofáin. In theObserver, Paul Ferris contrasted the Irish view
of the revolutionary with the English. He acknowledged that ‘many “good Irish
people” regarded MacStiofáin as a hero and were very annoyed when his Irishness was
questioned’. The fact that MacStiofáin, whose original name was John Stephens, was
born in England from an English father and amother of uncertain Irish parentage had
given rise to such claims. As for the English, although they acknowledged that Ireland
‘has been wronged for centuries’, MacStiofáin to themwas ‘Mac the Knife’. He was
described as ‘a man of limited imagination and fanatical views’ with ‘no public glow’
around his name.91 The Sunday Independent published two full-page articles on him in
consecutive weeks. ‘Fewmen have influencedmodern Irish history as much as Sean
MacStiofáin’, it wrote, but the paper did not fundamentally disagree with theObserver.
It reiterated that MacStiofáin had apparently no Irish ancestry whatsoever, and only
had become involved in Irish politics through a group of London Sinn Feiners that
included Cathal Goulding. They described him as a very conservative Catholic with
‘fanatically generated energy’ and pointed out that he demanded total obedience,
annoyingmany Republicans with his abstemious ways and abrupt manner. Although
the paper later published an apology to Cathal Goulding for misrepresenting him and
printed a letter fromMacStiofáin in which he claimed there were at least eighteen
inaccuracies in its articles, the public picture of MacStiofáin was no doubt influenced
by these portrayals.92
During the next twomonths occasional reports were put out that the prisoner had
abandoned his hunger strike. The credibility of MacStiofáin’s position was not aided
whenhewent on and off the thirst strike in a vain attempt to prove his commitment.93
When after abandoning his thirst strike he took tea, glucose and orange juice, some
senior Republicans felt this meant he had broken his hunger strike too. Hearing
this, he cut back again to water alone.94 To make clear that the strike was indeed
life-threatening, his wife issued reports that he was weak, had lost a lot of weight and
had no intention to abandon his strike.95 To generate understanding, a friendly priest
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stated that he had only started to drink again so that he could take communion.96
Nevertheless, the allegations eventually stuck and the perception amongmany since
1972 has been that MacStiofáin was not truly dedicated to the cause. In December 1974
Lord Dunleath said in the British House of Lords that MacStiofáin ‘remains almost a
forgotten name now and a figure of ridicule’.97 Essentially, he stated, this was due to
the fact he had not gone through with his hunger strike to the end. Some took this a
step further. A few days after the conviction, Sherwin stated in the Dáil that there had
been a calculated campaign in the previous year to make out that MacStiofáin ‘was a
British spy, that SeánMac Stiofáin was an Englishman and therefore how could he be
on the Irish side?’98 In 1985 some ruc constables claimed that MacStiofáin had been
an informer for the Garda, the Irish police force, from about 1970 to the 1980s, which
MacStiofáin felt he was obliged to deny vociferously.99
At the root of these rumblings may have been some infighting in the ira itself.
The tensions that had prevailed between northern and southern leaders ever since
the formation of the Provisionals in 1969 may have been responsible for the false
reports a fewmonths before his arrest that MacStiofáin had resigned as chief of staff.
In October 1972, just before his arrest, rumours were discussed in a series of articles in
theObserver, stating that MacStiofáin was to be deposed at the Army Council meeting
of that month.100 These speculations appear to have emerged every year and were
said to be related to the rigid discipline on which MacStiofáin insisted. After the
meeting, the Irish Independent reported that there had been no challenge to the existing
leadership and that no changes in the Army Executive or Army Council were expected
in the impending convention. This caused one reader to send in a letter accusing the
British papers of character assassination onMacStiofáin.101 His former comrades in
the Official ira argued that the fact that he was born in Britain and did not have an
Irish Catholic backgroundmade him suspicious in the eyes of some Republicans.102
The existence of tensions in the leadershipwas confirmed in the followingmonths.
In December 1972 the Irish Times and the English papers reported that before his arrest,
unknown to the other leaders, MacStiofáin had put out peace feelers to the British
about a truce. The Observer argued that the ira was losing in the North and that
MacStiofáin wanted to be remembered as the leader who brought peace, not as one
who lost the war.103 The previous month, however, the same paper had claimed that
these suggestions had been brought into the world by his rivals in the Provisionals’
executive and that MacStiofáin had put a stop to them by disclosing what went on at
the meeting. Afterwards his main rival, Daithi O Connaill, was ousted from the Army
Council. After his conviction, the Belfast ira denied any involvement of Republicans
in the peace overtures and claimed they had beenmade by ‘well-intentioned local
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people’.104 In December 1972, the Irish Times told its readers that peace moves were
afoot as soon as a change in ira leadership had taken place.105 The Observer saw
MacStiofáin as a purely military figure whose inability to play a political role ‘has
reduced the Provisionals to a sterile campaign of violence’ that had lost him support
in the movement. The paper expressed the hope that he would be replaced by a
more flexible leader, but feared that he would inherit a martyr’s crown. After his
release, whenMacStiofáin was asked by reporters about his position in the Republican
movement, he dismissed this as ‘rubbish’ allegations that his fellow prisoners had
ignored him and refused to talk to him. Nevertheless, although it was not apparent in
the short run, he found it difficult to regain a position of influence after his release.
Public support continued to pour in in the fight for his release, even after he was
ordered off the hunger strike.106 Indicating that he had been physically affected
by the strike, the Irish Times reported upon his release a fewmonths later that ‘he
looked pale and weak and was visibly shaking while talking to newsmen and being
photographed’.107
The struggle over public impact was most acute in the Republic of Ireland, where
politicians hadmore to gain from a commitment to Irish unity than in the North.
MacStiofáin and the ira as well as all Irish politicians and the government were
acutely aware of this. The ira side emphasised thatMacStiofáin was willing to go
to extremes of suffering for the nationalist cause, a degree of commitment that one
sought in vain in the behaviour of the government. The imprisonment was portrayed
as unjust and vindictive and as having been carried out on the behest of the British
government. This view of things would have had greater impact had it not been
undermined by signs of disagreement within their own camp. As for the government,
it had little choice but to position itself as the guardian of law and order. A campaign
to undermine MacStiofáin’s credibility that emanated from unclear sources did not
seem to havemuch immediate impact, but in the long run this reflected what most
people came to believe. Irish opposition politicians hadmany targets to criticise. They
attacked the government for its failure to maintain law and order, in particular before
the arrest; for the harshness of its treatment of MacStiofáin; and, in particular, the
threat to freedom of speech implicit in its actions against rte and O’Kelly. Large
swathes of the populace—not just active nationalists but also public bodies such as
trade unions, sport clubs and the Catholic Church—were potentially receptive to
criticism of the government on these points.
The different newspapers took slightly different positions in the framing of events.
They all reported the proceedings fairly faithfully; the distinctions lay in emphasis
and the inclusion or exclusion of particular issues or events. Most remarkable was the
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total absence of reporting on the case by all Irish local newspapers except the Kerryman,
which limited its remarks to plain reports on who brought out statements or went on
strike in support of MacStiofáin. The British newspapers, which had to explain in
more detail than the Irish ones the peculiarities of the Irish political and court systems
and ira tactics, seemed keen to report onmatters that underminedMacStiofáin’s
credibility. Despite this bias, they devoted more space to his physical discomfort than
the Irish Times, which remained fairly neutral while hinting at behaviour that would
tarnish his image. The Irish Independent was notable for the copious attention it paid to
the physical consequences of the hunger and thirst strike. The manner in which the
paper did this generated a certain amount of sympathy, as witnessed by local reactions
demanding the release ofMacStiofáin on humanitarian grounds. Demands of this
kind were quite popular, providing Republicans and other nationalists a cause on
which they could agree. Few of the papers moved on from humanitarianism to adopt
(as opposed to merely mentioning) the injustice frame advanced by the Republicans.
Nationalist newspapers were more likely to concentrate on the humanitarian aspects
of the case and the threat to press freedom posed by government tactics.
5.4. The Trial of the Belfast Ten (1973)
One of the first major trials of ira activists in England after the outbreak of violence
in 1969 took place in the autumn of 1973. Ten people108 stood trial inWinchester: court
for planting four car bombs, two of which went off, in London on 8March of that
year. Although a warning had been issued, 243 people were injured and one died of
a heart attack when bombs went off outside the Old Bailey and the Scotland Yard
building, which also housed an Army Recruiting Centre. The police later admitted
that the great extent of the harm had been partly due to a delay in their control room
as a result of human error.109 These first major ira bombings in London since the
outbreak of the Troubles in 1969 were part of a wider campaign against a planned
referendum to determinewhether the people of Northern Irelandwanted to remain in
the union with Great Britain or to join the Republic of Ireland. The poll was organised
by the British government with the intention of undermining the legitimacy of the
Republican claim to a united Ireland, as they were sure that the majority in Northern
Ireland would vote in favour of the Union. Nationalists boycotted it, arguing that
such a poll could only be held if the population of the whole of the island of Ireland
could vote. Shortly after the bombs were found, ten people were arrested at Heathrow
airport on their way to Dublin. After an unusually lengthy detention of over four
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days without charge or access to lawyers, they were accused of conspiring to cause
explosives likely to endanger lives or damage property.110
During the trial, which lasted ten weeks, it became clear that the four cars used
had probably been hijacked in Belfast, then taken to Dublin where they had received a
fresh coat of paint and new number plates, were loaded with explosives and driven to
London. The evidence against the ten, who included two sisters, Marian and Dolours
Price, and the future leading Republicans Hugh Feeney and Gerry Kelly, was mainly
circumstantial, namely that they had travelled to London by car and were returning
by plane only a few days later, right after the bombings. The fewminor clues included
a notebook belonging to one of the Price sisters that contained the initials of those
participating and a sketch of what looked like an electric circuit. The only direct
evidence connecting the ten to the car bombs was a fingerprint of Robert Walsh on
the rear-viewmirror of one of the cars used and another on a parking ticket found
in one of the other cars. The only ‘weapons’ found on themwere two screwdrivers
which Dolours Price was carrying in her bag. At the start of the trial the 19-year-old
defendant WilliamMcLarnon pleaded guilty to membership of the ira but claimed
he was unaware of the mission they had been on. He then left the dock until the
end of the trial. It also became clear that another defendant, the 18-year-old Roisin
McNearney, whomade a statement similar to McLarnon’s but pleaded not guilty, had
cooperated with the police. Eventually she was acquitted, while McLarnon received a
15-year sentence. The other eight got two life sentences and 20 years’ imprisonment,
to run concurrently.111
The authorities clearly wanted to give the case a high public profile. For what were
claimed to be security reasons, the trial was moved from London to Winchester Castle,
where the court was situated only 300 yards from the local prison. The courtroomwas
specially adapted for the trial, with an enlarged dock and a sound system. According to
theObserver, the courtroomwas specially painted in ‘battleship grey’. At the opening
of the trial, all of the government representatives arrived wearing their full regalia to
show how seriously the authorities took the case.112 Throughout the trial, details
concerning security measures were reported in all the newspapers—except for An
Phoblacht, which claimed that its reporter was refused admittance by the Special
Branch.113 Most Irish and British newspapers simply detailed the arrangements,
but the Irish Timeswasmore descriptive. It discussed how, when driven to court, the
defendants were accompanied by a motorcycle convoy, a dog car and a police van,
where they were awaited by armed police and then brought in through the front
door while their relatives and friends had to wait until they were all safely inside. The
paper was nevertheless not impressed, remarking drily that ‘although security was
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tight it was minimal by Belfast standards’.114 The Sunday Independent claimed that
scores of Scotland Yard Special Branch officers had been drafted to join a strong local
police force. Marksmen were stationed on rooftops overlooking the route from prison
to courthouse; the perimeter wall of the prison was floodlit during darkness; special
passes were required; and people were searched. Under the heading ‘One of the biggest
trials in British legal history opens this morning’, the Irish Independent added that
the judge would have amarksman riding alongside him in his limousine, and that
detectives in the courtroomwould be armed. The Guardian specified all the measures
taken, which they believed was the biggest security operation ever mounted in a
British court, involving hundred soldiers on standby, a ban on parking in the city, and
a doubling of the guard at the prison. The supposed justification was that the police
received a tip-off fromNorthern Ireland that the trial would be violently disrupted.
Themeasures taken included intensified precautions at government buildings and
the postal services to prevent a new outbreak of parcel bombs. Hospitals were prepared
for large numbers of casualties.115 The precautions were not entirely unjustified. On
the first day of the trial two bombswent off in London and about hundred hoaxes were
reported, causing widespread chaos and confusion. The consternation in England was
great, with somemps demanding such draconic measures as requiring identity cards
for all Irishmen; a ban on the ira; deportation of known sympathisers; and the death
penalty for terrorist killers.116
The press and public were nevertheless allowed into the courtroom, and pho-
tographs of the judge and prosecutors were published freely. In light of the expressed
fear of ira retaliation and the bomb attack on the judge in the Card andMcKee case,
this seems somewhat inconsistent. In the courtroom, the defendants were put side
by side in a lengthened dock, with numbers in front of them for easy identification;
special tables were put behind them to accommodate their seventeen lawyers. The
numbering could be seen as an attempt to dehumanise the defendants and reduce
public sympathy. Before the opening sitting, the defendants were made to wait in the
dock for an hour and twentyminutes. After that it took almost thirty minutes more
to swear in the jury members. Eleven of themwere challenged and another two were
released on account of pressing commitments during the eight weeks the trial was
expected to last. Compared to the one- or two-day trials in the cases discussed above,
this was extremely long.117
The importance the government attached to presenting its case was highlighted
by the choice of Sir Peter Rawlinson, the attorney general, as chief prosecutor. His
opening speech alone lasted five and a half hours. Starting off, he stated that although
the coming referendum on the Irish borders was expected to incite attacks in London,
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and even if car bombs had been an everyday experience in Northern Ireland for some
time, the crime for which the defendants was chargedmarked the first time since
the war that London had been rocked bymassive explosions. The calling up of this
sense of threat was amplified by the Guardian, which specified the probable weight of
the explosives used, concluding that each car had been transformed ‘into a moveable
lethal bomb’.118 Rawlinson sketched the ira as less than heroic by understatedly
arguing that the deed under judgment ‘might be thought a cowardly form of attack’
which ‘left passers-by to suffer the consequences of the explosives’. By way of contrast,
he commended the work of security men at Scotland Yard who noticed that the bolts
of the number plates on one of the cars did not fit the holes for them and subsequently
were in time to defuse one of the bombs. ‘If there were medals for such courage such
medals should go to men such as these who, with such nerve and skill, protected
other people.’ According to the newspapers, the attorney general then gave a detailed
account of how, in the view of the prosecution, the ira operation had been carried
out. Catching the defendants had been possible by a ‘combination of human error,
carelessness and coincidence’. Their guilt was mainly to be established through their
use of false names and the fact that they all got up very early on themorning of the
bombing ‘to catch a plane to be back snug in the republic’. Rhetorically he asked: ‘If
their purpose was innocent whywas it that they were scurrying home on themorning
of March 8th?’119
During the trial, the prosecution tried to undermine the credibility of the
defendants andpicture themas callousmurderers. The policemenwere askedhow they
had behaved under questioning; their answers revealed that most of them had been
unwilling to cooperate. One policeman suspected that the defendants had undergone
counter-interrogation training, since when questioned ‘they fixed their eyes on an
object, clenched their hands and stared at it continuously, as if “appearing to have been
hypnotised”.’ During her first interrogation, Marian Price was said to have ‘looked
pointedly at [the] watch and smiled’ when shewas asked about the bombings. A special
target was Dolours Price, who was identified by Rawlinson as the leader of the group,
and whose human feelings were called into question. Did she avow to feelings of
horror, indifference or pleasure, Rawlinson asked, when he showed Price photographs
taken after the explosions at Scotland Yard and the Old Bailey and then asked her
what kind of person would perpetrate such a crime. To that question she replied
‘indifferent’. After establishing that she had been a politically active Republican,
which she confirmed, he produced a photograph of her with a British soldier taken at
an army checkpoint in Northern Ireland, apparently to diminish her status among
Republicans.120
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In the final summing-up the prosecution reminded the jury, and with it the wider
audience, that the huge bombs of great destructive power constituted a concerted
attack on selected targets on the day of the plebiscite in Northern Ireland. Going
through the evidence step by step, Rawlinson conceded that the Crown’s case was
founded on a mass of circumstantial evidence. It was difficult, he said, to unravel the
‘web of deceit’ around ‘one of the most serious crimes which had been perpetrated in
the capital’. What could be demonstrated beyond doubt is that all the bombs arrived
in London during the brief time the defendants were there. Between the arrival of the
first car and the explosions, all the cars were parked in one garage, the people involved
all stayed nearby in different hotels and all set off for Dublin the next day under false
names. All other people travelling that day could identify themselves, while they
could not. He then referred to ‘coincidence upon coincidence’ and to ‘chancemeetings’
which were put forward by the defendants to explain events, adding that they ‘had
advanced explanations which they [the jury] might think in many cases to be wholly
unacceptable’. Comparing the number of coincidences needed to explain the evidence
to a pantomime, he attacked the integrity of the defendants mainly by innuendo
and inference. After establishing that they were active nationalists he asked the jury:
‘Have you any doubt this was an operation planned, organised and financed and
controlled by the i.r.a. and executed by those sympathetic with its aims and beliefs?’
He had no doubt; in his view they were guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The lack
of evidence caused RepublicanNews to allege that the prosecutor was motivated by
vengeance and ‘showed no interest in proving the elements of the crime charged. His
main objective was to show the jury the defendants were i.r.a. agents. The defendants
were not put on trial. Their political opinions were put on trial.’ The certainty evinced
by the prosecution appeared to flag when it came to Roisin McNearney, who had
cooperated with the police. In her case, he wondered whether she really should be
convicted of placing the bomb at Old Bailey, since ‘she seemed a bit on the fringe of
this’.121
The presiding judge, Sebag Shaw, generally attempted to demonstrate impartiality.
He was responsible for the extra tables brought in to accommodate the seventeen
counsels for the defendants. To help the jury follow proceedings in the noisy
courtroom, worsened by poor acoustics, he had loudspeakers installed and called upon
all participants to speak loudly.122 Some of the Irish journalists noticed that this did
not always have the desired effect, due to the heavy Irish accents and colloquialisms
used by some of the defendants. Paul Holmes, in particular, had a heavy Ardoyne
accent and used unfamiliar expressions in his evidence like ‘I was under the whip’; ‘He
said he was brassic’; ‘He must have thought I was touch for a tap’; ‘he was skippering’.
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Shaw clearly did not follow all that was said; at one point he failed to remember a
manwho had been introduced a couple of times before. In a feature article Eamonn
McCann expressed his concern: ‘ “My God”, muttered a journalist behindme, “they
have not understood a word he has been saying.” ’123 Shaw did show he possessed
a sense of humour. After one of the police officers had said he was certain of his
identification of one of the defendants because he ‘had never seen someone looking
so much like a villain’, one of the lawyers doubted the accuracy of his recollection
and referred a couple of times to ‘ “the wickedest-looking, most unshaven villain”
that Constable Benson had ever seen.’ The judge then told him, ‘You have, if I may
say so, a splendid gift of sarcasm.’ After the same lawyer referred to ‘a glorious piece
of retrospective ratiocination’, the judge asked him to ‘have mercy on the shorthand
writer’.124
Shaw did try to ensure that the jury stuck to the rules. He told them not to discuss
the case with others when they went home. That they were allowed to do so at all is
quite surprising, considering the security concerns of the authorities. He also warned
them not to listen to outside opinion, as ‘people seem to know exactly what happened
on the basis of second hand knowledge’, he urged them to base their judgment solely
on what they heard in court.125 He told them not to be influenced by the guilty plea of
the defendant McLarnon and assured one of the defendants that he would not be kept
in solitary confinement over the weekend if he did not finish his evidence on a Friday,
as his wardens had apparently said he would.126 He even acknowledged that many
people in Irelandmay share the ideals of the Republicans. The question, as he put it,
was whether the defendants supported violence to further that ideal. Before the jurors
started their deliberations on the verdict, he advised them that having Republican
views and even having been interned had no bearing on the question of whether or
not the defendants were guilty as charged. He told them that because ‘a case like this
arouses strong horror and resentment’, theymust resolve not to let emotion play a part
in their decision. He also reminded them of the possibility that the police had planted
evidence, as was alleged byMichael Mansfield, senior counsel for the Price sisters.
During questioning, Shaw told one of the detectives that if he had planted evidence
this was the time to say so, and afterwards reminded the jury that being a police officer
‘does not necessarily make him an angel of truth or a person who conformed to decent
standards’. He also forbade the prosecution from questioningMarian Price on her
father’s republican views. The Republican News nevertheless accused Shaw of allowing
the defendants to be questioned on their political beliefs and opined that his tactics
reeked of vengeance.127 He asked the jury not to allow sentiment to intrude on their
judgment: ‘All the accused were young people not out of their twenties. “Sympathy
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and chivalry have no place in trying matters such as these.” ’ He also reminded them
that there were no special rules for what ‘were called political crimes whatever that
maymean’.128
Nevertheless, Shaw’s prejudices occasionally surfaced. Generally, a consequent
negative attitude towards the defendants was based on his repudiations of violence
and expressions of horror over the bombings. When one of the policemen on the stand
tried to undermine the trust between the defendants and their lawyers by stating
that he had received information fromMichael Mansfield on the time the bomb
was planted at the Old Bailey, the judge questioned the need to introducematters
of this kind, but ‘pointed out that it might reflect credit toMr. Mansfield’. What in
fact had happened was that Mansfield had parked his car at the Old Bailey and had
testified that the car used for the bombing had not been there when he arrived. His
own Triumph was apparently severely damaged in the explosion.129 Shaw also made a
special effort to commend for his great courage a journalist who, upon receiving the
warning from the ira, had gone to one of the car bombs and had warned the public
there before the police arrived. ‘The staff of the Times seemed to be infected with
a reckless courage that day—hovering in the vicinity of the explosion.’130 After the
verdict he praised the bomb squad and Special Branch and said that all the police could
go home with their integrity untarnished.131 Another show of feeling on the part of
Judge Shaw emerged when one of the defendants refused to give the names of people
who could corroborate his version of events. He had been interned, and Loyalists,
as he believed, had a policy of assassinating former internees. Moreover, he did not
want to say anything at the trial that would get a comrade interned; internment,
he said, was like being put in a cage. To which Shaw replied, ‘You do understand
that at a trial like this these matters have to be brought out. Just as you naturally
detest internment, so people walking about the streets detest being blown up.’132
In his summing up, he reminded the jurymembers that they should not overlook
‘statements made from the dock which failed to deal withmatters earlier heard in
evidence’, subsequently mentioning the ‘terse statement’ by Walsh to explain how his
fingerprints got onto both the rear-viewmirror of one of the bomb cars and a parking
ticket found in another. ‘If Walsh had been given a lift in the Viva he might have left
his print on the mirror but how on earth, the jury might ask themselves, did he leave
his fingerprint or did it find its way on to the car park ticket for the Cortina?’ Remarks
such as these hinted broadly that he did not believe the explanations given by the
accused; they almost gave the impression of directing the jury to a guilty verdict.133
In the Guardian, it was also made clear he wanted a ‘not guilty verdict’ for Roisin
McNearney. ‘If the jury did convict the other defendants, they would be “wise and
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just” ’; referring toMcNearney, he said that ‘she was too precariously near the line to
say with certainty she was guilty, rather than just ignorant and foolish’.134
Mr Justice Shaw also tried to ensure that the defendants would not use the trial
as a political platform. In this regard he demonstrated a lack of understanding of
the motives of the defendants when he askedWilliam Armstrong, a father of five,
how he ‘got involved into this kind of affair’. ‘Is it money or a misguided notion of
patriotism?’135 He was also unable to conceal his scepticism concerning the way the
defendants attempted to explain away one unlikely coincidence after another. ‘It
might occur to the jury that “no fairy godmother in any fairy tale had ever appeared
so opportunely to a protégé, to provide just what was needed, as Dave did for Martin
Brady”.’ Full of irony, he instructed the jury not to swallow the explanations but to
test them in the light of good sense. ‘If [you] feel [the] case as presented by prosecution
is too harsh too inflexible to allow for the contingencies of life […] you will accept, no
not accept, but regard Mr Brady as somebody who, until his unfortunate arrest, had
been looked upon benevolently by providence.’136
Shaw clearly wanted to portray himself as a defender of society against terrorism.
This was apparent from his answer to one of the lawyers, who called upon the judge
to take account in his verdict of the growing unrest among the Irish. He had it in his
power either to feed that sense of grievance or else to retard the historical cycle of
retaliation and reprisal. Shaw’s first reaction was to deny the existence of this cycle by
stating ‘these people kill even people on their own side’. When this was dismissed as
rubbish by the defendants, he retorted that he was concerned only with ‘offences
against this society’.137 In his verdict he referred to the bombings as a murderous
enterprise, to which one of the solicitors objected because the perpetrators had placed
warning phone calls intended to save lives. Shaw stood by his use of the qualification
‘murderous’, but admitted that killing or injuring was not the foremost aim of the
attacks. In his effort to protect society against the defendants he initially gave the
Price sisters and Hugh Feeney a life sentence on a charge for which the law limited
the penalty to 20 years.138 TheObserver reported that the combative attitude of the
defendants during the sentencing brought Shaw to the verge of tears. ‘Passing sentence
on people as young as you are is repugnant to me’, he professed, eliciting the sarcastic
retort: ‘Don’t worry, we absolve you.’139
In dealing with Roisin McNearney, who had been acquitted and given police
protection until she was restored to her family, he took it upon himself to present her
as an example to society. After reading out the sentences he asked her to sit down
and pay heed to a lesson he wished to convey to her and all Irish youngsters: ‘You
have been in custody since last March and you have nobody but yourself to blame.
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You have learnt a bitter lesson and I hope it has taught you and others like you not to
dabble in murderous enterprises, and treat it as a frolic, for it brings grave danger to
you.’ He added that he did ‘not know the dangers outside this courtroom that you
will face. I hope all will be well with you. I think the jury was right to acquit you. But
you came near to the edge of guilt and youmay reflect upon that. And if you have
friends in Ireland still, you tell them about the experiences here, so theymay know
what to expect if they follow your example.’140
Unlike in the other cases discussed here, the defendants in this case had not
admittedmembership of the ira and denied involvement in the bombings. Con-
sequently they recognised the court as legitimate and had themselves defended by
English lawyers. The ira seemed to assent in their taking this stance, even though it
contravened general ira policy. The jurisdiction of the courts was apparently accepted
when operating in Britain. Although not an issue in the proceedings itself, the ira
membership of the defendants was not a secret. Immediately after the completion
of the trial, the newspapers reported on the activist background of almost all the
defendants, including their rank and unit in the ira. In line with judicial practice
this information was not allowed to be reported on during the trial. The first time a
previous record in the ira wasmentioned was on the day the verdicts were reported,
when the Irish Independent stated, ‘Dolours Price and her sister, Marian, nicknamed
the “Armalite Widow” by the Provisional i.r.a.—smiled and waved from the dock to
relatives and friends in the public gallery before the judge entered. Marian is said to
have got her nickname from her expertise with the Provos’ favourite weapon, the
Armalite rifle.’141 The Irish Press said it referred to the large number of widows she
hadmade among army wives. It also cited the Price sisters, who studied at a teacher
training college, as examples of the new breed of ira intellectuals.142 Because their
ira membership did not have direct bearing on the bombings, the prosecution was
not allowed to put it forward during the trial. They did nevertheless refer to a trip to
Italy made by Dolours Price to lecture on the Northern Irish situation to left-wing
groups. Showing that althoughMr Justice Shaw instructed the jury that holding
republican beliefs and having been interned should not be taken into consideration in
judging guilt or innocence, the prosecution was willing to use an activist background
to make the charges stick.
One recurringmotif in the defence of the accusedwas that they weremaltreated in
custody, a claim that fortified the idea—among Irishmen in particular—that British
society wasmarked by an anti-Irish bias. The Irish Independent, which in contrast to
the Irish Times reported only occasionally on the trial, and generally provided only
a simple summary of the evidence, picked up on this issue; the editors must have
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expected it to be of interest to its readers. Even theGuardian, which generally supported
the Conservative government’s actions against the ira, reported extensively, in a
concurring tone, on the aspersions cast by the defence on the truthfulness of the
police evidence. Upon arrest the clothes of the defendants had been taken from
them for forensic tests, and it was not until the next day that they were given spare
clothes, clothes that the Price sisters and Feeney refused to accept. In the interim
they were dressed in blankets, a condition in which their photos were taken. Because
Dolours refused to use the blanket, which she claimed was filthy, the photo shows her
completely naked. The defendants had been forced to have their fingerprints taken,
which was against the law. They also claimed to have beenmanhandled, and Feeney
said he did not get a mattress in his cell. Mansfield alleged that the leading inspector
had called Price an ‘evil little maniac’ and had told her she ‘would not be seeing the
sunshine again for some time’. He had also taken her crucifix as he felt ‘she did not
deserve to have it’.143 All newspapers reported these events fairly dispassionately,
but somewhat surprisingly it was the Irish Independent that defended the enforced
fingerprinting of Dolours Price—an act that technically constituted an assault—on
the grounds that police investigations sometimes require desperate measures.144
The inspector justified his actions. He denied having said those things to Dolours
Price, but admitted that at the end of the first interview he was ‘perhaps a little
annoyed with her’, and had taken a chain and locket as he believed somethingmight
be hidden in it. He did not deny that the fingerprintswere taken forcibly.He knew that
he did not have the right to do so, but said that he needed them for the investigation.
The photograph of Price was taken with no clothes on because she unexpectedly did
not put on the blanket, as he thought she would. That the prisoners had not been
allowed to see a solicitor for four days, the inspector said, was because their identity
had not yet been established.145 When one of the lawyers asked a policeman if he
knew that his colleague had ordered what he called ‘a criminal assault’, the judge
forbade him to answer the question, adding, ‘The Jury have had quite enough about
that.’146 The defendants considered the maltreatment and the anger it generated
explanation enough for their lack of cooperation as well as their lack of distress when
confronted with the pictures of the bombings.147
During the trial, they presented themselves in an upbeat, unconcerned and
innocent manner. When they were first brought to the court many of the defendants,
including the Price sisters, gave v-signs through the small windows of the police van.
This was later prevented by having the windows blackened. In court the defendants
seemed to be in a perfectly good mood. The Irish Times reported that the girls had
shiny hair and were sprucely dressed when they arrived, accompanied by half a dozen
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women prison officers. The next day the girls were reported to cause ‘heads to turn in
the galleries when they arrived in the dock wearing brightly coloured pinafore dresses
and blouses’.148 The other Irish and British papers also made occasional references
to the looks of those involved, but the Observer stood out for its rapt attention to
outward appearances.149 In a background article entitled ‘English justice in all its
grandeur for Winchester: 9’,150 details of the physical appearance of some of the men
were provided, including Judge Shaw, who came to court carrying his black hat and
white gloves, and Gerard Kelly, ‘who wears his dark hair shoulder-length and walks
with the cheerful swagger known in Belfast as a dander’. The other men in the dock
were described as ‘rather a square looking bunch’. The paper contradicted the evidence
of one of the police witnesses, who had described William Armstrong as the most
villainous-lookingman he had ever seen, saying that he ‘looks as inoffensive as any
other window-cleaner [his stated occupation] in a sports jacket’. In another implicitly
critical reference, it recounted how Peter Rawlinson, the attorney general, was said to
be getting £200 a day for this case.Most spacewas however given to thewomen. Roisin
McNearney was described as having delicate pretty features; the paper noted that ‘at
the end of the day she rests her chin on a folded arm and looks dreamily ahead’. The
Price sisters attracted themost attention: ‘They are handsome rather than pretty, with
firm jaw lines, creamy complexions and auburn tint to their chestnut-coloured hair.’
They seem to have played on the effect of their appearance by often changing their
clothes during the lunch break; ‘pinafore dresses and smocks seem to be the favourite’.
Somewhat in opposition to the description above, the paper reported how ‘everybody
in court, police, counsel, reporters—agrees they are an absolute knockout’. (‘Dolly
birds in the dock’, said a headline in the London Evening News.) In a retrospective
article, somewhat confusingly entitled ‘The sisters of terror’, the paper recalled how
rural policemenwere amazed that beauty could be so dangerous.151 This trivialisation
of the defendants gave them a sense of innocence, an unexpected effect coming from a
British newspaper.
In their evidence, the defendants accounted for their presence in London in various
ways, saying that they were looking for a job, visiting people or that they came
simply as tourists. A few of them refused to testify but gave statements through their
solicitors. Their use of false names was explained with reference to the situation in
Northern Ireland, where it was dangerous to admit having a Republican name or
even a name easily identifiable as belonging to a Catholic. Gerry Kelly explained that
many, even very respectable, people were giving false names due to the introduction
of internment without trial. Hugh Feeney said he had started to use a false name
after having been stopped and beaten up by vigilantes of the uda, the Ulster Defence
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Association.152 The Irish Independent, in stressing the credibility of these explanations
in a Northern Irish context, contributed to the idea that the suspects were victims
of English ignorance.153 The main argument of the defence lawyers was that the
defendants did not have to prove their innocence—the prosecution had to prove
guilt; the case, they argued, was based ‘upon allegations made by assertion more
than anything else’. A bit of consideration, they argued, would reveal that the picture
painted by the defendants was not that unlikely. Most people on a short holiday
wouldmeet someone they knewwho travelled on the same day. This was not a strange
coincidence, just something that happened. With the Special Powers Act in force
in Ulster, giving a false name was quite logical. That one of themwas identified in
a line-up was also unsurprising, considering the fact that he was the only one in
borrowed clothes and without shoelaces. The fear that their family and friends would
be shot if they testified was hard to accept, but was ‘reality in Northern Ireland’.154
Dolours Price was portrayed as the leader of the ira bombing team andwas singled
out for special attention. She came from an active Republican family. Her father had
been interned for eight years during the 1940s and hadmoved to the South after their
house had been searched frequently following the reintroduction of internment in
August 1971. Dolours admitted to having given lectures in Italy on the Northern
Ireland situation. She was in favour of a united Ireland and claimed to understand the
aims and principles of the ira. Yet, as McNearney’s lawyer argued, it was no offence in
England to be a member of the ira or to associate with it. And although there was
probably ‘no organisation in this country at this moment with amore unpopular ring
to it than the i.r.a.’, the jury should not be led by their feelings.155 Dolours Price was
more assertive in her answers than some of her co-defendants. She had a reasonable
explanation for the photograph taken of her with a British soldier. She was held up at a
checkpoint with amanwhowas wanted, she said, andwhen a soldier asked for a photo
with her she agreed so as not to cause suspicion. Distress over her own situation was
responsible for her unwillingness to cooperate and her flat reaction when having been
shown pictures of the aftermath of the bombings. She was also defiant. When asked
by Peter Rawlinson what kind of person would perpetrate a crime like the bombing of
the Old Bailey, she said: ‘I really don’t know. If you saw photographs of Berlin after
it was bombed [duringWorldWar Two], could you say the person who did it was a
maniac?’ Being asked whether she supported the use of violence to further her ideals
she evaded the question.156
The two defendants who pleaded guilty or collaborated with the police were
treated somewhat differently by the rest. After WilliamMcLarnon had pleaded guilty
andwas led away, the other defendants showed no reaction.157 This was quite different
‘is there any justice left in this country?’ the ira on trial in the 1970s | 211
for Roisin McNearney, who like the others pleaded not guilty but cooperated with the
police. She admitted to having been drafted into the ira recently on an eleven-month
trial, after singing Irish songs in a Belfast bar. A short while before the bombings
she was told to go to Dublin, where she met two women and later two men who
said she was going to London, which she thought was great as she had never been
there. In London she had done a bit of sightseeing, going toMadame Tussaud’s and
Buckingham Palace, but knew nothing of the bomb in the car. As the attorney general
noted pointedly, a statement by her that was read in court contained evidence only
against herself, not against the others. She did provide whatever details she knew of
the movements of the others. She also offered to show the police the hotels where they
had stayed, ‘on condition that no one knew or saw her because otherwise she would be
shot’. Her fear of deadly reprisal was repeated at least three times.158
Until the verdicts were read, there nevertheless seemed to be nothing special
about the way she was treated by the others. However, when all the accused stood
to hear the verdicts read, McNearney stood back a little from the line of prisoners
instead of taking her usual place between Feeney and Brady. Another thing that
was noticed immediately was that McNearney’s father and eldest sister sat apart
from the other relatives, separated from them by three uniformed policewomen.
When McNearney was declared not guilty there was a scuffle in the dock. Feeney
and Brady had to be restrained while McNearney was taken down the stairs. Feeney
threw a coin at her and shouted, ‘Here is your blood money.’ As she left, several
of the defendants started to hum ‘Dead March from Saul’ intimating she would
soon be killed. There was a minor altercation between her father and relatives of
the other defendants, after which her family left abruptly. When she was brought
up again for the verdict on the other two charges, she returned crying into a white
handkerchief.159 The newspaper that paid most attention to the wayMcNearney
was treated by the other defendants was the Guardian. The front page opened with the
headline ‘Eight bombers chant death as girl is freed.’ In a departure from the facts as
reported in the other papers, the Guardianwrote that she had been ostracised from the
beginning and was now effectively sentenced to death by the Provisionals. Although
acknowledging thatMcNearney had been amember of the women’s organisation
of the ira, by painting her so pitifully the paper clearly wanted to place the emphasis
not on her culpability but on the ruthlessness of the ira. The single coin Feeney
threw at her in the Irish newspapers became a handful of coins in the Guardian.160
The Irish Presswas the only paper that reported on the death threats from the Loyalist
uvf (Ulster Volunteer Force) received by relatives of the two defendants who escaped
punishment.161
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After the verdict the prisoners dropped the pretence of non-involvement in the
ira, determinedly limiting their appeal to their own supporters. To hear the sentences,
the defendants were brought in with fifteen prison guards who packed the seats
behind them. Before the judge came in, several of the defendants were smiling, waving
to public and press, and leaning on the rail. Some continued to do so during the sharp
exchanges with Shaw that now ensued. It was as if now that they were condemned,
they manifested contempt for the court in retrospective conformity to the traditional
Republican refusal to recognise courts that they had not followed during the trial.
Even before sentence was passed the defendants announced that they were going
on hunger strike to be recognised as political prisoners and to be allowed to serve
their time in Northern Ireland. As the sentences were announced, the defendants
defiantly shouted ira slogans and raised clenched fists in the air. None of them asked
for leniency, and in their speeches from the dock they admitted membership of, and
expressed support for, the Provisional ira and the ideal of a united Ireland. Feeney, in
an impassioned address, said, ‘Victory is within the grasp of the Irish nation. She will
not bend the knee. England shall realise that we are indeed an arisen people.’ Kelly
stated that, as a member of the ira, he would fight until the people of Ireland could
decide their own destiny. Holmes concurred and ended with a famous quotation
from Republican icon Patrick Pearse: ‘Ireland unfree shall never be at peace.’ They also
claimed that this had been a political trial, and that the real defendant should be the
British government. They called for a trial in Strasbourg to judge the actions of the
British army in Northern Ireland, whom they called ‘uniformed thugs’ and who, they
claimed, had planted bombs in Dublin and hired criminals to fight Republicans. Even
McLarnon, who had admitted guilt from the beginning and was given fifteen years,
did not ask for leniency, and when sentenced shouted ‘Up the Provisional ira.’
The proceedings ended in some chaos. Gerry Kelly was removed when the judge
decided that the statement he was declaiming was a political speech; six spectators
who applauded and shouted support for him were also taken out. The entire audience
seemed to consist of—mainly female—relatives and supporters of the defendants. By
then none of the defendants was inclined to show respect for the judge. Shaw’s order
that they keep quiet only brought the defendants to shout ‘no’ in unison. When he
sentenced Feeney and the Price sisters, they interrupted him constantly, stating that
they did not want to listen to a lecture from him. The Guardian paid a great deal of
attention to what it described as ‘a series of extraordinary incidents in court’. As the
paper saw things, the statements by the other defendants were also blatantly political,
even after Kelly was removed. The Guardianmoreover expressed surprise that the
defendants ‘were quite unashamed of their deliberate perjury in an attempt to avoid
‘is there any justice left in this country?’ the ira on trial in the 1970s | 213
conviction’. When eventually led away, all gave the clenched fist sign to shouts of
‘All the best’ and ‘Cheerio, girls’ from their supporters. After their arrival in prison,
they issued a written statement in which the eight confirmed their hunger strike and
their refusal to wear prison clothes until they were transferred to Northern Ireland
and given political status. This would allow open visits, food parcels once a week,
the freedom to write and receive as many letters as they wanted and the right to be
together. Imprisonment in England, they claimed, would moreover entail financial
and emotional hardship for their relatives.162
The Provisional ira did not come out with an official response until after
the verdict. As the defendants had previously denied involvement with them, the
organisation had so far refused to be drawn into the case. In its initial reaction
immediately after the bombing it had announced that the eight operatives who had
really carried out the bombings had returned safely to Ireland. This implied that the
accused men and women were innocent, while countering Scotland Yard’s claim that
the car bombs had been planted by splinter groups.163 In a later article, the Guardian
reported that the attack had occasionedmuch argument in the ira. Former Chief
of Staff SeanMacStiofáin was said to have disapproved of the plan. It was only after
his imprisonment that the new Belfast-based leaders, who were under pressure in
the North and needed a success, pushed it through over lingering opposition in the
ranks. According to the Guardian this led to a huge row in the ira Army Council.164
Disregarding the possible effects of such an action on the defendants’ denial that they
weremembers of the ira, the Republican newspapers organised aid campaigns for
them from the beginning. ‘People wishing to offer support or give assistance to the
Belfast Ten should get in touch withMiss MaureenMaguire.’RepublicanNewswas
also the only paper consistently to report on the support groups emerging in England
and Ireland.165
In a statement following the conclusion of the case, the Provisionals criticised
the harsh sentences, which they claimed betrayed anti-Irish prejudices and hatred
and were ‘similar to the shooting of the sepoys from the barrels of cannons because
they too defied the Empire in defence of freedom’. This belated interjection of the
narrative of injustice was followed by threats of revenge: ‘The day is long past for Irish
people to lie under the lash of British Imperialists. In due course, retribution will be
extracted from the people who inflicted such callous punishment on Belfast youth in
Winchester today.’166 They expressed their admiration for the prisoners: ‘Undeterred
by the coercive atmosphere of the infamous Winchester court, the prisoners asserted
the god-given right of the Irish nation to freedom and affirmed that truth and attested
it with their liberty. Their heroismwill inspire thousands more to drive home the
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struggle for freedom to a victorious conclusion.’ This admiration did not apply to
Roisin McNearney, who the Provisionals said was expected after her release to appear
before an ira court of inquiry to explain her actions. For now nobody knewwhere
she was, but the declaration addedmenacingly that police protection would not last
forever. The next day Sinn Fein took defiance a step further. Irish Republicans no
longer feared the British, they said. As the sentences showed, it was the British who
feared the Irish. They made the specific prediction that 1974 would be the year of
‘victory over British imperialism’. In this they took inspiration from the convicted:
‘Inspired by their display of dignity and courage in the face of their enemies, we
rededicate with recharged enthusiasm to the present resistance struggle in the North.
Now, more than ever before, it is essential to conclude the victorious armed struggle
undistracted by “political” obstacles. In this victory our comrades will taste the sweet
air of freedom.’167
The Republican newspapers built on this argument. An analytical article in the
RepublicanNews positioned Britain as the real loser in the case of the Belfast Ten. The
bombs hadmademillions aware of ‘occupied Ireland’. British people had previously
been apathetic, it claimed, but nowmillions asked ‘what evils their government had
perpetrated in Northern Ireland to induce ten Irish youths to sacrifice their lives and
freedom’. The trial only accentuated British repression. The defendants had received
unprecedented life terms and had been treated as political enemies, to be put out
of commission for a long time to come. ‘It was a political trial.’ Even the English
attorneys representing the defendants admitted to this. The British Tories, said the
RepublicanNews, had had their vengeance, but their ‘blunders have poisoned thewell of
Anglo-Irish relations for generations to come’. ‘Moderate Irishmen were shown what
to expect under the British system of justice. Once again, the Crown became the chief
recruiting officer for the ira.’168 In a special supplement to An Phoblacht dedicated
to the Winchester hunger strikers, a whole list of allegations was published to back
up the accusation that the proceedings were a show trial. The defendants, the paper
claimed, were already found guilty before the trial, which wasmoved toWinchester
in the expectation that there would be a more ‘pro-Government blood-thirsty jury’
there; the defendants had beenmaltreated; and the press had influenced the trial by a
‘wave of hysteria whipped up by [the] Capitalist press’; even before the trial started,
the bbc had described the suspects as culprits (a qualification it later withdrew); and,
An Phoblacht recalled, the sentence by ‘blood-thirsty Sebag’ initially exceeded the legal
maximum.169
The government clearly wanted to show that it took up the challenge put to it
by the ira and the defendants. Although Scotland Yard denied any knowledge of
‘is there any justice left in this country?’ the ira on trial in the 1970s | 215
an alleged ira plan to kidnap ten villagers from Essex in retaliation, after the trial a
major security operation was put into effect. It was announced that the homes of
the judge, prosecutors, senior policemen and jurors were being protected and that
public buildings were being watched. The authorities refused to confirm or deny
reports that armed guards were posted in the houses of those involved in the trial and
of senior government figures.170
Public reaction to the attempts to impose a specific narrative by those involved is
difficult to measure. Reporting on the trial in the Irish Timeswasmuchmore extensive
than in the Irish Independent and Irish Press, let alone the local Irish papers, but even
coverage in the Irish Times tapered off after the first couple of weeks. Generally, the
paper simply conveyed the evidence that was being presented. The strongest reaction
in favour of the defendants seems to have been in England. Immediately after the
arrest of the ten suspects a ‘Belfast Ten Defence Committee’ was set up to help the
prisoners and to draw attention to the way they were treated. It brought together
Irish, left-wing and student organisations on both sides of the Irish Sea. Supporters
includedMauraMaguire of the Anti-Internment League, EamonnMcCann of the
International Socialist and Pat Arrowsmith, a pacifist campaigner. They asserted that
the newspapers had condemned the suspects before the trial had begun; castigated the
authorities for the maltreatment to which the accused were allegedly subjected; and
providedmoral and financial support as well as organising an ‘international solidarity
campaign on the lines of the successful Angela Davis Defence Committee’. English
civil rights activists became involved immediately, in reaction to the fact that initially
no charges were levied against the defendants and because they were not given access
to a lawyer for almost five days. The Council for Civil Liberties and the Prisoner Action
Committee described this as ‘a blatant and cynical denial of basic human rights’, and
went to the High Court to demand the prisoners’ release on grounds of habeas corpus:
‘A system of mental torture, intimidation and total isolation is being used in a case
where the police are obviously unable to bring charges.’171
Early reactions among the British public were not devoid of sympathy for the
Irish in general. Politicians and bystanders expressed the hope that ‘God would help
the people in Belfast if this is what is going on there.’172 Occasional hostility was
elicited by the protest marches and pickets of government buildings organised by
the defence committee, which were manned by up to 200 demonstrators. During
one of these demonstrations, which went from Charing Cross to Hyde Park, a few
fists were shaken by passers-by but there was generally little response even when
shouts of ‘Victory to the i.r.a.’ went up when passing a recent bombsite. An Phoblacht
reported similar numbers of protesters as the other papers.173 Only the Irish Press
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expressed concern for the consequences of the events for Irish people living in Britain
and for British–Irish relations. It also feared the security precautions would generate a
groundswell of prejudice against the defendants amongst townspeople, and that this
might affect the jury. It was the only paper to observe a negative response, epitomised
by what the Irish Press regarded as an exceptional reaction from an elderly man sitting
in the public gallery, who said through clenched teeth, ‘They shouldn’t waste a trial
on these people: they should have just shot them.’174
However, Irish supporters did concentratemore on social activities and fundraising
than on public protest afterwards. Their weekly collections, he said, were not down;
sales of An Phoblacht even went up a bit. During the trial Republicans felt strong
enough to organise a march through the constituency of a very vocal anti-ira Tory
mp. According to the Irish Times this was ‘a nose-thumping exercise but also a measure
of the Provisionals’ confidence that they will be able to operate despite bombs’. A
certain downturn in support from left-wing organisations in Britain did appear to
develop over time. A picket organised by Official Sinn Fein, in which all Irish, socialists
and those believing in justice and democracy were asked to participate, saw a turnout
of only a hundred people. This stood in blatant contrast to the thousands who had
demonstrated after the events a year before on Bloody Sunday, in which fourteen
civilians had been shot dead by security forces in Derry.175
The Guardian, which had provided most detail on the dangers to the population
during the trial, helped to create a sense of threat after sentencing by speculating
on possible retaliation by the ira in Britain: ‘There are fears that the iramay try a
novel form of terrorist action for them in an attempt to force the authorities to free
the prisoners. It is known that bombings and kidnappings have been considered.’
The next day it discussed the possibilities that a plane would be hijacked or a ‘daring
rescue’ by helicopter be undertaken, while adding reassuringly that the ira would
find it difficult to operate in Britain, where it lacked public support. The paper also
expressed its faith in the positive effects of the hard government line against prisoners
who went on hunger strike in order to acquire political prisoner status: ‘The Home
Office in this country is unlikely to ever accede to granting any of the ira prisoners
this status in Britain, contrary to the practice of the Republic.’ In full realisation that
prisoners who once went on hunger strike could not go back without losing face, the
paper nonetheless concluded that the prisoner would have to give in.176
In Ireland itself, public response to the verdicts was very limited. The Irish Times
felt that the whole bombing plot, which it claimed had been designed in Dublin,
was confused and dangerous. None of those involved was apparently able to keep
quiet about the proposedmission. ‘Their entire approach was muddle-headed and
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drawn up withmonumental incompetence.’ The strongest positive response came
from the students of St. Mary’s and St. Joseph’s Colleges in Belfast, where some of
the defendants studied. They put a statement out protesting at the savagery of the
sentences, demanding the right to appeal and claiming that the prisoners should be
allowed to serve their sentence in Northern Ireland.177 Althoughmost Irish Catholics
and nationalists did not much like the bombings, in the months following the
sentence their attitude towards the bombers improved when the press reported on
the harsh treatment they were receiving from the British authorities and the British
refusal, despite the hunger strike, to transfer the convicts to a prison in Northern
Ireland.
The Republican newspapers, which had been fairly quiet during the trial, now
tried tomobilise support. An Phoblacht and, in particular, RepublicanNews detailed
the ordeal being endured by the seven hunger strikers, claiming that they were
effectively being tortured to death. The five male prisoners, dispersed over the country
without access to their relatives, had no clothes and just one blanket; they were kept
in windowless, unheated cells where they had to sleep naked on stone floors. On the
basis of a letter written by Dolours Price, smuggled out of prison, the paper detailed
themechanics of the forcible feeding to which the seven were subjected and compared
the conditions to those in Bergen-Belsen concentration camp. It called upon the Irish
people, Amnesty International and the International Red Cross to use their good
offices to ensure that their demands were met, asking, ‘Must these people die before
it is too late?’178 It highlighted the request to be moved to a prison in Northern
Ireland, where it was not unusual for political status to be granted to Republican
prisoners. The paper recalled how a Northern Irelandminister had recently referred
to eighteen convicted prisoners who had beenmoved from England to the North.
A list of efforts supporting themove was then discussed, including actions by the
National Council of Civil Liberties and the Association of Legal Justice. The issue had
also been raised at a conference on torture in Paris, where relatives of the prisoners
had started a 24-hour fast in protest. The paper called upon everyone to phone or write
to people with influence, asking them to have a resolution in favour of the prisoners
passed and sent to the Home Office. A further demand was addressed to the Dublin
government, urging it to take a case to the European Court of Human Rights.179 In
themiddle of January the prisoners finally broke throughwhat An Phoblacht called
the wall of silence erected around them, when their letters detailing their situation
were allowed out. This led to demonstrations, mock forced-feeding sessions outside
Wormwood Scrubs and Brixton prison, and open expressions of support from a large
array of people and organisations in Ireland. Among them, the paper claimed, were
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the Gaelic League, the gaa, trade unionists, students, teachers, university professors
and lecturers, writers, artists, journalists, actors, actresses and a growing number of
local authorities.180 It also criticised the other papers and politicians of all parties who
were too busy putting together a political compromise to bother with the issue.181
The plight of the hunger strikers also appeared to generate more support in
Britain itself. Even some Labour mps were willing to associate themselves with the
Irish Political Hostages Campaign set up to support their demands. As An Phoblacht
put it, ‘The demands are capable of gaining broad support, and so will cut across
the hysteria of the press.’182 The forcible feeding saw to it that the hunger strike
continued for more than two hundred days, generating ever more support among
those of a nationalist persuasion and also among sympathisers in Great Britain and
abroad. The huge difference in public response between the trial and the hunger
strike highlights the distinction people felt between sympathy for the plight of the
prisoners and support for their tactics. This was just as true of the Irish as of the
English and others.
In the long run, all parties involved appear to have been fairly successful in
convincing their own audience of the validity of their narrative. The performative
power of the government’s attempt to highlight the danger of the ira to law and
order seems to have been successful to the extent that English left-wing organisations
becamemore hesitant to express their support for ira prisoners; even the Guardian
supported government policy towards the ira. At the same time, in the public domain
there was no noticeable increase in anti-Irish utterances, a phenomenon that was
actually in the interest of the British government. (In private, people may well have
been much more critical of the Irish than before.) The ira, although it succeeded
fairly well in the initial phases in mobilising support for the defendants among civil
right activists and left-wing groupings in Britain, did not reach themasses either in
Britain or Ireland. In the long run, however, they were helped by the hunger strike in
generating widespread sympathy, in particular among the population in the Irish
Republic. The portrayal of the British government as unfair in its treatment of the Irish
appears to have struck a chord with the populace, thereby maintaining a potential
support base for the objectives and, to some extent, even for the methods used by the
Republicans.
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5.5. The Trial of Bobby Sands (1977)
The final case discussed here is the trial of Bobby Sands. While best known for
his hunger strike in 1981, Sands had been in prison since October 1976. His trial
on 7 September 1977 is included here for the insight it offers into the impact of
the abolition of trial by jury for cases of political violence in Northern Ireland.
The conviction of paramilitary suspects had proved to be particularly difficult for
the authorities ever since the outbreak of the Troubles in 1969. We have seen that
early in 1971 a type of covert internment policy had been initiated to deal with
known leaders such as Card andMcKee. Yet this was ultimately unsatisfactory due
to the intimidation of jurors and witnesses, acquittals by biased juries, and the
inadmissibility of confessions, which often were the only evidence brought forward by
the prosecution. To deal with these difficulties, actual internment was subsequently
introduced on 9 August 1971. However, this only led to intensified violence, as a
large number of people not associated with the Provisionals were interned. The
concomitant raids and arrests, with a large measure of violence against people who
were not involved, only abetted the recruiting efforts of the movement. The ranks of
the irawere swelled after the first swoops against Republicans, whilemost prominent
members of the Provisionals, who were largely unknown to the security forces, had
evaded arrest. From a public relations point of view, internment had considerable
drawbacks. It undermined the legal system and its credibility among Catholics, as
most internees came from their community.
The introduction of the Diplock courts on 8 August 1973 was a way of ending the
need for internment and the use of the associated label ‘political prisoner’. These
juryless courts made it much easier to convict known activists, as the introduction of
Special Criminal Courts in 1972 had done in the South. In contrast to the latter, on
which three judges sat on the bench, the Diplock courts had a single county or High
Court judge who presided over political cases. When arms were found, the burden of
proof was put upon the suspect, while standards for confessions were lowered. To
mitigate the effects of a possiblemiscarriage of justice, the death sentence could not be
meted out. Other changes included the introduction of a 28-day arrest period without
charge and a higher threshold for bail. From a British perspective, the Diplock courts
appear to have been successful. Their introduction led to many more convictions and
a substantial reduction in violence. Evenmost Catholics seem to have preferred them
over internment. The assured right to appeal and the requirement that the judges
for the first time had to write out the factual and legal arguments underlying their
decision improved chances for a successful appeal. It also benefitted the quality of
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the judgments, as judges did not like to have their verdicts reversed. The favourable
reception of the Diplock courts allowed the authorities to abolish internment on
5 December 1975.183
Little is known about Bobby Sands’s trial, which took a single day. The only
papers to report on it were the Irish Times and the Irish Independent, and even they were
content with not muchmore than the bare facts. This in itself demonstrates that
the simplification of the proceedings under the new legislation lessened the public
impact of the trials. Most papers in Ireland and Britain however had reported on
the incident that led to his arrest, but, again, stuck to the unadorned details. This
was even true of the Republican papers. An Phoblacht referred briefly to the arrest in
their column ‘News from the North’, while the northern Republican News did not
even report on this specific action, only the general ira policy of targeting business
premises, of which the specific incident was an example.184 Sands and five other
men had been arrested on 14 October 1976. Together with two others, a man and a
womanwho escaped, they had taken over the Balmoral Furniture Company at the
Balmoral Industrial Estate, held up the staff and placed two twenty-pound bombs
and two drums of petrol. When the raiders left they were confronted by troops and
police. The six were captured after a shoot-out. In the meantime the bombs exploded
and a fierce fire started. The firemen, who were on strike at the time, made sure the
staff was safe and that the fire did not spread, but let the factory burn down, causing
about £400,000 worth of damage. Sands and three others were arrested in a car in
which a revolver was found on the floor. A short clause in the Irish Independent article
may explain the lack of attention to this relatively minor case: ‘[…] meanwhile with
assassinations reaching almost a rate of one a day and two explosions per day in the
North’.185
All the defendants refused to recognise the court and seemingly made no attempt
to defend themselves. They were ultimately convicted only for possession of a weapon
with intent. No evidence could be produced linking them directly to the fire-bombing
of the furniture company. Nevertheless, they each received a fourteen-year sentence,
almost three times as long as the penalty meted out to Card and McKee for the
same offense only two years earlier. The length of the sentence may well have been
influenced by the fact that although there was no evidence, the responsibility of
the defendants for the fire was fairly incontrovertible. The authorities may also
have hoped that severe sentences would deter others.186 Except for the element of
deterrence, the performative power of the case was very minor. Neither Republicans
nor the authorities or the media attempted to use the case to make a particular
point. The low-key response to the case was probably due to a combination of factors.
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The effects of the Diplock court procedures and the extremely violent context of
the Troubles robbed the goings-on in a minor court case of any and all publicity
value.
5.6. Conclusion
In all the cases discussed above, the various parties involved seem to have been fairly
well aware of the message they wanted to put across about themselves and their
opponents. The emphasis and effort put into this were adapted to local conditions. It
was generally clear to anyone familiar with the political situation of the moment
who was being addressed when. In the three jurisdictions—Northern Ireland, Great
Britain and the Irish Republic—the population was highly polarised to begin with,
leaving only one group in society that could be swayed to one side or the other. In
Northern Ireland, Unionists would not be open to whatever message was put out
by Republicans. The primary aim of the latter was to maintain the support of their
own constituency and to bring nationalists who were opposed to the use of violence
to their side. In the main, they were out to portray the proceedings as unjust and
unfair. If they succeeded, all nationalists would feel potentially threatened by the
state, a state that was apparently able to lock up any of them. The government and the
legal profession in Northern Ireland simply tried to emphasise that they maintained
the rule of law and that those who broke it would be punished severely. This simple
dichotomy also meant that newspapers generally paid little attention to court cases.
In the South, the ‘battleground’ was more open. As the ira objective of a united
Ireland was widely shared, there wasmore to gain. It was relatively easy for the ira,
contrary to the government, to claim that, however counterproductive the use of force
might be perceived as being, it was doing something tangible for a united Ireland.
This dichotomy also enabled them to use a whole range of damaging narratives to
tackle the government and generate support among the populace. One favoured tactic
similar to what was used in the North was to accuse the southern Irish courts of
denying justice to Republicans and using illegal means to convict them. The ira
also emphasised the apparent lack of independence of the Irish government, which
appeared to act in unison with the British, who were portrayed as the eternal enemies
of Irish independence. In a sense, the emphasis of the Irish government and the
legal system in the court cases onmaintaining the rule of law can be explained by
the absence of a more effective counter-narrative. The ira succeeded in generating
widespread protest, but at the end of the day people were too apprehensive of anarchy
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to accept the Republican framing. Their claims were only accepted by those who
already questioned the agenda of the Irish government.
In view of the unlikelihood that open supportwould be forthcoming on the British
mainland, the best option available to the ira was to appeal to liberal and left-wing
constituencies. They did this by emphasising the imperialist tendencies of the British
government and its lack of respect for civil rights, illustrated by its behaviour towards
the prisoners and to Irishmen in general. The ira did not challenge the legality of the
court. On the contrary, the fact that it was legal strengthened their criticism of the
procedures and the actions of the various actors within the system, including the
police, prosecution and judge. In response, the government stressed the threat to
society posed by the actions of the defendants, not just in words but also in the way
they staged the proceedings. This tactic was picked up by the judge and prosecution
as well. The public impact of the bombs had been great, but the court proceedings did
not appear to have much effect. Concerns over civil liberties were initially substantial,
but the association of the suspects with the violent politics of the ira seems in the
final analysis to have scared away some of the liberal constituency.
Looking at the reporting in the newspapers, one can only conclude that little use
was made by the parties involved of the theatrical potential of court proceedings. The
case of the Belfast Ten, in which this did occur, was an exception. The staging of that
trial, the security measures outside the courtroom and the placing of the defendants
inside sent out a clear message. In Northern Ireland, the news was dominated by the
violence taking place on the streets. No court case could command as much public
attention as a lethal bomb attack or the killings on the street. To some extent, the
same can be said of the South and Great Britain, where coverage of the court cases
had to compete with reports on the latest violent incident or attempts to come to a
peaceful solution of the conflict. The long history of ira violence also limited the
ability of politicians, the judicial system and the ira itself to use the court cases for
their performative power. The parties involved appear to have known fairly well which
message worked and which did nothing for their intended audiences evenmore so in
Ireland than in Britain.
One instructive aspect of this analysis concerns the way various newspapers
emphasised different aspects of events. The so-called quality papers tended to pay
most attention to the content of the proceedings. They nevertheless each had their
own individual slant. The Guardian, for instance, stressed the danger emanating from
the ira, possibly in an attempt to justify its support for the policies of the conservative
government and to counter criticism from civil rights organisations. Papers like the
Observer and the Sunday Independent felt most comfortable with superficial aspects of
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the case, such as the appearance and background of the defendants. The local papers
in Ireland did not pay any attention to the cases, apart from an occasional obligatory
report, but the various national newspapers did cover them, each in keeping with its
own political position. The Irish Times, which represented a fairly wide range of views,
was critical of the governments in relation to civil liberties and press freedom, but
tended to side with law and order. The Irish Independent was erratic in its reporting. It
featured a strong human interest component, but was certainly not swayed by the
Republicannarrative. The IrishPress,whichhada close associationwith thegovernment
party in Ireland that contained a faction of relatively hard-line Republicans, was
most likely to accept the way the defendants framed their opponents sometimes in
opposition to the government.
In general it could be argued that this analysis of court cases against ira suspects
in different jurisdictions has revealed that the parties involved were quite conscious
of the narrative they wanted to put out to certain targeted audiences, and explicitly
questioned the quality of justice administered (“Is there any justice left in this
country?”). The societies in the three jurisdictions were divided by clearly drawn lines
of identification and by their past experience with cases like those dealt with here.
That and the all dominating violence in Northern Ireland constrained possibilities for
exploiting the performative element to the full. Those who implemented it did so
mostly to strengthen their own or undermine the opponent’s narrative. The public
reactedmuchmore strongly to the performative power of the hunger strike, which the
ira preferred over the court case, if only because it hadmore control over the physical
sufferings of ira prisoners than over the impact and framing of judiciary proceedings.
It could nevertheless be argued that the Republican narrative was strengthened by
their use of the performative power of the court cases and therefore was a contributing
factor in maintaining the Republican campaign of force for such a long time by
maintaining the idea that Republicans were more willing to suffer for the shared
objective of Irish unity than existing parties and in the process were unjustly treated
by the governments involved.
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6. Germany Confronts the Baader-Meinhof
Group. The Stammheim Trial (1975–1977)
and Its Legacies
Jacco Pekelder and KlausWeinhauer
6.1. Introduction
One of themost remarkable twentieth-century legal confrontations between state and
terrorists took place at the trial against the leaders of the Rote Armee Fraktion (raf,
Red Army Faction) at Stammheim, Germany, from 21May 1975 until 28 April 1977. This
trial stands out because of its extraordinary length and the ferocity of the altercations
between those present in the courtroom, in particular between the presiding judge
and the accused and their defence team. Daily proceedings over the 192 trial days
lasted between ten minutes and ten hours, a total of about 1,000 hours. After the trial,
14,000 pages of protocol were typed up, and in early October 1977, the Stammheim
judges presented a written verdict of 319 pages.1 We begin our analysis of this trial
with a brief history of the raf. This is followed by a review of research on German
left-wing terrorism in the late twentieth century, and an outline of our analytical
perspective.
6.1.1. History of the Red Army Faction: A Brief Overview
Between 1970 and 1998, the Red Army Faction (also known as the Baader–Meinhof
Group) confronted the Federal Republic of Germany. The raf was a social-revolu-
tionary terrorist group that began as an offspring of the protest movement of the
late 1960s, just as this movement was in the process of disintegrating into various
groups. The raf regarded itself as a left-wing revolutionary urban guerrilla group,
andmodelled itself on similar organisations in Latin America (Uruguay’s Tupamaros)
and the United States (the Black Panthers). To continue the struggle for a revolution
inWest Germany, the raf opted to take up arms against the state.
The raf outclassed other left-wing terrorist groups inGermany for several reasons.
Firstly, its membership included some of the most prominent people of the protest
movement: lawyer Horst Mahler, who had defended many protesters; journalist
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Ulrike Meinhof, whose critical columns in the left-wing periodical Konkret had
earned her respect among Germans of radical and liberal persuasions; and the radical
lovers Andreas Baader and Gudrun Ensslin, already convicted of arson against two
department stores in Frankfurt in 1968. Secondly, the raf entered the political stage
spectacularly, with the liberation of Baader from captivity on 14 May 1970. Thirdly, the
raf aimed to win the hearts andminds of others on the radical left by publishing
declarations and semi-intellectual brochures, including, in 1971, the lengthy essays
The Urban Guerrilla Concept and About the Armed Struggle inWestern Europe. Finally, the
Baader–Meinhof Group strongly portrayed itself as the vanguard organisation inWest
Germany for all the radical left-wing groups, action committees and projects, and it
emphatically demanded their solidarity and support.
During the first two years of its existence, the raf concentrated its efforts on
building the organisation, with its members only occasionally involved in violent,
sometimes fatal, confrontations with the police. Yet even at this stage the raf caused
great upheaval throughout West Germany. On the one hand, there were waves of
moral panic in mainstream society, fuelled by anxious press commentaries and
politicians demanding tougher anti-terrorist policies. On the other hand, several
surveys of public opinion in 1971 found that the raf enjoyed some sympathy among
a number of left-wing intellectuals and youngsters. Partly in reaction to this, state
institutions implemented rather radical counter-terrorist policies, not just against the
perpetrators of political violence but scrutinising a far wider radical left milieu. The
Bundeskriminalamt (bka, the Federal Criminal Police Office) coordinated counter-
terrorist policies, and high hopes were invested in its new president Horst Herold,
and the advanced computer-based investigation techniques he introduced. The bka
and other government agencies also mobilised the press in an effort to win over the
general public for the fight against terrorism. While genuine support for the raf
remainedminimal and decreased over the years even in radical circles, government
policies encouraged right-wing politicians and the media to instigate large-scale
campaigns against raf ‘sympathisers’.
InMay 1972, the raf launched its first campaign of political violence: six bomb
attacks spread over several weeks. On 11 May, the us Army barracks in Frankfurt
were attacked, killing one American officer and wounding thirteen. On the following
day, explosions in police headquarters in Augsburg and Munich left another ten
people wounded. On 15 May a bomb destroyed the car of a federal judge in Karlsruhe,
seriously wounding his wife. Four days later, an attack on the Hamburg offices of
the conservative Springer Press injured 38 staff members. On 24 May, Heidelberg
usmilitary headquarters were targeted in a violent blast that killed three American
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soldiers andwounded fivemore. The raf’s triumph at the ‘success’ of itsMay offensive
was short-lived, and when in June 1972 police arrested its leaders, including Baader,
Ensslin andMeinhof (Mahler had already been apprehended in late 1970), it seemed
that the raf had come to an end. Its members faced court trials and lengthy prison
terms.
In the crucial period that followed, 1972–1977, events took an unexpected turn.
Instead of passively undergoing their detention in custody, most members of the
raf (excludingMahler who left the organisation) started a prison struggle involving
collective hunger strikes. This was intended to create a solidarity campaign within
the left-wing radical milieu and to attract new recruits, which led to the formation of
new terrorist cells. Violent acts were committed with the aim of forcing the German
government to release the prisoners. The first of these acts was the armed occupation
of the German embassy in Stockholm, on 24 April 1975, just weeks before the start of
the trial against the raf leaders at Stammheim.
Aswill becomeapparent below,however, theraf and the state saw the Stammheim
trial as their most important battleground over the next two years. Only in the
spring of 1977, when the trial was nearing its end, did the raf cells begin another
campaign of violence. ‘Offensive 77’ drove West German society to the brink of a
socio-political crisis in the so-called ‘German Autumn’ of September/October 1977.
During these months German business leader Hanns Martin Schleyer was kidnapped
(and four security men were shot and killed in cold blood) and a passenger jet was
hijacked by Palestinian terrorist comrades of the raf. On 18–19 October 1977, German
gsg-9 Special Forces liberated the abducted plane at Mogadishu airport in Somalia.
After hearing this, Baader, Ensslin and Raspe collectively committed suicide in their
Stammheim prison cells and, immediately thereafter, Schleyer was murdered by his
captors.
Now that its leaders were dead, it seemed the raf really would come to an end. It
proved to be a long goodbye however, lastingmore than twenty years despite further
raf arrests and deadly gun battles with the police. All through the 1980s and until 1991,
the raf mounted attacks against nato-related targets, German business leaders and
government representatives. Remarkably, the perception of the raf as a fundamental
threat to German society gradually faded away despite these events. This was in
part caused by changing civic attitudes towards the state. Whereas in 1977, extreme
measures by police and state against the terrorists and their prospective ‘sympathisers’
hadmet with consent frommost quarters of German society, it appears that following
the ‘German Autumn’ a period of critical reflection began. In the last years of the
1970s criticism of the police grew markedly, especially of measures electronically
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to collect and process large quantities of personal data. Trust in state institutions
eroded and state officials were subject to increased democratic scrutiny. In view of the
traditional regard for the state in Germany’s political culture, these were remarkable
developments.2
In the early 1990s, fragmentary discussions between rafmembers (both inside
and outside prison) and small conciliatory gestures by government officials led to the
final dissolution of the organisation. On 10 April 1992 the raf announced a unilateral
armistice, and in 1993 performed its last, highly symbolic bombing. No physical harm
resulted but a new prison facility in the final phase of construction was destroyed
(60million Euros damage). Five years later, on 20 April 1998, the raf announced its
disbanding, proclaiming that in future itsmemberswould seek otherways to promote
social transformation.
6.1.2. Theoretical Outlook and Line of Investigation
‘Terrorism’ is a contested term.3 It is often used for political effect: labelling certain acts
or organisations as ‘terrorism’ or ‘terrorists’ can disqualify political adversaries. We
will distinguish between two interrelated meanings of ‘terrorism’. Defined narrowly,
terrorism is a specific act or threat of political violence throughwhich the perpetrators
attempt to influence the behaviour of social actors other than the immediate victims
of violence. In their seminal study Violence as Communication, Alex Schmid and Janny de
Graaf thus frame terrorism as ‘a kind of violent language’.4 On ameta-level terrorism
can be interpreted as a ‘social construction’; just like any other social problem, the
concept of terrorism ‘is shaped by social and political processes, by bureaucratic needs
andmedia structures’.5
Following this interpretation,we can recognise that the reactions that are provoked
by acts of violence, reactions among politicians, the media and the general public,
are constituent elements of terrorism. While the actual violent attacks cannot be
reasoned away, nor the victims discounted, these acts or threats acquire their ‘terrorist’
quality when other groups in society label them or react to them as ‘terrorism’. In this
sense, communications and interactions between ‘terrorists’ and other groups and
institutions in society have a considerable influence on the development of ‘terrorism’
as a social problem. Against this background, we argue that reactions to raf activities
by politicians, social actors and the established media in the frg in the 1970s co-
determined the impact this organisation had on German society at the time. The
brief historical introduction to the raf above has demonstrated some aspects of this
notion.
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Examining terrorism as both a process of communication and a social construction
has important consequences for our approach to the phenomenon. It demands a shift
of focus from questions that have usually dominated terrorism research (and research
on the raf)—questions restricted to the emergence of terrorist groups or to their
confrontation with the state in violent acts. Broadly-based research is necessary to
understand the social, political and cultural dynamics which are set inmotion by
certain acts or threats of violence that public debate deems to be ‘terroristic’. More
emphasis on the wider context of events and structures is required.6 We also need to
take a closer look at developments in particular societies after specific chains of events
(attacks, reprisals, trials etcetera) related to ‘terrorism’ have taken place. Howwere
the violent acts and the proclamations of the terrorists perceived, interpreted and
responded to by state institutions, social actors, the mass media7 and by other groups
in society?8 The semantic coding which shapes the interpretation of terrorism also
requires analysis. Such a broadly-based social and cultural historical approach could
not only help to overcome the dichotomous interpretations of terrorism. It could also
contribute to opening up some analytically challenging avenues for a general debate
about terrorism as a phenomenon which is shaped by the interactions of state, social
andmedia actors on the one hand andmilitant activists on the other.
Seeing terrorism as an act of communication can help us understand its strong
potential for the performative; terrorism is a constructed reality which is shaped
and defined by the performances of different actors.9 From the perspective of
communication and performance, the confrontation between the opposing parties can
be seen essentially as a clash between different narratives of justice and injustice. This
approach is particularly useful for the analysis of terrorist trials, as a recent comparative
study into the dynamics around court cases and associated detention conditions (in
Germany and the Netherlands in the 1970s) has shown.10 The courtroom provides
a unique stage for the clash of narratives, with its clear division of roles between
judge(s), prosecution and defence, as well as the customary procedural court rules and
rituals. The various players involved adopt strategies and perform accordingly, with
the aim of persuading audiences within and outside the courtroom to endorse their
narrative.11
Not least because of its extraordinary length and the exceptional vehemence with
which the parties involved played out their confrontations, the Stammheim trial
against the raf leaders offers an excellent subject for analysis from the perspective of
communication and performance. Of course, ours is not the first attempt to study the
trial, and it will not be the last. Following the release of early collections of various
documents on the trial,12 book-length studies first appeared in the mid-1980s. In 1986,
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the apparently well-informed Spiegelmagazine journalist Stefan Aust publishedDer
BaaderMeinhof Komplex. A long and informative chapter on the Stammheim trial is
probably based on newspaper reports and trial transcripts (unfortunately Aust does
not reveal his sources). In the same year, Dutch lawyer Pieter Herman Bakker Schut
published Stammheim. Die notwendige Korrektur der herrschendenMeinung, an insider’s
analysis of the trial. Smaller books or edited volumes were released around the same
time, mainly focused on the so-called ‘Deutscher Herbst’ (German Autumn) of 1977
when the confrontation between the raf and the state reached its zenith, but also
dealing with some aspects of the Stammheim trial.13
Thirty years after these events, in 2007, the journalist Ulf G. Stuberger published an
eyewitness account of the trial, and in 2009 awell-researched legal studybyChristopher
R. Tenfelde appeared.14 Further books written by and about former raf defence
lawyers cover the trial to some degree.15 With rare exceptions, professional historians
avoided the subject of the trial and the raf in general until the 21st-century. More
historians arenowstudying andwriting about the subject ofWestGermany’s left-wing
terrorism.16
Although these studies about Stammheim have produced valuable information
and many interesting viewpoints, they also have some shortcomings. The older
publications about the trial tend to focus on personal drama and many exhibit strong
political bias and a lack of objectivity. Aust’s journalistic approach provides a clear
illustration of the first flaw; he also betrays some personal emotional involvement.
Bakker Schut’s writing, in spite of the legal discourse he uses, is about as politically
partisan as one can get. The smaller books and edited volumes were mostly produced
to participate in Germany’s public debate and are often biased and often provocative.
Not even the most recent publications escape these shortcomings. Stuberger’s
attempt at a more nuanced approach, combining the unique circumstance of his
eyewitness status with the benefit of hindsight, is valuable. Still, his account is
too narrow and personalised really to increase our understanding of the trial. Even
Tenfelde’s monograph fails to deliver, although at first glance it looks like the most
promising serious legal analysis of the trial. Central to Tenfelde’s examination is
the question of whether or not Stammheimwas a ‘political trial’. Tenfelde clearly
aims to criticise and counter the claims by various German officials at the time that
politics played no part in the trial or in the confrontation with the raf in general. By
debating this claim, Tenfelde enters into a dialogue with the historical material he
studied as if he were himself part of a discussion taking place in the 1970s. From a
jurist’s perspective this endeavour might make perfect sense. As historians, however,
we are far more interested in asking why the trial’s (obvious) political character was
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contested at all. Instead of trying to proclaim a final verdict on this, we present a
critical, theoretically informed analysis of the probable intentions and deeds of the
trial’s actors, and of the social dynamics they were involved in.
In general, the authors who have studied Stammheim to date have consciously
or unconsciously embraced a narrow view of the raf’s history, reducing the issue
to a two-sided confrontation. Caught up in the moral dilemmas presented by the
history of the raf and the counter-terrorist policies it provoked, these authors are
constrained within a ‘them versus us’ perception of this particular chapter of German
history. Because of that, in the end, they feel morally obliged to take sides. It seems to
us that academic research about the raf in general until around the year 2000 still
betrayed a similarly view.
We suggest that early historiography about the raf and other German left-wing
terrorist organisations has been flawed in two interrelated ways. Firstly, the authors
(be they journalists, political scientists, sociologists or legal experts) interpreted
terrorism mainly as a bipolar confrontation between the terrorists and the state.
The analytical narrowness of this dichotomy was intensified by a second flaw: while
some authors told stories about single actors, others focused on social structures,
ignoring actions by individuals. Intellectual exchanges or even communications
between researchers from both groups were rare.
This gap was bridged only when historians entered the fray after 2000, and the
concept of ‘terrorism as communication’ (introduced to terrorism studies by Schmid
and de Graaf in the early 1980s) was applied to the analysis of German left-wing
terrorism.17 Using a communication-oriented approach, scholars were able to escape
the dominance of binary coding and gradually to emphasise the triadic structure of
communicationon the issue. The actors in this process of communication canbe clearly
named: themilitants and their constituency; the state and its institutions; and society
at large, which of course consists of many sub-groups. The media (newspapers, radio
and television) play an important role, not only providing channels of communication
but also performing as agents with their own political agendas.18
A communication-oriented approach helps to address the tendency that many
publications on the raf have of insulating confrontations between left-wing terror-
ism, the state and society from all other developments of the time. The strong focus on
communication enables scholars to re-contextualise the raf, re-connecting its history
to the social and cultural history of state and society. As Klaus Weinhauer proposed
earlier, this enables the integration of the study of German left-wing terrorism into a
broader social and cultural history of ‘Internal Security’ (Innere Sicherheit), focusing
on the interaction of the three main actors mentioned above.19
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On this theoretical basis, we aim to present an example of what a new approach to
the history of the raf has to offer. Firstly, using a wide variety of publications and
sources, our narrative of the Stammheim trial also focuses on the events leading up
to the trial and in court, with attention being paid to the performative aspects of
the proceedings. We analyse the legacies of the trial from a similar perspective, and
this chapter takes a first step towards an analysis of the political, juridical and social
consequences or repercussions of the Stammheim trial. Because a solid social and
cultural history of West German terrorism is still lacking, this can be only amodest
attempt to analyse the collective memory of the Stammheim trial in West German
society and to contextualise it within the general re-evaluation of left-wing terrorism
and the counter-terrorist policies it provoked at the time.
We see our chapter, and its openness to criticism, as an important step in breaking
free from established patterns of thinking about the trial and related themes. Even
after their conclusion, terrorism trials exhibit the semantic coding that structures the
interpretation of terrorism as a whole. These codes (and sometimes also the trials)
frame public memories. We argue that in 1970s/1980s Germany, the semantics of
communication about left-wing terrorismwere structured by a binary and highly
politicised coding system, built on a clear dichotomy of them (terrorists, supporters)
versus us (state, society). In this system ‘Stammheim’ was an important symbol; it
helped to locate the transnational struggle of left-wingmilitants against imperialism,
the state and its institutions, and at the same time it drew attention to the German
state and its inhumane arrogance. Or, as the news magazine Der Spiegel wrote in
1992, ‘Stammheim’ was ‘a symbol, congealed in concrete, of uncompromising raison
d’ état’.20
6.2. Setting the Stage, Writing the Script
Almost three years passed following the arrests of the leading raf members, Andreas
Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Ulrike Meinhof and Jan-Carl Raspe, before their trial began
in the Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court) in Stuttgart, sitting in the city’s
Stammheim district, on 21May 1975. This meant all parties involved had a lengthy
period to prepare for this unique courtroom confrontation. This section will elaborate
on the pre-trial phase and the various ways the prosecution and the defence tried to
influence the setting of the stage and the writing of the script. We will discuss new
rules (and laws) drawn up by the state, and the way the raf and its lawyers responded
to, or anticipated, these steps.
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6.2.1. State Trial Strategy and the Introduction of New Legislation
The various state institutions involved, including the prosecution, regarded the trial as
more than just an opportunity to bring the raf leadership to justice, as the following
statement by Bundesgeneralanwalt (Chief Federal Prosecutor) Siegfried Buback shows.
‘In this trial’, Buback told a radio reporter in June 1976, ‘because we were dealing with
the leaders of this Baader–Meinhof Gang, we had to prosecute more comprehensively.
It was important to present the court with a representative cross-section of their
actions.’21 In effect, politicians and state officials tried to create the preconditions
that would turn the trial at Stammheim into a public reckoning with raf terrorism
in particular and German left-wing extremism in general. Firstly, this involved the
formulation of the accusations in a bill of indictment against the suspects by which
the state hoped to influence the content of the trial proceedings. Secondly, it meant
the choice of a stage for the trial; this resulted in the building of a new courthouse.
Thirdly, the long period of preparation permitted the state to rewrite laws intended to
limit the defence’s ability to obstruct trial proceedings.
The Accusation against the raf Suspects: A Political Trial without Politics
Although no one doubted the political significance of the Stammheim trial, the
authorities declared time and again that it was ‘ein ganz normaler Strafprozeß gegen
Kriminelle’ (an absolutely normal trial against criminals).22 This fitted well with the
discursive strategy practised by the authorities in their struggle with the raf from
1970 onwards. In the eyes of established politics andmedia in the Federal Republic
of Germany (frg), the raf’s destructive violence automatically disqualified the
organisation as a political entity. Instead, the raf was portrayed as a criminal gang of
egotistical maniacs, devoid of any idealism. Rather than using its chosen name Rote
Armee Fraktion (raf—RedArmy Faction) or the quasi-neutral Baader–Meinhof Group,
politicians, state officials andmany journalists preferred the use of ‘Baader–Meinhof
Bande’ (gang), a reference that called up associations with criminals like Bonnie and
Clyde, whose story had beenmade into a successful Hollywood film in 1967.23
By denying the raf’s political project, the authorities attempted to isolate the
raf from other critical groups. As Horst Ehmke, Chief of the Office of Chancellor
Willy Brandt, declared on 7 June 1972, it was ‘one of the most important tasks’ to
‘deny [the raf] all solidarity, to isolate it from what other left-wing views there are in
this country’.24 In the bill of indictment, therefore, Baader cum suiswere not accused
of political crimes like ‘high treason’ (paragraph 81 of the German Criminal Code,
StGB25) or the preparation thereof (paragraph 83 StGB). Although the option had
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been discussed within the Bundesanwaltschaft (Federal Prosecutor’s Office),26 this
possibility was dismissed as part of an effort of ‘de-politicising by selecting the norms’,
as German legal scholar Christopher Tenfelde writes in his dissertation about the
Stammheim trial. At a ‘high treason’ trial the political character of the confrontation
between the armed groups and the state would necessarily have been acknowledged.27
Instead, the bill of indictment (354 pages, with an extra 471-page attachment)
mainly stressed the ordinary crimes of the raf leaders: murder (of one policeman,
killed during a bank robbery, and four American soldiers, killed in two of the 1972
bombings), attemptedmurder (71 wounded, also in 1972), robbery, theft and criminal
use of explosives.28 The problemwas, however, that in spite of a massive number of
996 witnessesmentioned by name in the indictment and despite some 1,000 additional
reports (mostly by criminal experts), the prosecutors were unable to prove conclusively
that the suspects had been on the crime scene at any of the bombing sites, although
some witnesses had seen them in the immediate surroundings shortly before the
explosions. To circumvent this problem, the Federal Prosecutor’s Office built the
indictment on the notion that the raf be regarded as a ‘Krimineller Verein’ (criminal
association), of which the accused had been leadingmembers, thus creating a collective
responsibility for raf acts.
Inadvertently, by reverting to paragraph 129 of the German Criminal Code, the
prosecutors themselves reintroduced a political element into the prosecution of the
raf. It is important to note in this respect that the legal history of this paragraph goes
back to the legislation of German states preceding the establishment of the Federal
Republic. In Prussia, the Kaiserreich (empire) and theWeimar Republic, this paragraph
wasmostly used against political organisations rather than against profit-oriented
criminal gangs. During the Bismarck era, social democratic organisations had been
suppressed with the help of this paragraph, while in the Weimar years it had been
used against Communist organisations. The fact that the accusation against Baader
and others was based on paragraph 129 indicates a continuation of a tradition of
the German justice system against left-wing adversaries who were portrayed (and
subsequently widely perceived) as criminals.29
Paragraph 129made it possible to hold different members of a criminal association
responsible for acts of the organisation as a whole without having to prove their actual
participation as individuals. There were also other practical juridical benefits. With
only ‘typical’ crimes like murder on the agenda, it would have been necessary for
a range of state prosecutors (from different states within the Federal Republic) to
prosecute the accused for separate crimes. The use of paragraph 129 made it possible to
prosecute the raf as a whole and place the central management of the prosecution in
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the hands of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office. The added benefit was that one central
trial could be organised at an Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court) in one of
the eleven German state capitals. This was the only way for the state to achieve the
exemplary trial against the raf it so strongly desired.30
Building the Stage and Its Props: A Fortress of Fear
Apart from juridical considerations, security issues were important in discussions
about the choice of a location for the trial. Politicians, security officials and adminis-
trators feared a repetition of the raf’s first act, the armed liberation of Andreas Baader
from captivity inMay 1970. The Oberlandesgericht in Stuttgart (the state capital of
Baden-Württemberg) was selected, as it was in this state that the bombing with the
gravest consequences (the attack on the us Army headquarters in Heidelberg) had
taken place. The Stuttgart suburb of Stammheim also hosted a modern prison facility
that could easily be upgraded tomaximumsecurity level. Stuttgart is also conveniently
close to the Federal Prosecutor’s Office in Karlsruhe. There were objections to Stuttgart
on the ground that it violated legal requirements that called for trials be held in the
place in which the accused lived or was arrested. The government took care of this
problem in a technical sense bymoving the accused to Stammheim prison before the
trial began, making them Stuttgart residents.31
The Second Senate of the Stuttgart Oberlandesgericht consisted of six voting
judges (one of them presiding) and three substitutes. Theodor Prinzing, president of
the Second Senate at the time of the trial, was a relatively fresh appointee installed
on 4 February 1974. Rumours suggested some behind-the-scenes manoeuvring had
side-lined his predecessor and that Prinzing had been hand-picked by the political
authorities to conduct the impending trial against the raf.32 Prinzing (then president
of a youth court) was seen to possess experience with lengthy proceedings (gained
in trials against former Nazis), as well as the analytical skills, self-assertiveness and
ambition necessary for the job. Prinzing also had the reputation of a judge whose
verdicts had never been revised by higher courts, whichmeant he would probably
meet public expectations for the trial against the raf.33
If this is a correct interpretation—this information has not been verified by
historical research—a conflict arises with the principle that every accused has the
right to a lawful judge—in this case Prinzing’s predecessor—without political
interference. The impression that a special court was created is reinforced by the
state’s decision to build, alledgedly for security reasons, a new (12 million D-Mark)
courthouse close to the Stuttgart-Stammheim prison, rather thanmake use of the
existing court in the city centre. In an ironic remark, Stefan Aust described this new
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building as a ‘memorial of steel and concrete [which] had been erected to [the raf
leadership] in their lifetime’.34 In Germany and beyond, concerns were raised that
the government was organising a show trial in a special court, which German and
international law specifically prohibit. Some raf lawyers and other critics compared
the decision to build the special courthouse to the creation of the Sondergerichte
(special courts) by the Nazis to guarantee convictions of perceived enemies of the
state.35
The law also holds that a fair trial should not take place in prison, because that
would be in violation of the presumption of innocence of the accused. Some critics
believed that locating the new Stammheim courthouse close to the penitentiary
amounted to a pre-trial conviction, or could at least be interpreted as such by the
suspects themselves. German authorities reacted to this by declaring that the new
concrete hall was part of an older plan to renovate the prison facilities. They described
the new structure as a ‘Mehrzweckgebäude’ (multi-purpose building) that would
in future function as a sports facility or workshop for the inmates. Retrospectively,
it has become clear that this was mere window dressing, as during the 35 years
since its construction the multi-purpose building has been used only for high
security trials and has remained the main seat of the Second Senate of Stuttgart’s
Oberlandesgericht.36
Security arrangements around and within the new Stammheim courthouse were
extraordinary. This is apparent from a balanced overview written by Ulf Stuberger, a
German journalist (who claims to have been the only reporter present on all trial
days). Stuberger relates that on his first visit to the trial site the two rows of fencing
surrounding the entire facility reminded him of the border with Communist East
Germany. The first fence was topped by a roll of barbed wire and the second, twice
as high, withmilitary-style nato razorwire. Between the fences a secure zone was
controlled bymotion detectors, surveillance cameras and heavily-armed police with
watchdogs. Parts of the court building were covered with steel netting to prevent
a prisoners’ liberation attempt by helicopter. Despite this, and the tight control of
airspace above the courthouse, a small aeroplane flew over the site on the first day of
the trial and was forced to land by army helicopters. Apparently a photojournalist had
hired the plane to take pictures.37
Stuberger notes the police presence outside the courthouse, especially on this
first day of the trial. Hundreds of police, some on horseback, as well as paramilitary
border police, riot police and a special counter-terrorist commando were present to
block undesired visitors from approaching the facilities. Physical obstacles such as
‘Spanish riders’ (knife rests—military-style wire obstacles), road blocks and concrete
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walls created further barriers around the courthouse. Visitors entered the building
through a revolving door of steel and armoured glass, scrutinised by security officers
in a bullet-proof glass roomwith surveillance cameramonitors. Identity papers were
checked and visitors were searched and personal belongings temporarily removed
(reporters were allowed only paper and one ballpoint pen). Finally, visitors passed
through a full-height turnstile to reach the courtroom.38
Critics have questioned the impact of this high security environment on the
independence of judicial decision-making. Suchmeasures not only reinforced the
idea of the accused as being extremely dangerous, but also displayed the performative
power of the government’s raf trial policies. Press commentary about the opening day
of the trial noted that the whole atmosphere around the court undermined both the
state’s claim that the trial only involved ‘ordinary criminals’, and the image of a liberal
democracy dealing with criminal behaviour in amatter-of-fact and legal manner.
Reports of the harsh treatment of some of the journalists created an impression
that the authorities had lost their sense of proportion and humanity.39 According
to Aust, however, the security extravaganza at Stammheim ‘can also be explained
by the fact that no one in government was willing to take personal responsibility
for possible risks. A bit too much safety seemed at any rate better than somewhat
too little.’40
The enormous interior of the courtroom (610 square metres) did little to redress
the balance. Walls and floors consisted of raw concrete, the ceiling was an assembly
of heating pipes and other utility installations. The general public were seated in
rows of yellow plastic chairs (120). Chairs fitted with small foldout tables (81) were
to serve the press. At the end of the room, beneath an oversized coat of arms of the
state of Baden-Württemberg, the judges sat behind a table. Behind the judges a giant
bookcase would store hundreds of ring binders of trial records. In front of the judges’
table stood a solitary witness chair and in between a table for the state prosecutors
and one for the defence.41
One day during the trial, Stuberger visited the office of the presiding judge
Prinzing. For Stuberger, the official quarters confirmed the impression of a machine-
like state mercilessly seeking revenge; the judge was no more than a pawn in the
game. ‘A bunker of justice, I thought’, Stuberger writes.
The whole building radiates nothing but coldness, no trace of humanity. Here
the naked state is on display, cold and merciless. I was convinced that in these
surroundings, reminiscent of an old black-and-whitemovie version of GeorgeOrwell’s
Nineteen Eighty-Four, I [as a judge] would be unable to reach a humane verdict. Behind
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the scenes [Stammheim] appeared to me […] like a slaughterhouse. Or, to put it in
friendlier terms, like the technical area behind the coulisses of a modern theatre: the
aim ruled everything, there was no room for human emotions.42
Rewriting the Code of Criminal Procedure, Evicting Lawyers
As a third trajectory towards a trial outcome favourable to thewishes of the authorities
several changes were introduced into the Code of Criminal Procedure. These changes
were intended to restrict the potential for the defence lawyers and the accused to
delay or obstruct a trial through the lawful use of petitions, motions and the like.
Such precautionarymeasures were deemed necessary based on several experiences
with left-wing suspects and their lawyers since the mid-1960s. During the student
rebellions of the 1960s, there had been unprecedented courtroom scenes in the frg,
with left-wing radicalsmocking judges and prosecutors and turning trials into farcical
political demonstrations.43
More shocking to the establishment than the unruly student behaviour was that
lawyers, often working collectively,44 had also begun to reject juridical conventions.
These ‘Linksanwälte’ (a wordplay on ‘Rechtsanwälte’—lawyers, and the adjective
‘links’—left-wing)45 had shed the traditional understanding of lawyers as ‘Organe der
Rechtspflege’ (instruments of the justice system). They had distanced themselves
from the traditional interpretation of their job as the ‘third profession of the law’,
alongside judges and prosecutors, ‘to form a bridge between the justice system and
the accused’. Instead, they decided to advocate their clients’ interests far more strongly
and single-mindedly.46
Obviously, this style of ‘political defence’, as they themselves dubbed it, drew
these lawyers into a direct confrontation with the other parties involved in the justice
system.47 A brochure published in 1975 by the Rote Hilfe (Red Aid), an organisation
supporting left-wing radicals against the judiciary, presents a clear picture of how
these left-wing lawyers saw themselves. ‘In principle, at a trial’, the list begins, ‘left-
wing lawyers practise solidarity with their clients. Although they do not have to
identify completely with the ideology of their clients, politically they will always
side with them and in principle they oppose the same enemy.’ On this basis, left-
wing lawyers would lend their technical juridical skills to clients to help ‘destroy the
illusion of an apolitical and impartial justice system’. Apart from that, they would not
hesitate to appeal to public opinion by publicising their clients’ detention situation or
reporting onmiscarriages of justice.48
In practice, this concept of political defence meant that the lawyers used every
opportunity to exploit the Code of Criminal Procedure to stall and obstruct trials by
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procedural means. Rather than attacking the accusations against their clients, these
‘Linksanwälte’ seemed determined to undermine the legitimacy of the trial and the
justice system that had produced it.49 Angry and frustrated, judges and prosecutors
were forced to listen to the fulminations of the left-wing lawyers as if they themselves
were in the dock.
From June 1972 onwards, a campaign against the justice systemwas initiated;
lawyers involved accused the state of subjecting rafmembers to torture. One aspect
of the campaign immediately raised great concerns for the state. The authorities
had already been confronted with the possibility that a lawyer would smuggle
handwritten notes (Kassiber) between raf members inside and outside prison to
maintain communication. A note by rafmember Gudrun Ensslin (clearly written
while she was in custody) had been found among Ulrike Meinhof ’s papers when she
was arrested. Ensslin’s lawyer, Otto Schily, was suspected as the middleman, but there
was no evidence to convict him.
A corresponding effort to have Schily evicted from Ensslin’s legal team also failed
when on 14 February 1973 Germany’s Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitu-
tional Court) quashed an eviction order made by a lower court. The constitutional
judges considered such an eviction to amount to an unlawful breach of the profes-
sional freedom of a lawyer. They declared, however, that this case had highlighted ‘ein
höchst unbefriedigender Rechtszustand’ (a highly unsatisfactory legal situation) and
advised the legislator to resolve this bymaking it legally possible to evict a lawyer
from a trial.50
The authorities sought to protect their trial of the raf leadership from some of
these unexpected outcomes by introducing two sets of anti-terrorism legislation: the
First Law for a Reform of Criminal Proceedings of 9 December 1974, and the Law to
Amend the First Law for a Reform of Criminal Proceedings of 20 December 1974 (both
came into force on 1 January 1975).51 These changes rolled back attempts to strengthen
the rights of the defence that had been part of a wave of liberalisationmaking its mark
on the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Criminal Code since 1964.
The first set of changes abolished the right of the defence to have any final say
on the criminal allegation before the arraignment by the prosecution. The second
set of changes established extensive restrictions on the legal defence. Twomeasures
specifically targeted the practice of collective ‘political defence’: the number of lawyers
for each accused was limited to a maximum of three (paragraph 137, section 1 StPO52)
and a ban on the common defence of multiple accused by one lawyer was introduced
(paragraph 146 StPO).53 Until then some lawyers had had power of attorney for
several raf members, which created a tightly coordinated defence team. Under
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the new law it would be far more difficult to uphold this measure of cooperation.
The new laws also prevented an unlimited number of lawyers making use of the
defence’s rights to petition the court, thus limiting the risk of the obstruction of trial
proceedings.
The new legislation created the possibility of evicting a lawyer from a trial
(paragraph 138a, 138b StPO). This was the stopgap measure the Federal Constitutional
Court had asked for in its verdict in the Schily case. Moreover, the new law made
it possible to continue a trial in absentia of the accused when a lack of fitness to
stand trial was of his or her own doing (paragraph 231a, 231b StPO). Hitherto inWest
Germany it had been considered taboo to proceed without the defendant, because
of experiences during the Third Reich. Finally, the defence’s right to make statements
during a trial was somewhat restricted (paragraph 257 StPO); and the powers of the
presiding judge were expanded to enable the disciplining of unruly participants in
a trial, includingmembers of the audience disturbing the proceedings, for example
by shouting abuse.54
During the Stammheim trial a third set of anti-terrorism legislation was intro-
duced in the form of the Counter-terrorist Law of 18 August 1976 (it entered into
force on 20 September 1976 and 1 January 1977).55 This introduced further restrictive
changes to the Code of Criminal Procedure that came into force while the Stammheim
trial was underway, as well as changes in the Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung (the law
regarding federal rulings of the legal defence trade) that made it easier to prosecute
and punish lawyers who violated their professional code. This ruling provided the
authorities with another instrument with which to discipline lawyers who were seen
to obstruct normal court proceedings or who assisted imprisoned terrorists in their
efforts to maintain links with their organisation.56
In his book about the Stammheim trial, Tenfelde reflects upon themixed reception
of the new laws against terrorism. Some authors condemned them as an infringement
upon the rights of the defence and as an example of undemocratic ad hoc legislation
(‘Lex Baader–Meinhof ’57),while others regarded themas an effective andproportionate
response to terrorism within the rule of law. Some even felt the new laws did not
go far enough. According to Tenfelde themeasures have to be seen as part of a range
of responses by the state to the terrorist threat that were directly related to societal
reactions to terrorism and to the expectations of state responses held by the general
public. This implies there was no ‘master plan’ behind the legislation, in spite of
speculation by some on the left that the new laws were inspired by a totalitarian
strategy of pre-emptive counter-revolution that had allegedly engulfed Western
societies since the 1950s. Instead, as Uwe Berlitt andHorst Dreier have already proposed
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in their early analysis of the anti-terrorism laws, the legislation and the activities of
the violent terrorist perpetrators are better understood as ‘an interactive process’ in
which societal and state forces mutually influenced the end result.58
The fact that the legislative process around the first two sets of anti-terrorist
laws suddenly accelerated at the end of 1974 makes this interaction perfectly clear. In
November and December 1974 the confrontation with left-wing terrorism reached a
high point during the third campaign of collective hunger strikes by raf prisoners.
On 9 November 1974, the death of hunger striker HolgerMeins (one of five raf leaders
to be tried at Stammheim) led to a wave of protest by left-wing radicals throughout
West Germany. The revenge killing of Berlin’s most important judge, Günter von
Drenkmann, by another terrorist group on 10 November 1974, in turn triggered
a large-scale police operation against left-wing radicals, their organisations and
publications.
Influenced by these events, legislators of the Bundestag (Federal Diet) and the
Bundesrat (Federal Council) not only hastened their deliberations on the first set
of anti-terror legislation (originally presented to them in 1973), but also approved
the second set of changes that the government had only recently proposed.59 These
tensions present in late 1974 encouraged the legislative change that the authorities
thought they needed, just in time for the scheduled start of the Stammheim trial in
May 1975. As might be expected, this speedy legislation process led to somemishaps
that had a negative influence on the trial during its first months.
With the option to evict lawyers in place, the authorities started tomove against
some of them in the early months of 1975. There were risks associated with this course
of action, because German lawprescribes that a legal defendermust always be available
for an accused person. To prevent the interruption or even cancellation of the trial,
judge Prinzing (of the Second Senate of the Stuttgart Oberlandesgericht) decided
to appoint two ‘Pflichtverteidiger’ (officially commissioned lawyers) for each of the
accused. If a ‘Wahlverteidiger’ (lawyer of choice) acting for the accused was evicted
by order of the presiding judge, he or she could be replaced by such commissioned
lawyers. The appointment of these substitute lawyers was intended by German law to
ensure the continuity of long trials. Of course the Pflichtverteidiger were paid by the
state, not by the defendant.60 rafmembers did not want to speak to the substitute
lawyers, whom they called ‘Zwangsverteidiger’ (lawyers forced upon them), because
they did not trust them.61
Usually, in order to accommodate the rights of the accused and assist with the
organisation of the legal defence, the court formally commissioned all or some of the
lawyers of choice as Pflichtverteidiger, with the state covering the bills. Many of the
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lawyers originally chosen by rafmembers were also officially commissioned by judge
Prinzing. In early 1975, however, Prinzing started to decommission some of them.
Klaus Croissant (Stuttgart), Kurt Groenewold (Hamburg) and Hans-Christian Ströbele
(Berlin), all three lawyers of Baader’s choice, were sacked as Pflichtverteidiger, on
suspicion of supporting the (criminal association) raf. In Ströbele’s case the suspicion
rested on letters in which he had called his clients ‘comrades’; he called himself a
‘socialist’ andhiswork that of a ‘political defender’. Now that the statewould no longer
cover their costs, the participation of these three lawyers of choice in the impending
trial became precarious.62
In the last month before the trial started, Prinzing went even further and
actually evicted the three lawyers he had already decommissioned as (state financed)
Pflichtverteidiger but who had still been allowed to defend the accused at their own
expense, one after the other, on the basis of recent legislation (paragraph 138a StPO).63
These evictions created enormous problems for Baader’s defence, especially when
the last remaining lawyer to enjoy Baader’s trust, Siegfried Haag (Heidelberg), went
underground in early May 1977. The Bundeskriminalamt (Federal Criminal Police
Office) had temporarily arrested Haag on suspicion of involvement with the armed
occupation of the German embassy in Stockholm by a raf commando on 24 April
1975. Haag spent the next year and a half organising a new terrorist commando group
of the raf, until he was arrested for a second time at the end of 1976.64
With the state and media pressure on left-wing lawyers, and the ban on common
defence recently installed, it was clear Baader would have difficulty finding a
trustworthy new barrister in time for the trial of his life. The pool of leftist or liberal-
minded lawyers was small. On 21 May 1975, the front man of the raf entered the
Stammheim courtroomwithout a lawyer of choice. This did not reflect well on the
trial, and subsequently dented the credibility of the state’s narrative of justice at
Stammheim.
6.2.2. The raf and Its Lawyers: Expanding the Stage
In complete contrast to the actions of the authorities, the raf leadership and their
lawyers did their utmost to stress the political implications of the impending trial. In
the years after their arrests they deliberately expanded the stage for the confrontation
with the established order. Firstly, the imprisoned members of the raf started
challenging the conditions of their imprisonment, a struggle intended to inspire a
solidarity movement among left-wing radicals (in Germany and abroad). Secondly,
the raf’s defence lawyers developed a strategy in line with the style of the late 1960s
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political defence we discussed above. As will be demonstrated, the raf leaders directly
influenced the formulation and implementation of this defence strategy.
Prison Struggle: Hunger Strikes and the Rise of an raf SolidarityMovement
In the years after their arrests, the leaders of the raf did not passively await their
impending trial and the lengthy prison sentences that would probably result
from it. Baader, Ensslin, Meinhof and their comrades started a prison struggle.
They accused the state of using extreme solitary confinement that amounted to
torture (‘Isolationsfolter’). They claimed this was intended to destroy their identities
as ‘guerrillas’ and to mentally and physically ‘annihilate’ them (they spoke of
‘Vernichtungshaft’). They stressed their plight by staging several collective hunger
strikes, the first one lasting frommid-January to mid-February 1973.65
It must be acknowledged that there was some truth in these allegations. The
West German state kept the imprisoned members of the raf and other left-wing
terrorist groups on a very short leash indeed. Although a general historical overview
of the prison conditions of rafmembers has yet to be written, it is generally accepted
that, initially at least, three female members were held in solitary confinement for
exceptionally long periods.66 In the case of other raf prisoners there is reason to
believe that (less extreme) modes of solitary confinement were applied, although some
groupmembers were held under regular prison conditions. The forced feeding of
prisoners on hunger strike, a painful and humiliating procedure, lent, in the eyes of
some observers, a degree of substance to accusations of state torture.67
Thenotion that the authoritieswere out to kill the rafprisonerswas, nevertheless,
rather far-fetched. In reaction to the hunger strikes, for example, the authorities began
granting privileges to rafmembers, especially to the leaders, to avoid jeopardizing
their participation in the upcoming trial. From late 1974 onwards, the authorities also
began accommodating Baader and other raf leaders, men andwomen, together on
the seventh floor of Stammheim prison. Special favours, like the provision of electric
hotplates to cook their ownmeals, were granted to raf prisoners to help them recover
from the hunger strikes. FromFebruary 1975 onwards, theywere even allowed to spend
several hours a day in the corridor of their high security ward in order collectively to
prepare for their trial. To prevent eavesdropping on discussions about the defence
strategy, the judge ordered the prison guards to keep out of hearing distance.68
Regardless of these and other concessions, Baader and others continued to
remonstrate against prison conditions. This indicates that the dual purpose of the
prison struggle was not only to put pressure on the German government to improve
prison conditions, but also to create empathy that would serve as a platform for an
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raf solidarity campaign. In styling themselves as martyrs for the radical left, the raf
prisoners aimed at mobilising support among other radical Germans and recruiting
newmembers from this pool of sympathisers. Apart from that, the prison struggle
can also be seen as an effort to hold on to the raf claim to lead the vanguard of the
radical left, a claim that had been stated from the beginning, especially in the 1971
publications.69
The raf lawyers played an essential role in the solidarity campaign. In February
1973, alongside the first collective hunger strike of the raf, they staged a four-day
solidarity hunger strike in front of the Federal Court of Justice in Karlsruhe to attract
public attention to the plight of the prisoners.70 As hinted at above, the lawyers were
of central importance for maintaining communications between the raf prisoners
and with their supporters (and probably also with active terrorist cells) in the outside
world. In the spring of 1973 the lawyers established an intricate communication
system called ‘das info’.71 Instructed by the prisoners, the office of Hamburg lawyer
Kurt Groenewold functioned as an information centre and archive. It collated all
instructions, (circular) letters, newspaper clippings and other discussionmaterials
provided or requested by raf leaders. Subsequently, the lawyers circulated these
among the imprisonedmembers of the raf by using the Verteidigerpost (defence mail
between lawyers and their clients) which was protected by law.72
After a police raid on Groenewold’s office on 23 June 1975, a month after the
Stammheimtrial had started, the information systembrokedown.Gradually, however,
lawyer Klaus Croissant’s office in Stuttgart re-established communications among
the prisoners and with the outside world. At first, Croissant and his associates used
the defence mail as before. However a change in the Code of Criminal Procedure in
August 1976 made it possible to control defence mail in those cases where there was a
grounded suspicion that it served to establish or continue a terrorist association. After
that, lawyers started touring the country, visiting all of the raf prisoners one after
another.73
raf lawyers also initiated special solidarity committees for the imprisoned
members of the raf, the so-called (Anti-)Folterkomitees (Committees against Torture).
These were founded inmany big cities and university towns throughout the frg,
beginning in April 1973. During the second hunger strike of the raf, in May and June
1973, a national teach-in of Anti-Torture Committees in Frankfurt strengthened the
campaign’s base, and createdmaterial for propaganda, such as the special issue on
the torture of ‘Political Prisoners’ in the influential left-wing intellectual magazine
Kursbuch.74 Around 450 activists joined the Anti-Torture Committees in the first
year.75
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Political activism in defence of the raf peaked during the third hunger strike,
which began after a proclamation by Ulrike Meinhof when the trial against her
and others started in the West Berlin Schwurgericht (lower regional jury-based
court) on 13 September 1974.76 The raf leadership had been preparing this third
hunger strike with great care since late 1973, and this time they were very deter-
mined. In January 1974, Baader had written to raf activists outside the prison to
insist that this time the hunger strike would not be broken. ‘Das heißt es wer-
den typen dabei kaputtgehen.’ (This means that some types [of people] will die.)77
And indeed, on 9 November 1974, raf member Holger Meins did die of starva-
tion. In a declaration distributed by his lawyer Croissant after his demise, Meins
blamed the state for his death: ‘In case I switch from life to death in prison, it
was murder—whatever the pigs might say. Don’t believe the lies of these mur-
derers.’78
The significance of this hunger strike for the trial at Stammheim that was to begin
half a year later lay in the solidarity and support it managed to mobilise in Germany
and abroad. After Meins’s death, protests and demonstrations in West Berlin attracted
2,500 participants. A resolution circulated amongst those present at a gathering in
Berlin’s Technical University. The resolution stated that it was clear that the special
treatment of ‘political prisoners’ in the frg aimed ‘to silence them […], to make them
renounce their political beliefs, and, as a necessary step to that end, to destroy their
souls and rob them of their identities.’79
Many young people subscribed to the raf framing of the situation. Criticism
of the organisation and of the use of political violence in revolutionary politics was
temporarily silenced. The revenge murder of Günter von Drenkmann, president of
Berlin’s Kammergericht (higher regional court), did not change this. While most
radical left-wing demonstrators did not endorse this killing, few were having second
thoughts about their support for the raf’s prison struggle linked to it.80
The third hunger strike also raised solidarity with the raf to an international
level. When the strike began on 27 September 1974, raf sympathisers in Hamburg,
Amsterdam and London staged a series of well-coordinated actions, attracting
considerable media attention. A visit by French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre to
Andreas Baader in Stammheim prison on 4 December 1974 was a veritable publicity
coup.81 Only days later, the raf’s lawyers established an international network to
muster foreign pressure on the German government.82 Stories about the treatment
of imprisoned members of the raf had raised anxiety outside Germany, and on
14 December 1974 the ‘Comité International de Défense des Prisonniers Politiques
en Europe’ (International Committee for the Defence of Political Prisoners in Europe)
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was established in Utrecht. The committee consisted mainly of lawyers and doctors
from the Netherlands (where lawyer Bakker Schut was the driving force), Belgium,
France and Italy.83
The committee was presented as an independent network of foreign professionals,
but in reality itwas an instrument of the raf’s defence team—as further developments
indicated. After the International Committee, known under its German name
‘Internationales Verteidigungskomitee’ (International Defence Committee, ivk),
had reconvened and formulated its programme at a meeting in Paris on 20 January
1975, the secretariat was based in Croissant’s office in Stuttgart, where the frg arm
of the committee resided.84 During the Stammheim trial this bureau helped to
coordinate the activities of national committees such as the DutchMedisch Juridisch
Comité Politieke Gevangenen (Medical-Juridical Committee for Political Prisoners,
mjc), founded on 19 April 1975.85 In the following years, the ivk and these national
committees published declarations of international solidarity and other kinds of
propaganda, including Ulrike Meinhof ’s last texts in German and other languages86
as well as a voluminous book documenting prison correspondence by rafmembers.87
The committees were also associated with other international bodies such as the
‘independent’ research committee that investigated Ulrike Meinhof ’s suicide in
prison on 9May 1976.88
By the time the Stammheim trial began, the raf had constructed a transnational
network able to transmit statements by the accused and their defenders to left-
wing supporters they regarded as their first audience, and to the public at large.
The operations of this network had already been active during the trial against the
only Dutchmember of the raf, Ronald Augustin, at Bückeburg (near Hanover) in
mid-February 1975, when activists in the Netherlands vigorously publicised this trial
as a dress rehearsal for the Stammheim trial. There were some striking parallels,
including the fact that the courtroom was situated on the grounds of Bückeburg
prison. The Augustin campaign helped to get the network off to a running start in
preparation for the trial at Stammheim.89
Guerrilla Tactics: Clients, Lawyers, and the Defence Strategy
As explained above, the raf had used court cases against its members for propaganda
purposes well before the Stammheim trial. rafmembers had spoken at length from
the dock about their ideology and their plight in prison, hoping to attract the attention
of other left-wing radicals and German liberals. Initially there appeared to be some
reservations regarding the raf’s defence strategy at the Stammheim trial. ‘It is far
from certain that there will be a defence in Stammheim’, Baader confessed in a circular
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letter, dated June 1974. ‘We are interested in this show only if we can turn it around.’90
It took some time for the raf to understand that the media coverage of this trial had
the potential to spread their gospel.91
Ultimately, however, the raf leadership saw their performance at the trial as
a continuation of guerrilla warfare against the state and its ‘counter-insurgency
strategy’ against the radical left.92 To understand this we have to go back to the
intellectual roots of the raf’s urban guerrilla practice, which was partly inspired by
the guerrilla warfare theory of Latin American revolutionary Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara
in the 1960s, as it was subsequently popularised by the French left-wing journalist
Régis Débray. Guevara had explained guerrilla warfare as a strategy operated by small,
elusive, armed groups, designed to provoke the state into large-scale repression of the
general population, thereby revealing its true, oppressive nature to the masses and
inciting revolution.93
Analogous to this, the raf leadership, using secret letters distributed among raf
members within and outside the prison, devised behaviours at the trial by which they
hoped to provoke judges and prosecutors into revealing the naked oppressiveness of
the West German state. ‘What we want’, read one circular letter from early November
1975, ‘is that the operations of the Federal Prosecutor, in the legal vacuum between
the bourgeois rule of law and the open fascism of the state of emergency legislation,
are used to reveal the strategies of the state security apparatus.’ The raf wanted to
turn the trial at Stammheim into a demonstration of ‘the dimension of the domestic
repression’, and the unveiling of ‘fascism as an institutional strategy’.94
A circular letter from September 1975 revealed the optimum result the raf hoped
to gain: a failed trial.
[A] failed trial contradicts the assumption of a normal situation, a normal criminal
procedure—the war begins to look like a war—what the state fears most, because it
makes it clear that a small group of 20 or 30 fighters can challenge the state—it makes
clear that armed struggle is right, possible, and necessary, in spite of the weakness of
the left here and because of its weakness.95
The raf’s legal defenders were crucial to its goal: to transform the trial into an
instrument of propaganda. It was up to the lawyers to enlighten the public with
regard to the trial’s alleged political function. In a statement from a circular letter on
one of the first trial days, 1 July 1975, lawyers were depicted as teachers, ‘let’s say, with
chalk, pointer, and blackboard’. The lawyers, with their legal skills, could point out
the weaknesses in the arguments put forward by prosecutors and judges, showing
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‘the people’ the true nature of these functionaries: ‘underneath their robes [they are]
politicians, [and] as politicians [they are] reactionaries of the darkest hue, virulent
anticommunists, bureaucratic collaborators of mass murder’.96
In true communist fashion, the raf regarded its strategy of political defence as a
‘popular front strategy’, building a coalition of left-wing and liberal forces around a
communist core, like the antifascist alliances in Spain, France and elsewhere during
the 1930s. The lawyers were important in building this popular front and creating
‘democratic public opinion’ against the government policies aimed at the radical left.
This did notmean the raf leaders held their lawyers in high esteem. In their view,
it was ‘grotesque’ that socialist lawyers seemed to have become ‘the last defenders
of bourgeois rule of law’. In fact the raf leadership ridiculed their efforts to save
the bourgeois state. Baader and his comrades nevertheless considered their efforts
useful—defending rafmembers in court and protesting against restrictive counter-
terrorist legislation, which contributed to the mobilisation of opposition against the
established order.97
The lawyers reacted differently towards efforts to instrumentalise them. Heinrich
Hannover (Bremen), who was very experienced in political cases, was one of several
lawyers who were too independent to maintain good relationships with raf clients.
Ulrike Meinhof had once sacked Hannover for refusing to comply with her demands,
and he finally left in 1974, having defended her since 1970.98 Other lawyers were more
docile. Prominent raf lawyer Kurt Groenewold, for instance, had acknowledged as
early as 1972 that a lawyer’s task was to reveal the essence of the justice system as an
instrument of the status quo; he also pleaded for the creation of an association of
communist lawyers.99 His colleague Klaus Croissant went further and identified to a
large degree with the raf. Croissant gave up his independence as a legal adviser to
comply fully with raf wishes and demands.100
Otto Schily, the sharpest mind andmost able orator on the defence team, kept
a seigniorial distance from his clients, staunchly addressing themwith the formal
‘Sie’—instead of ‘du’—the informal term for family members, friends and (especially
on the left) political comrades.101 Yet even Schily adhered to the raf leaders’ defence
strategy and complied with Baader’s conditions, agreeing in a letter he wrote to Klaus
Croissant on 17 April 1974 to ‘collective defence, the course that has been discussed by
the prisoners, [and] final editing of the plea speeches by the prisoners’.102
Before we look at the Stammheim trial in detail, it is worth mentioning that
the raf leaders also displayed a kind of stage fright. More than once they seemed
to be searching for an emergency exit to evade facing their judges altogether. They
had discussed among themselves whether or not a hunger strike that undermined
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their physical fitness would create plausible grounds not to appear in court. A
letter that circulated among raf prisoners in March 1974 proposed this route to
obstruct the efforts of the state to bring them to justice.103 In the press, however,
they denied considering this strategy, dismissing police reports about it as examples
of the government’s ‘Countertaktik, Gegenpropaganda’ (counter tactics, counter
propaganda).104
At an early stage, Andreas Baader had also tried tomotivate underground raf
comrades to organise a hostage-taking operation to force the government to swap the
imprisoned rafmembers for the hostages.105 The arrests of sevenmembers of an
underground cell on 4 February 1974 had initially thwarted this plan, butMeins’ death
in the hunger strike addedmomentum to rebuilding the armed struggle. One such
raf sympathiser who decided to take up arms against the state was Susanne Albrecht.
She remembered thinking after Meins’ death, ‘If the justice system won’t change the
conditions of detention, then wemust act. We cannot allowmore prisoners to die.’106
On 24 April 1975, the raf commando group ‘Holger Meins’ stormed the German
embassy in Stockholm, taking hostage the ambassador and other personnel. They
were clearly inspired by the success of an earlier act of hostage-taking of the West
Berlin cdu politician Peter Lorenz by another group that had resulted in the release
of five left-wing radical terrorists from custody in late February 1975.107 In exchange
for the lives of their captives, the Stockholm hostage-takers demanded the release
of 26 ‘political prisoners’ in order to rescue these comrades from ‘isolation torture’.
To underline their resolve the commandos killed two German diplomats, but the
government in Bonn proved unwilling to give in. That evening, with new deaths
seemingly imminent in the Swedish capital, there was a sudden series of explosions
when raf explosives accidentally detonated. One rafmember was killed instantly
and another was fatally wounded. In the ensuing turmoil, Stockholm police cleared
the burning embassy and arrested the hostage-takers.108 The raf’s final effort to
evade the Stammheim trial, a month before its scheduled start, had resulted in bloody
failure.
6.3. 192 Days: From Stammheim Stalemate to Ghost Trial
In the days just before 21 May 1975, the day the trial against the raf leadership
would finally get under way, themedia set the stage for the proceedings with great
anticipation. Many journalists focused on the scale and cost of the security measures
and the collection of evidence. The weeklyDer Spiegel even entitled its article about
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the trial’s opening ‘Materialschlacht’ (material battle), comparing the preparation
of the opposing forces at Stammheimwith the industrialised trench warfare of the
First World War.109 On the one hand this terminology clearly shows, as Andreas
Musolff has worked out,110 that even in liberal newspapers metaphors of warfare
were used to describe the confrontation between the raf and the state, which did
not exactly downplay the supposed terrorism threat. On the other hand the ww I
comparison became indeed an appropriate metaphor as conflicts over procedural
issues sometimes appeared to produce a stalemate. During the 192 days of the trial
proceedings, daunting legal complexities and vehement confrontations between the
participants combined to confuse and sometimes infuriate observers. We will try to
deal with the apparently strictly legal issues and the turbulent theatrics separately to
illustrate the performative aspects of the Stammheim trial.
6.3.1. Strictly Legal? Protracted Proceedings in a ‘Normal Criminal Case’
After months in which the raf had been confronted with the consequences of the
recent changes in the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Stammheim trial finally
presented a chance for them to redress the balance.111 Thus in the first months of the
trial, the accused and their lawyers swamped the proceedings with applications on all
kinds of procedural issues. The long second phase of the trial began in November
1975, when the court at last was able to proceed to the actual hearing of the evidence.
Most of the legal wrangling in this phase concerned the role played by two ‘crown
witnesses’, as the defence dubbed them. The raf’s lawyers also argued for criminal
proceedings against their clients to be abandoned altogether. It was argued that the
raf had committed acts of war in resistance to American interference in Vietnam,
rather than crimes, and its leaders should therefore be treated not as criminals but as
prisoners of war.
Procedural Issues: Evicted Lawyers and Fitness to Stand Trial
Before the Stammheim trial, the judges of the Stuttgart Oberlandesgericht’s Second
Senate were among the first to implement the legislative changes hastily introduced
for trials against the raf. This had put the judges in an awkward position, and
especially their president, whose task it had been to make decisions on the conditions
of imprisonment of the accused and the admission of their lawyers. During the
opening stages of the trial, this pre-historymade discussion about procedural issues
highly likely, as already became apparent on the first day when the raf’s defence team
tried to prevent the eviction of Baader’s lawyers of choice. As we related earlier, judge
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Prinzing had evicted all three of them before the trial, a decision based on a recent
change in the Code of Criminal Procedure (paragraph 138 StPO). Immediately after
the president had opened the trial, the raf defence team asked the court to re-admit
these evicted lawyers to defend Ensslin, Meinhof and Raspe.
At issue was the question whether evicting the lawyers as Baader’s representatives
meant they were banned from the Stammheim trial for good. Initially judge Prinzing
bluntly denied the lawyers’ request; however, the prosecutors sided with the defence,
warning Prinzing that it would not do to simply deny them access to the courtroom.
The text of the lawmay indeed have left room for the interpretation put forward by
the raf lawyers, namely that a lawyer could legally only be evicted as counsel to one
specific defendant. The prosecutors advised a temporary halt to the proceedings until
the lawyers in question had been evicted from the defence of all four rafmembers
facing trial at Stammheim.112 In effect, the prosecution admitted that the raf had
spotted one of several lacunae that legal authorities in their haste had allowed to enter
the new legislation.
Of course the prosecutorswere not keen to admit this lacuna, butwereworried that
a Stammheim verdict could be overturned in future by a higher court disapproving
of the non-admittance of lawyers without proper legal grounds. After hours of
deliberation, the president suspended the trial until further notice and left the judges
of the First Senate to decide on thematter. After two weeks the First Senate decided
to back Prinzing’s broad interpretation of the law. Given the doubts that even the
prosecutors had displayed, this was a controversial decision. Nevertheless it was later
upheld by the Federal Court of Justice.113
In relation to the first procedural issue, Andreas Baader himself introduced another
issue on 5 June 1975, the second trial day. Pointing out that he lacked a lawyer of his
own choice, he asked for a five-day adjournment to find one. The president denied
this request, arguing that Baader still had two substitute lawyers commissioned by
the court at his disposal. Linked to this was the next procedural issue, which arose on
11 June 1975 (the fourth trial day), when a new lawyer of choice for Baader, Hans-Heinz
Heldmann (Darmstadt), finally presented himself and asked the Second Senate for a
ten-day adjournment for trial preparation (to look at thousands of pages of police
documents). The court denied this request despite the fact that it had evicted Baader’s
three lawyers at such short notice, arguing that Baader had had ample time before the
beginning of the trial to find himself a new lawyer of choice. In protest, Heldmann
filed a constitutional complaint against this decision with the Federal Constitutional
Court in Karlsruhe, but a commission of three constitutional judges decided not to
admit the complaint.114
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In the meantime, on the third trial day, 10 June 1975, the substitute lawyers
commissioned by the court had found themselves at the centre of a row between the
rafmembers and the court. The defence had demanded the court decommission
these ‘Zwangsverteidiger’ (compulsory defence attorneys) as the raf called these
substitute lawyers. When the substitute lawyers tried to speak, Baader and the other
accused shouted them down and called them names until the presiding judge ordered
the court’s guards to lead the accused from the room.115 The court decided not to
comply with the raf defence’s demand and to keep the substitute lawyers. The judges
(and the prosecutors) probably feared that without substitute lawyers the risk was
simply too great that at some point in time during the proceedings a walk-out by the
lawyers of choice would lead to a failed trial. To the court’s embarrassment, later that
day one of the substitute lawyers fell asleep. When Baader directed the president’s
attention to the old man, the audience erupted in a roar of laughter.116
The following week, the court’s president had become themain focus of attack.
On 18 and 19 June 1975, Otto Schily, acting on behalf of his client Gudrun Ensslin,
questioned the appointment of Prinzing as president of the Second Senate. He
portrayed him as a functionary of the national security state, bowing to the officials of
the West German security services and denying the raf prisoners their rights. Schily
accused Prinzing of having allowed and defended the conditions of severe detention
for raf prisoners and of co-responsibility for the death of Holger Meins. Against
this background, Schily challenged the judge on grounds of bias: the accused could
not regard Prinzing as an impartial judge and therefore he should be taken off the
case.117Six weeks later on 30 July 1975, lawyers acting for Ulrike Meinhof continued
the attack on Prinzing, challenging him on similar grounds. They argued that judge
Prinzing had shown bias in an interview on German television on the day before the
trial started, because he had called the Stammheim trial a ‘normalen Straffall’ (normal
criminal case) rather than a political matter. In a statement before the court, Ulrike
Meinhof declared that this denial of the trial’s political character was intended to
obscure its function as ‘a show trial against revolutionaries’. Without this denial, the
trial could not fulfil its counter-revolutionary purpose, she added.118
Less than a month later, on 20 August 1975 (trial day 27), Schily pleaded for a
cancellation of the trial altogether. According to him there was no longer any question
of a fair trial because of the total absence of the presumption of innocence of the
accused, as required by the European Convention onHumanRights. Tomake his point
he presented a list of about 30 statements by politicians about the accused, including
a comment by Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in reaction to the Stockholm
hostage crisis that referred to the accused as ‘unscrupulously violent criminals [and]
germany confronts the baader-meinhof group | 259
bandits’.119 The defence argued that these statements were based on a conscious
campaign by the Federal Prosecutor’s Office to influence public opinion against the
raf.120 The defence also pointed to another indication suggesting the absence of a
fair trial: although the raf leaders were far from being convicted, a high security
prison ward obviously meant for themwas already under construction in Bruchsal
(near Karlsruhe).121
The biggest procedural issue, however, concerned the health of the defendants and
their presence in court. In the Federal Republic criminal trials were rarely conducted
in the absence of the accused, the legal maxim being that nobody should be convicted
without having his or her say in court. The Code of Criminal Procedure actually
obliged the accused to appear before the court. Yet, as explained earlier, the legislator
had changed the Code of Criminal Procedure (paragraph 231a StPO) in reaction to
the hunger strikes shortly before the Stammheim trial began. This was to enable a
court case to proceed if an accused had deliberately undermined his or her fitness for
trial.122
From June until November 1975, parties at the court in Stammheim wrestled with
two questions: were the accused ‘verhandlungsunfähig’ (unfit to stand trial) and, if
so, was this of their own doing (because of the hunger strikes). Only if the accused
themselves were to blame for their lack of fitness could the court decide to continue
in their absence; otherwise the only legal options were suspension or cancellation
of the trial. On 11 June 1975, Marieluise Becker (Heidelberg), acting for the defence,
presented the first motion to stop proceedings because of lack of fitness to stand trial,
arguing that the Stammheim prison situation and earlier circumstances of detention
were responsible for the poor condition of her client, Gudrun Ensslin. Becker painted
a bleak picture of the periods of solitary confinement that her client had endured.
Becker claimed the confinement imposed a deprivation of the senses that surpassed
human tolerance levels. Referring to propaganda material used during the solidarity
campaign, she argued that this sensory deprivation was a scientifically proven torture
method, a counter-insurgency strategy used by imperialist states, and she demanded
a hearing in court of foreign experts such as the Dutch psychiatrist Sjef Teuns (who
had written on political prisoners in 1973 in a special issue of Kursbuch).123At the end of
that day, in a demonstrative gesture, the lawyers of choice requested an early end to
the day’s proceedings due to the condition their clients were in. After judge Prinzing
turned down the request the lawyers walked out of the courtroom collectively, leaving
the president fuming about what he called their act of sabotage.124
As the law required a medical doctor to be consulted before a judge could decide
whether or not an accused person was fit to stand trial, the lawyers repeatedly tried
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to obtain permission for medical examinations by doctors of their clients’ choice
(including Teuns). Initially the Second Senate, supported by the prosecutors, refused to
comply andwas only prepared to consult prison doctors. This led to several accusations
of bias against the president and other judges. Later, in a conciliatory gesture, the
judges set up a committee of three medical experts from outside the prison system
to examine the accused. These doctors diagnosed a limited fitness and advised that
proceedings should not exceed three hours a day to enable the accused to follow them
with the measure of clarity of mind required by the law. Moreover, the experts listed
possible causes of the limited fitness of the accused, explicitly mentioning the tight
prison regime.125
On the basis of this medical advice, lawyers estimated that just hearing the
evidence of the almost 1,000 witnesses would take at least eight years. On 30 September
1975, however, Prinzing announced the decision of the Second Senate to continue as
before, because the prisoners themselves were responsible for their weak condition.
When the president tried to explain this decision by reading aloud letters by raf
prisoners that clearly indicated their intention to render themselves incapable of
standing trial by means of hunger strikes, this led to an uproar in the courtroom
among defendants and counsel alike. When the president refused to stop reading,
Rupert von Plottnitz (defencelawyer), shouted ‘Heil, Dr. Prinzing!’126
Although the defendants and especially their defenders reacted with a disturbing
degree of emotion, their objections to the court’s decision were not wholly irrational.
The judges of the Second Senate (and those of the Federal Court of Justice and the
Federal Constitutional Court, which later upheld the decision)127 did indeed stretch
the ‘limited fitness to stand trial’ rule attested to by themedical doctors. This was
done in order to be able to fulfil the ‘absolute unfitness for trial’ ruling that the
(recently changed) Code of Criminal Procedure (paragraph 231a, StPO) considered
a precondition for continuation of a trial in the absence of an accused. Tenfelde
interprets this as an indication of the judges’ willingness to serve political purposes
and is therefore very critical of their decision.128 In fairness, though, the judges
had a point—it really would have been undesirable to extend the trial by limiting
the proceedings as dramatically as themedical doctors had advised. It seems overly
principled to demand that the judges accept the ultimate consequences this advice
brought with it: a trial in excess of perhaps eight years. This would uphold one specific
right of the defendants, but at a huge cost. Such lengthy proceedings would in turn
neglect other rights of the defendants, whomight then face eight years in custody
without a conviction. Moreover, it would have adverse effects on the legitimacy of the
trial as such, and for the rule of law inWest Germany.
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‘CrownWitnesses’: The Credibility and Legality of Bought Testimony
As we mentioned earlier, the Federal Prosecutor had not succeeded in establishing the
individual guilt of the accused. Therefore it was alleged that the criminal organisation
‘raf’ had performed the indictedmurders and other criminal acts, creating a collective
responsibility for all members of the raf. However, this notion is absent in the
German Criminal Code. Individual members of an organisation can only be convicted
of certain criminal acts when it is proven that the individuals have actually committed
them. The fact that raf leaders, on 13 and 14 January 1976, taking turns, had read
aloud lengthy political statements (in total 200 pages of manuscript)129 in which
they confessed to beingmembers of an urban guerrilla movement and took ‘political
responsibility’ for the bombings they were accused of, did not really change this. Not
only did they, at the same time, explicitly deny responsibility ‘in a legal sense’, they also
refrained frommaking further statements. Thus a time-consuming demonstration to
show an ‘Indizienkette’ (chain of evidence) of their involvement was still necessary.
To establish this, the prosecution at Stammheim relied heavily on witnesses whose
evidence put the accused close to the scene of the bombings shortly before the bombs
went off. The prosecution tried to close the remaining gap by emphasising further
indications of the ultimate responsibility of the accused.130
In a seemingly endless row of witness hearings, the questioning of two witnesses
for the prosecution stood out. Both were deeply implicated in the crimes that were
central to the trial. The first of these was the metal sculptor Dierk Hoff, in whose
workshop the 1972 bombs had been produced. At the end of January 1976, Hoff testified
against the accused, sketching in detail his cooperation with the raf. Initially, he
told the court, he had beenmakingmetal objects for them in the belief that these
would be used as props in a film by Holger Meins, a former filmmaker with whom he
was vaguely acquainted, and a few other men who visited his shop. Later, when they
admitted they were members of the raf, he had continued his involvement because
they had threatened him.131
The other witness was Gerhard Müller, an raf member who had been involved in
a shoot-out with the Hamburg police in October 1971 in which an officer had died.
After his arrest in 1972, Müller had remained a loyal member of the raf, keeping in
close contact with the othermembers through his lawyer, Hans-Christian Ströbele. He
had also participated in the collective hunger strikes. In the autumn of 1974, however,
after numerous confrontations with police interrogators, Müller decided to split
from the raf and share his knowledge of the organisation with the authorities.132
His evidence closed many gaps in the prosecution’s case. On 8 July 1976 (trial day
124), Müller testified on the structure of the raf, lending support to the view that
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it was a criminal organisation. He called Baader the head of the organisation and
mentioned Meinhof, Meins, Raspe and Ensslin as its core members, separating them
from ordinary andmarginal members.133
In Stammheim the role of these two witnesses triggered enormous controversy,
not only because of the suspicion raised about the fact that a witness had a criminal
background. Many observers openly suggested that Hoff and Müller were in fact
‘crown witnesses’, whose testimony against the accused had been bought by the
prosecution with promises of money and reduced sentencing for their complicity
in the crimes committed by the raf. This was more problematic because the
German justice system did not have a place for crown witnesses; the suggestion
of their existence therefore also implied that the Federal Prosecutor was breaking
the law.134
The suggestion was amplified by the preceding public debate about the use of
crownwitnesses as a means to address the difficulties of raising evidence in terrorist
cases. Since 1975, debates in political circles in Bonn had proposed introducing the legal
institution of crownwitnesses as part of a larger set of anti-terrorism legislation.Many
legal experts, even including Chief Federal Prosecutor Siegfried Buback, however, had
objected to this element as too foreign to the German justice system. As is well known,
in exchange for a crown witness making statements helpful to the prosecution, some
of the crimes he or she is suspected of having committed are to be immune from
prosecution. Critics pointed out that suchmeasures would collide with one of the
central maxims of German law, the ‘Legalitätsprinzip’ (legalist principle), which holds
that all crimes must be prosecuted.135
The persistent suspicion that the prosecution hadmade a dealwith thesewitnesses
was not eliminated by these objections. Witnesses on behalf of the defence, as well as
the accused, had contradicted some of the remarks by the ‘crown witnesses’. Andreas
Baader denied having threatened Hoff to obtain his continued cooperation, arguing
that the raf never used coercion when dealing with its sympathisers.136 And the
imprisoned rafmember BrigitteMohnhaupt contradictedMüller’s statements about
the organisation’s authoritarian traits, declaring that the ‘guerrilla’ is a ‘hydra, which
means it has many heads.’137
In the end, however, the defence decided against a detailed denial of all of the
statements by the alleged crown witnesses. Instead, the defence lawyers concentrated
far more on undermining their credibility, especially Müller’s. Not only did they try
to portray him as an untrustworthy opportunist, but when they questionedMüller
on 22 July 1976 (trial day 129) they also openly suggested his evidence had been bought.
Although Müller denied this, the defence managed to get him to admit that his
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treatment in prison had improved after he broke with the raf—though he stated
that this was also caused by a change in his own behaviour.138 The defence showed
thatMüller clearly hadmuch to gain from a deal with the prosecution. They even
produced an eyewitness statement by one of the imprisonedmembers of the raf,
Margrit Schiller, who testified thatMüller had shot and killed the Hamburg police
officer in 1971.139 For the raf’s lawyers, this evidence suggested that by acting as a
crownwitnessMüller was evadingmurder charges and a probablemandatory life
sentence.
Federal Prosecutor Heinrich Wunder protested against the accusation that
Müller had been bought or brainwashed bymembers of the Federal Criminal Police
Office. Wunder suggested that Müller’s earlier criminal behaviour did not lessen his
credibility, declaring this would not be ‘the first time that a Saul turns into a Paul’.140
Some journalists, however, suggested that the prosecution had already delivered its
part of the deal. Müller had been tried at the Hamburg Schwurgericht during the
early stages of the Stammheim trial. He had been sentenced on 11 March 1976 to a
mere ten years’ imprisonment for membership of a criminal organisation, accessory
to murder and some lesser crimes.141
Earlier, the authorities had felt it necessary to close a file detailingMüller’s early
statements to the police. In the autumn of 1975, the file’s existence had become public,
but the Federal Minister of Justice, Hans-Jochen Vogel, had closed the file citing state
security. This added to the suspicions about the quality of Müller’s evidence; there
were speculations that he had confessed to being the Hamburg shooter and that
the state was willing to refrain from prosecuting a possible murderer in exchange
for testimony against the raf. When efforts to obtain the file failed, the defence
summoned Chief Federal Prosecutor Buback as a witness in order to question him
about its contents. At first, Buback’s superior, the Federal Minister of Justice Vogel,
refused to grant the necessary permission, but the defence lawyers’ efforts led to a new
decision by an administrative judge ordering Buback to appear in Stammheim. On 14
October 1976 (trial day 153), Buback was questioned by lawyers Schily and Heldmann,
and remarkably also by Baader and Raspe, but he revealed nothing new. He reiterated
that the prosecution had not made a deal withMüller or any other witness. Although
Buback was composed and answered all questions in a courteous manner, his very
brief answers left a bad impression. Vogel had apparently limited his permission to
testify.142
Just before Buback’s appearance, from 5 October 1976, the prosecution had
presented its final plea, which took three full days. There was little public interest and
of the lawyers of choice only Hans-Heinz Heldmann was present. By now, apparently,
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many thought the outcome was a foregone conclusion. In Stuberger’s account of the
Stammheim trial, we can read that in his long career of trial reporting he had rarely
heard prosecutors talk so emotionally and at times even irrationally and defamatorily
about the accused. Again and again, the prosecution stressed that the three remaining
raf leaders (Ulrike Meinhof had in the meantime committed suicide) were mere
ordinary criminals, devoid of political motivations. State Prosecutor Peter Zeis called
the raf’s claim to political ideals ‘den größten Etikettenschwindel des Jahrzehnts’
(the decade’s greatest labelling fraud). His colleague Klaus Holland accused the raf
of a mentality ‘devoid of human traces’. Baader’s behaviour was especially criticised;
the prosecutors decried the stark contrast between his luxurious lifestyle and the
proclaimed struggle for the underprivileged. Stuberger found it offensive that the
prosecutors talked about the absent lawyers of choice, as if they too were facing
trial.143
Journalist GerhardMauz’s report, published inDer Spiegel at the time, is largely
in line with Stuberger’s memories, althoughMauz gives more credit to the oldest
prosecutor, Wunder. According toMauz, Wunder argued sharply but matter-of-factly
and thereby represented a system of justice that showed respect for the procedural and
human rights of the accused. Mauz wrote that his younger colleague Zeis, however,
manifested ‘a scary kind of “system of justice”, in which the prosecution aims at
annihilation, destruction, elimination. This “system of justice” does not deal with
people, but with phlegm.’144
Prisoners of War: The raf and the Geneva Conventions
On several occasions during the trial the raf’s lawyers were seen as addressing issues
that were not strictly legal. More than once, judges and prosecutors andmany outside
observers expressed their doubts. They suspected the raf leaders and their lawyers of
political motives and accused the defence of, as they saw it, misusing the trial as a
stage for political propaganda. As we have shown, this was in fact what they intended
to do. One key argument was mistrusted by observers, and was not regarded as a
serious legal point. This was the plea to treat the rafmembers as prisoners of war
who had been fighting on German soil against the us war effort in Vietnam.
On 28 October 1975, this line of argument was expressed in court for the first
time, albeit unsystematically. Judge Prinzing began this (41st) day of the trial with an
explanation of howhewished the proceedings to continue, now that it was established
that the accused were lacking in fitness. He announced that the accused were allowed
to follow theproceedingswhenever they felt able. Thedefence lawyers reacted furiously
and, not for the first time, challenged the judge on grounds of bias. Von Plottnitz
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declared that the president’s actions amounted to a ‘declaration of war’ against the
accused. ‘However, in war there would always be the Geneva Convention[s], whose
provisions would protect the prisoners from something that is to be considered
legitimate in consequence of the judge’s decision: the deliberate destruction of their
health. The risk of the prisoners’ health deteriorating if they continue to be kept in
isolation, as mentioned in themedical report, does not bother the judges; after all,
they long since shifted their responsibility for the destruction of the prisoners’ health
on the prisoners themselves.’145
In the months to come, the ‘prisoners of war’ argument would return. On 20
January 1976 (trial day 65), Axel Azzola, a law professor fromDarmstadt University
who had recently joinedMeinhof ’s defence team, brought forward amotion to halt
the trial and start treating the accused as prisoners of war. Remarkably, Schily and
Heldmann did not endorse this, seemingly because of legal peculiarities. This action
brokewith the established practice of the raf lawyers to support each other’smotions.
Until this time the imprisoned members of the raf had always demanded to be
treated like ordinary prisoners, so Azzola’s motion also marked a switch to a plea for
special treatment.146
The Darmstadt professor based his motion on an intricate analysis of the conflict
between the raf and theWest German state. He argued that the two sides were taking
part in an international war between the forces of capitalist imperialism and the
liberationmovements of the thirdworld. At the time international law still considered
war to be amatter of nation-states, and excludedmembers of other organisations from
protection as enemy combatants. However since the early 1970s, negotiations about an
additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions and the law of war hadmoved towards
including movements of national liberation and their ‘soldiers’. Professor Azzola tried
to persuade the Stammheim court to accept this impending extension of international
law (in the end, the protocol was added to the Geneva conventions in 1977) and to
recognise the raf as a legitimate ‘subject of war’, being a partner organisation of one
of the third world liberationmovements, the National Liberation Front of Vietnam
(Vietcong). As such, its members should be treated as prisoners of war (to be housed in
special, internationally monitored camps) and criminal proceedings against them
had to be halted.147On this basis, only an investigation into possible war crimes
committed by the raf, and possibly a new trial on the basis of that, still seemed
feasible. Azzola also stated that the raf had legitimately used their constitutionally
guaranteed right to resist institutionalised fascism, and, apart from that, had used
violence in self-defence, ‘not to defend the existing order, but exactly with the aim of
its abolishment’.148
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Federal Prosecutor Wunder was unimpressed by Azzola’s inventive analysis,
arguing that existing law did not allow for such ‘wishful thinking’. According to
Wunder this was a preposterous attempt to legitimize the raf’s acts of violence. ‘In
our country murders are prosecuted as what they are. We live in peace and not in
the state of war that the accused have imagined.’ Azzola’s remarks about the raf’s
legitimate use of the right to resist had specifically annoyedWunder, who called them
an offence to the members of the actual resistance during the Nazi era.149 Wunder
thus refrained from an in-depth discussion of themotion. The same applied to the
reaction of the court, which swiftly dismissed the motion, concluding that there
was ‘no legal ground to switch to a treatment of the accused as prisoners of war’.150
Although these brief reactions may have made good sense from a legal standpoint,
they did little to challenge Azzola’s faulty reasoning or expose it to the public eye.151
Azzola’s detailed attempt at Stammheim to portray the raf as Robin Hood-style
freedom fighters thus remained untested.152
On 4May 1976, the defence brought forward a large number of motions (among
them nine by Schily alone) to summon as witnesses a range of American politicians
(among them former President RichardNixon),military and security service personnel
(including former cia Chief William Colby), various West German politicians (such
as former Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt and his successor Helmut Schmidt) as
well as experts in international law and other academics. According to the defence
their evidence would prove that us forces had committed war crimes in Vietnam,
that usmilitary institutions onWest German soil had played an important role in
these actions, and that members of the Federal government and other leadingWest
German politicians had supported or at least not prevented this. This would lead to
the conclusion that the accusedmembers of the raf should be acquitted, because by
bombing American facilities in Frankfurt and Heidelberg they had legitimately made
use of the right to resist and the right of self-defence.153
With some ceremony, the lawyers declared that their motions at the Stammheim
trial would at last introduce the issue of the Vietnam War, which they claimed
to be of central importance in the prosecution of the raf. Axel Azzola, now in
full cooperation with the other defence lawyers, even called the raf ‘an answer
to Vietnam’. He stated that these motions, finally, put the crucial question on the
table as to ‘whether the individual, who had put himself up against themurderers
of Vietnam and had been prepared to wage this struggle with relatively modest
means, must on the basis of existing law be seen as a member of a criminal gang’.
Wunder was unmoved. He saw the Vietnammotions as merely another instance of
the accused attempting ‘to turn the trial against them into a stage for propagandistic
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self-presentations’. According to him, the motions were not really meant to serve the
purpose of finding the truth and he pointed out that they did not even really refer to
the allegations in the bill of indictment.154 Twoweeks later, after ample consideration,
the court denied a right of resistance and self-defence in this case, and turned down
themotions.155
6.3.2. Theatrics: Charming the Audiences
In the end, these attempts by the defence to derail the trial by repeatedly addressing
procedural issues, except when dealing with the issue of crown witnesses, all appeared
rather far-fetched and futile. Indirectly, however, the raf leaders and their lawyers
scored some points. Theymanaged to turn the trial into a continual bickering between
parties; this considerably undermined its legitimacy. Many observers lost interest in
the perceived stalemate at Stammheim.Thismeant that the trial didnot become, as the
authorities had hoped, the staged reckoning with the raf. At least as far as spectators
close to the raf were concerned, the protracted proceedings at Stammheim confirmed
the political character of the trial that the defence had always alleged. Contributing to
the image of a ‘failed’ trial were the conscious and unconscious performances of the
various participants. Constantly interacting with one another, the players in this
drama—including the president and the other judges, the prosecutors, the lawyers
and the accused, and even some of the witnesses—modelled their behaviour to appeal
to audiences inside and outside the courtroom.
Acting Their Part: An Unavoidable Clash between Judge and Accused
For a first impression of the actual events in court we can rely on Ulf Stuberger’s
eyewitness account from which we have already quoted several times. When this
journalist sat down in the Stammheim courtroom for the first time on 21 May 1975,
he could not help smiling to himself: ‘I could not suppress the thought that I sat
waiting for the chime to announce the beginning of the show.’ And indeed, ‘Suddenly,
a buzzing sound could be heard, just like in amodern theatre.’ UlrikeMeinhof and
the other accused entered the courtroom first, followed by the Second Senate of the
Stuttgart Oberlandesgericht. To Stuberger and some of his colleagues this entrance
looked like a ballet performance. ‘In their black robes the nine men strutted daintily
to their seats’, he observed.156 The beginning of this confrontation between judges
and accused and between prosecution and defence had long been anticipated by all
present and bymanymore who followed the trial in themedia. The question nowwas
whether the actors would live up to expectations.
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The accused and their lawyers, as we have made clear in our discussion of the
raf’s defence strategy, had givenmuch thought on how to perform in court. One
of the raf’s lawyers, Gerd Temming, had even conceived a ‘dramaturgical frame
for the defence’ as a basis for an internal debate on the matter.157 From Stuberger’s
memoirs, however, we gather that the demeanour of the defendants at the trial and
their trial strategymostly reinforced the sceptical attitude towards the rafwithwhich
this left-leaning journalist and probably many other more or less neutral observers
had entered the courtroom. ‘Baader often looked very nervous’, Stuberger writes,
‘constantly playing with a plastic lighter, plucking his clothes or browsing through
legal papers that he had carried in. He was able to control himself for days and would
then erupt in choleric outbursts, visibly sweating and blurting out vulgarities like a
little child.’ The raf leader was said to have a high sex appeal, but Baader appeared
rather dim-witted to Stuberger because of his constant swearing and a cynical grin
that clearly annoyed the other participants in the courtroom. It was Baader’s bad
luck, Stuberger argues, that his looks made him the perfect example of the terrorist
scarecrow. In a way, he seemed to confirm the image that the prosecutors had spread
of him as the raf’s ringleader.158
Of the other three, neither Gudrun Ensslin nor Jan-Carl Raspe appeared in a
good light. To Stuberger, Ensslin seemed ‘a particularly aggressive, radical young
woman, [who] erupted easily and in her way seemed to imitate Baader’s behaviour’.
Without hesitation, she rebuked the court, the prosecution and the substitute lawyers.
Stuberger’s impressionwas that Ensslin felt able to give orders to the other participants
at the trial, totally misjudging her actual status. In contrast, Raspe appeared as
‘the great taciturn’. Mocking Azzola’s prisoners of war motion, Stuberger and other
reporters labelled the subservient Raspe as commandant Baader’s ‘boot-jack’. Raspe
seemed to conceal his real motives and ideas, a negative impression that was amplified
(in the eyes of Stuberger) by his deep eye sockets.159
However, when confronted with UlrikeMeinhof, Stuberger sometimes needed
to remind himself of the crimes for which she was on trial. ‘From the first trial day
onwards, she seemed to stand out from the other [three]’, he writes, ‘[looking] almost
well-behaved with her long pigtails’. Meinhof, herself a journalist before turning
terrorist, often seemed to have the impression that the other accused rafmembers
ignored her, for instance when she indicated to Ensslin that it was not polite to light a
cigarette in court. In contrast to Baader and Ensslin, Meinhof hardly spoke and rarely
raised her voice in anger. She preferred ‘fascist’ or other political terms of abuse to the
use of gutter language. She looked physically andmentally weaker than the other
three, an impression that grew stronger by the day. This was confirmed by stories
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about tension and arguments betweenMeinhof and the other rafmembers, reported
to Stuberger by some of the guards. ‘She seemed less and less able to follow the course
of [the trial] that would determine her future’, he remembers, ‘[and] she lookedmore
andmore absent.’160
That there were indeed splits within the group became apparent on 4May 1976
(trial day 106) when, after the defenders had presented their Vietnammotions, Ensslin
addressed the court (in Meinhof ’s absence) with a remarkable statement:
If there is one thing about the 1972 affair that depresses us, it is our lack of correlation
betweenhead andhands.Wewouldhave liked tohave beenmilitarilymore efficient. To
put it simply once again: we are also responsible for the attacks on the cia headquarters
and the headquarters of the Fifth us Army Corps in Frankfurt amMain and the us
headquarters in Heidelberg. In so far as we were organised into the raf from 1970
onwards, fought in it, and were involved in the process of the conception of its policies
and structure, we are certainly also responsible to the same degree for operations
undertakenby commandos—for instance, against the Springer building [inHamburg],
of which we knew nothing, and disagree with in principle; which we disowned while
it was in progress.161
Since it is generally assumed that a commando group underMeinhof ’s leadership
was responsible for the Springer bombing, Ensslin’s statement basically isolated
Meinhof from the other three standing trial, and excluded her from the raf’s central
command.162 It is chilling to note thatMeinhof ’s suicide followed only four days
later, during the night of 8/9 May 1976.
To return to the performance of the accused in court, it is clear that they accepted
the rules of the trial only to the extent that these enabled them to continue their
political struggle from the podium of the courthouse. In this sense their behaviour
was typical of the composure of others facing political trials, as analysed by Otto
Kirchheimer. According to this German-American jurist and political scientist ‘With
the political defendant […] reversal of the roles becomes real; whatever adjustments
he is likely to make to the necessities of the situation are of a tactical and narrow
nature.’163 The right to bring forward petitions on all kinds of legal issues (under
the Code of Criminal Procedure) created great opportunities for the defence to
turn the trial into a platform for the raf’s political communication efforts. Or,
as the raf leaders declared, ‘because the Code of Criminal Procedure allows for
an explanation of these [motions], they could function as transporters of political
argumentation’.164
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This effort to politicise the trial or, from the raf point of view, to reveal its political
character, made a clash with the court almost inevitable, especially when its president,
Theodor Prinzing, appeared to take keeping politics out of the courtroom as one of his
most important tasks. From the beginning he displayed an extraordinary eagerness
to prevent political speeches, interrupting the accused or their lawyers whenever
he felt they were moving away from legal grounds towards political terrain. As a
consequence, he repeatedly withdrew their permission to speak when they trespassed
beyond the imaginary line in the sand that he had drawn. Prinzing used various
disciplinary measures at his disposal to control the proceedings. At an early stage, the
lawyers of choice walked out in protest when the court refused to have the defendants’
fitness to stand trial tested by independent doctors. The presiding judge warned them
that next time he would withdraw their formal court appointment. The lawyers
regarded this as a threat, because the state would then no longer cover their costs and
they would have to be paid by their clients, who were withoutmeans.165 Over the
following months the court would indeed decommission these lawyers, one after the
other.166
Prinzing tried to soften his strictness with little jokes, but his ironic wit tended to
backfire, causing indignation on the defence counsel’s bench. Moreover, Prinzing
often appeared not to be completely even-handed, thereby confirming the defence’s
complaint that he was basically working for the state. It left a bad impression, for
instance, when he thanked Federal Prosecutor Siegfried Buback for ‘his patience’ after
he had appeared as a witness—Der Spiegel clearly found this deference toward a state
functionary overdone.167
The judge seems not to have been a very good listener. On 28 October 1975 (trial
day 41), for example, he lost his patience with UlrikeMeinhof when she was struggling
with words, talking in theoretical terms about the difficulties faced by an isolated
prisoner. In hindsight, Meinhof ’s statement could be interpreted as a signal to the
authorities that she was contemplating a change of attitude. At the time, though,
Prinzing could not be bothered with her theorising and failed to register not only a
possible hiddenmessage behind her words, but also how far she had already drifted
away from the raf. After all, for the raf, a member who openly hinted at leaving
the organisation was dangerously close to becoming a traitor. An irritated Prinzing
simply interruptedMeinhof several times, finally withdrawing her right to speak
altogether.168
Prinzing’s insensitivity to the defendants reached its nadir with his handling of
the trial immediately after Ulrike Meinhof ’s suicide. On the following trial day the
president wanted to continue in a business-as-usual way, as if nothing had happened.
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The court turned down a request from the defence for an adjournment of the trial
until after Meinhof ’s burial, even though one of the substitute lawyers, Manfred
Künzel (Waiblingen), supported their plea. This decision caused uproar in the crowded
public gallery on the day following Ulrike Meinhof ’s death. Her death had enhanced
themotivation of these raf sympathisers in the gallery to show their support, ‘to
show, especially today, that there is somebody there [for them]’.169 After the protesters
were led out on the president’s orders, others in the room jumped up and chanted
abuse: ‘Prinzing “raus” ’, ‘Prinzing murderer’ and ‘Suicide is a lie.’ The lawyers of
choice collected their files and left in protest, saying they would not return until after
the funeral.170
Importantly, the court’s refusal to allow for an adjournment may have been
caused in part by the way the lawyers and defendants argued for it. For example,
Hans-Heinz Heldmann, defending, not only pointed to the close ties between the
four prisoners torn byMeinhof ’s sudden and unexpected death, but also remarked
that the lawyers saw reason to doubt the official explanation of her death because
Meinhof had supposedly not given the slightest hint of suicide plans.171 Jan-Carl
Raspe even went a step further and openly declared:
We think Ulrike has been executed. We don’t know how, but we know by whom. And
we can work out the way it was calculated. […] It was an execution, conceived in cold
blood, in the same way as Holger [Meins] was executed.172
In fact, prison notes reveal that only hours after having been informed of her death, in
a reflex reaction, the remaining leaders of the raf together with their defence counsel
had decided to use Meinhof ’s death as an opportunity to revive the raf solidarity
campaign.173
Et tu, Künzel? Prinzing’s Final Challenge and the End of the Trial
The accused raf leaders regularly erupted in anger against the strictness and formality
of the presiding judge and were genuinely frustrated at Prinzing’s interruptions,
which ruined the effect of statements they had so laboriously drafted in their cells.174
In part, however, these outbursts were consciously provoked confrontations with
the president to show disdain for the court and the established order of the Federal
Republic. Other commentators have already cited some of these clashes in detail,
so we will only relate one illustrative discussion from the court, taking place on 19
August 1975. On trial day 26 the accused stood up and shouted abuse in an attempt to
be removed from court. The ensuing violent exchange mimicked an absurdist play. At
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first judge Prinzing refused to expel them, then Raspe asked if they should ‘make
some sort of formal disturbance’. Finally the judge informed the accused that they
were ‘now causing disruption of the trial’. Later in the day, when the defendants were
led back into the courtroom, they repeated their abusive language, calling Prinzing ‘a
fascist asshole’, ‘an old pig’ and ‘a dirty bastard’.175
The climax of animosity toward the presiding judge occurred on 28 July 1976
(trial day 131), when Klaus Jünschke, an rafmember who at that time was facing a
trial in Kaiserslautern, testified on behalf of the defence. In themiddle of a dispute
with Prinzing, after he already had called the president ‘a fascist’ and had received
disciplinary punishment, Jünschke suddenly stood up, ran around the witness table
and cried, ‘Wait, here I come.’ In three quick paces he had jumped onto the judges’
table and crashed onto the president, so that they fell to the floor together. Several
judges, guards and policemen overpowered the enraged witness. As Jünschke shouted,
‘For Ulrike, you pig!’, the guards tied his hands and feet and carried him out.176
Within the parameters of the Code of Criminal Procedure the clearest expression
of confrontation from the defence was the torrent of accusations facing Prinzing and
other judges on the grounds of bias.177 In theory, for any such challenge to succeed
it was sufficient for the accused to come to a convincing rational conclusion that a
certain judge was biased.178 Within a total of 175 trial days, various lawyers brought
a total of 85 challenges against Prinzing, of which only the last was successful.179
The sheer number of challenges in the Stammheim trial raises the question whether
this was a misuse of defendants’ rights. This question is further justified because
according to the Code of Criminal Procedure these challenges have to be dealt with
immediately, making them a powerful tool for trial obstruction.180At Stammheim,
the prosecutors and the judges did indeed accuse the lawyers of deliberately slowing
down the trial with their challenges.181 Tenfelde’s legal study of the Stammheim trial
argues that the lawyers, in his opinion, were simply exploiting the rights of their
defendants. He criticised the judges’ negativity when faced with such challenges,
which they considered to be shameful and damaging to their professional honour.182
In Prinzing’s case it was probably indeed a question of his honour that led to the
success of the 85th and final challenge against him. It all began in January 1977 when
Otto Schily, defence counsel for Ensslin, received explosive information that revealed
Stammheim’s presiding judge had been in contact with Federal Judge AlbrechtMayer,
of the Third Senate of the Federal Court of Justice in Karlsruhe. This court was not
only responsible for dealing with complaints about the judges at Stammheim, but
would also have to consider any appeals after the court had reached a verdict. Prinzing
regularly spoke toMayer by phone and once even sent him copies of trial documents
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through his private mail. Mayer, in turn, forwarded these to the chief editor of the
conservative newspaper Die Welt, apparently hoping that this might result in an
article that could damage Schily.183
On 10 January 1977 (trial day 171), Schily challenged the presiding judge over his
contact with Mayer, but the other judges of the Second Senate curtly disallowed
this challenge. Substitute lawyer Manfred Künzel (Waiblingen), court-appointed
counsel for Ensslin, challenged the president again, because he felt that Prinzing’s
contact with Mayer andMayer’s actions should be openly discussed. This motion was
also rejected by the court, but Künzel had obviously hurt the president’s feelings, or
damaged his honour as Tenfelde suggests, since Prinzing now began to show signs of
panic. On the evening of 13 January 1977, he telephoned Künzel, who was still acting as
a lawyer in the case he was presiding over.184 It was an act of desperate disillusion,
remotely reminiscent of Julius Caesar’s last encounter with his former pupil, the
dagger-wielding senator Brutus.
To Künzel’s astonishment, the president complained that his challenge had been
the worst experience in the two years of the trial, because it came from such an
unexpected quarter. Prinzing was hinting at their shared past, when Künzel was a
junior in Prinzing’s chambers. The lawyer replied that he simply desired a better
explanation for Prinzing’s contact with a judge of a superior court. In his opinion it
was not enough to say, as the president had done, that he would not comment on
private conversations, because that nourished the suspicion that such contacts had
occurred. ‘Put yourself in Frau Ensslin’s position’, Künzel explained. ‘She must now be
saying to herself that any future appeal is pointless, since there’s been an interchange
between the two courts with the aim of ensuring that no appeal against the court’s
judgment can succeed.’ Prinzing replied that Ensslin would not care, and that it was
all Schily’s doing. Künzel disagreed, whereupon the president told him that he was
looking at it ‘in the abstract’. The conversation ended with Prinzing complaining
about the stress the case put upon the court and on him especially: ‘I’m almost at the
end of my tether. And if I can’t see it through, Herr Künzel …’185
After Prinzing had hung up, Künzel told Baader’s lawyer Hans-Heinz Heldmann
about the telephone conversation. On 20 January 1977, Heldmann challenged the
president again, and this time the Second Senate decided to uphold the challenge.
‘Ultimately it does not depend onwhether Dr. Prinzing is or feels himself to be biased’,
they declared. ‘The deciding factor is whether, from the defendant’s viewpoint, there
may be reasonable distrust of the judge’s impartiality. Suchmisgivings cannot be
dismissed.’ On the basis of this decision Prinzing was discharged from the case. His
associate, Dr. Eberhard Foth, replaced him.186
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All in all, Prinzing had clearly not been in full control of the trial. Stuberger
remembers that he was often reminded of Don Quixote as the president engaged
in one procedural quarrel after another, as did theman of la Mancha with Spanish
windmills.187 Nevertheless, Stuberger also reminds us that it would be too easy to
put the blame for the unfortunate turn of events in the Stammheim trial solely
on Prinzing. So much was at stake, and external pressures for a conviction were so
demanding that no judge would have been able to preside over the trial without
makingmistakes.188
Still, Prinzing appeared to be lacking both the sovereignty and impartiality
required for his role. He appeared to have taken the trial’s events and challenges rather
personally, missing the point that they were mainly attacks on his function. We can
illustrate this by his remarks in a recent interview. The former president confessed
to a certain sportsmanlike respect for his most important opponent. ‘Baader was
capable of cool calculation’, Prinzing told the press, ‘and for me he was really a highly
intelligent desperado, who on account of his failed career up to that moment found a
confirmation of himself in this new career as revolutionary’.189During the trial, it
seemed that the president’s pride was hurt that this respect was not returned by the
accused. Time and again, the lawyers argued that itwas not Prinzing presiding over the
proceedings, but the Federal Prosecutor.190 Psychologically, many of these challenges
were rather testing, for instance when Baader sneered just after the president turned
off his microphone, ‘So maybe you’re in charge of the microphones, but you’re not in
charge of this trial, far from that.’191
The constant bickering and legal nitpicking on display at the trial was nearly fatal
to the public interest in it. After the first few trial days, media coverage dwindled
and the press chairs were left empty. ‘Most of the time, I was really lonesome and the
only representative of “published opinion” in Stammheim’, Stuberger remembers.
The court was also less attractive to visit when the raf leaders were absent. As one
visitor concluded, ‘The zoo effect is lost.’ In the eyes of most observers, the trial took
too long and was far too expensive. Nevertheless, Stuberger notes that the visitors’
benches were often well occupied and that altogether there were about 30,000 visitors
attending one or more sessions of the court.192
Most observers agreed that compared to Prinzing the new president was a relief.
Eberhard Foth not only reprimanded the lawyers, for example, but also corrected the
prosecutors if their statements were too aggressive.193 In essence, though, Stuberger
reveals that president Foth, like Prinzing, kept up the pretence that the trial was
a strictly legal affair. He recalls the president’s final statement, after reading out
the verdict, on 28 April 1977. Foth addressed the audience and the press with a short
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rhetorical question: ‘Somemight ask: Where now is politics? There where it belongs,
outside this courtroom.’ Stuberger wrote that he and other journalists could barely
suppress their laughter.194
Nevertheless, the Stammheim trial clearly had a better judge in its final stages,
although on Foth’s watch the going was at times also rough. For instance, in the early
months of 1977 the weeklyDer Spiegel revealed that the German secret service had
installed a listening device in the private home of nuclear scientist Klaus Traube when
it was discovered that he had been in contact with a left-wing terrorist. Following this
revelation, a member of parliament in Bonn asked the government to prevent similar
actions in future, adding, as if he knewmore, ‘including wiretapping in prisons’. As a
consequence, on 15 March 1977 (trial day 184), defence lawyer Otto Schily demanded an
interruption of the trial proceedings and invited the Federal Minister of the Interior,
Werner Maihofer, to the witness stand. Schily wanted to ask him if state security
services or other agencies had possibly overheard, taped and analysed conversations
among the raf prisoners, and between them and their lawyers.195
Senior Public Prosecutor Zeis reacted strongly, accusing Schily of capitalising
on the developing scandal around Traube. However on the next trial day, 17 March
1977 (day 185), Zeis had to tone down his comments, because in the meantime the
Baden-Württemberg State Ministers of the Interior and of Justice had confessed that
prisoners in Stammheimhadbeenoverheard, albeit onlyduring two small intervals.196
Thereafter, Schily called for a suspension of the trial until further notice, because the
affair had uncovered ‘a systematic destruction of all constitutional guarantees’. He
declared the defence did not feel able to continue to cooperate in the proceedings,
‘when it may perhaps seem to offer a kind of alibi by appearing’. All of the substitute
defenders, too, asked for an immediate suspension of proceedings.197
Zeis distanced himself from the affair, professing that his office had not been
informed about the taps. After that statement, president Foth tried to continue the
proceedings, but he was interrupted by Schily’s announcement that the defence
lawyers of choice would leave the courtroom if the trial proceeded. ‘I can’t stop you’,
Foth reacted, ‘[but] I think youmust stay’. Schily and his colleagues gathered their
files and walked out, leaving the defence of their clients to the substitute lawyers.
Remarkably, Künzel also asked for a suspension of the trial, on the grounds that a
lawful defence might have been rendered impossible from the moment the taps had
been installed. Thereupon, the president closed the proceedings for deliberation.198
On 29 March 1977 (trial day 187), president Foth opened by reading a letter of
assurance by State Justice Minister Traugott Bender, stating that the taps had had no
connection with the Stammheim trial. After this, in what was to be their last trial
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appearance, the accused spoke one after the other. Baader and Raspe demanded to hear
important politicians as witnesses about the wiretaps, while Ensslin announced that
the prisoners had just started another hunger strike. When Raspe and Ensslin tried to
make political statements, the judge interrupted them and they gave up.199 Later in
the day, several substitute defence lawyers asked for more assurances from the court
with regard to an absolute ban on wiretapping. After the court had turned down all
the formal requests regarding the wiretaps, Künzel sent a telegram requesting that he
be decommissioned as substitute lawyer. He announced that he would no longer
cooperate in the proceedings because he thought it demeaned the standards of the
legal profession.200 At that point in time, the Stammheim trial had finally turned
into a ‘ghost trial’, as Stefan Aust calls it.201
The impotence of the justice systemwasmade all themore visible by themurder in
broad daylight of Chief Federal Prosecutor Siegfried Buback and two employees—the
work of a raf commando group in Karlsruhe, on 7 April 1977. This ruthless assault
was the start of a string of violent attacks by the raf in an effort to force the German
government to release its imprisoned leaders. This campaign of violence has since
become known as the ‘German Autumn’ of 1977.
On 21 April 1977 (trial day 191), in the absence of the lawyers of choice, the substitute
lawyers made their final pleas, lasting between oneminute and three quarters of an
hour. Most defence lawyers demanded the cancellation of the trial. Thereafter, the
presiding judge instructed a prison guard to ask the accused whether they wanted to
use their right to make a final statement. In the presence of four witnesses all three
waived this right.202
A day before the final trial day, on 27 April 1977, in the Park Hotel in Stuttgart, the
lawyers of choice held a press conference at which Schily and Heldmann pronounced
their final pleas, which they called ‘Bewertung’ (evaluation), in the presence of about
100 journalists.203 On the next day, 28 April 1977 (trial day 192), judge Foth concluded
the trial with the oral presentation of the verdict: life sentences for all of the accused.204
After this, a long process of appeals before the Federal Court of Justice was to be
expected. In the aftermath of Prinzing’s dismissal, a disciplinary procedure instigated
by Schilyhad forced the replacementof JudgeMayer. Althoughmost observers expected
the higher court to uphold the life sentences, representatives of the prosecution had
cautiously informed Stuberger that they were worried that certain aspects of the
sentences would be revised. Journalists expected that the lawyers of choice would
launch amultitude of challenges against the judges on grounds of bias. They also
expected the lawyers to try to petition for a temporary release for their clients. Baader,
Ensslin and Raspe had already spent almost five years in custody before a verdict
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was reached, which could be regarded as a breach of provisions in the European
Convention onHuman Rights. Legal observers thought that especially Raspe, who
had no previous convictions, had a real chance of being released from prison during
a second trial. The state thus seemed to have manoeuvred itself into a cul-de-sac.
In the end, however, the appeals against the Stammheim verdict were never heard.
The collective suicides of Baader, Ensslin and Raspe in their Stammheim prison cells
during the night of 18/19 October 1977 made them irrelevant.205
6.4. Legacies of the Stammheim Trial
The ‘Todesnacht’ (night of death) at Stammheim prison not only ended the lives
of raf’s triple leadership, but it also propelled the Stammheim trial definitively
into the domain of collective memory, which is the topic of this final section of our
article.206 Our analysis of the legacies of the Stammheim trial will present a critical
overview of how ‘Stammheim’ was ‘remembered’ in German-language academic
publications on terrorism and in theWest German press. A complicating factor is
the fact that in public memory, ‘Stammheim’ as a trial was soon overshadowed by
‘Stammheim’ as a symbol for the battle between the state and the raf. This broader
interpretation of ‘Stammheim’ integrated many elements. These included the debates
related to the incarceration of the accused rafmembers, and their deaths in October
1977—and the accusation that the state had killed the raf prisoners rather than that
they had committed suicide. ‘Stammheim’ also stood for the ultimate confrontation
between the West German state and the raf, and as such was a universal code for the
climate of fear, anger and state repression during the ‘Deutscher Herbst’ (German
Autumn) of 1977. The initial intense media interest in the Stammheim trial almost
completely vanished after 1977. Press articles published in 1987, ten years after the
German Autumn, mentioned the trial only in passing, and concentratedmainly on
the events triggered by the HannsMartin Schleyer kidnapping.207
6.4.1. Dichotomies Rule: Remembering Stammheim
Media scrutiny at a very early stage after the Stammheim trial led to the expression
of serious reservations.Der Spiegel, for instance, criticised the over-activity of state
institutions during the trial, while political elites had displayed such a lack of interest
in earlier trials against Nazi perpetrators.208 After the verdict in May 1977, both
the Frankfurter Rundschau (fr) and the Süddeutsche Zeitung (sz) expressed a sense
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of resignation over the trial and the verdict. In their view, the judiciary had not
fully uncovered the truth about the raf’s actions. These newspapers even claimed a
lack of dignity on the part of the judges, who hadmademany ‘mistakes’ (sz). The
consequences were a sense of ‘helplessness’ (sz) and a ‘stale feeling’ (fr) about a trial
that had ‘negative consequences for the rule of law’ (Der Spiegel).209
A further consequence that left a bad taste was the introduction of anti-terrorism
laws. Some of them have remained in place since their inception in themid-1970s,
including provisions against terrorist associations (tightened up after 9/11) and the
restrictions of defence rights for those accused of terrorist acts. For these reasons, legal
expert UweWesel deems the Stammheim trial ‘a catastrophe of the rule of law’ in his
2006 assessment of the criminal proceedings against the raf in the 1970s and beyond.
Moreover, Wesel argued that the trial and conditions of incarcerationof the accused
rafmembers had violated human dignity, as well as undermined the principle of
proportionality.210 As early as May 1977, Der Spiegel journalist Gerhard Mauz had
declared somewhat less forcefully that, at the trial, ‘the effort to come a little bit closer
to the rule of law had failed’. Mauz also identified an atmosphere of ‘bitterness’ and
‘hatred’ during the trial.211
Counter-intuitively, we will begin our analysis of the social and political effects
of Stammheim by examining the few positive effects of the trial. Firstly, it seems
clear that after 1977, in general, defence lawyers were motivated by the frustrating
experiences of the Stammheim trial to a heightened commitment in confrontations
with their counterparts in legal cases. Secondly, in a more general sense, the long view
shows that civic attitudes in Germany were changed by the experience with the raf.
‘Stammheim’ and the 1977 German Autumnmarked a historical caesura, a breachwith
a long tradition of state-centred political culture in Germany (see our earlier historical
overview). At least in some sections of West German society, scepticism towards the
state and the criticism of police measures becamemore widespread. Moreover, the last
third of the 1970s saw a growth of (new) social movements which addressedmany
political issues that were first raised around or during the German Autumn.212
Despite these positive long-term effects, Stammheim had mainly negative
consequences at first. In conjunction with other terrorism trials, Stammheim strongly
contributed to aprocess of growingpolitical radicalisation inWestGermany’s left-wing
milieu and to a polarisation in German politics in general.213 Themajor publications
about the trial, especially the books published by Aust and Bakker Schut in 1986, did
not escape the pitfall of partiality.While the political direction of their criticismdiffers,
both of the trial itself and of the actors involved,214 each author presents a polarised
narrative that uncritically copied the lack of communication between the opposing
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groups involved, portraying the judiciary and West German state institutions on one
side, and the raf, its lawyers and sympathisers on the other side, fighting each other
relentlessly. State officials are depicted as imagining themselves deeply threatened by
the activities of the so-called terrorists, while the raf and its supporters are seen to be
convinced that the state was utterly andmercilessly opposed to all left-wing radicals.
Nomatter how accurate this picture may be, Aust’s and Bakker Schut’s texts help to
construct and re-enact an unbridgeable gap, the entrenched lack of communication
between these two opposing camps.215
Similar dichotomies can be found in the state’s documentation (in late 1977) of the
Schleyer abduction, and in edited volumes published by radical intellectuals, such as
Ein deutscher Herbst (1978/1997) andDer blinde Fleck (1987).216 Polarised interpretations
also shaped the book written by journalists Oliver Tolmein and Detlef zumWinkel,
Nix gerafft (1987), and also Tolmein’s later publication, Stammheim vergessen (1997).217 In
October 1987, ten years after the trial, commemorative issues of the liberal newspapers
Frankfurter Rundschau and Süddeutsche Zeitung were dominated by the polarised
interpretations outlined above. This model of analysis can still be found in more
recent publications on the raf.218 Interpretations claiming that the raf’s activities
were an indication of insanity were part of the same problem, as this explanation
denied the rafmilitants any political purpose and sought to exclude them fromWest
German society.219
The weekly newspaperDie Zeit observed early in 1986 that there were obvious
‘difficulties in copingwith our recent past … the problemhas been isolated, the chapter
is closed, [we only have] time for the theatre and for the feature pages …’220 Indeed,
media interpretations usually collided with harsh social realities, as the reception
of Reinhard Hauff ’s film ‘Stammheim’ demonstrated. Early in 1986 a public debate
about the film, scheduled for Hamburg’s alternative theatre venue Kampnagelfabrik,
was cancelled when fistfights and brawling broke out. Once again, the inability of
both ‘sides’ to engage in dialogue was an indication that the radical left’s motto
still applied: ‘Über Stammheimwird nicht gesprochen’ (Stammheim is not open for
discussion).221
6.4.2. Establishing the Individual Victim
A first crack in this entrenched view of the struggle came late in 1986. Gerold von
Braunmühl, a Germanmiddle-ranking diplomat, was assassinated by the raf on
10 October 1986. Following his death, von Braunmühl’s brothers published an open
letter to the militants who killed him in the left-wing daily taz.222 In September 1987,
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they also released a small book entitled Ihr habt unseren Bruder ermordet (You have killed
our brother) which included some reactions by taz readers and a few short articles.223
The von Braunmühl brothers’ attempt to initiate a public dialogue with the
raf constructed a clearly recognisable third party, the individual victim,224 located
between the two opposing parties (the state and the raf). The language of victimhood
was by nomeans new in this field.225 Siegfried Buback and HannsMartin Schleyer,
assassinated by raf commando groups in 1977, had also been labelled as victims of the
raf. In the case of Gerold von Braunmühl, however, it was individuals rather than
the state who claimed the right to victimhood. In this process it was not the victim’s
relationship to the state or to structural or social issues which served as the primary
point of reference. Instead, the von Braunmühls’ letter to the raf underlined their
brother’s individuality, his aims and his personal life. Moreover, they stressed the
suffering of his family—this was not about von Braunmühl’s death as a representative
of the state.
This kind of communication between victim and offender, with its strong
emphasis on the suffering of human beings, is a very ambivalent process. Firstly, it
has the potential to detract attention from a necessary analysis of social interactions
between state and social institutions, and the terrorist(s). A focus on victims can also
sustain the omnipresent tendency thatmany commentaries have: to individualise and
personify terrorism. On the other hand, defining the victims of terrorism inevitably
intervenes in the communicative process between state and society and terrorism.
Consciously or not, the von Braunmühls questioned the state’s monopoly to claim
and define the victims of terrorism. Simultaneously, they cast doubts on the state’s
ability adequately to protect its citizens against terrorism or to care for the victims of
terrorism. The criticism implicit in the initiative of the von Braunmühl brothers
may explain the irritated reactions of some politicians and state functionaries to
their intervention in the public discourse. From a criminological perspective, the
state’s monopoly on setting the conditions for the sentencing of offenders can also be
challenged when the interests of victims dominate. Victims and their families may
have completely different opinions with regard to the length and severity of offenders’
sentences. A focus on the victims of terrorism can also be seen as a by-product of new
penal policies that have emerged since the late 1970s, which tend to stress the rights of
victims above the re-integration of offenders in society.226
Considering the discourse around terrorism in West Germany in the 1980s,
however, it was victim-led communication that indicated a first step towards breaking
down the entrenched interpretative model of them (terrorists), versus us (the state).
Further efforts to move away from a polarised pattern of interpretation can be
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discerned in the attempts by Antje Vollmer and Christa Nickels of the Green party to
communicate with (former) terrorists and discuss new exit options for them.227 At
about the same time, plans weremade to establish a foundation for terrorists who
wished to leave their militant way of life.228 It took another ten years for the process
of victim-focused communication to emerge strongly. The language of victimhood
became much more widespread in the late 1990s, and elements of victim-based
communication can be found in the films of Heinrich Breloer (‘Todesspiel’—1997) and
Andres Veiel (‘Black Box brd’—2001).229
By the late 1990s, interest had also moved beyond the ‘big name’ victims of the
raf. Press articles were written about the son of Schleyer’s chauffeur, for example,
mourning his father who was also killed in 1977, and about the shocked residents
of the street where Schleyer and his escort were ambushed.230 By 1999, former
militants and some relatives of their victims began talking to each other.231 This
disruption of entrenched patterns also took place among some former raf prisoners,
creating a platform for changing self-definitions. Formermilitants spoke of their
individually traumatising experiences, their fears and their suffering, eroding the
tough fighter image step-by-step. Acceptance of this new image should not be
overestimated as widespread, however.232 Also in the late 1990s, criticism emerged
that the state’s tactics towards the raf had been too hard-line and inflexible
during the German Autumn.233 Nevertheless, even as late as the end of the 1990s it
remained highly controversial openly to stress the structural roots of West German
left-wing terrorism by examining the interactions of the state, society and the
media.234
In the early 2000s, two parallel and interrelated tendencies could be discerned in
discussions about 1970s terrorism. One was an erosion of the established polarised
interpretations, which is not to say that this view disappeared altogether. Secondly, the
dominant interpretations of left-wing terrorism and the state’s responses splintered
into several competing narratives. A very strong current among these was the focus
on victims, as demonstrated by controversy around plans for an art exhibition on the
raf at the KunstWerke art centre in Berlin in 2003. The exhibition finally opened in
early 2005.235 KunstWerke curator Klaus Biesenbach and his team’smain aimwas
to focus on the terrorists as perpetrators, and on the pre-history of 1970s terrorism.
The public debate generated in summer 2003, however, called for the role of victims
to be integrated into the concept. At the same time it became obvious that the old
dichotomous interpretation of the terrorists versus the state still existed.236 Against
this background, it was no surprise that the early 21st-century saw a wave of popular
literature on individual victims of German left-wing terrorism, mostly written by
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family members of people killed by the raf.237 Interestingly the role of victim was
only conceded to family members or friends of those killed by the raf. It was almost
unimaginable to write about deadmilitants as victims, or about the suffering of their
families and friends.238
But victim-based communication was not the only way of recalling the history of
terrorism. Interpretations of certain other aspects of terrorism also began to appear.239
These published individual accounts still did not focus on the Stammheim trial, but
they did comment on related aspects, such as the conditions of imprisonment of raf
members.240 The old polarised codes dominated biographies about former militants,
which appeared from the late 1990s. The samewas true for other authors like Butz
Peters (who published several popular books on the raf), although he at least tried to
demystify the raf.
Still, by the early 2000s the dualistic ‘them versus us’ was less prevalent in
the discourse about terrorism. In recent years several narratives have coexisted. As
early as 2002, Christopher Roth’s film ‘Baader’ had depoliticised the leading raf
figure, focusing on Andreas Baader’s ambivalent personality as other pop cultural
interpretations of the Baader–Meinhof Group had in the meantime emerged.241 This
trend becomes evenmore evident in a series of articles published in the Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung in 2007, dealing with the experiences of the traumatised passengers
and crew of the Lufthansa jet that had been hijacked during the German Autumn (by
a Palestinian terrorist group supporting the raf). In the same year the Süddeutsche
Zeitung suggested that West German terrorism had contributed to a ‘democratisation
of society’ (Demokratisierung der Gesellschaft).242
As Thomas Steinfeld pointed out in the Süddeutsche Zeitung in April 2007, relatives
of the victims of terrorist attacks now played a muchmore important role in public
debates aboutWest German terrorism. Almost no trace of the original politicalmotives
of the terrorists can be found in these discourses. As Steinfeld put it, ‘in the near future
everything that was political about terrorism will fragment into individual fates.’243
The discourse about 1970s left-wing terrorismwas no longer dominated by a polarised
political controversy.
There is no easy explanation of why this occurred. Somemay relate this change
to the end of the Cold War as the black-and-white images of the Cold War enemy
dissolved; or to German unification in 1989/1990, as the Federal Republic of Germany
developed more self-awareness in its dealings with domestic political opponents.
The situation had altered since the 1970s, when at the end of the decade political
commentator AlfredGrosser could still detect a lack of self-assurance inWestGermany,
which ‘had not sufficiently realized how stable her state was [and] how stable the
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foundations of [the] ideological consensus underpinning this state really were’.244 By
2002, the Süddeutsche Zeitung could declare that the West German state had become
‘more stable and self-confident than ever before’.245
A closer look, however, reveals far more complex and contradictory patterns.
First, the perception of the West German state had been changing from the early to
mid-1980s, as the importance of the state in people’s lives became less central. State
services (like unemployment payments) began to be seen as comparable to goods and
services offered by themarketplace. As contemporary observers, whose statements also
echoed the demise of the welfare state, claimed, citizens used these state payments
for individual purposes only. They did not care about articulating feelings of moral
obligation or gratitude towards the welfare state.
The public debates about globalisation and its practical consequences may have
contributed to assumptions that state power was waning.246 Remarkably, the latest
films and press seriesmainly focus on the question of how far the state had intercepted
the communications between the imprisoned rafmembers in Stammheim until
their deaths in October 1977.247 Second, the demise of the radical left at the end of the
Cold War made it less problematic for state and police institutions in West Germany
to make concessions to the raf. Third, as the individualisation of society placed
more value on individual suffering, the discourse shifted to individual victims of
terrorism.248 Fourth, the scale of the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001
served to put the raf into perspective as a terrorist organisation, which led to a more
balanced interpretation of its political threats.249 Three other important developments
should be taken into consideration in explaining the changing discourse on 1970s
terrorism: the initiative to bring about a ‘reconciliation’ with raf prisoners by the
liberal Minister of Justice Klaus Kinkel in early 1992,250 the cease fire declared by the
raf on 10 April 1992, and the raf’s self-dissolution in April 1998.251
All in all, thedouble process of the erosionof the entrenched lack of communication
with (1) its hermetic binary political code and (2) the splintering of the memories
of 1970s West German left-wing terrorism had unquestionably begun in the last
third of the 1980s and saw its breakthrough in the early 21st-century. At that time,
remembering 1970s terrorismwas mainly structured by victim-based communication
and by individualised, often non-political narratives. Even the temporal resurfacing
of old dichotomous ‘frontline’ arguments, such as in the debates about the Berlin raf
exhibition, could not conceal that there was nomore space for the highly polarised
atmosphere of the 1970s/1980s. Asmemories finally splintered and the hermeticmaster
narrative became depolarised and depoliticised, Germany’s left-wing terrorism of the
1970s had become part of history.
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6.5. Conclusion
We have examined the Stammheim trial from the perspective of communication
and performance, focusing on the way that different actors (defendants and their
lawyers, prosecutors, judges, the media and bystanders) manipulated their behaviour
and statements with the aim of mobilising public and political support for their
interpretations of politics and justice in post-war Germany. The trial resembled
a staged drama, with the players often losing sight of legal issues while leading
commentators classified the trial as a ‘Justizalbtraum’ (justice nightmare).252 The
trial also displayed the enduring negative results a terrorist trial can produce. Partly
because of the extraordinary theatricality of the proceedings at Stammheim,we believe
the public memory of the trial remained highly politicised and polarised, in a sense
reproducing the lack of communication between the parties that was so manifest at
the trial itself.
The Stammheim trial turned into a bizarre game of shadow boxing over its
purported political character. Even in the lengthy pre-trial phase, it became clear
that the question whether this was ‘an absolutely normal trial against criminals’
as the authorities maintained, or a ‘political show trial’ as the raf would have it,
would become amajor issue. In essence, the raf leadership saw their performance
at Stammheim as a continuation of their guerrilla warfare against the state, meant
to undermine its legitimacy by subverting court trial procedures whenever this
promised to be to their advantage. The credibility of this raf strategy was reinforced
by the inconsistent pre-trial policies of the government. The Federal Prosecutor’s
Office itself inadvertently reintroduced a political element into the prosecution of the
raf, building the indictment on the notion that the raf be regarded as a criminal
association, thus creating a collective responsibility for its acts. Numerous other
factors, such as the choice of the Stuttgart Oberlandesgericht for the trial and the
extreme security arrangements in and around the purpose-built courthouse, the
many changes in the criminal code procedure, the appointment of the court president
and the use of de facto ‘crown witnesses’ all created the impression that the state
regarded the raf as political adversaries, in spite of its own rhetoric that they were
criminals. These inconsistencies were rooted in the desire of the authorities to achieve
more with the Stammheim trial thanmerely bringing the raf leadership to justice.
We believe the intention was to create the preconditions for a public reckoning with
raf terrorism in particular, and with German left-wing radicalism in general.
By addressing these inconsistencies and legal anomalies at the trial the raf
defenders seem at first glance to have effectively shifted the burden of self-justification
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away from the raf, and onto the state representatives (and especially to Stammheim’s
presiding judge, Theodor Prinzing). The fierce attacks against Prinzing undermined
the authority and legitimacy of the court. Both contemporary press reports and
historical accounts of Stammheim reflect a high degree of criticism about Prinzing’s
handling of the trial, and show some understanding for the arguments brought
forward by the defence. However one could also argue that the rafmissed a chance
to use the trial as a stage to spread its message of dissent, because the protracted
wrangling over procedural issues meant that bothmedia and public attention for
the trial quickly faded away in the first months. As a result, there was hardly any
opportunity for the raf to directly communicate their radical ideas; theymanaged
only to accuse the state of a miscarriage of justice.
Summing up, we offer some final conclusions regarding the effectiveness of
the performance of the different players at Stammheim. Firstly, the aim of the
authorities to stage a public reckoning with the raf leadership largely failed, due to
the inconsistencies in their own trial strategy. The problemwas twofold: the blatantly
unrealistic denial of the raf’s political clout by politicians and state officials lacked
credibility from the start, and the special arrangements around the Stammheim
trial (location and construction of the court, security, the appointment of officials)
indicated that the authorities clearly felt this was a highly political case, in spite
of their statements to the contrary. The state thus performed rather poorly, largely
because it did not want to discuss the ‘political’ elephant in the room. The attitude
and demeanour of judge Prinzing and many of his peers contributed further to
this problem. Their approach resembles a viewer who observes only the puppets at a
Wayang theatre, andneglects the shadows that are the crux of this Indonesian art form.
To the state participants, this attitudemade perfect sense. It matched the post-war
West German tradition of a militant democracy that banned the fundamentally
radical opposition forces from the competitive forum of official politics.253 Or, as Ralf
Dahrendorf argues in his seminal article on the social structure of German politics:
Wherever opposing interests meet in German society, there is a tendency to seek
authoritative and substantive rather than tentative and formal solutions. Many
institutions of German society have been and still are set up in such a way as to imply
that somebody or some group of people is ‘the most objective authority in the world’,
and is therefore capable of finding ultimate solutions for all issues and conflict.254
This tendency has fostered a very specific political attitude amongWest German elites
from the 1950s until the 1980s. They have neglected or shown blatant disinterest in
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extreme political viewpoints, because in their daily lives it has been unnecessary to
take these into account (as one does not even come across these voices). At Stammheim,
neither the prosecutors nor the judges conceded a semblance of curiosity about the
political or other motives that led the accused to their deeds. Yet the urge to discover
these motives might reasonably be considered an essential part of establishing the
truth (Wahrheitsfindung) that the elites themselveswould claim tobe central to criminal
trials. Instead of making an effort to communicate with the defence, prosecutors and
judges seemedmerely interested in communication with each other, over the heads
of the defendants. In our view, this lack of curiosity at Stammheim shown by the
prosecutors and judges betrays an underlying insecurity or anxiety on the part of
those elites.
For reasons discussed above, the raf’s performance, measured against its aim
to use the trial as a platform for its own propaganda, was also poor. The efforts of
the leaders of the raf to enforce their interpretations of reality upon audiences
within and outside the courtroom failed. A clear parallel can be discerned here
with their campaigns of violence, which never resulted in tangible gains, but
occasionally succeeded in scratching the reputation and legitimacy of West German
democracy. Ultimately, the raf was never able to match the achievements and power
of its counterparts at the trial, the judges and prosecutors who represented the
state.
One of the most striking features of the Stammheim case (and its legacy), finally,
was the lack of genuine communication within the court, and within German society
as a whole. As an instrument to restore social peace and renegotiate norms and
values, the trial was clearly a failure. Rather, our overview of the collective memory of
‘Stammheim’ suggests that the trial contributed to a continuation of the ‘entrenched
speechlessness’ that had been characteristic of the German government’s dealings
with contestant militants from the start. In the late 1970s some of these dichotomies
between the state and themilitants were re-articulated (a menacing fascist state had
been replaced by a menacing security state). However, as we have elsewhere stated,255
the codes for remembering Stammheim both in a narrow sense (focused on the trial)
as well as in a broader sense (taking Stammheim as a summary symbol of the battle
between the state and the raf) remained fairly stable until the late 1980s. It seemed
unlikely that there was a way out of this interpretative spiral.
The semantics of (the symbolic) ‘Stammheim’ and of the 1970s terrorist–state
confrontation was structured by a highly politicised dualistic master narrative until
the late 1990s. As we have explained, two developments played a crucial role in
breaching the stasis in the communication between ‘them’ (terrorists) and ‘us’ (state
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and society). The individual victims intervened in this polarised field, and at the same
time the collective memory of 1970s terrorism splintered into a variety of co-existing
narratives.
In hindsight it seems clear that the early 2000s presented an analytical and
methodological turning point. For the first time, historians began writing about
the history of the raf and integrating that story into the general history of the
German Federal Republic and its society. This enabledmemories and narratives to
coexist within a broader framework and time span, and to be re-interpreted against
established patterns. We see the present analysis as a contribution to this innovative
socio-cultural and historical research agenda.
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7. National Security on Trial:
The Case of Zacarias Moussaoui, 2001–2006
Geert-Jan Knoops
7.1. Introduction
Criminal prosecutions of terrorism suspects are perhaps the most controversial trials
within (international) criminal law. The juxtaposition between the nature of the
charges and the level of fair trial rights bestowed upon terrorist suspects raises a
recurring question in public debate: should such rights also be granted to terrorist
suspects? A derivative question pertains to which judicial forum should be most
competent to hear terrorism cases—amilitary commission or federal (civilian) court?
The choice of forum is contingent upon security concerns as well as on the political
strategies to be performed by the government and the defendants. TheMoussaoui
trial is perhaps the most illustrative example of this juxtaposition; it serves as a good
example of showcasing hownational security threats are sentenced in ordinary district
courts.
The federal trial before theUnited States (us) District Court for the EasternDistrict
of Virginia, which took place in the period from August 2001 to May 2006, against
ZacariasMoussaoui illustratedboth the advantages anddeficiencies of the criminal law
system in dealing with terrorism. Despite the us government’s political preference
for subjecting prominent terrorist suspects, such as Salim Hamdan (Osama Bin
Laden’s driver) and Khalid SheikhMohammed and his four co-defendants (the alleged
organisers of 9/11), to the usMilitary Commission’s proceedings at Guantánamo Bay,
Zacarias Moussaoui’s trial was held before a federal (civilian) court.
Whilst the us government, evidenced byMoussaoui’s conviction and sentencing
to life imprisonment on 4 May 2006, demonstrated its capacity to prosecute ter-
rorist suspects before us federal courts, it almost simultaneously pursued similar
prosecutions before military commissions. What rationale underlays this duality?
This article covers the performance of the terrorist suspects and their opponents,
but relates this performance predominantly to the fundamental question, why
Zacarias Moussaoui—contrary to other 9/11 terror suspects—was brought before
a us federal (civilian) court instead of before a military commission. Did this choice
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pertain to a genuine belief that the federal justice systemwasmore suitable to try
terrorism cases? Secondly, it examines whether and how this type of trial was—either
procedurally or politically—more legitimate from the perspective of the accused as
opposed to military commission proceedings (sections 2 and 6). Section 3 delves into
the particulars of the Moussaoui case: the events preceding and during the trial.
Section 4 examines the prosecutorial theory underlying the Moussaoui case. Section 5
addresses the performative strategies pursued by the prosecution and especially by
Moussaoui, as well as their effects on the fairness of the trial.
7.2. The 9/11 Legacy
7.2.1. Ever-expanding Anti-terrorism Legislation
It has been said that the terrorist attacks of 9/11, 2001, when two planes crashed into
theWorld Trade Center, another hit the us Pentagon and one crashed in the fields of
Pennsylvania, changed the international legal order.1 Significantly, after 9/11 a series of
newus laws expanding the possibilities of investigating (terrorist) crimes entered into
force. Just over a week after the attacks, on 18 September 2001 President GeorgeW. Bush
signed into law the ‘Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists’ (aumf)
Bill; an Act allowing for the use of military force against those held responsible for the
9/11 attacks.2 Two days thereafter, President Bush announced the ‘War on Terror’,
stating that ‘loosely affiliated terrorist organisations’ operating under the name of Al
Qaeda were responsible for the 9/11 attacks.3 Al Qaeda is a terrorist organisation that
was established around 1989 under the leadership of Osama Bin Laden.4 Al Qaeda—a
terrorist group with connections across the world—violently opposed non-Islamic
governments. The roots of this group can be traced back to Afghanistan and Pakistan,
particularly Peshawar; subsequently Al Qaeda was headquartered in Sudan from 1991
until 1996, before moving back to Afghanistan.5
President Bush claimed that Al Qaeda had a great deal of influence in Afghanistan
through its support for the Taliban regime; a regime that he accused of repressing its
ownpeople and of housing, supplying and sponsoring terrorists.6 Bushdemanded that
the Taliban hand over Al Qaeda operatives who were hiding in Afghanistan and close
all terrorist training camps; yet to no avail.7 On 7 October 2001, Operation Enduring
Freedom was launched and the first bombs were dropped on Afghan soil.8 On 26
October 2001, the so-called us Patriot Act was signed into law. With the advent and
expansion of us anti-terrorism legislation, the powers of law enforcement agencies
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to gather intelligence, to detain and deport immigrants suspected of terrorism and
the penalties for those committing and supporting terrorist crimes all increased.9
These developments impacted on the international legal order in amanner that is
still evident today.
Less than three weeks after the enactment of the us Patriot Act, President George
W. Bush signed an executive order establishing theMilitary Commissions.10 This order
was heavily criticised by the media, fuelling a debate on the legitimacy of the military
commissions promulgated by Bushwithout authorisation of the us Congress. The last
time that military commissions of this nature became operative within the United
States dated back to the SecondWorldWar; they had been established to prosecute
illegal immigrants fromNazi Germany;11 at that time the United States was engaged
in an officially declared conventional war. The 9/11 events did not trigger a traditional
war but rather a ‘war on terror’ against non-state parties like Al Qaeda.12
7.2.2. Prosecuting 9/11 Suspects: Realpolitik Effects
The ramifications of the 9/11 events on the legal order were not limited to a spate of
security laws; they also affected the way terrorism trials were to be conducted. In the
aftermath of 9/11 the us Administration expanded the boundaries of law enforcement
and international (criminal) law principles. The criminal case against Zacarias
Moussaoui, who was tried before a us federal court, illustrates this phenomenon.
Moussaoui, whose case will be described below, was arrested before the 9/11 attacks for
violating us immigration laws and was subsequently charged with not disclosing to
federal agents information on the impending 9/11 attacks which could have prevented
them happening. As a result Moussaoui was given a life sentence.
The influx of realpolitik, exacerbated by the 9/11 events, was manifest in a second
high-profile case, namely the case against Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (ksm), the
alleged mastermind of the 9/11 attacks whose evidence played an essential role in
the case of Moussaoui. ksmwas captured in 2002 in Pakistan by cia and Pakistani
intelligence forces. He was detained at various cia ‘black sites’ before he was
transferred to the Guantánamo Bay detention camp in 2006.13 The case of ksm is
particularly controversial since it turned out that he had been repeatedly subjected to
waterboarding at Guantánamo Bay, where he—in 2013—has been held for six years
and elevenmonths.14 Due to security considerations the ksm case was ultimately
referred from the federal court system to the military commission system. Initially
the Obama Administration intended to prosecute ksm and his four co-defendants
before a federal court in New York City. If this were to happen, evidence obtained
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from torture would probably be barred while the security costs would be exceedingly
high.15 This led to opposition on the part of the us Congress and ultimately to a
bill in December 2010 prohibiting Obama from using government funds to transfer
Guantánamo Bay detainees to us courts.16
Military commissions are said to be designed specifically for wartime situations;
differences with federal courts include the admissibility of hearsay evidence, the use of
protective orders that may require disclosure of attorney–client communications and
broad classified information rules that obstruct verifying the prosecution’s sources for
some information.17 Furthermore, evidence obtained outside the us is not barred even
if it is obtained without a preceding search warrant; similarly, use of statements made
by the defendant without a precedingMiranda warning is permissible.18 According
to the us government, these differences betweenmilitary commissions and civilian
courts are justified since military commissions take into account ‘the reality of the
battlefield’.19
The legal basis for military commissions’ trials after 9/11 can be found in the
Military Order of 13 November 2001, signed into law by President Bush.20 This order
provided for prosecuting a non-us citizen before military commissions if there
was ‘reason to believe’ that the person was a member of Al Qaeda or had engaged
in terrorist activities harming the us.21 This Order was replaced by the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 after the us Supreme Court ruled inHamdan v. Rumsfeld
that the Commissions violated the Geneva Conventions and the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (umcj).22
7.2.3. Prosecuting 9/11 Suspects: Legal Effects
The criteria promulgated by the us Administration in order for the military commis-
sion to assume jurisdiction are indicative of its political purpose. Military commission
trials can only be initiated when the suspects are:
– non-us citizens;
– affiliated with Al Qaeda; and
– persons (‘unlawful enemy combatants’) who have engaged in hostilities against
the us or its coalition partners or persons who have purposefully andmaterially
supported such hostilities.23
Next to the limitation regarding whom to prosecute, only certain types of offences can
be brought to these commissions: the alleged crimes should qualify as ‘violations of
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the laws of war’. The us government has pursued a broad interpretation of what can
be subsumed under ‘violating laws of war’; e.g. throwing one grenade at a us soldier
in Afghanistan was deemed tomeet this definition. That particular act was at the
heart of the Omar Khadr case, that of a Canadian boy who was captured by us Special
Forces at the age of 15 and tried before the Military Commission at Guantánamo
Bay. No-one actually saw whether or not Khadr threw the grenade.24 Omar Khadr
ultimately entered into a plea agreement with the prosecution.25
These limitations are yet balanced by a quite extensive prosecutorial tool under us
law, namely the insertion of the concept of conspiracy into penal law. Unlike several
jurisdictions in civil-continental law systems, common law accepts that a simple
‘meeting of minds’ without any crime actually taking place can constitute a criminal
offence, i.e. that of conspiracy. One can prosecute a person on the basis of this liability
concept simply when there is proof of an agreement between two or more persons to
commit a crime, irrespective of whether it subsequently materialises. The agreement
itself constitutes the crime. Mere knowledge of the agreement, however, does not
suffice; the intent should bematerialised in acts which reveal the criminal objective,
inferred from sufficiently significant circumstances.26 Or, as put by the South Carolina
Court:
It is sufficient that theminds of the parties meet understandingly, so as to bring about
an intelligent and deliberate agreement, to do the act and commit the offense charged,
although such agreement be not manifested by any formal words.27
The conspiracy concept may perhaps have been one of the decisive factors in deter-
mining why Zacarias Moussaoui was not tried before a military commission. Under
the laws of war, conspiracy is not deemed to be a separate crime—which deserves
some elucidation at this stage. As far as prosecutions for violations of the laws of
war are concerned, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(icty) Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case differentiated between the concept of Joint
Criminal Enterprise (jce) and conspiracy, the latter not being a violation of the laws
of war.28 The Tadic judgment emphasised the proper nature of criminal liability: that
of individual participation and responsibility. The icty Appeals Chamber held that
‘nobody may be held criminally responsible for acts or transactions in which he has
not personally engaged or in some other way participated’.29 These words must not be
interpreted as creating a means of international collective responsibility—comprising
the act of conspiracy—as opposed to the classic individual responsibility. The Appeals
Chamber specified which type of scenario jce refers to. Actually the Chamber referred
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to a scenario of jce in which ‘the participation and the contribution of the other
members of the group is often vital in facilitating the commission of the offence in
question’.30 The participation has of course to be voluntary and intentional, andmust
bemade in full knowledge both of the gravity of the acts planned to be committed and
of their foreseeable consequences. On its face this seems similar to the definition of the
offence of conspiracy; yet, jce can be distinguished by the nature of the ‘participation’
in the commission of the crime. Within this concept, the Appeals Chamber held that
‘participation’ need ‘not involve commission of a specific crime under one of those
provisions (for example, murder, extermination, torture, rape, etc.), but may take
the form of assistance in, or contribution to, the execution of the common plan or
purpose’.31 There is no such requirement in the crime of conspiracy, which relies
more on the intent of the conspirator than his or her effective participation in the
commission of the crime.
This differentiationwas affirmedby theus SupremeCourt inHamdanv.Rumsfeld.32
The Court endorsed the argument that ‘international sources confirm that the crime
charged here [i.e. conspiracy; gjk] is not a recognized violation of the law of war’.33
Thus, in hindsight it might have been a prudent choice to have theMoussaoui case
referred to a federal court, since the conspiracy charge wouldmost likely have been
quashed, as happened in theHamdan case. However, the us Supreme Court’s decision
inHamdan v. Rumsfeld has been superseded by theMilitary Commissions Acts (mca)
of 2006 and 2009 which do include conspiracy.34
Unlike the ksm case, which was barred from the Federal Court system, Moussaoui
was put on trial before a federal court, which case commenced in January 2002 and
lasted until his conviction inMay 2006. Following an analysis of Moussaoui’s history
and the particulars of his case, this chapter focusses on the political and defence
strategies of his trial.
7.3. Zacarias Moussaoui: A Personal History
For defence barristers, probably one of themost problematic clients is a defendant
who is uncooperative, especially one who challenges the competence of the court to
hear his case. Zacarias Moussaoui turned out to be such a defendant. The reasons for
his (strategic) position in court had probably much to do with his personal history.
Zacarias Moussaoui was born on 30May 1968. His mother was only 14 years old
when she married. Five years later she and her husband moved from Morocco to
France where Moussaoui was born and brought up without much of a religious
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education. Moussaoui’s parents divorced in 1972. During his childhoodMoussaoui
was confronted with violence, particularly by his father, and racism; he grew up partly
with his family and partly in different orphanages.35
Zacarias Moussaoui and his family followed different religious paths. Whereas he
and his brother were both believers in Islam, though in different forms, his sister
found her faith in Judaism and his mother did not practise her religion in public,
although she did identify with Islam.36 TheMoussaoui household thus turned out to
be a synthesis of different religions, underlining the freedom of choice of the family
members.37 Surprisingly, unlike his brother and sister (having more or less the same
socio-cultural background) Zacarias Moussaoui radicalised. Apparently, a shared
socio-cultural background does not fully account for the choices an individual makes,
as the example of theMoussaoui family shows.38 Moussaoui’s radicalisation process
must thus have had a different cause.
7.3.1. Moussaoui’s Radicalisation Process
TheMoussaoui family, being first generation immigrants fromMorocco, was often
confronted with racism in France, as was also testified to by a witness for the defence
during the sentencing phase of the Moussaoui trial.39 In France, Moussaoui and
his brother were discriminated against because of their Arab descent, had fights
at nightclubs for the same reason and did not meet the approval of the parents
of Moussaoui’s girlfriend.40 In 1992 Zacarias Moussaoui moved to London to learn
Englishwhere he obtained aMaster’s degree in international business fromSouthbank
University in London in 1995.41 While in London, Moussaoui’s family started noticing
Moussaoui’s transformation. He started wearing a beard andmade comments on
his sister’s clothing, calling her a whore because she was tooWestern.42 As a student
Moussaoui started to attend prayers at differentmosques, among which were the
BrixtonMosque and later themore radical FinsburyMosque. The imam of the Brixton
Mosque noticed that Moussaoui was growingmore militant.43 After showing up in
military fatigues, wearing a backpack and demanding information about joining the
jihad, Moussaoui was suspended from the BrixtonMosque.44 In the meantime he was
approached bymore extremist groups, such as Al Muhajiroun (‘the emigrants’).45
According to some, perhaps due to his experiences with racism in France and his
inability to find a proper job despite his Master’s degree, he was drawn into this
militant branch of Islamism.46 As of 1996, the French authorities became interested
in him after Moussaoui was seen with Islamic extremists in London. The French
authorities noticed his growing affinity with Islamic radicalism and they started
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monitoring him.47 Moussaoui had already started to sever ties with his family,
returning to France only once, in 1997. In 1998, he went to the Khalden training camp
in Afghanistan, a training camp tied to Al Qaeda, at the same time asMohamed Atta.48
Atta hijacked and piloted American Airlines Flight 11, the first plane that flew into the
World Trade Center on 9/11.49 In 2002Moussaoui saw his mother again, when she
appeared at his trial hearings in Alexandria, Virginia.50 At trial, Moussaoui’s defence
team presented evidence outlining his ongoingmental health problems, indicating
that Moussaoui was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia.51 Furthermore, the
vulnerable relationship with his French girlfriend, andmore particularly the rejection
of Moussaoui by her parents, was put before the jury in an effort to obtain a reduced
sentence.52
7.3.2. Moussaoui’s Arrest
Moussaoui returned to London after he attended the Khalden training camp. Clearly,
this strengthened his opposition to non-Islamic governments and his desire to fight
for the jihad, since he continued and intensified his activities for Al Qaeda.53 In 2000
he was sent to Malaysia by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of the
9/11 attacks, to take flying lessons.54 Moussaoui, who could not find a flying school of
his choice inMalaysia, started with other terrorist activities, such as buyingmaterials
to produce bombs. When Khalid Sheikh Mohammed found out about this, he ordered
Moussaoui to take flying lessons in the us.55 He started at the Airman Flight School
in Norman, Oklahoma, in February 2001.56 After a break from late May onwards, he
made inquiries about taking Boeing 747 lessons at the Pan Am International Flight
Academy in Eagan, Minnesota. On 10 July 2001, Moussaoui deposited us$1,500 for
training at that flight academy, after which he received a training schedule for 13–20
August.57 It was never revealed howMoussaoui had obtained the large sums ofmoney
that were in his possession during his time in the us. No explanation was found for
the us$32,000 that Moussaoui had deposited in a bank account in Norman upon
his arrival in the us, and it was not believed thatMoussaoui’s self-declared job as a
freelance telemarketer brought in enoughmoney to pay us$8,300 for flying lessons.
Mohamed Atta, a friend ofMoussaoui, who was also allegedly involved in the 9/11
complot, indicated that Moussaoui receivedmoney from overseas; yet he was unable
to say how he knew this.58
Moussaoui’s flight instructor, Clarence Prevost, became suspicious because
Moussaoui had paid his tuition fee in cash and, unlike the other students, he focused
his training specifically on piloting a Boeing 747 inmid-air. He was not interested in
national security on trial: the case of zacarias moussaoui, 2001–2006 | 319
learning to takeoff and land theplane.59The flight schoolwarned thefbi.On 16August
2001, the fbi arrestedMoussaoui because his visa had expired, just a month before
the 9/11 attacks.60 After Moussaoui was arrested, the fbi had difficulty researching
Moussaoui’s assets; the fbi headquarters in Washington were reluctant to issue either
a criminal warrant or a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act warrant, because they
believed there were insufficient grounds to justify the warrants.61 Prior to 9/11, the us
government was limited in its ability to collect and share intelligence inside the us.
This legislative situation within the us changed dramatically after the 9/11 attacks, as
outlined in the preceding section.
AlthoughMoussaoui’s activities subsequently raised the suspicion that he might
have been selected to be one of the 9/11 hijackers, were it not that he was detained at
that time, Khalid SheikhMohammed revealed in one of his interviews with the us
intelligence services that Moussaoui was not part of this plot.62 Another important
question raised was whether the attacks could have been prevented if Moussaoui had
told the fbi in August 2001 everything he knew. The prosecution argued that this was
indeed the case, whilst the defence argued that Moussaoui had no specific knowledge
of the 9/11 attacks.63
Few contested that Moussaoui was linked to Al Qaeda. He had attended Al Qaeda
training camps, he could be linked to several other Al Qaeda members and when fbi
officials searchedMoussaoui’s house after 9/11 a notewas foundwith themobile phone
number of an Al Qaeda cell member in Germany. This person turned out to have dealt
with the financial arrangements for all nineteen 9/11 hijackers. It was established that
Moussaoui’s flying lessons were paid for withmoney wired by this German cell of
jihadist comrades.64
From a legal perspective, it was questionable whether this link was sufficient to
sustain the conviction of Moussaoui for conspiring in the 9/11 attacks. When taking
into account the evidence that was released during the trial, one could well ask why
Moussaoui entered a guilty plea. From ksm’s written evidence previously obtained by
the us—Moussaoui’s defence was not allowed to call this witness at trial—it could
be derived that Moussaoui was not involved in the 9/11 attacks. According to ksm,
Moussaoui was supposed to participate in a second follow-up attack.65 Moreover,
because ‘Moussaoui was supposed to be in flight school and was not supposed to be in
contact with him or anyone until after graduating’,66 ksmwas reportedly unaware
that he was captured before the 9/11 attacks. Later, at the sentencing stage, Moussaoui
testified that hewas supposed to fly a plane into theWhiteHouse on 9/11 togetherwith
shoe bomber Richard Reid. But no evidentiary link was ever established between Reid
andMoussaoui in relation to a White House attack on 9/11.67 It seems that—aware of
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the evidentiary weakness of the prosecution’s case—Moussaoui deliberately entered
a guilty plea as part of an overall trial strategy, which included his tactic to die as a
martyr (see below).
7.4. The Prosecution’s Theory as regards theMoussaoui Case
As mentioned, Zacarias Moussaoui was initially arrested on immigration charges in
August 2001; yet ultimately he was prosecuted on the basis of conspiring in the 9/11
attacks, particularly for not disclosing the impending attacks. Notably, at the time of
the attacks, Moussaoui was already detained and had been interrogated on the basis
of these immigration charges. The ‘conspiracy’ element was based on the assumption
that in August 2001, at the time of his arrest, Zacarias Moussaoui was already aware
of the impending twin tower attacks, whilst withholding this information from
us federal officials. This conspiracy charge arose from suspicious acts surrounding
Moussaoui’s flying lessons, his connections to other Al Qaedamembers who were
allegedly involved in the plot and the fact that he had attended an Al Qaeda training
camp. The notion that Moussaoui was aware of the 9/11 plot might also have been
fuelled by his personal history, as illustrated above.
Yet, no conclusive evidence existed in August 2001 that Moussaoui materially
contributed to the 9/11 attacks other than lying to federal authorities about his
contacts and flying lessons, with the apparent aim of preventing the attacks from
being revealed. It might even have been the case that in the absence of a guilty plea on
Moussaoui’s part (which he entered in 2002, but which was refused by the court, yet
successfully re-entered on 22 April 2005),68 he could have been acquitted.69
On 11 December 2001, the French-Moroccan was charged by a Federal Grand
Jury in the us District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia with six conspiracy
counts: conspiracy to commit acts of extra-territorial terrorism, conspiracy to commit
aircraft piracy, conspiracy to destroy aircraft, conspiracy to use weapons of mass
destruction, conspiracy to murder us employees and conspiracy to destroy property.70
The indictment included overt acts such as providing guesthouses and training
camps for Al Qaeda, providing military and intelligence training and attempting
to obtain nuclear weapons.71 Many acts did not explicitly refer toMoussaoui, but
were targetedmore broadly by naming ‘Usama Bin Laden, and others known and
unknown’ or ‘unindicted co-conspirators, known and unknown’.72 Furthermore,
the time-frame included in the indictment was rather extensive, using terminology
such as ‘at various times from at least as early as 1989’.73 The acts leading up to
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the ‘conspiracy to commit terrorism’ charge that did explicitly refer toMoussaoui
consisted of his alleged attendance at an Al Qaeda training camp in 1998, his inquiries
about flying training (i.e. an e-mail to the Norman Flight School in Oklahoma and
letters fromhis employer indicating that hewould earn amonthly income of us$2,500
as a marketing consultant), flight logs that indicated that Moussaoui flew from
London to Pakistan, from Pakistan to London, from London to Chicago—where he
declared at least us$35,000 cash at customs—and from Chicago to Oklahoma. In
Norman, Oklahoma,Moussaoui opened a bank account where he deposited us$32,000
in cash.Moussaoui took flying lessons inNorman from February 2001 until he stopped
his classes early in May 2001.74 Curiously, Moussaoui’s membership of a gym in
Oklahoma was also brought up as one of the acts in the indictment.75 With regard
to the allegation thatMoussaoui withheld vital information about the impending
9/11 attacks, the prosecution alleged that Moussaoui ‘while being interviewed by
federal agents inMinneapolis, attempted to explain his presence in the United States
by falsely stating that he was simply interested in learning to fly’.76 The five other
conspiracy counts in the indictment all made reference to the acts mentioned in
the first count (i.e. conspiracy to commit terrorism). Taken together, the acts were
meant to demonstrate that Moussaoui used the same preparatorymodus operandi as
the nineteen co-conspirators who conducted the 9/11 hijackings.77
7.5. Prosecution and Defence Trial Strategies within theMoussaoui Case
7.5.1. Introduction
TheMoussaoui case illustrates the level of legal randomness involved, inasmuch as it
concerns the placeswhere the 9/11 and othermajor terrorism suspectswere prosecuted.
Moussaoui and Ahmed Ghailani were tried before a federal (civilian court). Ghailani
was indicted before a federal court inNew York in 2010 for conspiring in the 1998 bomb
attacks on the us embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.78 Yet other terrorist suspects
such as ksm and his four co-defendants were subjected to the military commissions
system, created through the aforementionedMilitary Order.79
In general, terrorism trials may serve as legal mechanisms both for governments
and defendants to pursue (political) strategies. The legal arena, in which the gov-
ernment, the terrorist suspects, possible witnesses, victims and the media all have a
role to play, may encourage such strategies.80 Unlikemilitary commissions, whose
proceedings are held in closed session, public federal trials enable terrorist suspects to
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elevate them into ‘show trials’, i.e. using the public trial to advocate the ideological
message of their terrorist organisation. Similarly, the public nature of a federal trial
can serve the political agenda of the government, i.e. the message conveyed by the us
government that it endorses the rule of law by showing the world the fairness of the
us criminal law system.
In what follows we will discuss how both the us government andMoussaoui tried
to instrumentalise the trial in pursuit of their respective political strategies.
7.5.2. Trial Strategy of theusGovernment
Security considerations were increasingly factored in when dealing with legal-
procedural questions. Section 2 touched on some of the differences between federal
courts andmilitary commissions relating to jurisdictional and evidentiary issues.Once
such differences exist, a government can anticipate them by opting for either the civil
court system or the military commission’s system. In a military commission context
the defence does not have the same access to witnesses or other evidence as it has in a
federal court; hearsay evidence is more easily admissible before military commissions
and there are few options available to challenge its source; and rules protecting the
use of classified information transformmilitary commissions trials into proceedings
entrenched in secrecy.81 Proponents of military commissions point to the security and
disclosure risks accompanying a federal trial, arguing that a federal trial could (more
easily) result in acquittals of guilty persons.82 On the other hand, federal trials are
generally seen as able to produce fair verdicts; an important perception factor within
the us and abroad.83 The possibility of undue delay may also be part of a prosecution
strategy to opt for federal trials which are, time-wise, most often conductedmore
efficiently. Federal courts have not only processed a far greater number of terrorism
cases thanmilitary commissions, but also concluded themmore swiftly.84 Whereas
military commissions had completed seven cases in the ten years after the 9/11 attacks,
federal courts had completed 578 terrorism-related cases in the same timeframe.85 Yet,
at the timeMoussaoui was tried in a us federal court, the prosecution could not have
foreseen this.
It is instructive to ascertain why the us Administrationmade the legal-political
choices that it did between a federal court trial and that of a military commission.
In a public speech at Northwestern University near Chicago in 2012, us Attorney
General Eric Holder set out the policy and preference of the Obama Administration
for prosecuting terrorism suspects before federal criminal courts. Holder proffered the
view that there ‘[is] no inherent contradiction between usingmilitary commissions
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in appropriate cases while still prosecuting other terrorists in civilian courts’.86 The
us Attorney General advocated that the ‘reformed commissions’ (in 2009—under the
Obama Administration—the Military Commissions’ rules were amended supposedly
in favour of the defendant) guaranteed the same fair trial rights as within the civil
court system; for example, that ‘statements obtained through torture, inhuman
or degrading treatment’ are prohibited, suspects have the right to legal counsel,
and that these commissions too ‘provide a presumption of innocence and require
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt’. Yet the us Attorney General acknowl-
edged that there is one fundamental difference between these two types of trials;
some of the evidentiary rules at the military commission level do reflect the ‘re-
ality of the battlefield’, in that statements obtained from suspects and witnesses
‘may be admissible even in the absence of Miranda warnings, because we cannot
expect military personnel to administer warnings to an enemy captured in bat-
tle’.87
Holder’s statement regarding the fair trial equality between the two types of trial
does not, however, hold for when theMoussaoui case was first dealt with in court
in January 2002. At that timemilitary commissions proceedings did allow evidence
obtained through coercion. A slightly augmentedMilitary Commissions Act (mca)
was enacted by the us Congress and signed into law by the Bush Administration
following the us Supreme Court’s ruling of 29 June 2006 inHamdan v. Rumsfeld.88 In
this five-to three majority judgment, the justices ruled that the military commissions
established without congressional approval by President Bush in November 2001
were unconstitutional because the executive branch of government did not have
the power to create judicial organs with special jurisdiction. They also deemed that
suchmilitary proceedings violated Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. In
particular, the admission of evidence at trial in the absence of the defendant was ruled
out of order by the us Supreme Court. In 2009, under the Obama Administration,
the mca was revised, amending some of the 2006 rules. And yet, as of this writing,
the defence lawyers for ksm and his four co-defendants still face court hearings
at Guantánamo Bay in which the defendants are not allowed to participate, the
reason given being that they may not share the results of these hearings with
them.89
While balancing these arguments pro and contra military commission proceed-
ings, itmayhave been the case that theus government under the BushAdministration
was willing to putMoussaoui on trial before a federal court in order to test the re-
silience of the federal criminal law system in prosecuting terrorism suspects. After all,
Moussaoui did not have an active part in the 9/11 attacks; from this point of view, he
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was only ‘a small fish’. The us government was able to demonstrate ‘good faith’ to the
international community by subjecting terrorism suspects to a swift and expedient
federal trial. Clearly, the objective that the us government pursued in the Moussaoui
case was to show the world the transparency of its system, a ‘strategy’ that the trial
judge Ms. Leonie Brinkema was eager to implement. Her intention was to admit all
of the victims into the courtroom and to organise simultaneous video casts in other
places in order to provide extensive live coverage of the proceedings. Furthermore
she had these screenings set up in other courtrooms akin to the ‘real’ one.90 Therefore,
the choice to tryMoussaoui before a federal court had direct consequences for the
families of the victims, offering them a forum to ease their pain and to seek justice.
Despite the fact that manymembers of the victims’ families were willing to testify
in court (relatively soon after the attacks), the Moussaoui trial ultimately did not
turn into a public forum for the victims. Only some of the familymembers of the
victims testified at trial, and these appearances did not turn into amedia circus as
was feared.91
One could say that the success of the prosecution’s strategy was evidenced by
the jury convictingMoussaoui and sentencing him to six consecutive life sentences,
without the possibility of parole.92 On the other hand, the prosecution had sought
the death penalty, which Judge Brinkema tried to prevent.93 Be this as it may, in the
Moussaoui trial the us government was able to demonstrate that it could produce
guilty verdicts against 9/11 suspects through its federal court systemwhile upholding
fair trial guarantees as provided for in the us constitution. This observation does not
negate the criticism that revolved around theMoussaoui trial; namely that it offered a
‘stage’ for Moussaoui to express his radical ideas. This performative perspective is
addressed in the next section.
7.5.3. Moussaoui’s Performative Trial Strategies
The Plea Agreement ‘Battle’
At the start of the trial, Moussaoui proclaimed, ‘In the name of Allah, I do not have
anything to plead, and I enter no plea’.94 From the outset of the trial—which began
on 2 January 2002—Zacarias Moussaoui intended to steer the proceedings in his own
direction by refusing legal counsel and insisting on representing himself, by refusing
to plead to the charges (as a result of which federal judgeMs. Brinkema entered a not
guilty plea ‘on his behalf ’) and to petition to hear several detained Al Qaeda leaders as
potential witnesses, including Khalid SheikhMohammed. At the outset, Moussaoui
stagedmore aggressive tactics, in that he challenged the court’s competence to try him
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and indeed the very competence of the us court system as awhole. His refusal to accept
any legal assistance from court-appointed lawyers is illustrative of this. In response,
on 22 April 2002, a hearingwas held to assessMoussaoui’s demand to represent himself
without counsel. To clarify his reasons for declining court-appointed counsel and to
underpin his view that he was subjected to a ‘corrupted’ legal system, Moussaoui
recited several surahs of the Koran.95 On 13 June 2002—after a mental evaluation by
experts—the federal judge considered him competent to represent himself whilst
at the same time ordering the previously court-appointed counsel to stay on as a
standby.96
Moussaoui changed his legal defence strategy several times. When the trial began
in January 2002, Moussaoui refused to enter a plea.97 As mentioned above, in April
2002Moussaoui asked to represent himself, occasioning Judge Brinkema’s request that
he be mentally evaluated.98 On 13 June 2002, Moussaoui, once he had been permitted
to represent himself, pleaded not guilty. On 18 July 2002, after the indictment was
amended by the prosecution to strengthen its case for the death penalty, Moussaoui
announced his intention to plead guilty. He then told the court, ‘I have knowledge
and I participated in Al Qaeda. […] I am a member of Al Qaeda […] I pledge bayat
to Osama Bin Laden’.99 On 25 July 2002, Judge Brinkema—after givingMoussaoui
one week to reconsider—rejected his plea as disingenuous and equivocal, not being
convinced that Moussaoui fully understood the consequences of his actions. On
14 November 2003, Judge Brinkema terminatedMoussaoui’s self-representation due
to his repeated unprofessional and dishonourable interventions.100 Between 2002
and 2004 several important procedural aspects were litigated at trial, such as access
to certain Al Qaeda witnesses (including ksm) and the admissibility of the death
penalty. In April 2005 Moussaoui again expressed his intention to plead guilty, a
plea Judge Brinkema accepted on 22 April 2005 for all six conspiracy charges. Hence,
the trial entered the sentencing stage.101 Opening statements were delivered on
6 March 2006. On 3 April 2006 the twelve-person jury ruled that Moussaoui was
eligible for the death penalty since his lying to federal agents implicated him in the
9/11 attacks.102 After a month of deliberations the jury—unable to reach unanimity
on the death penalty—recommended a sentence of life imprisonment on 3 May
2006. This recommendation was formally accepted by Judge Brinkema on 4 May
2006.103 One day after Moussaoui was sentenced to life imprisonment, he announced
to his lawyers his intention to withdraw his guilty plea; on 6 May 2006 a motion
was filed to that effect.104 Judge Brinkema denied Moussaoui’s motion on 8 May
2006, ruling that federal law does not provide for withdrawing a guilty plea after
sentencing.105
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Moussaoui’s Main Strategy: Putting the Trial ‘on Trial’
Moussaoui’s changing attitude during the trial makes it difficult to detect his exact
strategy. The most likely strategy he pursued was to disrupt the actual trial and
question the legitimacy of the trial itself, an explicit strategy of rupture. From
this perspective, it might have been a deliberate choice to switch tactics (such as
his inconsistent approach vis-à-vis pleading to the charges) in order to discredit
the us criminal justice system. It is unlikely that Moussaoui was unconscious
of the implications of his strategy due to his mental state. On the one hand,
Moussaoui’s lawyers argued thatMoussaoui’s actions—e.g. firinghis lawyers—showed
his disturbed state of mind, while he invented conspiracy theories.106 Judge Brinkema
hadMoussaoui mentally examined during the trial phase.107 Moussaoui’s mother,
Aicha el-Wafi, stated in an interview on 21 June 2002—when she was in the us to visit
her son in jail—that Moussaoui had made a mistake by firing his lawyers. In her view,
her son did this due to the fact that he had been ‘shut up and closed away from the
world for the past ninemonths, that he doesn’t eat well. He is not sleeping well. He
has light above his head 24 hours a day. He doesn’t see anyone.’108 Yet, these factors do
not support the notion that Moussaoui was insane.
On the other hand, Moussaoui appeared to have deliberately targeted the us
legal system and the person of the presiding judge, Ms. Brinkema, transforming the
courtroom into an arena of open lawfare (see Introduction), with the intention of
undermining the integrity of the judge. On 11 June 2002, Moussaoui submitted a
self-writtenmotion, entitled ‘Motion for pre-contempt of Leonie Brinkema order
to declare Zacarias Moussaoui crazy’. Clearly this action attacked the impartiality
of the federal judge since she had earlier ordered the psychiatric assessment of the
defendant. Moussaoui’s strategyto undermine the legitimacy of the trial as such was
illustrated in his ‘own’ psychological analysis of the federal judge, embedded in that
motion, reading:
Mental Status Examination
Axis 1: Acute symptom of Islamaphobia with complex of gender inferiority.
Diagnostic Impression
Legal pathological killer instinct with ego boosting dementia to become Supreme.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Immediate psychiatric hospitalization to specialist unit. (Propose unit. ubl
Treatment Center, of course ubl stand for Unique Best Location)109
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Another example was Moussaoui’s motion filed on 22 February 2003 entitled:
In the Name of Allah: Censured by the United Sodom of America
Slave of Allah v. Slave of Satan
Zacarias Moussaoui John Ashcroft110
John Ashcroft, the us Attorney General at the time of the Moussaoui case, is thus
referred to as ‘Slave of Satan’, while Judge Leonie Brinkema is referred therein as ‘Death
Judge Leonie’. The power struggle between the court and the defendant continued
until 14 November 2003, when Judge Brinkema’s tolerance was exhausted; citing the
continued recurrence of several inflammatory briefs from the defendant, she annulled
Moussaoui’s right to self-representation and appointed counsel.111
Moussaoui’s strategy of rupture to discredit the us legal systemwas also visible
during the battle at the trial when it came to disclosing evidence. Moussaoui must
have been aware that under the us criminal legal system the prosecution bears the
absolute obligation to disclose to the defence upon request all exculpatory evidence
in its possession and other discovery materials. This obligation originates from a
us Supreme Court ruling in Brady v.Maryland: ‘Suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused who has requested it violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or
bad faith of the prosecution’,112 as well as fromRule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. This provision obligates the government to disclose to a defendant copies
of relevant statements made by the defendant as well as of photographs, documents,
books, etc., relevant to the trial when these are within the government’s possession,
custody or control.113
As a result, in theMoussaoui case, due to these strict disclosure obligations, the
prosecution—assisted by experts from the Counter-Terrorism Section of the Criminal
Division of the Justice Department—was forced to invest ‘hundreds of hours in
reviewing thousands of documents’ in the possession of theus intelligence services.114
Subsequently, in July 2003, Moussaoui asked the court for access to Al Qaeda detainees,
including ksm, in order to interview them. Moussaoui and his appointed lawyers also
relied on the Fifth Amendment (due process protections) and the Sixth Amendment
(fair trial rights).115 Moussaoui’s actions triggered an intense and fundamental legal
debate and opinions, revealing a dichotomy between the judiciary and executive
branch within the us as to the scope of fair trial rights that terrorism suspects should
have. The disclosure battle also resulted in a debate on the admissibility of the death
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penalty, which the prosecution sought. On 2 October 2003, Judge Brinkema barred the
us government from seeking the death penalty because Moussaoui was denied access
to certain Al Qaeda witnesses.116 This decision was overturned by a federal court of
appeals on 22 April 2004; the government was allowed to seek the death penalty. It was
also argued that national security provided satisfactory grounds for refusing the right
to interview certain witnesses prior to or during the trial, and that Moussaoui would
have tomanage with government-prepared summaries of the statements by the Al
Qaeda witnesses that were requested.117
All of these actions by Moussaoui indicate that he had deliberately chosen to put
the trial and the judge ‘on trial’, and as such they also contradict the suggestion that
he was insane. In addition, more tacit indications confirm that Moussaoui’s strategy
was intentional. These include his legal battle to represent himself without counsel
as well as his filing of all sorts of motions in an effort to discredit, delegitimise and
delay the trial; providing a catalyst for journalists to refer to the case asMoussaoui v.
the United States instead of the other way around.118 It is thus fair to say that, given
Moussaoui’s legal performances, his approach was indeed defined by a well-chosen
strategy of rupture, which turned the courtroom in a theatre of lawfare.
Moussaoui’s Secondary Strategy: Putting theWesternWorld on Trial
It is also likely that a secondary goal of his strategy of putting western civilisation as
such ‘on trial’ was to become amartyr within the Islamic society. Several examples
illustrate this aim.
First, from the outset of the trial, the French-Moroccan prayed for the annihilation
of several states, including Israel, Russia, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and
the us, as well as for the liberation of Palestine, Chechnya and Afghanistan.
Second, two specific tactics can be disentangled fromMoussaoui’s 2002 guilty plea.
Moussaoui made it known at the trial in no uncertain terms that he wanted to die
as a martyr in his fight for the jihad.119 Two days before Moussaoui announced his
decision to plead guilty, the government had strengthened its case in order to support
the request for the death penalty.120 If Moussaoui wanted to die as a martyr, he had to
act accordingly at trial in order to ‘convince’ the jury to impose the death penalty. Yet,
he was unsuccessful in pursuing this strategy; in the end the death penalty was not
imposed. Three weeks after Moussaoui was sentenced to life imprisonment, Osama
Bin Laden released a video denyingMoussaoui’s involvement in the 9/11 attacks.121
Analysts concluded that AlQaedawas probably trying to distance itself from ‘a lunatic’,
for many considered Moussaoui to be erratic during his trial. This message from
Osama Bin Ladenmust have been a setback in Moussaoui’s ‘martyrdom strategy’.122
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Still, some analysts have argued that Bin Laden’s video was released to demonstrate
the flaws of the us criminal justice system; one that was willing to convict someone
for conspiracy in a plot in which, according to high-ranking Al Qaeda leaders, the
defendant was not even involved.123
Moussaoui’s Sentencing Strategy: The Battle for the Death Penalty
The opening statement of Moussaoui’s defence attorney, EdwardMacMahon, at the
sentencing stage raised the question whether the trial could have produced a guilty
verdict had Moussaoui not entered this plea. On 6 March 2006 MacMahon proclaimed
that Moussaoui had not admitted involvement in the 9/11 attacks, while those attacks
formed ‘the heart of this case’.124 MacMahon contended that:
What the Statement of Facts contains is mostly historical admissions of a general
nature about al Qaeda and its training and other plans thatMoussaoui, as an admitted
al Qaeda member, was in a position to know, including, yes, the existence of a plane’s
operation. The reasonMr. Spencer [lead prosecutor, gjk] declines to tell you that he is
going to prove what role Moussaoui played in the 9/11 attacks is because there is no
evidence to support it. There is no evidence as to what he did in these attacks, and the
government would surely come forward with that evidence if it existed.125
The defence statement contended that Moussaoui did not lie to federal agents, since
he simply did not know about the impending 9/11 attacks.
At the end of the trial,Moussaoui’s defence attorney concluded that a verdictwould
giveMoussaoui exactly what he was longing for, namely, martyrdom.MacMahon
stated, ‘the only way he can achieve that dream and then live on as some smiling
face on a recruiting poster for Usama Bin Laden is by your verdict. Please don’t
make him a hero.’126 However, against the advice of his lawyers Moussaoui, on
27 March 2006, alleged that he was supposed to fly a fifth plane into the White
House on 9/11, although—as said—no evidence of that was found.127 On 13 April 2006
Moussaoui stated that he did not regret the 9/11 attacks. Five days later a psychologist
on behalf of the defence testified thatMoussaoui suffered fromparanoid schizophrenia
with delusions.128 On 24 April the jury started its deliberations and on 3May 2006
recommended a life sentence,whichwas accepted by Judge Brinkemaon 4May 2006.129
As mentioned, the appropriateness of imposing the death penalty was both legally
and politically one of themost axiomatic issues. Provoking the death penalty most
likely served as an additional trial strategy for both the prosecution and forMoussaoui
in terms of his becoming amartyr.
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The prosecution’s adamantly seeking to impose the death penalty on Zacarias
Moussaoui raised one of the most controversial issues of dispute. Ironically, by
pursuing the death penalty the prosecution was obliged to meet a higher standard of
proof, namely that Moussaoui ‘intentionally participated in an act […] and the victim
died as a direct result of the act’.130 Yet, Moussaoui only conceded that he knew about
the plot and did not do anything to prevent it from taking place.
Why then did the prosecution ask for the death penalty? Radsan notes that ‘the
justice department’s decision to seek the death penalty in theMoussaoui case was
political’, since ‘the American public was outraged after the attacks on our soil’.131
Here, as observed, one may find the reason why Judge Brinkema was relatively lenient
in favour of the defendant in terms of the disclosure of exculpatory evidence, namely
‘the looming threat of the death penalty over Moussaoui.’132 Had the death penalty
not been on the table, the prosecution would probably not have been put under legal
pressure to disclose classified materials to the defence, or at the least would have been
authorised extensively to redact such documents.133
On 3May 2006, the federal jury—after having foundMoussaoui guilty—sentenced
him, not to death, but to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The
irony lies in the fact that because, on one charge, a single juror voted against the death
penalty, it was the us jury system itself that savedMoussaoui’s life. Three of the six
charges were punishable by the death penalty, yet required a unanimous jury. But, as
the foreman of the 12-member jury revealed to theWashington Post, the jury was not
unanimous; it voted 11–1, 10–2 and 10–2 in favour of the death penalty.134
Judge Brinkema, in her sentencing order, sentencedMoussaoui to six consecutive
terms of life imprisonment which, as observed, deprivedMoussaoui of ‘martyrdom
in a great big bang of glory’135—words chosen by Judge Brinkema. Needless to say,
Mr. Moussaoui must have been surprised to receive life imprisonment instead of the
death penalty. He apparently never anticipated that outcome.136
For the international community though, the fact that federal prosecutors were
pursuing the death penalty could have endangered international cooperation in
criminal matters, for example in extradition cases between the European Union and
the us.137
In conclusion, Moussaoui’s performance suggests a fourfold strategy:
1) Discredit the judge;
2) Discredit the us legal system
3) Put western society as such on trial;
4) Provoke the use of the death penalty and die as a martyr.
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Unlike ksm and his four co-defendants who face the death penalty before the
Military Commission, Moussaoui was not put on death row. It is doubtful whether
this was due to this fourfold strategy. It seemsmore likely that his escaping death row
was due to the functioning of the federal (jury) system.
7.6. Conclusion: Past and Future Legislative (Political) Lessons
7.6.1. The Aftermath
Aicha El-Wafi, Moussaoui’s mother, responded after the trial by stating that her
son was ‘being judged for the things he says, the things he believes, the convictions
he has that shock us all, but not for his involvement in the attacks’.138 Indeed, as
analysed before, the evidencewas not persuasive as to the actual knowledgeMoussaoui
had before 9/11; what exactly did he know about the 9/11 plots? Both Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed and Osama Bin Laden denied that Moussaoui was to be the 20th hijacker.
Two other Al Qaeda operatives—detained at Guantánamo Bay—declared in their
interviews conducted by us authorities that Moussaoui was not involved in the 9/11
conspiracy; rather, the government would come to suspect that the 20th hijacker was
an Al Qaeda detainee at Guantánamo Bay.139
The question triggered by Mrs. El Wafi’s remark is whether the outcome of
the Moussaoui trial was justified from a legal and political perspective. From the
perspective of law enforcement, the Moussaoui trial made clear that disclosure
obligations in the federal court system put intelligence agencies at a disadvantage,
whereas military commission proceedings provide the government with more
mechanisms of secrecy to submit classified documents required for a conviction
while securing its sources.140 As John Radsan put it, Zacarias Moussaoui ‘should have
been dealt with as we are dealing with Khalid SheikhMohammed and other members
of the Al Qaeda terrorist network; through non-criminal detention. […] Placing him
in a federal district court for a criminal trial was amistake.’141 Indeed, the criminal
law paradigm in dealing with terrorist suspects (the tension between the secrecy of
counter-terrorism operations and the defendants’ fair trial rights) is at the heart of
the political reluctance to prosecute terrorist suspects in civilian courts. Proponents of
pursuing the line of military commissions, as being the appropriate forum to try
terrorist suspects (affiliated with Al Qaeda), tend to rely on pragmatic arguments such
as the costs, complications, risks to intelligence sources and agencies.142 They will
also point to trial performances akin toMoussaoui’s tactics.
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However true these arguments may be, they negate the fact that by submitting
these cases to civilian courts the incentive for law enforcement and intelligence officers
to comply with the law and fair trial standards is strong. In other words, they will
bemore inclined to abstain from illegal methods lest the federal judges hold such
methods against them. Thus, the quality of their fact-finding and ultimately the
quality of the criminal evidence submitted could be reinforced. Potential disruptive
trial performances should not weigh against the advantages of allowing the rule of
law to prevail.
7.6.2. Political Choices Revisited
Following the Moussaoui trial, several terrorism trials, such as the case against ksm,
havebeen referred to amilitary commission.Was this due toMoussaoui’s performances
at his trial? The ten years since 9/11 have demonstrated that terrorism trials in federal
courts seem amore viable option in terms of efficiency: quantitatively more trials can
be concluded, and in a shorter period of time. Moreover, the judgments rendered by
federal courts are likely to bemore widely accepted because of adherence to interna-
tional fair trial standards. Yet, at a federal trial the government faces more legal risks,
and cannot satisfy all national security demands or meet all security risks involved.
In this regard, it is interesting to focus on post-Moussaoui trials held before the
revisedMilitary Commissions, specifically the Omar Khadr and the Ghailani trials
which took place in 2010. LikeMoussaoui, Ghailani was tried before a federal court and
sentenced to life imprisonment. Yet, unlike the French-Moroccan Al Qaeda member,
Ghailani cooperated with his counsel and pleaded not guilty, launching an effective
defence. The question of Ghailani’s right to a fair trial arose during the proceedings, as
it appeared that he had been tortured by the cia during his detention in Guantánamo
Bay. The New York federal judge, Judge Kaplan, ruled in favour of Ghailani’s right
to a fair trial—as Judge Brinkema had done in theMoussaoui case. The us district
Judge Lewis Kaplan admonished the us government for torturing Ghailani (which
led to the disclosure of the name of the person who allegedly delivered the explosives
to him). Hence, Judge Kaplan precluded the evidence of this witness.143 Although
both federal courts gave preference to the fair trial rights of the accused, Moussaoui
was ultimately denied access to key witnesses at his trial, such as ksm. At the end
of the day, the result was the same: bothMoussaoui and Ghailani received a life term
in prison.
Terrorism trials are lost orwononprocedural and evidentiary issues. Theus federal
courts and actually the criminal justice system in its entirety are predominantly
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created for ordinary crimes, not for crimes allegedly committed on the battlefield.
The choice to try terrorists before a civilian court may inevitably lead to a distortion
of common procedural mechanisms. TheMoussaoui trial illustrated this tension:
national security interests clashed with the defendant’s fundamental rights, and
no actor in the legal arena was able to unequivocally demonstrate the superiority of
either of them. Hence, trying a national security threat in an ordinary district court
remains a balancing act for the presiding judge and jury.
However, it seems that Moussaoui did benefit from a trial before a federal court.
In the aftermath of theMoussaoui case, the policy pursued by the us government
in countering terrorism through (criminal) trials remains ambiguous. Its policy for
deciding between us civilian courts andmilitary commissions seems arbitrary and
subject to amendments (i.e. laws have been frequently amended to keep all options
open for the us government). The 9/11 events were instrumental in transforming
the international legal order, in terms of security policies but also as to the political
choices to prosecute terrorism suspects before civil courts or military commissions.
The trial strategies performed in theMoussaoui casemay have exacerbated the current
preference within us policy for bringing high-profile 9/11 suspects such as ksm to
justice beforemilitary commissions and for allowing security considerations to prevail
over open and fair trial standards.
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8. Guantánamo as Theatre:
Military Commissions as a Performance in the
Court of Public Opinion, 2003–20041
Fred L. Borch
Chief Prosecutor for Military Commissions:
‘Mr. Secretary, I can win these cases. But convictions are not what is important.
Rather, the only important trial is the trial in the court of public opinion.’
Deputy Defence Secretary Wolfowitz:
‘Do you really believe that?’2
8.1. Introduction
The decision to use military commissions to prosecute terrorists held at Guantánamo
Bay was premised on the idea that these men had committed war crimes that should
be tried by ‘war courts’.3 But the decision did not ignore the fact that the trials would
be a performance on theworld stage in that, for the judicial proceedings to be a success,
the world must be persuaded that the terrorists received fair trials—and that justice
was done.
This chapter explores the ‘script’ written by the prosecution in order to win its
military commission cases in the court of public opinion. It focuses almost exclusively
on events in themilitary commission process betweenMay 2003 andMay 2004, because
during this twelve-monthperiod public interest inmilitary commissionswas greatest,
if for no other reason than that military trials for terrorists appeared to be imminent.
It first ‘sets the stage’ by looking at the events leading up to the decision by President
George Bush to use military commissions to try Al Qaeda members. It then discusses
the ‘actors’ and ‘stage’ in the Guantánamo ‘play’ before examining the audience for the
‘performance’, i.e. the news media and public opinion.4 The chapter then looks at the
first cases selected for prosecution and the prosecution’s theory of criminal liability,
and how these were part of the effort to shape public opinion. A discussion of the
death penalty as a possible sentence follows. Finally, this chapter raises a number of
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performance mistakes that occurred in the Guantánamo process in the period under
consideration, and concludes with a brief analysis and critique of these early military
commissions as theatre, including some comments on their judicial, political and
social impact.
8.2. Setting the Stage
Early in the morning on 11 September 2001, fifteen Saudi Arabians and four Egyptians
boarded four commercial airliners. Two of the aircraft took off from Boston. The
third flight departed fromNewark, and the fourth flight left fromWashington, dc,
for Los Angeles. At 8:46 a.m. and 9:03 a.m., the two Boston aircraft crashed into the
north and south towers, respectively, of theWorld Trade Center in New York City.
At 9:38 a.m., theWashington, dc, flight struck the Pentagon, destroying a portion
of the building. The remaining Newark flight crashed into a rural area southeast
of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, at 10:10 a.m. By mid-morning, when bothWorld Trade
Center towers had collapsed, the death toll—including the airline passengers—was
2,753 killed in Manhattan and 189 killed in Washington, dc. The victims came from
more than ninety countries from around the world.5
Within days of the terrorist attacks, the us government had identified Osama
bin Laden and his Al Qaeda (‘the Base’) network as responsible for the 9/11 attacks.
The nineteen Al Qaeda hijackers had entered the United States legally (on student
or tourist visas) and, while they kept to themselves, tried to fit in as Americans to
avoid any suspicion (e.g. they drank alcoholic beverages in bars). In formulating
their plan of attack over a period of years, some of the terrorists took flying training
at civilian schools. This rudimentary instruction was sufficient to allow them to
pilot the American and United Airlines planes after they killed the commercial pilots
or otherwise overpowered the crews. While bin Laden did not claim immediate
responsibility, he released videotapes praising the 9/11 hijackers, and also threatened
more attacks against America.6
After the Taliban as the de facto government of Afghanistan refused us demands to
surrender Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda operatives, the United States launched air
strikes against Afghanistan in October 2001. These air operations were followed by
ground combat involving us and Allied soldiers andmarines. Bymid-2002, Taliban
and Al Qaeda forces had been driven frommost areas of Afghanistan.7
In themeantime, onemonth after hostilities in Afghanistan had commenced,
President George W. Bush announced that Al Qaeda’s attacks on the United States
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had ‘created a state of armed conflict’ and that the ‘extraordinary emergency’ arising
out of this new ‘war against terrorism’ required a number of extraordinary decisions.
Consequently, the president proclaimed in his ‘Military Order of November 13,
2011’, that he was taking the following actions. First, any Al Qaeda member or
international terrorist falling into us hands would ‘be detained at an appropriate
location’. Second, President Bush announced that, having determined that a state
of armed conflict existed, these detainees would ‘be tried bymilitary commission for
any and all offenses … that such individual is alleged to have committed’.8 According
to Bush’s military order, these terrorists must be prosecuted by amilitary commission
because only trial by a military tribunal would ‘protect the United States and its
citizens’, ensure ‘effective conduct of military operations’ and prevent future terrorist
attacks.9
This view—that a military commission was the only appropriate tribunal at
which to prosecute Al Qaeda terrorists—was a radical change in the us government’s
perspective on terrorist acts. Prior to 9/11, the United States had insisted that attacks by
international terrorists were criminal acts, and that the United States would prosecute
these crimes in federal civilian court.10 Themagnitude of damage and loss of life on
9/11, however, caused President Bush to decide that these terrorist attacks against
America and its citizens could no longer be categorised as criminal offences to be
prosecuted in civilian courts. Rather, the nature of Al Qaeda’s attack11 meant that
the United States was engaged in a ‘war against terrorism’, and that terrorist acts
were war crimes that should be prosecuted by a special war court, i.e.the military
commission.12
While President Bush personally decided that the military commission would
now be the proper forum at which to prosecute Al Qaeda and other international
terrorists, it is unlikely that he had the idea of using a military legal framework. What
is known is that the idea for the Military Order of 13 November 2001 originated in the
White House, and that the principal author was on the president’s or vice-president’s
staff. This person was also familiar with American legal history, as key language used
in Bush’s order was borrowed from the procedural rules for a military commission
created by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the early months of World War ii.
To recall: on 2 July 1942, after eight Germans who had landed by submarine in
New Jersey and Florida were caught before they could accomplish a sabotage mission
on American soil, Roosevelt proclaimed that ‘all persons who are subjects … of any
nation at war with the United States’ and who set foot in the United States in an
attempt to commit ‘acts of sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts’, would be
tried by a military commission.13 While Roosevelt also announced that same day in
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a relatedmilitary order that the commission had the power to make its own rules
‘for the conduct of the proceedings’, and that the commissionmight consider any
evidence that had ‘probative value to a reasonable man’, Roosevelt also stated that the
German defendants must receive a ‘full and fair trial’.14 Since this same evidentiary
standard and the ‘full and fair trial’ language appears in Bush’s Military Order of
13 November 2001,15 there is little doubt that the author of themilitary order was
using the trial of the German u-boat saboteurs as a template.
TheWhiteHouse saw the u-boatmilitary commission as an attractivemodel for at
least three reasons. First, Roosevelt (relying on his authority as commander-in-chief)
had created amilitary commission that hadmet in secret, determined the guilt of
eight Germans defendants, and sentencedmost of them to death—all in less than five
weeks.16 This speedy process appealed to President Bush and his advisors because it
ensured that Al Qaeda members and other terrorists who attacked the United States
could expect swift and certain punishment. A speedy process would also deter others
contemplating a future attack on America.
The second reason that the Roosevelt model was an attractive precedent was that
it was a sort of ‘rough justice’. Terrorists would get a trial that would be ‘full and
fair’ but justice would not be perverted by evidentiary and procedural safeguards
that, while appropriate for civilian defendants, had no place in a trial of international
terrorists who were guilty of war crimes. This explains why, in announcing that Al
Qaeda members and other terrorists would be prosecuted at a military commission,
Bush expressly stated that ‘given the danger to the safety of the United States and
the nature of international terrorism’, he had personally determined that it was not
‘practicable to apply inmilitary commissions … the principles of law and the rules
of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States
district courts’.17
Third and finally, the creation of a military tribunal by the president—using his
powers as commander in chief under Article ii of the Constitution18—meant that the
commission’s work would be unfettered by legal precedent that had developed in
us civilian courts governed by Article iii of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights
contained in the first ten Amendments.19 For example, evidence obtained by coercion
was admissible, as was hearsay, even though these would be barred in a civilian court.
The defendant had a right to be represented by legal counsel at the commission, but
only after that defence lawyer had been approved by the government. That same
defendant could be convicted and sentenced to life in jail on a vote of two-thirds of the
commissionmembers; the unanimous vote required in American civilian criminal
proceedings was not applicable to a tribunal created under Article ii.20 Finally, there
guantánamo as theatre | 349
was no appeal to a civilian court; President Bush personally would review the record
andmake any final decision, unless he delegated this authority to the Secretary of
Defence.21
8.3. The Actors and the Stage
Since Bush’s Military Order required that he personally approve the prosecution of a
terrorist at the military commission, the President himself was a key ‘actor’, with
a leading role in the Guantánamo performance. So, too, was Secretary of Defence
Donald Rumsfeld, who was given considerable authority in themilitary commission
framework created by the Military Order. But, when Rumsfeld later delegated
his responsibilities in the legal process to Deputy Secretary of Defence Dr. Paul
D. Wolfowitz, the latter became a key player, since Wolfowitz was now required
to decide on a number of key issues.22 These included issuing orders and regulations
that would establish procedures for a commission to follow in any trial of any alleged
terrorist; determining the number and identity of Guantánamo detainees to be
recommended for prosecution; after the president had approved the trial of one or
more detainees, when the trials should start; and whichmilitary officers would be
appointed to serve as jurors to decide guilt or innocence and determine an appropriate
sentence.23
At thedirectionof SecretaryRumsfeld (and later SecretaryWolfowitz),MrWilliam J.
‘Jim’ Haynes ii,24 the Department of Defence’s top lawyer, began working on various
orders that would govern the operation of the military commission. Haynes also
began searching for Army, Navy, Air Force andMarine Corps lawyers to take part in
the newmilitary commission framework. While senior uniformed lawyers from all
the services were considered, Haynes ultimately chose Army Colonel Frederic L. ‘Fred’
Borch to be the Chief Prosecutor, and Air Force Colonel William ‘Will’ Gunn to serve
as Chief Defense Counsel for the military commissions. Both Borch and Gunn then
began selectingmilitary lawyers for their staffs. While these men and women were
selected for their top-notch legal skills, both Colonels Borch and Gunn recognised
that the lawyers selected to join their respective teams would be performing in the
courtroom and would be the ‘face’ of their respective efforts. Borch, for example,
selected Navy Commander Scott Lang as the Deputy Chief Prosecutor, in part because
Lang had obtained a special advanced university degree in trial advocacy that included
acting lessons. In the Anglo-American judicial system, the requirement to convince a
jury of non-legally trained people that a defendant is guilty requires a prosecutor to
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present a narrative of the crime and the events surrounding it—and telling such a
story is best done by a prosecutor who develops a theme and presents his evidence in
a compelling and persuasive manner. Lang’s special trial advocacy training would
ensure that the prosecution’s performance was first-rate.25
There were six more actors in the Guantánamo performance: Salim Hamdan,
Ibrahim al Qosi, Ali Hamza al Bahlul, David Hicks, Moazzam Begg, Feroz Abbasi.
They joined the troupe when President Bush selected them as the first defendants
on 3 July 2003.26 More on why these six men were chosen for the play can be learned
below, in the discussion about choosing the first cases for prosecution.
Finally, although not on the Guantánamo stage, Osama bin Laden must be
considered an actor in the Guantánamo play, since his efforts had caused 9/11 and
he was present in the minds of everyone participating in the military commission
process. The fact that bin Laden was off-stage did not make him any less important to
the Guantánamo performance,27 especially as one of the prosecution’s aims was to
educate the public about the evil caused by international terrorism generally and Al
Qaeda in particular.
As for the location of the stage, it soon became clear that it would be in Cuba,
where the United States had ‘perpetual’ possession of a small area of land.28 This
was because shortly after the publication of the ‘Military Order of November 13,
2001’, the United States announced that it would detain those individuals covered by
the order at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba; the first twenty detainees arrived in January
2002.29 With the individuals subject to the jurisdiction of theMilitary Order located
in Cuba, it onlymade sense to hold the impending trials there. Moreover, this location
also ensured that there was adequate security for all parties to the proceedings, as
Guantánamo’s geographic isolationmade it difficult, if not impossible, for people
wanting to disrupt the trials to travel there. At the same time, Guantánamo’s location
outside the United States meant that the us Article iii civilian judges probably would
not have jurisdiction over themilitary commission proceedings. As a result, the judges
could not entertain petitions from the terrorist defendants or hear actions filed by
civil libertarians desiring to halt or disrupt the process.
8.4. Audience: Media and Public Opinion
From the first day he reported for duty as Chief Prosecutor, Borch began preparing to
speak to the news media. As the public face of the prosecution efforts, he knew that he
would soon be asked bymagazine, newspaper, radio and television reporters to sit for
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interviews, and that the Defence Department expected him to be able to explain to
the American people and the world at large that the trial of the terrorists by a military
commission was the right thing to do—bothmorally and legally.
To assist Borch in his public role, the Public Affairs Office at the Department
of Defense (DoD) arranged for him to have media training ordinarily reserved for
high profile DoD officials. This included classes on how to develop a theme for each
interview, andmock question-and-answer sessions with intentionally aggressive
questioners. The focus was on finding the right message for the prosecution efforts,
and then getting that message out to the public through the newsmedia.30
Borch decided that the principal theme of the prosecution would be ‘full and
fair trial’ and he wanted these four words to be a ‘Greek Chorus’31 that would be
picked up by the general public and the media in particular. But there were five other
messages—of varying importance—that Borch wanted to deliver to the public, too.
First, that Al Qaeda members should be tried by a military commission rather than in
civilian courts because the United States was at war with Al Qaeda and its attacks were
war crimes that should be tried in war tribunals. Second, that military commissions
would be useful because theywould educate the public about the dangers of terrorism.
Third, that the military commission would serve the criminal justice purposes of
retribution, punishment and deterrence. Those tried and punished by a military
commission would satisfy a desire, if not a need, for revenge for the evil that befell the
United States on 9/11; quick and severe punishment also would deter other terrorists
from attacking Americans. Fourth, that military commissions would provide an
alternative legal and moral basis for long-term detention of terrorists. Fifth and
finally, that the military tribunals held in Cuba would support intelligence collection
efforts (and therefore the war effort against Al Qaeda).
8.5. Selecting the First Cases for Prosecution
While the message for the military commission process was ‘full and fair trial’,
the theme for the first cases for prosecution was that each defendant was a ‘true
believer’32 who was fanatically committed to the depths of his soul to either Al Qaeda
or its terrorist goals, or both. The prosecution ultimately recommended to Secretary
Wolfowitz that he request President Bush to designate six Guantánamo detainees
as defendants in the first military commissions. Each of the six men selected for
prosecution fitted into the true believer theme; all hadmet with bin Laden or were his
close associates, or else hadmet bin Laden and supported his terrorist goals.
352 | fred l. borch
Salim AhmedHamdanwas a Yemeni citizen whose close personal association with
bin Ladenmade him an ideal defendant. Hamdan had joined Al Qaeda in 1996, when
he travelled to Afghanistan with the express purpose of joining bin Laden’s military
group of holy warriors. Hamdan ultimately took an oath of personal loyalty (‘bayat’)
to bin Laden, picked up and delivered weapons, and finally joined bin Laden’s inner
circle as a chauffeur, mechanic and bodyguard. In late November 2001, Hamdan was
captured by a group of Afghan warlords near the Pakistani border and turned over to
the United States for a $5,000 bounty.
While these facts alone were sufficient to convict SalimHamdan in a trial, Borch
immediately saw that Hamdan was the perfect first case for the government. Unlike
many Al Qaedamembers, who had never met, Hamdan was intimately familiar with
him, and had freely admitted during questioning at Guantánamo that he had worked
directly for bin Laden. Additionally, unlike many jihadists, who had joined Al Qaeda
after 1999, Hamdan had served bin Laden since 1996—whichmeant that Hamdan was
amember of bin Laden’s inner sanctum during the 1998 attacks on the us embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania, the 2000 bombing of the uss Cole, and the 9/11 attacks. Hamdan’s
should be the first case to be prosecuted because his trial would allow the United
States to tell the story of Al Qaeda’s evil-doing through the narrative of a man who not
only had Osama bin Laden’s trust and confidence, but had breathed the same air and
eaten the same food as the ‘prince of darkness’. Since one of the prosecution’s goals
was to educate the public about Al Qaeda as a force for evil, Hamdan’s narrative was
ideal.33
Ali Hamza Ahmad Sulayman al Bahlul, also a Yemeni citizen, was selected as one of
the six defendants because his misdeeds likewise fitted into the prosecution’s overall
theme. Under questioning at Guantánamo, al Bahlul had boasted that he worked
as bin Laden’s bodyguard and as his media secretary. From late 1999 to December
2001, al Bahlul had used his computer skills to create ‘instructional and motivational
recruiting video tapes’ for AlQaeda, and thereby act as amouthpiece for bin Laden’s evil
designs.34 One of these tapes was an internet-based video that glorified the October
2000 suicide attack on the uss Cole, which had killed 17 American sailors. The video
combined film footage of the damaged warship with calls by bin Laden for jihad
against America.
Like Hamdan, al Bahlul also was a trustedmember of bin Laden’s inner circle, and
had been with him on 11 September 2001. During questioning, al Bahlul revealed that
bin Laden had asked him to set up a satellite connection on 11 September so that he
and other Al Qaedamembers ‘could see news reports’.35 In the weeks immediately
following the 9/11 attacks, bin Laden tasked al Bahlul with obtainingmedia reports
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about the attacks, and ‘gather[ing] data concerning the economic damage caused by
these attacks’.36
Al Bahlul was proud of his affiliation with Al Qaeda and, as he later proclaimed, ‘I
will never deny any actions I did along with bin Laden fighting you and your allies,
the Jews.’37 While in custody in Cuba, al Bahlul also continued to insist that, if given
the opportunity, he would kill innocent Christians and Jews. Perhaps the best proof of
his evil intent was the statement he made to interrogators at Guantánamo Bay:
I wish it had beenme as the hijacker who went into the World Trade Center. I hope
you Americans kill me as this will anger Usama bin Laden and there will be greater
retribution. I can be a double martyr.38
The entire prosecution team believed that when amilitary commission jury heard
this statement, any feelings of sympathy they might have for al Bahlul—or concerns
about his guilt—would evaporate instantly.
Born in Sudan, Ibrahim AhmedMahmoud al Qosi also was a good choice for an
early trial. He, too, was a long time bin Laden lieutenant; al Qosi had joined Al Qaeda
in 1989 while the organisation was located in Sudan. Initially, al Qosi had served as a
messenger, and passed information betweenmembers of terrorist cells operating in
that country; al Qosi also provided food, shelter and clothing for these terrorists.
In 1990, al Qosi travelled from Sudan to Afghanistan, where he received training in
military tactics and weapons. After participating for a period of time in the fighting
in Afghanistan, al Qosi became an accountant in Al Qaeda’sMektabh alMuhassiba
(accounting office) in Pakistan. From 1992 until 1994, he was put in charge ofmanaging
donated money and distributing it for salaries, travel and support of Al Qaeda
operations, including terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. In the mid-1990s,
after a failed assassination attempt on bin Laden in Sudan, al Qosi was handpicked to
serve as a member of bin Laden’s newly formed bodyguard.39
As for Australian-born David Matthew Hicks, his case was attractive because
English was his mother tongue and he was cooperative. Although Hicks insisted
that he had never been an Al Qaedamember (he admitted only to membership of
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (‘Army of the Righteous’)), there was proof that he had attended an
Al Qaeda-run camp in Afghanistan, where he ‘trained in weapons familiarization and
firing, landmines, topography, fieldmovements, andbasic explosives’.40Hicks claimed
to have engaged in hostile military operations against India and, after the 9/11 attacks,
he had returned to Afghanistan to rejoin his Al Qaeda associates. Hicks was captured
by Northern Alliance forces and turned over to us personnel for a $ 1,000 bounty.41
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While Borch believed there was sufficient evidence to convict Hicks at a military
commission, and recommended that Hicks be one of the first six defendants, Borch
rejected the idea of bringingHicks to trial quickly. His chief reasonwas thatHicks’ was
not the face of terrorism. As a white Australian with very fair skin and blue eyes, Hicks
did not look like what the American public considered a typical Al Qaedamember
and, if a goal of the prosecution was to educate the public about the danger posed
by terrorists, a defendant at this stage of the process needed to look like the men
responsible for hijacking andmass murder on September 11.
In contrast to Hicks, Moazzem Begg and Feroz Abbasi were good first cases for
trial because both defendants spoke fluent English and, as men of Pakistani descent,
looked like the typical Al Qaedamember.
Both men had admitted under interrogation at Guantánamo that they had
trained at Al Qaeda-runmilitary camps in Afghanistan, and had received training
in close combat tactics, individual and crew-served weapons, and explosives. Begg
and Abbasi also freely admitted that they were Al Qaeda members and supported
that organisation’s goal of carrying out terrorist attacks onWestern targets. But, as
will be explained, the selection of Abbasi and Begg was amistake, because their uk
citizenship would later cause significant disruptions in the prosecution’s performance
strategy.
One other possible defendant who, like Hicks, Abbasi and Begg, spoke English
was Canadian-born Omar Khadr. Khadr admitted that he had killed a us Special
Forces soldier and was unrepentant about this homicide. This made him an attractive
candidate for prosecution. But Borch decided that he would not try Khadr because
Khadr had been fifteen years old at the time of the killing and his legal status as
a juvenile almost certainly would cause the Canadian government to oppose the
prosecution. Ultimately, it was a cost-benefit analysis, and Colonel Borch decided that
Canadian resistance and possible negative publicity in the court of public opinion was
not worth the value of bringing Khadr before a Guantánamo tribunal, at least during
Act i of the play.
8.6. Prosecution Strategy and Theory of Criminal Liability
As soon as the prosecutorial castwas selected and assembled, the prosecutors developed
their trial strategy.42 This included the details of the trials themselves, such as
determiningwhich terrorists detained inCuba shouldbe tried first (and inwhat order),
which offences should be charged, and whether the death penalty was appropriate. Of
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paramount concern was articulating a theory of criminal liability that would permit
themilitary commission to find the terrorists guilty of war crimes. Additionally, it
was imperative that this theory of liability be conveyed to the commission’s panel
members and the public if the tribunals were to win in the court of public opinion.
After some discussion, the prosecutors adopted this basic theory of criminal
liability: (1) that each of the six defendants had participated in a common criminal
enterprise to attack civilians, destroy civilian property, commit murder while
concealing themselves amongst the population, and terrorise governments and
peoples with the aim of acquiring power and changing the political order and; (2)
that each of the defendants had committed one or more acts in furtherance of this
enterprise.
While President Bush’s Military Order was a direct result of Al Qaeda attacks on
NewYorkCity andWashington, dc, the prosecution teamwas careful to adopt a theory
of criminal liability that did not require a defendant to be an Al Qaedamember in
order to participate in the conspiracy. While it was probable thatmost defendants who
would ultimately appear before amilitary commission would be affiliated in some
way with bin Laden, Bush’s Military Order clearly stated that any non-us citizen who
‘engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit acts of international terrorism’
could be prosecuted.43 By way of example, the fact that David Hicks denied being a
member of Al Qaeda, but admitted receiving extensive training in marksmanship,
small team tactics, and intelligence gathering in training camps run by Al Qaeda in
Afghanistan meant that any comprehensive theory of criminal liability must be built
around a conspiracy that was larger than Al Qaeda, i.e. that could include Al Qaeda
without being limited to it.
A diagram (see figure 8.1 on page 356) illustrating the prosecution theory of
liability showed the scope of the conspiracy theory as a dotted line, with bin Laden
(‘ubl’) and his associates (‘Shura Council/ubl Inner Circle’) as full participants in
the conspiracy. Members of other terrorist organisations—the Abu Sayyaf Group,44
Jemaah Islamiyah,45 Lashkar-e-Tayyiba,46 Egyptian Islamic Jihad,47 Armed Islamic
Group (gia)48 and the Taliban—could be part of the conspiracy too.49 However, the
diagram showed that not allmembers of Al Qaeda or other terrorist organisations
necessarily were part of the conspiracy; this was an intentional decision on the part
of Borch, who wanted to avoid makingmere membership a crime. Borch’s decision
reflected the strong precedent in Anglo-American jurisprudence against ‘guilt by
association’, i.e., status alone is not a criminal offence.50
Of almost equal importance to formulating a conspiracy theory was selecting the
actual crimes with which the Al Qaeda terrorists would be charged. While Military
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Figure 8.1: Diagram showing prosecution theory of terrorist conspiracy
Commission Instruction No. 2, Crimes and Elements for Trials byMilitary Commission,51
listed more than thirty possible offences, the prosecutors decided to charge each
defendant with conspiracy to commit five offences: attacking civilians, attacking
civilian targets, murder, destruction of property, and terrorism.
Al Bahlul, for example, was charged with ‘willfully and knowingly’ joining
‘an enterprise of persons’ consisting of bin Laden, Dr. Ayman al Zawahari,52 and
other ‘associates of the Al Qaeda organisation, known and unknown’. Al Bahlul then
conspired with the persons in this enterprise and shared ‘a common criminal purpose’
to commit the five offences listed above.
What followed in the text of the charging document (or indictment) was a list
of overt acts that al Bahlul and other conspirators had committed in order to bring
about the aims of their criminal enterprise. These included training at Al Qaeda-
sponsored training camps in Afghanistan and taking an oath of allegiance to bin
Laden, which affirmed a willingness to perform any act requested by bin Laden.
For al Bahlul specifically, overt acts performed by him included creating a uss Cole
video to recruit, motivate and inspire Al Qaeda members and others to commit
violent attacks against the United States and serving as a bodyguard for Osama bin
Laden.
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The theme in the al Bahlul case was that he was a true believer who had protected
evil (as bin Laden’s bodyguard), spread evil (through his media work) and continued
to want to do evil (as evidenced by his statement that he wished he had participated in
the 9/11 attacks). In presenting its case against al Bahlul, the prosecution’s ‘script’—the
way itwould present its evidence to the jury—would bewritten to support and develop
these themes.
A final point: the criminal enterprise that al Bahlul and the other defendants had
joined was prosecutable as a war crime because the men were engaged in an armed
conflict, yet had no lawful basis for their actions under international humanitarian
law or other the laws of war. As Professor Gary D. Solis explains in his authoritative
treatise The Law of Armed Conflict, there are ‘only two categories of individuals on
the battlefield: combatants and civilians’. The law gives immunity from criminal
liability only to combatants who are members of the armed forces of a nation-state;
civilians who take part in hostilities have no immunity ‘for their violent conduct
and can be tried and punished under civil law for their belligerent acts’. It follows
that terrorists belonging to groups like Al Qaeda, having no association with any
nation-state, enjoy no combatant privilege, and a terrorist who kills a soldier is an
unprivileged belligerent or unlawful combatant who is guilty of murder.53
8.7. Desisting from Asking for Death Penalties
Early in themilitary commission process, Borch informed Secretary Wolfowitz that he
would not seek the death penalty for the first six defendants. This was Borch’s decision
to make as the top prosecutor, and no one attempted to change his mind. While Borch
personally believed that the death penalty was an appropriate punishment—and that
some of the defendants might deserve it—he understood that much of the world,
especially European public opinion, was hostile to the death penalty. If the prosecution
announced that the defendants faced a capital sentence, the risk was that the military
commission process would become an argument about the morality of the death
sentence instead of a discussion about the evils of terrorism and the guilt of those
being prosecuted for war crimes. Not willing to run this risk—and perhaps damage
his chances of winning in the court of public opinion—Borch took the death penalty
off the table.
There were other reasons to avoid the death penalty in the first six cases. There
was every reason to think that some of the defendants desired martyrdom, and
consequently wanted to be put to death. It follows that removing capital punishment
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from the process would undercut public sympathy for Al Qaeda by depriving the
defendants of any prestige that might be gained from a death sentence. There was also
another, albeit less important, reason to remove the death penalty from consideration:
Borch believed that Colonel Gunn and his defence counsel would fight much harder if
their clients faced a death sentence; taking the ultimate punishment awaymight
encourage a more cooperative attitude and even a willingness to advise their clients to
plead guilty in return for an agreed upon sentence.
8.8. PerformanceMistakes
The prosecution made three major performance mistakes betweenMay 2003 andMay
2004, all of which affected the timing of the ‘opening’ of the play.54 First, it failed to
understand the depth of British government opposition to the trial of two British
citizens, Moazzam Begg and Feroz Abbasi. Attempts to overcome this opposition
delayed the trial of all defendants for months—thus damaging the overall prosecution
efforts. Second, the prosecution was never able to overcome opposition from those
within the Bush administration who believed that there was no good reason to
prosecute Al Qaeda terrorists at military commissions. This opposition delayed the
start of the trials—ensuring that there was no performance for months. Third and
finally, Borch failed to convince Secretary Wolfowitz and others that the actual results
of the trial in the courtroom, while important, paled in significance when balanced
against the need to win in the court of public opinion.55
While Abbasi and Begg were ideal defendants because they spoke English and
their trial would have proceeded without the aid of a translator, Lord Peter Goldsmith,
the United Kingdom’s Attorney General, decided that the twomen could not be tried
at a military commission because there were not sufficient guarantees that they
would receive a fair trial. At first, Goldsmith voiced these concerns privately, but
he then beganmaking public statements about his unhappiness with themilitary
commission process. The Defence Department General Counsel, Jim Haynes, tried to
convince Goldsmith that Abbasi and Begg would enjoy a fair trial, and Haynes and
a team of lawyers even flew to London tomeet face-to-face with Goldsmith. But it
was to no avail. Nothing Haynes said satisfied the British government’s concerns.
Goldsmith would not compromise and his public pronouncement that a military
commission ‘did not offer sufficient guarantees of a fair trial’56 for the two uk citizens,
meant that American efforts to prosecute Abbasi and Begg collapsed. For political
reasons, the United States could not prosecute the men in the face of official British
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opposition, and ultimately both Abbasi and Begg were released fromGuantánamo
(and returned to the United Kingdom). While this left four defendants still facing
trial, valuable time had been lost.
A further shortcoming in the performance was the failure to convince Secretary
Wolfowitz and others in leadership roles that military commissions needed to start
soon or the United States risked ‘losing’ the trial in the court of public opinion.
While the Chief Prosecutor repeatedly argued that the trial should go forward as soon
as possible, others with great credibility argued the opposite. Former us Attorney
GeneralWilliam ‘Bill’ Barr,57 for example, argued vociferously against the trials—more
than once in the presence of Borch. Barr insisted that there was no reason to try the
detainees and advised SecretaryWolfowitz that he and the Bush administration should
simply detain these alleged terrorists for the duration of the war—just as the United
States had done with German and Italian prisoners of war in World War ii. Given
Barr’s stature in the government—as a first class lawyer who had been the country’s
Attorney General—it was perhaps to be expected that Barr hadmore credibility with
Paul Wolfowitz than did a career military lawyer with whom bothWolfowitz and the
public were less familiar.
Particularly telling was a Pentagon conversation between Borch andWolfowitz
in late July 2003, after Rumsfeld had delegated his responsibilities as Appointing
Authority to Wolfowitz and after the president had selected the first six defendants
for prosecution. SecretaryWolfowitz began by asking if Borch could guarantee that
the prosecution would win every case it brought to trial. Colonel Borch answered
‘no’, in that victory at trial could not be assured because of the nature of the process
and the unpredictability of any jury. But Borch told Wolfowitz that the prosecution
had selected good solid cases and that there was every reason to expect good results.
Then Borch said, ‘Mr. Secretary, I can win these cases. But convictions are not what is
important. Rather, the only important trial is the trial in the court of public opinion.’
This provoked a sceptical look fromWolfowitz, and the response, ‘Colonel, do you
really believe that?’58
How canWolfowitz’s reticence to move forward with themilitary commissions be
explained? A producer wants to be certain of ‘good reviews’ from the critics before
launching a play. Paul Wolfowitz was no different: he was ultimately accountable to
both Rumsfeld and Bush for the success of the Guantánamo performance. Just as a
producer is ultimately responsible for what happens in the theatre when the lights go
out and the actors take the stage, politicians too are accountable for their decisions. It
is likely that Wolfowitz decided that the uncertainty surrounding the process made it
too risky to move ahead, despite the urgings of the Chief Prosecutor.
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8.9. Denouement: Comments, Criticisms and ‘Loose Ends’
In 2004, Salim Hamdan’s defence counsel filed a writ of habeas corpus in the us
District Court in Washington, dc, challenging the lawfulness of his detention in
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Ultimately,Hamdan v. Rumsfeld59 reached the us Supreme
Court, which decided in June 2006 that the military commission process created by
Bush’s Military Order of 13 November violated both us and international law. While
the court was careful not to rule that the President lacked authority under Article ii of
the us Constitution to create a military commission framework, it did decide that
the process created by Bush’s Military Order was deficient because it violated both
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (created by the us Congress to govern courts
martial) and the Geneva Conventions.
The decision inHamdan v. Rumsfeldmeant the end of the legal framework created
by the President using his authority as commander-in-chief and resulted in the us
Congress creating an entirely new military commission process by statute in the
Military Commissions Act of 2006.60 That legislation, amended by Congress in 2009,61
now controls the structure of military commissions taking place in Guantánamo
today.
This legislative response toHamdan v. Rumsfeld has completely remade the process.
The legal basis for its existence flows from Article i of the Constitution rather than
from Article ii. Significant changes adopted by Congress—in order to satisfy the
Supreme Court ruling inHamdan v. Rumsfeld—include: the creation of pre-trial, trial,
and post-trial procedures, including elements of proof (other than the requirement
for a full and fair trial, there were relatively few procedural rules in the Bushmilitary
commission process); the creation of a military judge (there was no judge in the
original military commission); and the right to appeal to the us Supreme Court (after
appealing to a newly created Court of Military Commission Review and District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals). A newly createdManual for Military Commissions,
United States (2010 edition), consisting of more than 250 pages of text, andmodelled
closely on theManual for Courts-Martial, United States, also had been created by the
Defense Department to ensure that the newmilitary commissions operate more like
ordinary courts martial.62
Was the performance in Guantánamo Bay from 2003 to 2004 a ‘hit’ or a ‘miss’? Let
us hear from the critics. Given the Supreme Court’s ruling inHamdan v. Rumsfeld, it
was a ‘miss’ in terms of howmany terrorists were convicted of war crimes during the
period. It was also a ‘flop’ in the sense that the military commission process created by
President Bush was declared to be legally deficient. Was the performance a victory in
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the court of public opinion? The jury are still out and the answer to this question will
have to wait until more commissions are completed at Guantánamo Bay.
Despite these theatrical failures, however, it is clear that the Guantánamo
performance succeeded in at least three areas. First, the selection of Hamdan, al Bahlul,
al Qosi and Hicks as defendants was a success, in that all four men were eventually
tried and convicted. Second, the theory of liability adopted by the prosecution remains
intact. Third and finally, the United States government continues to support the
legality of military commission trials for terrorists who attack the United States and
its allies; the administration of President Barack Obama appears just as committed as
its Republican predecessor to holdingmilitary tribunals for terrorists (albeit not at
Guantánamo Bay).
What happened to the defendants initially selected for prosecution? InMarch 2007,
David Hicks pleaded guilty and was sentenced to seven years in jail. He served nine
months in Australia and was released.63 In August 2008, Salim Hamdan was convicted
by amilitary commission of providingmaterial support to terrorism and sentenced to
five and a half years’ imprisonment. He returned to Yemen to serve his sentence and
was released in 2009.64 Al Bahlul was convicted by a military commission in 2008, and
sentenced to life imprisonment.65 As for al Qosi, he pleaded guilty in July 2008 and
was sentenced the followingmonth to fourteen years in jail.66 Finally, in October
2010, Canadian citizen Omar Khadr pleaded guilty to murder in violation of the law of
war and other related offences and was sentenced to forty years’ imprisonment. He
will serve all but one year of his sentence in Canada.67
Colonel Borch was dismissed from his position after one year in the job. Two Air
Force lawyers, Major Rob Preston and Captain John Carr, convinced that the military
commission process was unfair and mismanaged, accused Borch of wrongdoing.
In an email message sent to the Chief Prosecutor, the two attorneys ‘accused fellow
prosecutors of ignoring torture allegations, failing to protect exculpatory information,
andwithholding information fromsuperiors’.68 An investigation into their allegations
concluded that their claims were without merit, but retired Major General John
D. Altenburg, Jr., who had recently replaced Wolfowitz as the Appointing Authority,
decided that it would be best for the prosecution team if Preston, Carr and Borch went
elsewhere.69 Colonel Borch retired from active duty the following year.
Some final thoughts about ‘Guantánamo as Theatre’. Regardless of what happened
between 2003 and 2004, the basic questions remain: how do we balance freedomwith
safety? How do we design a legal system that balances the requirement for full and
fair trials with national security needs in an on-going war on terrorism? The new
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commissions created by the us Congress will have to wrestle with these questions and
try to arrive at a satisfactory answer.
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9. The Hofstad Group on Trial:
Sentencing the Terrorist Risk, 2005–20141
Beatrice de Graaf
9.1. Introduction
‘Our legal system is the “sharia”. That is the only system we acknowledge’, one of the
defendants stated during the trial of Dutch jihadi radicals, a network the secret service
internally dubbed the ‘Hofstad Group’. At that time, the defendants wore djellabas,
refused to stand up in court and were visibly encouraged by a number of burqa-clad
friends from the public gallery.2 A distinct performative strategy aimed at rejecting
the democratic rule of law guided their behaviour. In terrorism trials, the actors
involved often deploy performative strategies intended to mobilise or convince their
target audience(s) of their vision of justice and injustice. While the public prosecutors
try to invoke the reality of potential terror as allegedly inflicted by the defendants, the
defendants may adhere to a completely different set of beliefs, directed against the
democratic society or rule of law as such.
In this chapter, we will analyse how conflicting strategies, performances and
outcomes of the three subsequent trials against the so-called ‘Hofstad Group’, between
2005 and 2006 (appeals are included up to 2014) developed over time. While the trial
avoids easy characterisation, we discern elements of (1) a virtual trial, (2) a show run
by the prosecution, and (3) a media show (with sideshows) that evolved over the
years. In this analysis, three trials are discussed, which were closely linked through
‘fictive kinship’, friendship and the prosecution’s projections of guilt: the trial against
Mohammed Bouyeri, the trial against the first set of Hofstad Group defendants (the
‘Arles’ case) and the trial against the second group of suspects (the ‘Piranha’ case).
9.2. Theory andMethod3
The trial against the Hofstad Group turned out, for most of the suspects, to be a
protracted battle between defendants and public prosecutors about themeaning of
texts, the nature of the Hofstad associates’ network, the future possibility of terror
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attacks and the level of radicalisation, rather than about actual acts of terrorism
(Mohammed Bouyeri’s murder of Theo van Gogh was the only violent act actually
committed). Taking centre stage was not a concrete terrorist attack, nor even a defined
plot of preparation, but the question of jihadi innuendo in speech and in writings, in
phone calls, in chats and in text messages as well as the question of the organisational
nature of jihadist activities in the Netherlands. Therefore, large parts of the trial
could be defined as ‘virtual trials’. To elaborate on this element of ‘virtual reality’—i.e.
simulated or imagined reality—it is necessary to point to the concept of ‘premediation’,
that, in the words of Marieke de Goede, enables the virtual or precautionary turn
when trying suspects of terrorism.4
De Goede and De Graaf have argued5 that new anti-terrorism legislation since 9/11
has propelled the development of ‘anticipatory prosecution’,6 the phenomenon of
anticipating and preparing cases based on indication, allegations or even rumours
of preparatory deeds, far in advance of projected attacks.7 This tendency has been
identified and analysed before from legal,8 criminological9 and political10 perspectives.
We added to that body of literature the observation that terrorism trials function as a
highly effective performative space where the ‘spectre of catastrophe’11 is invoked,
where potential future deeds of terror are projected, contested and adjudicated on—
and hence made real.12
Here we will analyse the court cases of Mohammed Bouyeri and the two trials
against the Hofstad Groupdefendants from the perspective of premediation, as
described above and introduced before by Richard Grusin.13 De Goede (see references
above) andGrusinhave analysed someof the techniques thathavebeenused to imagine
potential future scenarios, to bring them into the present and tomake them ‘real’.
Although these mediated future attacks will never become reality, since the suspects
have already been apprehended, and the status of the anticipated attacks will remain
virtual forever, they are configured into charges and turned into judgments. Thus,
the trials against the Hofstad Group present exceptional cases of virtual adjudication;
or, as Claudia Aradau and Rens vanMunster have coined it, theatres of a ‘conjectural
style of reasoning’ which ‘constructs an explanation out of apparently insignificant
details. It links the smallest andmost inconsequential facts to a larger context that
cannot be directly observed or experienced.’14
Wewill describe and identify how during these trials real or future terror scenarios
were mobilised and visualised, how evidence was used, and how these bits, pieces and
imaginations were incorporated in the charges and final verdict. At the same time,
we will address how the audience, themedia, other stakeholders (victims or victims’
relatives), and the defendants themselves responded to this virtual or premediative
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turn in the criminal justice system. Was this premediated scenario accepted, did the
defendants resist it, and in what ways did they try to argue against a strategy that
deals with allegations and associations projected onto (merely) future scenarios? In
short, we will discuss how these terrorism trials functioned as a site for terrorism
risk management such that, in the latter two Hofstad trials, not the attack but the
premediated risk of an attack stood trial.
In asking and responding to these questions, we pay tribute to the ‘productive
power of legal arguments’ and themanner in which ‘legal arguments are embedded in
and reproduce deeper-lying social and symbolic structures’.15 Terrorism trials are key
opportunities to legitimise the scope and substance of post-9/11 terrorism legislation,
which is simultaneously implemented, contested and performed. By distinguishing
instruments and techniques in courtroom proceedings, we are able to contribute to
wider debates on precaution in counter-terrorism, and to analyse the ways in which
the logic of what Michael Power calls ‘secondary risk management’ can function.
This kind of riskmanagement strategy is not geared towards actually preventing a
calculated catastrophe, but towards addressing explicitly or implicitly the question of
political responsibility. Secondary riskmanagement techniques are intended to avert
or displace the responsibility and to prevent reputation damage in cases of ‘decisions
whichmust be made in potentially undecidable situations’.16 We will see how the
three trials discussed here could indeed be considered sites of anticipatory prosecution
and secondary risk management techniques.
9.3. Context of the Trial: The Emergence of the Hofstad Group
9.3.1. The Emergence of the ‘Hofstad Group’ as a Threat to National Security
From 2002 on, the Dutch intelligence and security agency, aivd (Algemene Inlichtin-
gen- en Veiligheidsdienst), monitored a group of jihadi radicals; a network which the
service dubbed internally ‘the Hofstad Group’, since it operated partly in the nation’s
capital, The Hague (Hofstad translates as ‘capital city’). Except for Mohammed, the
murderer of the journalist Theo van Gogh, whose case is discussed later, its alleged
core members were under surveillance. Even before December 2001, the aivd had kept
a close eye on the radical Salafist El TawheedMosque in Amsterdam-West, looking
for any suspicious Egyptian or Saudi influences (themosque had financial relations
with a Saudi non-governmental organisation, Al Haramein International).17 In the
summer of 2002 the secret service identified a group ofMuslim young people whomet
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in and around the mosque and gathered around Redouan al-Issa (then 43 years old),
also named ‘Abu Khaled’ or ‘the Sheikh’, who had ties to radical Muslims in Spain and
Belgium.
Abu Khaled, a formermember of the SyrianMuslim Brotherhood, came to the
Netherlands in 1995 as an illegal immigrant from Syria. He became a mentor to a
number of radical Muslims.18 He inspired, amongst others, 17-year-old high school
student Samir Azzouz, of Moroccan origin, but born and raised in the Netherlands.
Samir Azzouz came to the attention of the aivd in January 2003when he, togetherwith
his friend Khalid (or Hussam, age 17), took the train to Berlin, bound for Chechnya, to
join local jihadists in their fight against the Russian forces. At the Ukrainian border,
they were arrested and put back on a train toWestern Europe. Themedia described
their adventurous journey as an amateurish endeavour, but the two young Islamists
had prepared for their trip thoroughly. The police found night vision goggles and a
gps system (which turned out to have been used in Russia) at Samir’s residence after
their return. The police suspected that the two students were recruited by Redouan al
Issa. After his return Azzouz’s status rose; he started his own Islamic book company
and began only associating withMoroccan young people.19
Ismail Akhnikh was another alleged core member of the Hofstad Group, who had
international aspirations. The Dutch-Moroccan Akhnikh, born in Amsterdam in 1982,
regularly attended theEl TawheedMosque inAmsterdamwherehe became acquainted
with Azzouz and was believed to have helped him establish the Hofstad network in
the autumn of 2002. In the summer of 2003, he may have travelled with Azzouz to
Barcelona to meet there with Abdeladim Akoudad for guidance and instructions. This
Abdeladim Akoudad (or ‘Naoufel’), a Moroccan national living in Spain, was suspected
by the Moroccan security services to be involved in the Casablanca terror attacks of 16
March 2003.20
In October 2003, Akoudad and Azzouz discussed over the phone ‘shoes, first
and second rate, coming from Greece or Italy and that will do well in Spain’, and
‘documents’. At this point, the Spanish authorities intervened and arrestedAkoudad on
14 October 2003.21 Two days later, the aivd alerted the National Terrorism Prosecutor
that Azzouz and other members of the Hofstad Group, all regular visitors to the El
TawheedMosque and a phone shop in Schiedamwhich also functioned as a place
to meet were probably preparing a terrorist attack. On 17 October arrests were made
in several Dutch cities: Samir Azzouz, the Syrian ‘Abu Kahled’ (or Redouan al-Issa),
JasonWalters, Ismail Akhnikh andMohamed Fahmi Boughaba were apprehended.
Apartments, including the house of Mohammed Bouyeri in Amsterdam, were
raided.22
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However, because the allegation of terrorism could not be substantiated, the
Hofstad Groupmembers were released after eleven days. Even though a supermarket
bag, filled with goods resembling ingredients for constructing explosive devices,
including six security glasses, fertiliser, power tape, distilled water, liquid ammonia,
hydrochloric acid, batteries, a timer, kitchen gloves, halogen bulbs and chemical
cleaner, was retrieved by the police fromMohamed Fahmi Boughaba’s apartment,
where he had allegedly kept it on Azzouz’s instructions, this was not enough evidence
to keep themen in custody. Neither a direct link to a terrorist organisation nor any
specific terrorist intent could be substantiated.23
After their temporary detention in October 2003, Akhnikh, Azzouz andWalters
continued to collaborate and urged other Muslims to go abroad to wage jihad.24
Akhnikh went to Pakistan that year, as did Zakaria Taybi and Jason Walters (who
went twice, in July and December 2003). Walters and Akhnikh even bragged about
contacts withMaulanaMasood Azhar, a core Al Qaedamember—something they
later downplayed in court. In June 2004, Nouriddin el Fatmi went to Portugal with
other members of the group, among whomwasMohamed El M. The aivd warned
the Portuguese authorities, out of fear that the members were planning to kill José
Manuel Durao Barroso (the then president-designate of the European Commission)
and other guests during a reception in Oporto, which was organised in honour of the
European Soccer Championship that took place in Portugal. The three were arrested
and sent back to the Netherlands, where the aivd and the special anti-terrorism
unit of the National Police Services Agencies (klpd) interrogated them. It finding
no evidence of concrete preparations, the men were released.25 Only when they felt
that the security forces in Pakistan, Portugal and the Netherlands were closing in on
them did they presumably begin to conspire and confine their scope to their local
environment. The next time the security forces intervened to arrest themwas after
the murder of Van Gogh in November 2004.
The international inspiration and the impulse to organise were believed to have
come from their mentor, Redouan al-Issa, who also acted as Bouyeri’s mentor until
October 2003. With his alleged experience as a martyr, he seemed to have functioned
as the charismatic ‘magnet’ that bound the group together in the beginning, from
2002 onwards. In his seminal study Leaderless Jihad, Marc Sageman dismisses Al-
Issa’s role because ‘he seemed to have simply disappeared from his group’ and ‘the
remainingmembers of theHofstadGroup rarelymentioned him’.26 Sageman correctly
warns against viewing people like Al-Issa as hierarchical leaders or recruiters in the
traditional sense of the word. However, precisely because terrorist networks are not
static organisations, we should be careful not to dismiss him too soon from the picture.
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Moreover, it is only logical that the remaining Hofstad Groupmembers did not
mention Al-Issa after their arrests in 2004, since all of them tried to escape conviction
and did not confess to terrorist crimes. On the contrary, they denied being part of
a terrorist organisation altogether.27 It would therefore have been rather foolish
to comment on their relationship with Al-Issa or to dwell on his role as inspirer
of the Hofstad Group. There is another explanation for his disappearance from the
scene as well. After the first arrests in October 2003, Al-Issa, as an illegal immigrant,
was declared an ‘unwanted alien’ and deported. His role of inspirer, ideologist and
proselytiser was assumed by other leader personalities such as Azzouz and Bouyeri.28
Al-Issa did return in the course of 2004 (and had contacts withMohammed Bouyeri),
but had too little time to regain his former position or build another network. He fled
the Netherlands again on the morning of 2 November when Bouyeri assassinated
Theo van Gogh.
Al-Issa’s real role within the network still remains vague (because groupmembers
remained silent and did not want to compromise their defence strategy) and changed
over time (because of counterterrorism efforts). Nonetheless, he should not be
underestimated. He was wanted by Morocco and by Spain for involvement in the 2003
Casablanca and the 2004Madrid bombings. Additionally, he brought the Hofstad
Group members together, first through meetings in the El Tawheed Mosque in
Amsterdam and subsequently on amore informal basis, at Mohammed Bouyeri’s
apartment, where he inspired themwith stories of international jihad and conducted
Islamicmarriages.29 After his apprehension in October 2003, Abu Khaled compared
himself to a ‘Christian evangelist’. A witness in court, who attended the living room
meetings at Bouyeri’s home, saw him as a ‘priest’ and the young people surrounding
him as ‘disciples’.30 Only in the course of 2004 did the remaining Dutchmembers of
the network take over his role.31
In short, the Hofstad network was organised locally, without any demonstrable
direction from an Al Qaeda command centre or from any other identifiable, pre-
existing terrorist organisation.32 It started with some individuals prone to radical
jihadist philosophy. But they actively sought inspiration from international contacts,
from a foreign preacher and from international Salafist texts. Somemembers were
subsequently recruited to contribute to international jihad in Chechnya and estab-
lished contacts with terrorists abroad. Only when these attempts in 2002–2003 were
thwarted by the intelligence services and their mentor was expelled did they, in 2004,
allegedly began to conspire against Dutch targets.33
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9.3.2. TheMurder of Theo van Gogh
On the early morning of 2 November 2004, Mohammed Bouyeri, a 26-year old Dutch-
Moroccan, born and raised in Amsterdam, awaited journalist Theo van Gogh in an
Amsterdam street, shot him off his bicycle and slaughtered himwith a knife in the
middle of the street in front of many witnesses.34 This murder would tremendously
affect governmental counter-terrorism efforts.
Bouyeri’s action had taken the security services by surprise. From 2002, the aivd
hadmonitored ‘the Hofstad Group’, the network of jihadi radicals that Bouyeri was
acquainted with.35 Its core members were under surveillance, but Bouyeri was not
viewed as one of them.He did not take part in the foreign tripsmade by somemembers
and was not considered amain actor in the Dutch jihadi scene.36 Bouyeri’s radical
texts calling for violent jihad, disseminated under the name ‘Abu Zubair’, were noticed
only after the police and the aivd stepped up their investigation into the Hofstad
Group after the murder of Van Gogh on 2 November 2004.37
However, Bouyeri’s radicalisation process had taken some time and was not a
solitary process. He grew up in a dreary area in Amsterdam-West as the eldest son
(after his sister Saïda) of eight children, but was able to pursue higher education
and engaged himself in community development. From 1999 onwards, he rented
his own apartment at theMarianne Philipsstraat and studied an accounting course
at a college. He becamemore fundamental and aggressive; for example, he held his
sister captive for having an affair. In the summer of 2000 he was involved in a pub
brawl, and in the spring of 2001 he attacked his sister’s boyfriend. In October, he was
sentenced to 12 weeks in prison, where he studied the Koran intensively.38
At the end of 2001, when he was released, his father was declared disabled and
his mother died of cancer. In 2002, Bouyeri’s plans to set up a youth centre in
his neighbourhood collapsed. He left college and began to live on unemployment
insurance. He now devoted his time completely to studying radical Islamic texts and
started wearing fundamentalist clothes. In the El TawheedMosque, which he visited
frequently, he met with similar radicalisingMuslim young people, and a preacher of
Syrian descent, Redouan al-Issa, or Abu Khaled.39
Bouyeri invited his new soulmates to his apartment, where he organised so-
called living-roommeetings and listened to lectures by Abu Khaled. He also provided
lodgings for one of the alleged key Hofstad Groupmembers: Nouriddin el Fatmi. His
mentor, Abu Khaled, taught him and the other members of the Hofstad Group about
‘Tawheed’ (the unity of Allah), and instructed them on how to live as radical Salafist
Muslims. Bouyeri embraced these ideas.40 After Abu Khaled was expelled from the
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Netherlands in October 2003 as an illegal immigrant, Bouyeri took over Khaled’s role
as spiritual leader. As the ideologue of the Hofstad Group, Bouyeri wrote, translated
and disseminated via the internet more than 50 texts, in which he increasingly called
his brothers to arms against Dutch society, rather than on behalf of international
jihad elsewhere.41
InMay 2004 he abused an employee of the Social Services, and on 29 September
2004 the police arrested him because he resisted being fined for fare-dodging. The
law enforcement officials found on him notes with telephone numbers and e-mail
addresses of Hofstad Group members, which they sent to the aivd. Since he had
committed only a minor offence and was not on the list of approximately 150 jihadi
radicals the aivd had identified as a risk to security, Bouyeriwas released. At the time,
neither the police nor the aivd considered Bouyeri to be a serious threat, nor did they
take seriously his participation in the jihadi network of the Hofstad Group.42
Secondly, although Bouyeri carried out the immediate preparations for his attack
on his own initiative, he was continually surrounded by his jihadi associates during
this preparatory stage. On 19 May 2004, Bouyeri received his last unemployment
cheque. Between 19May and 28 October he withdrew only €200 fromhis bank account
(not an amount someone can live on for five months). On 28 October, he withdrew
the rest of his savings, €930, and reached his maximum overdraft. That same day, he
handed Rachid B. an envelope containing €1,650, intended for his family. Where did
he find the additional €720? And how could he have afforded his firearm, a hs 2000
pistol, which costs approximately €1,000 to €1,500? It is therefore not unlikely that
others—possibly the defendants—were involved in one way or another. No evidence,
however, was found that supports this assumption.43
OnMonday evening, 1 November 2004, during Ramadan, Bouyeri had a late supper
together with his friends from the Hofstad Group. He also left behind some letters,
discovered later to be his will. Early in themorning, Bouyeri prayedwith his associates,
had breakfast with them and left the house on his bicycle with his gun, a ritual Kukri
Machete and a fillet knife in his backpack. His housemates denied having known
anything about these weapons, despite the fact that they lived together in his cramped
two-room flat (the living roommeasured 15 square metres, the single bedroom only
ten), nor could they provide explanations about how Bouyeri could have purchased
the gun.44
Bouyeri carefully planned the attack on the controversial publicist and filmmaker
Theo van Gogh. Van Gogh was known, among other things, for his anti-Islamist
statements for producing the provocative documentary Submission (an attempt to
liberateMuslimwomen from their oppressive religion, broadcast in August 2004),
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together with the Somali-born Member of Parliament Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Hirsi Ali
was protected by Dutch security agencies at that time, but Van Gogh, who had
rejected protection, seemed a good alternative. For weeks, Bouyeri observed Van
Gogh’s house and daily cycling routine and, in one of the most crowded streets on the
route, spotted the place where he would kill his target. At 8:40 on Tuesdaymorning
2 November Bouyeri overtook Van Gogh on the Linnaeusstraat, shot him from his
bicycle, followed him to the other side of the street, fired another round of bullets
(eight in total), then slashed his throat with themachete, in front of 53 witnesses.
With the smaller knife, he pinned an ‘Open Letter to Hirsi Ali’ to Van Gogh’s chest
and then fled the scene, fruitlessly shooting at some passers-by before engaging in
gunfire with the police. He tried to kill the police officers that pursued him, planning
to be killed himself in the process and become amartyr, but was shot in the leg and
overpowered.45
The police found a farewell letter on him, entitled ‘Drenched in blood’. This versed
text read as an incitement to holy war and was signed Saifu Deen al-Muwahhied. At
least according to Ruud Peters, a Dutch Islam expert and witness for the prosecution,
these words are a combination of two Arabic terms ‘sword of religion’ (Saif al-Din) and
‘confessor of Tawheed’ (al-Muwahhid).46 In the ‘Open Letter’, he directly threatened
Dutch-Somali liberal politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and blamed politicians for allowing
Jewish influences in politics. According to Norwegian researcher Petter Nesser, the
conclusion of the letter reflects ‘the essence of al-Qaedaism’ by prophesying the
defeat of the enemy on the individual, local, regional and global levels in order of
priority:
And like a great prophet once said: ‘I deem thee lost, O Pharaoh.’ (17:102) And so we
want to use similar words and send these before us, so that the heavens and the stars
will gather this news and spread it over the corners of the universe like a tidal wave. ‘I
deem thee lost, O America.’ ‘I deem thee lost, O Europe.’ ‘I deem thee lost, O Holland.’
‘I deem thee lost, O Hirsi Ali’ ‘I deem thee lost, O unbelieving fundamentalist.’47
Since Bouyeri wrote these texts to provide spiritual support for this network, these two
texts suggest that Bouyeri’s attack was the result of an ideological turn to violent jihad
against theNetherlands, whichmay have inspired theHofstad Group network. One of
Bouyeri’s last writings was the ‘Open Letter to the Dutch Population’ dated 12 August
2004 (which he left on a usb stick for other Hofstad Groupmembers to disseminate).
For ‘the Umma’,48 he announced attacks against Dutch public places, justifying the
attacks by the support of the Dutch government for the United States and Israel. His
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argument echoed a fatwa announced by dissident Saudi Sheikh Hamoud bin Oqlaaʾ al
Sjouʾabi, legitimising the September 11 attacks.49 A translation of these and other texts
was found on the computers of other members of the Hofstad Group.50
9.3.3. The Arrest
Bouyeri was arrested on the spot, but not before he tried to shoot some eyewitnesses
and tried to carry out a ‘suicide by cop’ attempt. The public prosecutor charged him
on 11 November with murder, attempted murder (of a police officer), attempted
manslaughter (of by-standers and police officers), violation of the law on gun-control,
suspicion of participating in a criminal organisationwith terrorist aims and conspiracy
with a terrorist purpose tomurder VanGogh,Hirsi Ali and otherswhowerementioned
in his open letter and demanded a life sentence.51
The public prosecutor also set out to arrest the other members of the Hofstad
network for taking part in a conspiracy to wage terrorism in the Netherlands. Most of
the arrests went smoothly, but on 10 November 2004, a special arrest squad entered the
apartment in The Hague where Ismail Akhnikh and JasonWalters resided. Walters
threw a hand grenade, wounding four law enforcement officers, turning the arrest
into a 14-hour siege and a national spectacle.52
9.3.4. The RemainingHofstadNetwork Continues
In themeantime, two other leaders, Abu Khaled (who had illegally entered the country
again) and Nouriddin el Fatmi, fled the country. Samir Azzouz, one of the other core
members of the group, had been arrested on 30 June 2004 for his alleged participation
in a shop robbery. While picking him up, the Special Forces retrieved a number of
weapons, chemicals andmaps from his apartment, signalling that he seemed to be
preparing for a terrorist attack.53 When Bouyeri committed his attack, Azzouz was
thus stored away and could not be implicated in this first trial.
However, Azzouz andEl Fatmi continued their attemptswhenAzzouzwas released
after his acquittal in April 2005. The judge had ruled, in a rather short trial, that the
chemicals found inhis apartmentwere not sufficient to assemble an explosive device.54
Despite strongprotests by anumber of conservative and right-wingpoliticians, Azzouz
was acquitted. As a law enforcement official who was involved in the case stated in an
interview, ‘From themoment Azzouz was acquitted due to lack of evidence, we were
tasked to carry out an autonomous investigation. We knew there had to bemore guns.
We also found out that Nouriddin and possibly Azzouz had been in Brussels, probably
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to purchase weapons. We tapped their telephones, did observations.’55 Thus, in April
2005, the police immediately launched a second investigation, called ‘Paling’ (Eel), and
later ‘Piranha’. The police immediately started a new investigation.56 Twomonths
later, was spotted in The Hague and was arrested together with his wife Soumaya S.
and friendMartine van denO. (a nativeDutch Islamist convert) at AmsterdamLelylaan
railway station. After their arrest an automatic gun (a Croatian Agram 2000) with an
unleashed firing pin (safety) lock was taken from El Fatmi’s backpack.57
Together with two others, Azzouz continued his efforts to purchase arms; they
made observations in and around Schiphol Airport and chatted about waging jihad.58
According to the criminal intelligence units of the Utrecht and Amsterdam police
forces, Azzouz and his comrades had set out to find ten ak-47 rifles, two guns with
silencers and ten explosive belts.59 The police and secret service also found recordings
of a video ‘will’ or farewell message by Azzouz, in which he, with a ‘baby Uzi’ in
the background, said goodbye to his family and friends and addressed the Dutch
population, all in Arabic: ‘We will spill your blood like you spilled the blood of our
Muslim citizens in Iraq.’ The will was not (yet?) intended for dissemination and was
only later revealed to the public. For the police and intelligence services, this video
triggered their arrest.60 On 14 October 2005, Azzouz and JermaineWalters (the brother
of the aforementioned JasonWalters), who were suspects in the first Hofstad case but
not detained, and five other co-conspirators were arrested on suspicion of preparing
an attack against unnamed national politicians, the aivd and other targets.61
9.4. Performative Strategies during the Three Hofstad Group Trials
9.4.1. The Trial againstMohammed Bouyeri, 11–26 July 2005 (the ‘Fakir’ case)
The Hearing
The trial against Bouyeri started on 11 July 2005 under massive media attention. The
public prosecutor, Frits van Straelen, charged him with murder with terrorist intent,
attempted murder (of eyewitnesses and police officers) and obstructing the work
of a member of parliament (Ayaan Hirsi Ali). He demanded a life sentence and the
withdrawal of his active and passive voting rights. For the prosecution the case was
straightforward. The only question was how Bouyeri would defend himself. That
answer proved to be anticlimactic.
Apart from using his right to the ‘last word’, Mohammed Bouyeri remained silent
from 11 until 24 July (he spoke only during the last two days of the trial). During
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this first trial, Bouyeri instructed his defence counsel62 to be present in court but to
remain silent. As he did not recognise the jurisdiction of the court, he did not want
them to pursue an active defence on his behalf.63 Even though the defence counsel
obeyed his instructions, one of his attorneys, Mr. Plasman, did comment on the case
in the media, thereby triggering a response from the judges: They felt that he/they
should defend their client in court.64
Bouyeri’s defence strategy basically entailed ignoring the court. He refused to
appear and after being forced to be present he remained silent. From a perfomative
perspective his refusal to engage was successful. It provoked a response from the court:
The judges ordered him to be present. This inspired all sorts of legal debates. Were
there actually legal grounds for this in Dutch—or international—law?65 Furthermore,
even though he remained silent, he expressed himself non-verbally; for instance, by
appearing in a black-and-white ‘keffiyeh’ (a traditional Arab headdress), a long djellaba
and holding a Koran.66
On 26 July, he demonstrated his contempt for the court by openly addressing
his last word (which is a right of the defendant before the presiding judges close the
trial) to the mother of his victim; this, while stressing that he did not feel obliged to
address the court. He made his speech only, or so it seemed, to fend off the allegations
that he was personally insulted by Van Gogh (and that themurder had thus been a
personal vendetta rather than a religious statement in general), and to offer some sort
of consolation to Van Gogh’s mother. She was the only person in the courtroom to
whom Bouyeri paid some respect, while acknowledging her grief and offering some
apologies.67
By exercising his right to the last word in themanner that he did, one can conclude
that he tried to persuade his target audience of the legitimacy of his cause. Among
other things, he said:
So the whole story that I was offended as aMoroccan because he called us ‘Geiten-
neukers’68 is in no way the truth. I did what I did because of what I believe. Even
if it had been my father or my little brother I would have done the same thing ….
I can ensure you that if I were released I would do it again …. The same law that
obliges me to behead anyone who insults Allah or the Prophet does not oblige me
to live in a country where, as the public prosecutor said, the ‘freedom of expression’
is preached.69
Thus he justified his crimes on the basis of his religion. His religious arguments were
predominately inspired by several Salafist sources, which included the conviction that
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true jihadists should hate those who threaten the Islam and should isolate themselves
from the non-Muslimworld.70
After challenging the judiciary so openly and stating that he, if given the chance,
would do it again, the life sentence he received came as no surprise.71 His behaviour
seemed to suggest that this had been his aim all along. When he failed in committing
suicide by cop and becoming amartyr in death, he now showed himself willing to
become amartyr in life, thus possibly mobilising his sympathisers or other adherents
to follow his steps, to renounce the laws and the institutes of ‘non-believers’ and to
wage jihad against them.72
He might have succeeded in persuading a few regarding his (in)justice perspective
and his religious motives. From a qualitative study done in Amsterdamwe know
that some radicalised young people described themurder of Van Gogh as a heroic
and positive deed and argued that the violent Jihad was indeed the apt response to
perceived injustices carried out against Muslims.73 However, apart from the group of
sympathisers on the court’s public gallery (there were only a handful), Bouyeri did not
seem to attract a crowd of followers at all; not at that time and not since. On themajor
religious social sites that were frequently visited by religiousMuslim young people
(notably marokko.nl), his trial was not a major topic of debate at all.74
Media Response
From the attack onwards, the nature and character of the terrorist threat captured
Dutch public debate for manymonths to come. The attacks by Al Qaeda in New York
had, of course, already shocked the Dutch government and sensitised the general
public which, until then, had been rather indifferent to international terrorism. The
murder of Van Gogh, however, triggered public and political vigilance vis-à-vis the
terrorist threat within Dutch society. For example, theMinister of Finance, Gerrit
Zalm, declared ‘War’ onMuslim terrorists.75 The terrorist threat was enhanced by
emerging fears of globalisation, immigration and Islam and transformed these fears
into a state of moral panic. From that moment onwards, policy efforts, research
projects and public debate centred on the question: was Bouyeri a lone wolf, or was
it more likely that he was but one of the many more radicalised Muslim young
people who were being recruited and organised to inflict more damage to Dutch
society?76
However, it was significant that Bouyeri’s murder was hardly cited or appraised
on the dominant internet sites and fora on which DutchMuslim youth expressed
themselves.77 Sections of his oral pleadings were taped by a tele-journalist of Nova.
As he had not given permission for this it caused a stir. The media focused on his
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background, his radicalisation process, on the otherMuslim youngsters that formed
part of the group, and—during the last hearing—on the relatives of Van Gogh, his
sister, parents and 15-year-old son who were present in the courtroom. Van Gogh’s
mother summed the national sentiment up in describing and dismissing Bouyeri as a
‘loser’ (stakker).78
The Verdict and the Aftermath
On 26 July, the judge issued the verdict.79 Bouyeri received a life sentence, without
parole—unusually harsh in Dutch judicial history.80
Neither the public prosecutor nor the defence counsel appealed the verdict. The
judicial process was not over yet for Bouyeri. The national prosecutor announced
that he would continue the prosecution of Bouyeri regarding his membership of the
so-called ‘Hofstad Group’ organisation. That meant that Bouyeri would be heard as a
witness and accused in a new trial that was scheduled for the autumn of that same
year.
One particular consequence of this straightforward trial and verdict was the shift
in attention of some of the public and commercial media from Bouyeri to the question
whether Van Gogh’s murder could have been prevented. Who was to blame? The
aivd revealed that Bouyeri did belong to a group of a few dozen young people that
they considered to be radical Salafists. Why, then, for example, did a documentary
presented by a national celebrity reveal that the security services had allowed Bouyeri
roam freely? At this point, a conspiracy theory was introduced that surfaced from
time to time: Bouyeri had been an agent of the aivd and ‘the government’. And that
the ‘government’, e.g. the aivd, had willingly sacrificed Van Gogh.81
9.4.2. The Hofstad Group Trial, February 2005–10March 2006 (the ‘Arles’ Case)
The Hofstad (and Piranha) case in the Netherlands offers a set of conspicuous new
premediation and riskmanagement techniques,made possible by the implementation
of the European Framework Decision within the Dutch legal framework in July 2004.
Previously, Dutch legislation had not referred to or address any special terrorism-
related criminal acts. The Act on Terrorism Crimes, proclaimed in the official
governmentpaperHet Staatsblad in June 2004,82 added several newarticles to theDutch
Criminal Code, namely articles 140a, 83a, and 962: an article penalising membership
of a terrorist organisation (140b), an article on ‘terrorist aim’ (83a) and an article on
conspiring to commit terrorist crimes (962).83 The Hofstad and Piranha cases were the
first overlapping cases in which these criminal offences were tested. Among others,
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the six defendants were charged with belonging to and participating in a terrorist
organisation (article 140a), recruiting for terrorist activities (article 205), possessing
firearms andmonitoring, preparing and conspiring (articles 96 and 46) to commit
terrorist crimes (article 83a). The prosecution demanded considerable prison sentences:
between eight and fifteen years.84
The case was highly interesting because of the risk management techniques
applied. The first andmost contested one, both by defence counsel and in the judicial
commentaries on the case, pertained to the admission of intelligence evidence in court.
As Eijkman and Van Ginkel point out:
Traditionally, a distinction exists between collecting intelligence for national security
purposes and gathering evidence for criminal investigations, as they serve different
purposes. This distinction also translates into the allocation of powers to law
enforcement officials and the specific powers allotted to the intelligence services. For
the latter, it is crucial that the sources of the intelligence are kept secret, whereas the
fair trial principle demands that during a criminal trial, the public prosecutor and
defencecounsel enjoy equal access to the evidence. However, in specific circumstances,
such as the prosecution of terrorist crimes, these two worlds meet and intelligence
information is shared.85
Since 2004, terrorism cases have been carried out on an ‘inverse investigation’ basis.
Not proof of evidence, but intelligence reports act as immediate cause to start the
investigation. The use of intelligencematerialwas thoroughly expanded. These reports
made up for the lack of concrete evidence (a common element with preventive arrests)
and furthermore admitted into the investigative process telephone taps, hearsay
and other information the origin of which remained in the dark. Possible deeds and
alleged future attacks that only exist in preparatory actions, such as conversations,
telephone conversations or the purchase of completely legal goods, were accepted as
evidence in court. Only the premediated use of these legal goods turned them into
bona fide evidence of illegal conspiratorial acts.
This risk management technique reduced the discretionary competencies of
the public prosecutor. After the perceived intelligence failure surrounding Van
Gogh’s death, where the murderer had been on an aivd-list of second-rank jihadists,
the service started to divulge a continuous stream of intelligence reports to the
prosecution. Although public prosecutors have discretionary competences in deciding
to launch an investigation, order an arrest or run a second check on the aivdmaterial,
in terrorism cases they felt pressured to act muchmore quickly. In these instances
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the highest counsel of the Prosecution Office, often also including theMinister of
Justice, has a say in thematter, thereby reducing the autonomous function of the
prosecutor of an individual case to one (lower) link in a set of politically sensitive
deliberations. This centralised and politicised handling of terrorism cases went hand
in glove with the tendency of the Dutch aivd to dispatch their alerts muchmore
quickly and based onmuch less evidence. In short, since Bouyeri’s attack, the public
prosecutors felt the pressure to act immediately after an official written report entered
their e-mailbox.86
A conspicuous consequence of this riskmanagement assemblage, dictating an
increasingly heated prosecution cycle once the terrorism alert was signalled, was that
the deliberations for commencing an investigation were shielded from the public.
Intelligence briefs were characterised by their brevity, andmore often than not did
not reveal much about the background or the reliability of the sources. Defence
counsel in the Hofstad and Piranha trials consequently accused the prosecution
of discriminatory and selective investigation praxis. Why were some individuals
subpoenaed? Were some merely interrogated as potential witnesses and others
charged with jihadist crimes?87 The reasons for incriminating some individuals
and leaving others out remains hidden in the secret chambers of the security
agencies.
In short, we will see that the new laws, the heated political climate and the
pervasive sense of fear and terror (deliberately created by the defendants themselves,
according to the prosecution) spurred the prosecution to follow a strategy of projecting
‘virtual realities’ into the trial.88
The Public Prosecutor’s Strategy
In the ‘Arles’ investigation (the name that the national investigation squad gave the
investigation into the Hofstad members after 2 November), contrary to the case,
no defendant had committed or accomplished a physical attack, murder or other
violent act. Therefore, the prosecution relied on the new legislation adopted after
2004 to charge the defendants with the crime of belonging to a terrorist organisation,
preparing for a terrorist attack, recruiting others, inciting hatred and terrorism.89
This indicated a completely different approach. The prosecution had to invoke the
possible terrorist future based on preparations, intentions and associations only.
That made the trial a highly interesting and novel proceeding; it was cutting-edge
jurisprudence, also according to the prosecutors.90
In February and May 2005, two preliminary (pro forma) hearings took place in
which the prosecutors, Koos Plooy and Alexander van Dam, announced that the
the hofstad group on trial: sentencing the terrorist risk, 2005–2014 | 387
twelve (later thirteen) defendants were charged with beingmembers of a terrorist
organisation and that their custody would be extended by ninety days.91 During the
summer, the national investigation squad concluded its searches and observations
and heard a number of witnesses, in particular female friends and (ex-)partners of
the defendants. Rumours and stories about ‘seduced’ young girls, manipulated and
recruited by Hofstad Groupmembers to join their alleged jihadist cause, started to
spread.92 The spectacular arrest of El Fatmi (see below) and his wife Soumaya S. on 22
June 2005 further sparked the national debate and expectations as to the true terrorist
nature of the defendants.
In September a fourth pro forma hearingwas organised, after which two defendants
were released due to lack of evidence. The prosecution further announced that they
would also prosecuteMohammed Bouyeri for participating in the Hofstad Group.
Bouyeri’s counsel, Peter Plasman, accused the prosecution of turning the trial into a
‘show trial’. ‘The point is that the public prosecutor wants to mete out additional
punishment toMohammed B, although he has already received amaximum sentence.
This only serves tomake Bouyeri suffer more. That is something the criminal law
does not allow for.’93
Notwithstanding these protests, on 5 December the trial against the 13 defendants
commenced in the heavily guarded Amsterdam-Osdorp courtroom, ‘the Bunker’, a
venue far from the city centre, in an industrial area that is very difficult to access by
public transport. The group of defendants consisted of Mohammed Bouyeri, three
other alleged core group members (Nouriddin el Fatmi, Jason Walters and Ismail
Akhnikh) and nine others. JasonWalters and Ismail Akhnikh had been arrested after
heavy resistance (Walters threw a hand grenade at the police on 10 November 2004),
which gave them special status, since they could be charged under the regular criminal
law with attemptedmurder as well.
The prosecution initiated the hearing with Professor Ruud Peters, an Islam expert
from the University of Amsterdam, who commented on the ideology that the Hofstad
Group adhered to, as deduced from the numerous texts and videos the police and
security services had found on themembers’ computers. Although Peters made clear
that such an ideology, albeit fundamentalist and radical, need not necessarily lead
to concrete acts of jihadism, the prosecutor took his statements as an argument to
underpin the innate violent character of the Hofstad Group. Other witnesses were
summoned to substantiate this allegation. Sixteen-year-old ‘Malika’, who had left
home to enter into an ‘Islamist marriage’ with Nouriddin el Fatmi and who had spilt
the beans on how El Fatmi and the group recruited newmembers, was summoned to
explain her experiences to the court. She however refused to talk in court; it turned
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out that she had received threatening letters. Her story as it leaked out to the press,
however, made a great impression on the public and the court.
In his final plea on 23 January 2006, public prosecutor Alexander van Dammade it
clear that it was his aim to identify the network as a terrorist organisation, based on
two arguments:
Step 1: The binding agent [of the group] is the radical political ideology […], charac-
terised by hatred against the western, in particular also the Dutch democratic
rule of law, directed against people who think differently, whomay andmust
be killed as apostates and nonbelievers. It is an ideology aimed at the violent
destruction necessary to erect an Islamist state.
Step 2: What is pursued from that ideology (the intent) are criminal acts. We have
seen with Bouyeri, Walters, Akhnikh, El Fatmi and Azzouz, based on the
evidence, that their convictions cannot have another outcome than to commit
acts of violence. Their ideology obliges them to violence against anyone who
insults their prophet, against non-believers and apostates. There is no room
for a peaceful way. Since voting is prohibited according to various writings,
a political movement that disseminates its principles through dialogue or
legal action is thus unthinkable. The writings, videos and recordings found at
their places glorify and call to violence, as a means to reach the ultimate goal.
And thus, we have proved the criminal intent for the core members of this
organisation.94
With this argument, the public prosecutors invited the judges and the public at large
to take into account the potential future if the suspects had not been disrupted and
apprehended (which happened shortly after the murder in 2004). Later on in the
trial, the prosecutors posed the rhetorical question: who knows where this group of
suspects would have stood if [Mohammed Bouyeri] had not murdered Van Gogh but
had continued its ideological and practical formation? And the briefing went on to
speculate:
Fanaticism and extremismmake one blind. Driven by a strong sense of connection
people can bemoved to conquer heaven. By limiting themselves to talking, sometimes
open recruitment, and doing very little substantially to come to an attack, their
intent developed itself insidiously and perhaps all themore dangerously …. It is our
conviction that this group of and around the core members was undergoing this
transformation.95
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Through these speculative moves that were repeated in the appeals sessions, the
potential terrorist scenario of the Hofstad Group became configured into the court
documents and was a basis for evidence.
Moreover, the defendants were charged not only with participating in a terrorist
organisation, aimed at committing violent attacks, but also with aiming to commit
preparatory activities for enabling such attacks in the future. ‘It may seem strange, an
organisation that has the commitment of preparatory acts as its aim. However, it is
feasible that a group occupies itself on a frequent basis with the preparation of crimes
that might be committed by others, or by that same organisation, but in a later stage.
[…] Although we claim enough evidence for the aim of concrete violent or other acts,
the ancillary acts or preparatory aim can be determined as well.’96
The artefacts supporting these precautionary charges were mainly evidence from
the aforementioned female friends and texts and recordings, as interpreted by Islam
expert Ruud Peters. The other charges,murder and attemptedmurder, againstWalters
and Akhnikh weres muchmore straightforward, and based on solid evidence of the
thrown hand grenade.
The Defence Strategies
Overall, the performative strategies differed from defendant to defendant during
the successive Hofstad trials and changed over time.97 Some clear strategic positions
were visible. First of all, the most important difference existed between Bouyeri’s
trial and those of the rest. Bouyeri had of course accomplished his acts, but while
the prosecutors tried to argue that the accused had together committedmajor acts
of preparing for terror attacks themselves, they all, except for Bouyeri, categorically
rejected this charge.
The second issue on which the defendants showed different strategies was their
attitude towards the court and the rule of law as such. Some engaged with the court,
while others refused to show ‘respect for the laws of non-believers’.98 This refusal was
symbolised by not rising when themagistrates entered the courtroom, which is a
custom in the Netherlands. Key Hofstad Group suspects such as Bouyeri, Akhnikh
and Jason Walters refused to rise before the judges, thereby signalling that they
indeed did cherish other opinions on justice and injustice. AlthoughWalters, Azzouz
and Akhnikh did not plead guilty to terrorist attacks, they did accept the radical
Islamist attribution as formulated by the prosecution. Others, including Rachid B. and
Nadir A., seemed to distance themselves not only from the charges but also from the
alleged ideology the group supposedly adhered to, and they showed every conformity
and deference in responding to the court.99
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During the first trial, the court dealt with the fourteen defendants (one at a time),
commencing with Bouyeri, whom the prosecution identified as the leader of the
group.100 As in his first trial he was ordered by the court to be present. Even though
on the first day he wore a red-and-white ‘keffiyeh’, this changed over the course of the
trial. He began to wear western-style clothing.101 This time he reluctantly responded
when questioned by the judges and the public prosecutor. Furthermore, instead of his
defence counsel, who were present in court, he delivered his oral pleadings in person.
To do so is uncommon in the Netherlands. His oral pleadings lasted three hours,
during which he confessed he was filled with ‘joy and pride’ that the prosecution
compared him to Osama bin Laden. He also explained that he had killed Theo van
Gogh because he had insulted ‘the Prophet’.102
Most of the other defendants distanced themselves from Mohammed Bouy-
eri’s violent act and the association with terrorism. Stating that although they—
occasionally—had visited his house, received religious instruction and watched videos
of beheadings, they had been unaware of his plan to kill Van Gogh. Rachid B., for
example, a childhood friend, whomet with him the night before themurder, and
approximately oneweek before had been given some personal belongings (four letters),
stated that he had been ignorant ofMohammed Bouyeri’s intentions.103 He alsomade
clear that he was not an extremist, was cooperative in responding to the questions of
the judges, emphasised he held a steady job and did not share the radical ideology of
some of the other defendants.104 In the context of theHofstad Group trial this strategy
of showing respect for the court was distinctive. It communicated that Rachid B.,
in contrast to some of the others, wanted to communicate that he was an ordinary
person who due an unfortunate course of events was mixed up in the Hofstad Group
affair. Additionally, most suspects denied being terrorists. JasonWalters, for example,
defended himself by explaining that he only acted with the Hofstad Group to ‘look
cool’ (for social status).105
Because radical and/or extremist religious ideology and activities played an
important role in the allegation that the Hofstad Group was a terrorist organisation,
several defendants were cross-examined by either the judges or the public prosecutor
about their extremist or radical convictions. Some, like Bouyeri and JasonWalters,
were explicit about their orthodox beliefs; others including Rachid B. andMohammed
el B. emphasised that although they were ‘Muslim’ they were not extremists.106
Nonetheless, among those with extremist religious beliefs there were differences
in defence strategies. Even thoughbothBouyeri and JasonWalters explicitly renounced
the Dutch legal system, Walters, in contrast to Bouyeri, stressed that he would defend
himself. JasonWalters stated, ‘Our legal system is the “sharia”. That is the only system
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we acknowledge.’ Subsequently a judge verified whether or not he would defend
himself. He then responded with the words, ‘I will defendmyself, because this is a
non-Muslim state … and there is no “sharia”.’107
As noted earlier, the performative strategies differed for each successive Hofstad
trial and were not static.108 JasonWalters, for instance, adapted his defence strategy
a number of times. During his first trial he engaged to some extent; he would not
rise before the judges, but responded to their cross-examination. Yet in appeal he
refused to respond to the judges’ questions.109 During the partial retrial, however,
he explicitly stated that he was convinced he would receive a fair trial and remained
engaged.110 Furthermore, he first appealed his case and then filled a request not
to, but ultimately had to because the public prosecutor stuck to his request for an
appeal.111 During his second appeal, he changed his performative strategy again;
expressing a revolutionary turn in his behaviour and speech and affirming his belief
that his trial would be fair and just.112
Finally yet importantly, defence counsel played a crucial role in the performative
strategies of the defendants. Some were extremely vocal, both in court and in the
media. For example, a prominent Dutch newspaper, the nrcHandelsblad, quoted Ms.
Böhler andMr. Koppe, who represented Ahmed A. and Zakaria T., as saying ‘this trial is
a classical witch-hunt’.113 In the same interview, both criticised the public prosecutor
and the judges for focussing too much on religion rather than on concrete activities.
In court, defence counsel’s strategy differed from client to client. However, at times
they did collaborate with each other. In an effort to emphasise that the Hofstad Group
trial was severely politicised, suggestions of conspiracies, including the possibility
that the police and secret service had set their clients up, were inserted in their
pleas and communicated to the press. During the first trial, the lawyers requested to
hear in person the law enforcement officials who had taken statements from their
clients; a highly unusual request in the Netherlands because it suggests that the law
enforcement officials might have been biased in their interrogations.114 Moreover, on
appeal, two defence counsel questioned the neutrality of the judges and demanded a
wraking, a special request to replace one or more trial judges. Their rationale was that
by hearing a witness behind closed doors, the judges had given the impression of
no longer being objective and were giving in to the whims of the prosecution and
intelligence services.115
Although the particular request was denied, it fuelled suspicions of a tainted
investigative procedure. Counsel’s strategy was obviously intended to discredit the
security and police forces, to raise suspicion as to their integrity and thus to raise
doubts about the defendants’ access to a fair trial as such. However, contrary to some
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of their defendants (Bouyeri, Walters and Akhnikh), and contrary to strategies adopted
by their forebears in the 1970s, the defence lawyers did not reject the legal system as a
whole. On the contrary, they operated according to the same core principles of Dutch
and human rights law (fair trial, habeas corpus, freedom of speech and religion) that
they claimed the judicial and police forces were denying their clients.
The Verdict
On 10 March 2006, the District Court of Rotterdam convicted JasonWalters, Akhnikh
and El Fatmi and sentenced them respectively to fifteen, thirteen and five years
in prison. Nine suspects were convicted of being members of a criminal terrorist
organisation, whereas five others were acquitted of that charge. The Hofstad Group
was also placed on the European Union’s blacklist of terrorist organisations.116
However, on 23 January 2008 the Appeals Court of The Hague overturned the
sentences of seven defendants in the Hofstad Group case who had appealed the verdict
at first instance. They ruled that there was too little evidence to define the Hofstad
Group as a terrorist organisation that shared an ideological viewpoint, and that
conspired and associated on a regular basis.117 According to the judge, ‘the Hofstad
Group displayed insufficient organisational substance to conclude the existence of an
organisation as laid out in articles 140 and 140a of the Criminal Code’.118 Only the
sentences of JasonWalters (fifteen years for attemptedmurder for throwing the hand
grenade), Akhnikh (fifteen months for possession of illegal firearms andmunitions),
El Fatmi (five years for possession of illegal firearms) and his wife Soumaya S. (nine
months, same charge) were upheld on appeal.119
TheDutch court acquitted theHofstad Group in reference to articles 9 and 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (freedom of religion and freedom of speech).
The court concluded that the prosecution’s dependence on ideological writing did not
provide sufficient evidence for labelling the Hofstad Group as a terrorist organisation.
It also underlined that it attached great importance to religious pluralism and the
freedomof speech, even if this pluralism included fundamentalist and anti-democratic
opinions, such as expressed by the members of the Hofstad Group.120
This verdict, however, did not mark the end of the Hofstad Group saga. The
public prosecution filed for cassation and on 2 February 2010 the Dutch Supreme
Court, which only overturns the decisions of lower courts when their judgment is
not in accordance with the applicable law or on procedural concerns, ruled that a
partial retrial should be held.121 According to the Supreme Court’s judgment, the
Appeals Court of The Hague had too narrowly interpreted the legal definition of what
constitutes a terrorist organisation and should bring the definition more in line with
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jurisprudence on cases of group coherence of criminal organisations engaged in stock
fraud of money laundering.122 Henceforth the suspects’ organisation might not be
too loosely structured to merit the conviction Therefore, the case was referred to the
Amsterdam Appeals Court for partial retrial.123
In December 2010, the Appeals Court ruled that the Hofstad Group was a terrorist
organisation and sentenced seven defendants for participating in a terrorist and
criminal organisation; five of them received a fifteen-month sentence, one 38 months
and one thirteen years.124 Henceforth, the Hofstad Group network was labelled as a
terrorist organisation, aimed at inciting hatred, violence and intimidation, partly
with a terrorist intent.125 This ruling of the Amsterdam Court of Appeals had a strong
effect on legal counterterrorism instruments, since it legitimised the lowering of the
standards to classify a group as a terrorist organisation.
Public Debate
The defence strategies and verdicts differed during the successive Hofstad trials, a shift
that was also linked to the waxing and waning tides of media attention. The initial
setting of the trial in 2005 was polarised—the prosecution opened with an exposé on
fear and intimidation on the one hand, and defence counsel claimed that the trial
was a show trial or witch-hunt. The tension was caused in part by the extraordinary
socio-political context of the trials and the extensive media coverage in the immediate
aftermath of the Van Goghmurder, and the revelations about ‘Islamic lover boys’
within theHofstad Group during the first half of 2005.Moreover, theHofstad trial was
the first one that made great use of the new terrorism legislation, involving suspects
charged with non-violent preparatory crimes.
The heavy public, political and judicial pressure put the defendants in a very
defensive position. It was hard to argue against ‘conjectural reasoning’ and invoked
and premediated terrorist futures; the London bombings of July 2005 and other
terrorist attacks carried out by ‘home-grown radicals’ elsewhere in Europe made it all
sound so feasible. Defence counsel had to argue to contradict these fearful images
and associations. They did so by explaining to themedia how their defendants, in
their view, were already demonised in the press and were being sentenced based on
public fears and anti-Muslim sentiments alone. The only crimes the prosecution
held against themwere their religious convictions, according to defence counsel, Ms.
Böhler, Mr. Plasman andMr. Koppe.126
Initially, these pleas were not well received in mainstream Dutch society. Increas-
ingly, however, their calls on behalf of their clients for freedom of religion, tolerance
for extremist religious ideologies and the phenomenon of immigrant youth culture
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became part of the public and political debate.127 Their arguments were to some
extent supported by the emerging conspiracy theorymentioned above. If one were to
accept these conspiracy theories, the prosecution was thus busy shifting the blame
from the aivd by implicating defendants in omissions committed by the government.
Thus, the debate evolved from a discussion about the intrinsic violent nature of Islam
or Salafism to whether the notion of a ‘War on Terror’ itself constituted a threat to the
rule of law and to the principle of a fair trial.128
In later years, when the Hofstad Group trial was rehearsed in a first and second
appeal, not the purported future attacks, but the boundaries of freedom of expression
were what was subjected to greater scrutiny. Politicians, journalists and social media
websites alike commented on the trial, and it appeared to some as if the defendants,
especially those who had not committed acts of violence, were primarily convicted on
the basis of their radical beliefs. National celebrity, parliamentary representative and
the addressee of Bouyeri’s warning letter, Ayaan Hirsi Ali herself stated that radical
ideologies such as those of the Hofstad Group defendants formed part of the freedom
of expression, and should be engaged through debate and not by the criminal justice
system.129
9.4.3. The SecondHofstad Group Trial: The Piranha Case, 2005–2006
The Prosecution’s Strategy
While the Hofstad Group trial was already under way with the first preliminary
hearings, a second investigation started in April 2005 against the remaining members
of the group. This investigation, called the ‘Piranha’ case by the police forces, came out
in the open through the arrest of Nouriddin el Fatmi, who had been a fugitive since
2 November 2004.
On 22 June 2005, a Special Intervention Unit rushed onto the platform of the
Amsterdam Lelylaan railway station and fought two jihadist suspects to the ground,
Nouriddin el Fatmi, aged 22, and his wife Soumaya S., aged 21. Both were connected to
the Hofstad Group network to whichMohammed Bouyeri, the murderer of Theo
van Gogh, belonged. El Fatmi had a firearm, an Agram 2000, in his backpack. In the
end, El F. was sentenced to five years in prison for illegal possession of a firearm
andmembership of a terrorist organisation. Soumaya S. spent six months in jail for
complicity in the possession of the weapon and was released on 20 December 2005.130
Meanwhile, on 14 October 2005, Samir Azzouz (who had been released in April
2005) and two others were arrested and chargedwith preparing to commit an attack on
politicians, government buildings and an El-Al aeroplane. In August 2006, Soumaya S.
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was thought to belong to this group and was taken into custody again. Apparently,
new evidence had emerged.131 All in all, the group of defendants included five young
males and one female (all of Dutch-Moroccan descent), connected in some way or
another to the defendants of the Hofstad Group trial.
For the prosecution, this time represented by Alexander van Dam and Bart den
Hartigh, this case was much easier to make. In the Piranha case, the prosecutors
could prove that the suspects possessed illegal firearms and munitions and had
collected names and addresses of politicians and were therefore in a much later stage
of preparation than the suspects in theHofstad case.132 However, in April 2004, Azzouz
had been acquitted of a terrorist crime because the preparations were found to lack
focus and the chemical ingredients did not yet make for a real bomb. This time, the
prosecution did not want to obtain convictions based on the Weapons andMunitions
Act only, but intended to get Azzouz for terrorism as well. Therefore, they presented
some convincing attempts at conjectural reasoning.
Van Dam had already made the connection between the murder of Van Gogh, the
Arles case and the Piranha case. In his statement during the Arles trial in February
2006 (before the Piranha trial had started), he invoked the potential disastrous future
towards which Samir Azzouz (who was not a defendant in that trial at all, but who
was called as a witness) was heading:
The intended crimes [of the Hofstad Group, including both the defendants in the
Arles and the Piranha investigation] are located in the future. The group of defendants
was heading toward something, they felt they had to do it. Azzouz was probably the
first (at least according to the om) to capitalise on this future; despite his acquittal
[in April 2005] his behaviour was drenched in a terrorist ideology. But Bouyeri [Van
Gogh’s murderer] set the tone, as host and (co-)director of the meetings and by his
writings in which he was writing towards a violent climax. Then by embarking upon
the road towards jihad andmartyrdom. A road that begged for future imitation.133
Thus, themurder of Theo van Gogh on 2 November 2004 (when Samir Azzouz was
still in detention) was viewed as the inevitable outcome of a process of home-grown
radicalisation in which also the other defendants, both in the Arles and the Piranha
cases, were involved.
In the Piranha trial, which started in April 2006, aivd intelligence information
constituted the hard core of the evidence presented by the public prosecutor. One of
themost convincing and vivid pieces of evidence was a cd-rom, collected by the aivd,
on which Samir Azzouz had videotaped several versions of a farewell message. Azzouz
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had not dispatched this video ‘will’ to his friends, relatives or the media. The various
versions were retrieved from his home computer. However, the prosecutor argued
that the will was concrete proof of a pending attack. During the trial, the public
prosecutor gave a presentation of thirteenminutes in which he first showed amessage
by Bin Laden, followed by footage of Al Zawahiri, and some parts from the suicide
message of a Pakistani suicide terrorist responsible for the London attacks. Then
again a message by Al Zawahiri and finally (a version of) Samir Azzouz’s taped will (in
Arabic)—all provided with Dutch subtitles. The prosecutor wanted to demonstrate
that this was no ‘joke’, that Azzouz’ will resembled other jihadist messages broadcast
after an attack, and it was thus immediate proof of ‘a deed that was to be carried out in
the Netherlands’. The will, furthermore, was ‘obviously intended to be made public
after Azzouz had committed this act’.134 By showing the videotape and images from
the websites maintained by the defendants, the prosecution effectively coloured the
mind-set of the audience in and outside court and made it almost impossible to
refute the power of this sequential imagery (Bin Laden—Al Zawahiri—the London
Bombings—Samir Azzouz—Al Zawahiri).135
This very visual and compelling premediation technique was flanked by a subtler
one. Apart from Samir Azzouz, four other male suspects, including Nouriddin el
Fatmi, were included, and after somemonths one female suspect, Soumaya S. She was
implicated in the charge based on intelligence evidence as well. In her case, it became
plain how intelligence evidence can be transformed into incriminating evidence by
lifting snippets of conversation out of their original context, thereby stripping it
of its original meaning and opening the door to other, more sinister meanings. In
the Piranha case, one of the two key arguments for charging the female defendant,
Soumaya S., with membership of a terrorist organisation and conspiring to commit
terrorist crimes was supported by playing excerpts of a taped telephone conversation
with her sister Hanan. In the recordings, the defendant asked the sister, who worked
at a pharmacy close to the Dutch parliament buildings, for addresses of centre-right
and liberal politicians. According to the defendant, she only meant ‘to make dawah to
them’—as stated in the phone conversation.136
For the prosecution, the conversation implied a target-identifying process; the
remarks on ‘dawah’ were only meant to deceive the sister. By lifting the conversation
out of its context and connecting it to a jihadist website maintained by another group
member and to jihadist texts stored on their computers, the prosecution used the
technique of premediation: the defendants were already suspected of being members
of a terrorist group, therefore inquiring after names and addresses of Dutch politicians
could only have been made for that reason, notwithstanding other explanations
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being available.137 By omitting the conversation’s context defence counsel turned an
innocent exchange into a threatening phone call. To be sure, the prosecution did in
fact ask the aivd for more contextual information, but it drew a blank.138 The aivd
refused tomeet the demand. The prosecution therefore stuck to its charge. (Note,
exactly this refusal of the aivd to disclose the rest of the conversation prompted the
Dutch Supreme Court in 2011 to overrule this verdict and to call for a new trial. In
March 2014, the Amsterdam Court confirmed the terrorismsentence of three years for
Soumaya S.)139
A final way in which potential violent futures were interpolated into the present
terrorist trial revolved around introducing a vignette of the brainwashed female
jihadist into public discourse. In February 2005, just before the investigation into the
Piranha case started, two prominent Dutch journalists published a book on ‘Female
Warriors of Allah’,140 in which they stated that the Dutch judicial and intelligence
authorities had severely underestimated the threat of female jihadists within the
Islamist networks in the Netherlands. The tabloid press branded the converted
jihadist women as seduced, brainwashed and repressed by the male terrorist suspects
in supporting their radical activities.De Telegraaf wrote about ‘Preaching and porn:
Young women abused by Islamic “lover boys” ’. The ‘Hofstad Group network’—the
name an invention by the aivd connecting a disparate group of individuals and friends
surroundingMohammed Bouyeri—had been extended to include ‘mentally unstable
young women falling for the lures of radical “lover boys” ’. The handful of women
were even described as ‘Muslim groupies’.141 Debates on television, in parliament and
plenty of research projects followed. The defendants’ counsel condemned the trial as
political justice; anti-Islam parties complained about police and judicial indolence,
raising the stakes for trials to come.
The defendant Soumaya S. did not quite fit into this passive frame, since she
impressed the prosecution and the audience alike with her eloquence, intelligence and
bravado in court and during her arrest. She was arrested twice, first for co-possession
of a firearmwith her husband (in October 2005) and secondly for conspiring to commit
a terrorist attack. Already during the first trial, on 18 and 19 October 2005, public
prosecutor Koos Plooy deplored the fact that he could not charge herwithmembership
of a terrorist organisation, even though she was assumed to be ‘a potential instrument
in the hands of her husband’. Hemotivated his demand for a twelve month prison
sentence accordingly:
She followed him [her husband] blindly, but with eyes wide open. That turned her
into a potential instrument in the hands of this man.142
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In other words, although public prosecutor Plooy was only able to charge her
with co-possession of a firearm, admitting that he could not file a terrorism charge
against her based on her association with her husband and the conversational stub
mentioned above, he positively identified her as a ‘ticking bomb’, a potential, powerful
and willing instrument in the hands of a bunch of terrorists. In August 2006, Soumaya
was arrested a second time, based on roughly the same evidence as before, but this time
the prosecutor felt he could charge her with membership of a terrorist organisation.
This second time, the prosecutor rejuvenated his ‘old’ evidence by reminding the
public of the London bombings and Al Qaeda videos:
Fanaticism and extremismmake blind. Driven by a common basic feeling people
can turn into zealots, sparing nothing and no one. And that might lead to bizarre
offences, from unexpected angles. No one had expected the perpetrators of the London
attacks [7 July 2005] to carry out such acts. Likewise, no one would possibly expect
some of the defendants here today capable of participating or carrying out an attack.
However, this has been proven. There is therefore no room for underestimation.143
The Defendants’ Strategy
Like Mohammed Bouyeri, Samir Azzouz also explicitly rejected the Dutch rule of
law. Since 2003, he had been suffering from a chronic illness and inflammation of his
intestines, but often he did not receive his medication and was not allowed transport
to the hospital. His lawyer, Victor Koppe, wanted to enforce his treatment through
a court order. Azzouz, however, refused to use the Dutch legal system, because he
only respected the laws of Allah. ‘We reject you’, he stated on 21 December 2005 during
the Hofstad Group trial, where he was summoned as a witness, ‘we denounce your
system. We hate you. That’s about it.’144
On the other hand, Azzouz vigorously denied being a terrorist or having prepared
for terrorist attacks, and together with his co-defendants aggressively countered the
prosecution’s charges. He tried to discredit some key witnesses by implying that they
were evenmore fundamentalist in their beliefs than he was. His defence counsel also
tried to trivialise the farewell video by portraying it as try-outs during some severe
feelings of frustration.145 Nouriddin el Fatmi also played down his radical behaviour,
even claiming the he only carried the Agram 2000 with him to protect himself against
Soumaya’s angry ex-husband.
The only female suspect, Soumaya, followed a different performative strategy.
She tried to tone down her image as a ‘dangerous woman’. She did not deny that the
other defendants, notably Samir andNouriddin, might have been radicalised, but
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she clung to her statement that she hadmore or less tumbled into the whole affair;
explaining that she became affiliated with Nouriddin in the spring of 2005 and had
only spent six weeks with him before they were arrested, not knowing what he was
up to. She claimed ignorance regarding the gun he was carrying with him. Soumaya
also felt that her lawyers held her hostage within this group of defendants, lest she
make incriminating statements about Nouriddin and the others. She felt caught
between two stools. Her angry ex-husband sat in the public gallery accompanied by
her relatives.146 The public prosecutor wanted to get her convicted for terrorism this
time.147 And she was flanked by her co-defendants, including her Islamic husband,
and lawyers who were pressuring her to adhere to their performative strategy of
rejecting the charges as a collective.148
Soumaya, however, initiated attempts to detach herself from the group. On 20
October, she testified against Imam Fawaz Jneid, revealing that he had delivered a
sermon a few weeks before Bouyeri’s attack in which he had cursed Van Gogh and
others. Bouyeri was in attendance as well. ‘It was awful what I heard’, she confessed.
‘Fawaz constantly makes you feel that you are lacking in zeal and activity on behalf
of the defence of Islam’. With this confession, she detached herself from the ‘father
figure’ who had drawn her into Salafism’s lure. Fawaz, who was heard as a witness,
protested and provided the opposite story. He had ‘rapped Soumaya’s knuckles’ and
had warned her against continuing down a ‘path of mortal peril,’ only to see her
‘throw dirt’ at him now. Soumaya started sobbing. ‘He only warnedme about the
secret service. He is denying everything now, I feel betrayed.’ In addition, a copy of the
sermon surfaced, confirming Soumaya’s earlier testimony.149
On 1 November, she took the stage again and proclaimed her divorce from El
Fatmi. Her father, another defendant and her counsel had acted as witnesses, as was
required under Islamic law for undoing a marriage. The presiding judge Koning
questioned Soumaya on her relations with Fatmi. Had she been obedient to him,
followed him on his paths? ‘I am not good at obeying a man, so we just had to let that
go’, Soumaya explained. ‘You seem so cheerful and spry when saying that’, remarked
the judge. ‘Did your father not say “no” to you often enough? …Were you spoiled as a
girl? I can see your mother and sister nodding vigorously.’150 Despite this almost
fatherly conversation, the court was not impressed by Soumaya’s performance, as she
acted erratically and capriciously in their eyes. ‘Did Soumaya do this [the divorce] to
belatedly distance herself from her “God-fearing” husband, whomade her a radical,
and, in doing so, from the remaining defendants as well?’, the public prosecutor
wondered in his oral pleadings. ‘We believe that this gesture comes too late. For us, it
is beyond doubt that she belongs to the same organisation as her now ex-husband.’151
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On 6November 2006, the public prosecutor, Alexander van Dam, submitted the
sentences he was requesting to the court. Fatmi, Azzouz and another defendant,
Mohammed C., were believed to have been the ‘core members’, ‘inspirators and
initiators’, and ‘Soumaya S. andMohammedH. allowed themselves to be inspired
by them and actively got involved in their activities’. And what did these activities
involve? ‘It is our conviction that only through intervention of the police and judicial
authorities has an actual terrorist attack been prevented. Although this attack was
still in a preparatory stage, the plans and means were abundantly present.’ Since
the ‘danger of recurrence was very high’, the prosecutor demanded heavy sentences.
Against Azzouz, the public prosecutor demanded fifteen years, against Nouriddin
twelve (since he already had been sentenced in the first Hofstad trial for five years) and
against Soumaya ten years.152
The requested sentence for Soumaya startled most of the spectators. According to
her defence counsel, Yasser Özdemir, it was ‘absurd’ that the public prosecutor had
hardly made any distinction between core members and the others, like Soumaya. In
the fifty or so investigation files, her name did not appear in connection with any
of the preparatory activities for terrorist attacks. Soumaya was ‘shocked to pieces’.
According to the defence counsel ‘the Zeitgeist [i.e. the prevailing culture of fear,
caused by the terrorist attacks] had driven this trial’ and its severe sentences. During
the final hearing, on 10 November, Soumaya addressed the court one last time. In her
view, ‘the blind hatred againstMuslims’ from the crusaders’ times had returned in
this trial and in the anti-terrorism campaigns the Dutch government was waging. She
compared the special unit for terrorism suspects in the high security prison in Vught
with the Nazi concentration camp that had been located on that same spot during
the times of the German occupation. She wished the court good luck and wisdom in
deciding upon the sentence, although, ultimately, what would happen to her was
‘Allah’s will’. Samir Azzouz also proclaimed his ‘surprise’ over the severe demands by
the prosecution; he felt he ‘was being punished for being aMuslim and hating the
democratic rule of law’.153
The Verdict
A note of caution has to be added to the above-mentioned techniques of risk
management and premediation deployed by the prosecutors. Although their pleas
sometimes made for an impressive display of conjectural reasoning and compelling
images, theDutch inquisitorial systemas suchdoesnotmake for a ‘good show’. Theoral
pleadings of the public prosecutor and defence counsel are rather lengthy, very detailed
and difficult to understand for those without legal training. No television coverage
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is allowed in court either to record their arguments. Moreover, the prosecutor’s
riskmanagement techniques were new to the Dutch judicial system. They gained
credibility through the context of the heightened awareness for terrorist attacks in
2004 and 2005, but when no new attacks occurred, the waves of public indignation and
outrage over the Hofstad Group’s purported terrorist intentions waned a little.
On 1 December 2006, the court reached its verdict. In his verdict the judge accepted
some of the prosecution’s charges, but not all. The court acquitted the defendants
of membership of a terrorist organisation out of lack of evidence of a structured
association. The charge of inciting hatred and recruiting for jihad was dismissed
as well.154 The activities of the group had not been structured enough tomeet the
conditions for constituting a real terrorist organisation. The judgemoreover criticised
the way the prosecution had based its case on official notifications of the aivd (the so-
called ambtsberichten); the judge even excluded some reports from the case altogether.
He also expressed his doubts about the evidence of the prosecution’s crown witnesses.
However, the judge accepted the prosecution’s argument that Azzouz and the
others had planned for a terrorist attack in the near future, on an individual basis.
He especially saw Azzouz as someone ‘who wanted to attack the heart of the Dutch
democracy and inflict fear on the Dutch population by committing attacks thatmight
kill numerous persons’. Azzouz’ videotapedmessage to his next of kin and to theDutch
population proved that intent.155 The imagery was hard to reject and impossible to
downplay, even if it had only been a private attempt. Moreover, Azzouz had a track
record of strange behaviour; he had tried to purchase arms and amassed a number of
maps and details on critical infrastructure. According to the judge, the prosecution
had rendered plausible that the defendant had conspired to bomb the headquarters of
the Dutch security service, thereby killingmany people or harming high-ranking
politicians.156 Even if the preparation had been insufficient and amateurish, the court
took into account the purchase of a number of professional firearms, the use of which
could have resulted in a high number of casualties.157
Ultimately, the six defendants were thus convicted of conspiring to commit a
terrorist offence, but not of constituting a terrorist organisation. They received lesser
sentences than the prosecutors had argued for: Soumaya S. received a prison sentence
of three years, her husband Nouriddin four years, Samir Azzouz eight years158 and the
three others someminor sentences.159
Response and Aftermath
In the media, criticism came from all parts of the political spectrum. ‘Frustrated
youngster, but terrorist?’, the Amsterdam newspaperHet Paroolwondered.160 ‘Bunch
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of guys or terrorist organisation’, doubted the regional papers. Trouw suggested that
the defendants had been convicted on their extreme convictions rather than on their
actual deeds. Soumaya was portrayed as a ‘frail young woman’, devastated by the
verdict.161 Even AyaanHirsi Ali, who had been on a list of alleged targets, came to
the rescue. Hirsi Ali described Soumaya as our ‘hope for the future’. Clever girls like
Soumaya, who could think for themselves, were sorely needed in the struggle against
radicalisation.162
Many politicians, ranging from social-democrats, Christian-democrats to liberals,
were glad Samir Azzouz had been convicted. ‘It is good news that the court managed
to convict Samir this time, before an attack occurred’, according to cda representative
Sybrand van Haersma Buma. ‘This shows our legislation is in order.’ Right-wing
Member of Parliament Geert Wilders, who participated in the elections for the Second
Chamber for the first time with his new ‘Party for Freedom’, thought otherwise,
finding the prison sentences ‘ridiculously’ short. The defence counsel and the
prosecution were dissatisfied as well. The defence counsel Mr. Koppe characterised the
verdict as ‘shoddy’; the public prosecution held the same opinion, but for opposite
reasons: they would file an appeal to question the acquittal of being a terrorist
organisation.163
Around that time, Samir Azzouz’Dutch-Moroccanwife, Abida, started to campaign
in the media for her husband’s plight. She tried to raise sympathy for the severe
circumstances under which he was held prisoner. On 14 October 2006, in a television
documentary about Azzouz, she characterised the charges as ‘bizarre’. She suggested
that his case was used by the authorities ‘to terrorise the Dutch population’.164 Her
mother, a Dutch female convert, also gave her opinion: ‘They scare the population
with terror threats to push their repressive measures in parliament.’ Abida: ‘They
would have preferred an attack in the Netherlands. The secret service tried to sell
weapons to Samir via an informer, but he refused. After an attack they could have
further tightened the laws.’ Samir was treated ‘inhumanely’, he was held in isolated
captivity even in youth detention (during his first arrest, he had been only sixteen or
seventeen-years-old). She was not allowed to visit him at first and only after heavy
public pressure did he receive the right medication. ‘We are heading in the direction
of a Guantánamo Bay.’165 Abida’s main argument was, however, that Samir and she
did indeed adhere to the sharia and believed in solidarity for the ‘oppressed ummah’,
even if that required the use of violence, and that the Dutch freedom of speech and
expression allowed for that. She compared their fate to the Dutch resistance to Nazi
rule. Fighting jihad from a defensive position was legitimate. Confronted with the
question whether she and her husband renounced violence in the Netherlands, she
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evaded a straightforward answer, although she tried to make a distinction between
living in a peaceful society and joining the jihad elsewhere—amore quantitative and
gradual distinction than a qualitative one.166
InMarch 2008 the appeal commenced. Under heavy security and blindfolded, the
defendants were escorted to the Osdorp court in Amsterdam.Media attention was
high for a last time. Defence counsel Bart Nooitgedagt stated on television that the
trial was ‘false and constructed’. In June 2008, a member of the European Committee
for Prevention of Torture (cpt), who had visited the terrorist high security wing in
Vught and De Schie the year before, criticised the ‘irresponsible’ circumstances under
which the youthful detainees were held in prison, especially pointing to the plight of
the sole female detainee, Soumaya S. She had been in total isolation for tenmonths
now, and her health was deteriorating. ‘We will call upon the Dutch government to
deal with this’, according to cptmemberMarc Nève.167
This international criticism regarding the circumstances of the detention had its
effect. Soumaya was relocated to a regular women’s prison in Zwolle. She enjoyed
the advantage of all the social contacts there, engaged in a dialogue with the prison’s
rabbi, Aryeh Heintz, whom she hadmet during her first detention in 2005 and joined
an Evangelical church choir. In August 2008, Heintz wrote the court a letter, wanting
to ‘counterbalance, as a sort of character witness, the negative image the prosecution
had projected of Soumaya’. ‘Tome, she appears honest and reliable.’ Soumaya had
been drawn into ‘the wrong circles’, by a ‘hate mongering imam’. While that imam,
Fawaz Jneid, is still allowed to incite hatred, this ‘orthodox, but tolerant Muslima’ is
being held in captivity. ‘I believe that she can act as a role model for other girls that
are on the verge of radicalisation. She can show them how to be an orthodoxMuslim
without having to turn against society.’168
This was to no avail. On 18 September 2008, the court issued its shocking verdict.
This time, the judge identified the ‘Piranha’ group as a real terrorist organisation. The
judge hardly responded to Soumaya’s pleas, nor did the arguments put forward by
defence counsel regarding the conjectural reasoning based on intelligence reports
that lacked context impress him. The judge recognised that the aivdmight have
tampered with the telephone conversations of Soumaya and her sister, but he did not
draw any consequences from that, apart fromwarning the prosecution to treat such
evidence ‘carefully’. The court moreover acknowledged some ‘irregularities’ during
the investigation, but found that the prosecution had put them right during the
hearings. On 2 October, the Appeals Court of The Hague pronounced the sentences.169
Azzouz was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment, Nouriddin el Fahtmi to eight
years, Mohammed C. to six years, Soumaya S. four years (one year in addition to the
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initial sentence) andMohammedH. to threemonths. The sentences were higher, since
the judge included their involvement in real criminal acts (possession of firearms,
etc.) in the criminal act of constituting a terrorist organisation.170
Samir applauded upon hearing that the court considered him the ‘leader of a
terrorist organisation’.171 Soumaya’s counsel, Bart Nooitgedagt, was ‘livid’, branding
it ‘political justice’. Soumaya had, ‘bluntly stated, been screwed’.172 The lawyers
immediately announced their intention to refer the case to the Supreme Court.
Advocate General Leo Hollander did not see their problem. ‘In terrorist cases we
operate with relatively new legislation, causing prosecutors to test its boundaries.’
For the public prosecutors, the verdict was ‘a boost’. The newspapers were hesitant.
‘A terror group after all?’ the regional media asked, or rather ‘a political verdict’?De
Telegraaf called Soumaya a ‘terrorist sweetheart’. Even conservative Elsevierwarned
that the rule of law was balancing on a thin line. ‘In the end, it boils down to the
difference between thought and action’, a difference which was increasingly difficult
to distinguish with the new antiterrorism legislation. The Supreme Court therefore
first had to check carefully ‘whether the trials functioned according to the rules’,
and to establish ‘how tight a group had to be organised to justify a conviction [as a
terrorist organisation]’.173
The extent to which the perceived terrorist threat had been a product of the
imminent post-VanGogh years became clear after 2008. Azzouz’ wife Abidawas invited
to share her story on national talk shows.174 In 2011, the Supreme Court critically
reviewed the Piranha case: the Appeals Court of The Hague had not sufficiently
reasoned its refusal to question the context and content of intelligence reports that
were used as evidence, and had to partly re-try the case in 2012.175
9.5. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have tried to analyse the trials against Bouyeri and the Hofstad
Group defendants from a performative perspective, thereby focusing upon how future
terror scenarios were mobilised and visualised and on the extent to which they were
incorporated in the judgments (terrorist risk sentencing). It has become clear that only
Bouyeri followed a clear strategy aimed at mobilising his perceived target audience to
accept his vision of justice and injustice. To a lesser extent Samir Azzouz also stuck
to his extreme perspective, ventilating in court and (via his wife) on television, that
waging jihad on behalf of oppressedMuslims was a noble and righteous cause. He,
however, rejected the charges of preparing a terrorist attack. In his case, the line
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between legitimate war and non-violent protest was not as clear-cut as he portrayed
it to be. Neither he nor his wife renounced violence as such; for them, their Islamic
consciousness and solidarity with the oppressed ummah had priority over protecting
the Dutch rule of law.
On the other hand, the prosecutionmade clear that between 2004 and 2006 the
willingness to charge potential terrorists based on projected risk scenarios increased.
We maintain that since 2004 the appetite for sentencing ‘individuals at risk to
become involved in terrorism’ (terrorist risk sentencing) increased in the Netherlands.
Courts showed significant willingness to entertain the likely and possible effects
of inchoate plots and they delivered sentences based on potential violence. We have
established that performative strategies by the prosecution, where pre-emption
and premediation replace retribution, challenged basic fair trial standards. We have
identified and examined various ways in which the public prosecutors interpolated
potential disastrous scenarios as a reality in court andmade full use of the associative,
preparatory and precautionary elements in the new Dutch anti-terrorism legislation;
this, even though the Dutch inquisitorial system does not offer the best opportunities
for this.
More than a purely judicial shift, these findings can be related to shifting notions
of public and political responsibility. They can be understood in terms of what
Michael Power has called ‘secondary risk management’. For Power, risk management
professionals are not solely concerned with managing the primary risk they are
responsible for—this being, in our cases, the risks of terrorism and grave security
threat. They are also and in fact increasingly so, according to Power, ‘preoccupied
with managing their own risks’.176 Secondary risk management, as discussed by
Power, arises as an asymmetry appears between risk appetite on the one hand,
with the authorities more prone to act on future risks, and a responsibility-taking
aversion on the other, with authorities more worried about being held responsible
for actual disasters by themedia, their constituencies, parliament, etc.177 As such,
Power’s argument has affinities with that of Aradau and VanMunster,178 for whom
‘The rationality of catastrophic risk translates into policies that actively seek to
prevent situations from becoming catastrophic at some indefinite point in the future’
(emphasis in the original). In Aradau and VanMunster’s formulation, however, the
responsibility aversion of secondary risk management itself becomes an important
knowledge practice and spur to action.
The cases analysed in this chapter illustrate how practices of primary and
secondary riskmanagement have entered the judicial domain. The incorporation
of precautionary counterterrorism into criminal legislation is not just a matter of
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juridical change, but plays out in the performative dynamic between the police,
the public prosecutor, defence counsel and the judges. After the Van Goghmurder,
the security and intelligence services were quick to provide their early warnings,
prompting public prosecutors to launch investigations into possible terrorist attacks
before actual preparations had begun and based only on fragmented and inconclusive
evidence. Security agencies and politicians responsible for these ‘inverse investigations’
(initiated with a highly condensed intelligence alert, focussing on a certain individual,
and then developing into the search for a corresponding crime) legitimised it on the
basis of ‘the will of the people’ and ‘dangerous times’.
In the Dutch Hofstad case, the implementation of significant legal reform, and
the increasingly active role of the security services in bringing cases to prosecutors’
attention, produced a situation in which public prosecutors were not satisfied with
the acquittal of a suspect, felt heavy political and public pressure and proactivelymade
use of sparse intelligence alerts to launch pre-emptive investigative operations. They
subsequently rehearsed the aivd evidence to demonstrate the potential volatility of
the suspects (by showing a home-made video ‘will’ or by referring to the new vignette
of the brainwashed female terrorist). Theymoreover actively sought to test and expand
the reach of new terrorism laws.
For the defendants, it was very hard to argue against such instances of precaution-
ary and premediated charges that could very well have been true in their anticipative
dimension. In the cases discussed above, only Bouyeri—who did commit a murder—
accepted the charges. Although all other defendants rejected the terrorist charges,
the mediated nature of the trial, the broadcast farewell video, the lively images of
burqa-clad female friends and partners and the lists of chemicals presented by the
prosecutors made it very hard, if not impossible, to counter these projected terrorist
associations. Some of them, including Bouyeri and Azzouz, tried to raise their own
radical narratives of injustice (oppression of the Ummah; the Dutch democratic rule
of law) and justice (legitimate jihad). Lack of sympathisers within the larger Muslim
community and of an organised ‘Umfeld’ meant that they were not able to mobilise
much support. The strategy of their defence counsel, however, in pointing to the
inherent contradictions to compliance with human rights in the adjudication and
investigative process, achieved some results, not leading to acquittals, but in the case
of Soumaya S. to a partial retrial.
After a number of years the assessment of the Hofstad Group’s activities boiled
down to what they really were: chats, boasts and flawed attempts to draw maps
and to purchase weapons. Since then, Soumaya S. and JasonWalters have distanced
themselves completely from the rest and proclaimed their belief in the rule of law.
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The terrorist intent, their membership of a terrorist organisation, was overturned in
appeal, then upheld again, overruled by a higher court, confirmed by another, and
some defendants in this process still have appeals filed as of September 2014. In large
part, the Hofstad Group trials thus have been virtual, invoking possible futures and
transforming security considerations and risk management approaches into acts of
adjudication. For Bouyeri and Azzouz the trials were about conflicting systems of
justice, whereas the other defendants were nailed down and locked up in their own
nightmarish but inchoate deliberations. Performing and sentencing with imagined
reality remains a risky business for the public prosecutors, but evenmore so for the
defendants.
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10. Supporting Prisoners or Supporting
Terrorists: The 2008 Trial of Gestoras Pro
Amnistía in Spain
Carolijn Terwindt
‘This is a political trial. It is a disfraz jurídico (legal farce). It …’
The defendant was interrupted by the judge:
‘This is not what the right to a last wordmeans.
You have no blanket permit to offend the court.
You cannot call me a disfraz jurídico.’
A woman in the audience commented softly:
‘She cannot interrupt a last word!’
The defendant responded:
‘I had no intention to offend.’
The judge:
‘We have already heard this discourse, this history, it is already very clear’.1
10.1. Introduction
On 18 June 2008, these were the last words of the last defendant in a trial that was
characterised by a battle between different narratives of justice and injustice and
competing demands for respect and recognition. As in the quotation above, the
narratives and their confrontation found expression in the interactions between
the actors in the trial—the defendants, judge and public—who all ‘perform’ in
a way that constitutes, confirms or rejects their specific role. Thus, the actors in
the courtroom stage a ‘show’ that in its idealised form becomes a ‘performance of
justice’, which Beatrice de Graaf, in her introduction to the present volume, describes
as
A show where the verdict educates the public about the importance of the rule of
law in a democratic society, creates a collective memory and sets standards for future
conduct by states and society. This type of show is run by the judge/jury, but the
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performative strategy is based on a (perceived) neutral application of the law, not on
partisan politicisation of justice.2
From the words of the defendant above it is abundantly clear that in his perception he
did not think he was being tried under a ‘neutral application of the law’. In order
to understand why the trial under study failed to become generally accepted as a
‘performance of justice’, this chapter argues that it can most fruitfully be understood
as the staging of competing shows in the same venue at the same time. In her analysis
of the dynamics in operation between the different actors and their audiences, the
author applies the typology developed by De Graaf and demonstrates that while
the trial defies easy characterisation, it is possible to discern elements of (1) a virtual
show, (2) a show run by the defendants and their lawyers and (3) a media show (with
sideshows).
The trial against the defendants of the Basque organisations Gestoras pro Amnistía
and Askatasuna (in short, the ‘Gestoras trial’) is one of the ‘macro-juicios’ (macro-
trials), called such given the large number of defendants. The macro-trials started in
Spain at the end of the 1990s and prosecuted members of left-nationalist groups3 as
members of the terrorist organisation Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (eta). Significant in
these trials is the new conceptualisation of eta as a broad ‘entramado’ (network) rather
than, more narrowly, as the military wing alone. This innovative perspective and its
usage in criminal proceedings will be explored in more detail below. The targets in
themacro-trials were a Basque youth organisation, a certain newspaper, a number of
bars, a language institution, and Gestoras pro Amnistía, an organisation engaged in
prisoner support work. The prosecution claimed that these apparently socio-political
bodies were actually part of the broader eta ‘network’ and thus constituted subgroups
in a terrorist organisation. The Gestoras trial was thus a terrorist trial in the sense
that the defendants were charged with membership of a terrorist organisation, which
they all denied.
The macrotrials against the alleged eta network form an important transition in
the Spanish repertoire of contentious terrorism trials.4 The performance strategies in
the trials against eta defendants during the 1980s and 1990s had been very different
from the interaction in the macro-trials. eta defendants traditionally refused to
defend themselves. While they rejected the jurisdiction of the Spanish state, they
generally did not dispute the charges and often openly claimed their etamilitancy
in the courtroom. The earlier trials had generally belonged to the category of the
‘not-so-dramatic show’ in De Graaf ’s typology.5 Part of the reason for this is that
during the 1980s the battle betweeneta and the Spanish state tended to be viewed from
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a military perspective.6 It took place in the streets, not in the courtrooms. Illustrative
of this war-oriented way of thinking were the confessions by former President Felipe
González, who told a reporter from newspaper El País that in 1989 or 1990 he once
had the opportunity to have the entire leadership of eta killed during ameeting in
France. At the time, he rejected the option, but in 2010 was still wondering whether
that had been the right decision.7
Taking the Gestoras trial as illustrative of the new dynamics in themacrotrials,
this chapter describes the battle between the different narratives and performative
strategies employed by the prosecutors, the court, the defendants, the victims and
sympathisers on both sides. Because Spanish-Basque society is so polarised, it is
impossible to fit the trial into a single typological category as developed by De Graaf
in her introduction to this volume. The show was run by both the defendants and the
prosecutors, but each only for their own audience. They could not or did not reach
out to the constituency of the other side. The trial thus only confirmed pre-existing
divisions and pre-existing ‘narratives of (in)justice’.8 At the same time though, this
trial, along with the other macrotrials, effectively established the notion that eta is a
network and that criminal responsibility lies upon the shoulders of all who are part of
that network.
In the Gestoras trial, the accusation that the defendants were part of that network
was based on their engagement in activities that they described as ‘prisoner support’.
The analysis presented here, therefore, explores competing narratives that defend and
challenge this description of the activities of Gestoras pro Amnistía, as the trial called
into question the distinction between legal support for prisoners and illegal support
for (imprisoned) terrorists.
This chapter describes the Gestoras trial in four parts: before the trial, during the
trial, outside the courtroom, and after the trial. But first the data that were used will
be briefly described.
10.2. Data
The argument in this chapter relies on the author’s fieldwork in the Basque Country
and inMadrid, where she attended a large part of the seven-week proceedings in the
Gestoras trial. The author also gained access tomany court documents, the oral tapes of
proceedings, court verdicts and other documentary materials. The author was further
present at several activities of what she has called ‘prisoner support mobilization’,9
both in Madrid and the Basque Country. In addition, the collected data included
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in-depth interviews with several of the defendants, their supporters, representatives
of organisations of victims of eta and their families,10 and the lawyer executing the
popular accusation on behalf of these victim organisations (a Spanish legal procedure
allowing citizens to act as prosecutors). Unfortunately, the state prosecutor of this
particular trial refused to be interviewed,11 but the author did interview the chief
prosecutor of the Audiencia Nacional12 as well as one of the investigative judges.
Finally, the collected data included newspaper accounts across the political spectrum
that covered this trial as well as reports written by organisations sympathising with
the defendants or with victim organisations.
The research for this chapter was completed in 2008. eta announced to lay down
its arms in 2011.
10.3. Before the Trial
This section first describes some of the key features of the Spanish criminal justice
system, specifically in relation to terrorism prosecutions. Then the ‘eta network’
concept and the relatedmacrotrials will be described inmore detail. The section goes
on to describe the place assigned to Gestoras pro Amnistía within the eta network
and its prisoner support activities. Lastly, the Gestoras trial and its chronology are
presented.
10.3.1. The Spanish Criminal Justice System in Relation to TerrorismOffences
Terrorism proceedings in Spain should be understood within the context of a long
battle by the state against various terrorist groups. Especially in the early 1980s, quite
a few organisations were employing violence and threatening the young Spanish
democracy. eta was just one of them; others were the Comandos Autónomos (ccaa,
perceived as a radical split from eta), Terra Lliure (for the independence of Catalonia),
the anti-Fascist grapo, mpaiac (for the independence of the Canary Islands), and the
right-wing groups Triple A and Batallón Vasco Español. Spanish laws against terrorism
therefore have a long history. The period from 1975 to 1985 sawmany legal reforms and
attempts to bolster the judicial institutions so that they could deal effectively with
the threat of continuing terrorist attacks. In 1995 a new penal code was written into
which the special terrorism laws were integrated as separate offences. The code has
been revised several times since.13 The terrorism provisions have authorised solitary
confinement and limiting or suspending some constitutional rights.14 Membership
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of a terrorist organisation is criminalised in articles 516 and 515 sub 2 of the penal
code.
Until the reformof 1978, terrorism crimes fell under the jurisdiction of themilitary
courts. Under the new laws, terrorist offences were to be tried by a new court, the
Audiencia Nacional, which had been founded in 1977.15 Critics pointed out that this
court was an all too obvious successor to the ‘Tribunal de Orden Publico’ (Public
Order Tribunal), a heavily criticised instrument used by the former dictator Franco
to detain political opponents. The Audiencia Nacional was founded by executive
decision, adding to its illegitimacy in the eyes of its critics.16 Years of legal proceedings
followed, until in 1987 the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal ruled that the European
Commission of Human Rights had declared the Audiencia Nacional to be a normal
court. That decision effectively ended the dispute in strictly legal terms, but to this
day the court is criticised both within the Basque movement and outside the Basque
Country.17
The jurisdiction of the Audiencia Nacional is restricted to certain areas, of which
terrorism is only one (the other areas are money laundering, tax fraud, corruption and
the drug trade). In thewords of one of the investigative judges, it is not a special court—
as its critics say—but a specialised court.18 Proponents of the Audiencia Nacional
argue that physical distance from the Basque Country—the court sits in Madrid—is
needed to guarantee the safety and neutrality of judges. In 2003 a law was adopted
that created an appeals chamber in the Audiencia Nacional. Previously, appeals were
possible only in a limited review at the Tribunal Supremo, the highest Spanish court.
In 2001, the United Nations Human Rights Committee ruled that this was not an
adequate measure.19 At the time of the Gestoras trial, however, the appeals chamber
was still not operational, making the Tribunal Supremo the instance for appeal and
the last domestic resort.
The Audiencia Nacional is thus a separate judicial organ, with its own judges and
prosecutors. Operating as they do in a continental legal system, Spanish prosecutors
work in cooperationwith so-called instruction judges or investigative judges. In Spain,
investigative judges occupy an especially important role in criminal proceedings, as
they prepare a case andmake the crucial decisions regarding who is charged with
what. Only when the investigative phase is closed and the case goes to trial does the
prosecutor take over the dossier.
In recent decades, there has been an important shift within the criminal justice
system and its perceived capacity to deal with terrorism.20 In the period immediately
after the transition to democracy, the criminal justice system was deemed to be
inappropriate to respond to terrorist offences. In 1979, the Attorney General wrote,
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‘Let’s be honest: in the face of the terrorist phenomenon the normal operation of
judging, applying a penalty and taking care of its execution, is likewriting in the sea.’21
Doubts about the ability of the criminal justice system to deal with terrorist offences
have vanished over the years, and by 2007 the Attorney General asserted that judicial
activity against terrorismwas in ‘good health’ and that the work that had been done
was ‘firm, resounding, and according to strict fulfilment of the principle of legality’.22
Indeed, the trial after the Al Qaeda-linked attack inMarch 2004 was showcased as an
example for the international community in employing criminal justice in response
to terrorism. The ngoHuman Rights Watch asserted that ‘the Spanish government
sees itself as a leader in the effort to combine effective counter-terrorismmeasures
with full respect for internationally recognised human rights’.23
10.3.2. The etaNetwork and theMacro-trials
The simple question ‘What is eta?’ proved to be far more complicated than I could
imagine when I embarked on my fieldwork. Not only is the legal nature of the
group in dispute—is it a terrorist organisation or an armed organisation?—but so is
its membership. It is not at all clear who belongs to eta and who does not. During
the Gestoras trial even the prosecutor got confused. The charge brought against the
defendants was membership of eta, but during his argument he talked about the
relationship between one of the defendants and eta, as if eta were actually external to
the defendants. He corrected himself quickly.24
Another example serves to illustrate the discrepancies plaguing our understanding
of eta. During a trial regarding the legality of a Basque political party, the defence
lawyer interrogated one of the police expert witnesses. The policeman claimed that in
a public speech amayor of that particular party had openly called for support for two
etamembers who were detained and allegedly tortured. The defence lawyer asked,
‘Did she use the word “eta”?’ The expert witness responded: ‘she said “Basque political
prisoners” which everyone understands to mean eta prisoners’.25 During the Gestoras
trial this question and the competing answers—whether Basque political prisoners are
the equivalent of eta militants—became one of the core issues. Whereas the Gestoras
defendants steadfastly referred to the collective they supported as ‘Basque political
prisoners’, the verdict of the Audiencia Nacional talked about the ‘mobilisation
campaign in favour of the prisoner collective of e.t.a.’.26
In the macro-trials, the prosecutors’ narrative was an important voice in this
debate concerning the character of eta and who belongs to it. The prosecutor’s
investigation and charges were based upon the premise that eta consisted of more
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than just ‘gunmen’ and that the socio-political andmedia activities of the defendants
were therefore to be construed as ‘functions’ within the eta network. Several victim
organisations strongly supported and advocated this notion of the eta network.27 In
order to understand these assumptions and situate the Gestoras trial in the context of
the other macro-trials, it is important to describe in more detail the emergence of the
notion that eta is a network.
‘If the environment didn’t exist, terrorismwould bemuchmoremarginal; it is the
breeding ground’, said the chief prosecutor of the Audiencia Nacional in the interview
in 2008.28 This is a common perception in Spanish society and it explains the law
enforcement focus on the previously so-called ‘entorno de eta’ (eta environment).
Interestingly, the image of eta (both the structure and the concept29)—specifically
in relation to its ‘environment’—has changed significantly during recent decades,
leading to a very different kind of criminal prosecution. In the 1980s and the beginning
of the 1990s, the prosecutorial focus was on the eta commandos, their direct support
structure and the armed attacks they committed.30 During the 1990s, the focus of
criminal justice efforts has shifted from the commandos and their support structure
to include what was called the eta ‘environment’. Since then, it has become the
practice to accuse members of organisations in the Basque left-nationalist movement
of ‘membership of a terrorist organisation’.
ByMay 2008, 302 people had already been indicted in themacrotrials, many of
whom had spent time in pre-trial detention.31 The defendants were not suspected
of membership of an eta commando or direct involvement in armed attacks (e.g.
providing logistical support, such as housing to fugitives or stealing a car used for
a car bomb). Because of their activities in left-nationalist socio-political organisations,
they were alleged to be part of the ‘eta network’. People who in the 1980s and 1990s
would have been situated in the ‘eta environment’—loosely described by the Director
of Public Prosecutions in 1991 as those ‘political sectors with goals similar to the
terrorist organisation eta’32—were then, in the 2000s, prosecuted as ‘members of
eta’.
Investigative judge BaltasarGarzónplayed an important role in this re-conceptual-
isation of eta.33 Garzón redefined the military wing as a political organisation, and
in doing so considered that in turn the political wing formed part of the violent
strategy of the military wing. He argued that ‘a terrorist organisation was something
more complex than a mere collection of persons that kills, plants bombs, kidnaps and
engages in extortion to achieve its political objectives’.34 During the macro-trials,
prosecutors had to fight against the old image of terrorism that they themselves had
helped to create. In the Gestoras trial the prosecutor repeated over and over again that
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‘a terrorist organisation is not just a group of gunmen’. He was trying to subvert the
stubborn notion that terrorists, as a matter of course, were ‘pistoleros’ (gunmen).
In the indictments, socio-political organisations alleged to be part of the eta
network were linked to eta by way of the ‘funciones’ (functions) they were said to
fulfil within a broader strategy aimed at subverting the Spanish constitution. The
macro-trials were directed against both individuals and their organisations, because
an important goal was to suspend and outlaw these socio-political organisations in
order to make it more difficult for the network to operate.35
To bolster the argument that organisations such as Gestoras pro Amnistía were
in fact part of the eta network, the prosecutor in all of the macro-trials sketched
the history of eta since the end of the Franco regime in 1975, when eta decided to
put into effect a process called ‘desdoblamiento’ (split identity). This process was a
response to the fact that with the emergence of democratic structures, many cultural
and political organisations that had been prohibited under the dictatorship could
start to work above ground; only themilitary wing of eta would stay underground. In
order to maintain cohesion between the various organisations, eta decided that
its members would perform their illegal tasks within the underground armed
organisation and simultaneously sit on the above-ground boards of various socio-
political organisations.
Further, eta developed a theory of different ‘frentes’ (fronts). The armed struggle
was just one of the fronts in the fight for an independent Euskal Herria (the larger
Basque Country, including Navarra and the French parts); other battlefields were
the ‘frente politico’ (political front) and the ‘frente de masas’ (front of the masses).
Gestoras pro Amnistía, as a popular grassroots organisation, belonged to the front
of themasses. More specifically, Gestoras was said to be active within the ‘frente de
makos’ or ‘frente de cárceles’ (prison front). The coordination between Gestoras and
eta allegedly took place in committees called ask; these were dissolved in 1995, after
which coordination was carried out without intermediaries. Underlying the eta
network was therefore the assumption of the complementarity of different forms of
struggle: the institutional struggle within political parties, the struggle of the masses
bymeans of multiple socio-political organisations and the armed struggle by (the
military wing of) eta.
10.3.3. Gestoras Pro Amnistía and Prisoner Support
Many of the details regarding the historical relations as well as the communication
between themilitarywing of eta and the socio-political organisations in the left-wing
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nationalist movement had thus been given during each of the macrotrials and were
essentially undisputed. As the Audiencia Nacional put it in its verdict of September
2008, and the defendants would probably have agreed, eta and Gestoras pro Amnistía
were struggling for the same political project, namely Euskal Herria.36 The issues
that remained contested concerned the nature and extent of the communication
and coordination. The Gestoras defendants particularly criticised the leading role
in the hierarchy allotted to the military wing of eta, a role that would have denied
autonomous decision-making and independent initiative to individual members of
Gestoras. Whereas the defendants asserted that they chose to perform certain activities
as part and parcel of their main task, which was to assist prisoners and their families,
the prosecutor claimed that their activities were coordinated with eta and in line
with eta’s strategic goals and its armed struggle. In its verdict, the court explicitly
addressed this tension between different perspectives. It found that what seems to be
personal or legal assistance can be something else entirely if it fits into the logic of
maintaining cohesion within the collective of eta prisoners.37 At issue therefore in
the Gestoras trial was the question: when does support for prisoners turn into support
for terrorists?
Gestoras pro Amnistía was founded in 1976 out of solidarity with the political
prisoners of the Franco regime.38 As its name implies, the main goal of Gestoras pro
Amnistía was to bring about an amnesty for those prisoners. In 1977, the Spanish
government indeed adopted a broad amnesty law (Law 46/1977) covering all political
prisoners who were detained under the Franco regime, to promote ‘the pacification of
spirits, reconciliation and national concord’.39 eta prisoners and others, for example
members of grapo, were recognised as ‘political’ prisoners and released. The amnesty
did not put an end to Gestoras, which continued its solidarity with what it called
‘personas represaliadas’ (repressed persons), i.e. prisoners, refugees and deportees.
Later, in a process named ‘construcción nacional’ (national construction), a merger
was effectuated between Basque left-wing nationalist organisations in northern Spain
and in southern France. Thus, in 2001 Gestoras pro Amnistía merged with Iparralde
Koordinateka to become Askatasuna.
Gestoras/Askatasuna (hereafter Gestoras) has been engaged in prisoner support
since its foundation. Many of its members dedicated a full-time working week to
this commitment, paid for by the left-wing nationalist movement.40 It monitored
and reported incidents of repression, published lists of ‘political prisoners’ and
organised ceremonies honouring ex-prisoners.41 A lawyers’ collective provided legal
assistance. Prisoner support is given in many countries where people express concerns
about state repression and politics justice. Because the Gestoras trial questioned the
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distinction between the (legal) support for prisoners and the (illegal) support for
terrorists, the prosecutorial narrative in this trial is relevant beyond the immediate
case concerned.
For our analysis, four different kinds of prisoner support and supporters can be
distinguished: (1) personal support, (2) innocence support, (3) liberal support and (4)
political support. Family and friends often engage in ‘personal support’ intended to
alleviate the suffering of the imprisoned person. This is the kind of support that is
given regardless of the definition of the criminal facts, regardless of innocence or guilt,
and regardless of the political cause. The defendant/prisoner is simply recognised as a
human being worthy of human treatment.
A second form of support is extended only to those defendants or prisoners that
the supporters think are innocent of the charges. These supporters stand behind a
defendant because they believe his or her denial of the charges. A special strategy
to persuade the public of the innocence of prisoners, employed also by Gestoras
pro Amnistía, is to criticise the court’s decisions as pre-determined and politically
motivated or based on faulty evidence, such as confessions extracted under torture.
Such criticisms do not necessarily address any defendant in particular. They rather
disrupt the general belief (prevalent in liberal democracies) that there is a good reason
for everyone in prison to be there. Themessage sent by Gestoras frequently encourages
the larger public to identify with the prisoners, as anyone might be the next victim of
the alleged politically motivated persecution.
‘Liberal’ support is given, for example, by human rights organisationswho criticise
torture, long preventive detention, disproportionate sentences or the lack of due
process. Such groups draw a distinction between ‘formal’ support (for the legal case)
and ‘substantive’ support (for the political cause). Liberal supporters limit their efforts
to formal support, generally insisting on the right to a fair trial. They typically demand
that the state should play according to its own rules.
Finally, defendants or prisoners can try to be recognised as ‘political’ by receiving
support from a broader movement that agrees with their political claims.42 ‘Political’
prisoners and their political supporters generally defy the state’s legitimacy to
condemn their actions. Legal scholars hold that the possibility of punishment involves
a claim to legitimacy.43 Real punishment presupposes an agreement between the
parties. Similarly, anthropologist Max Gluckman once wrote that ‘If the litigants have
rules of rightdoing different from those of the judges, the judges can punish them,
but not convict them.’44 Self-identification as a ‘political’ prisonermay be a strategy to
advance the collective political cause. Such a decision is not, however, taken lightly. It
can be prejudicial to the individual criminal case. For example, if defendants commit
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themselves to a solution in the political cause, theymay decide to waive chances of
individual leniency from judges.
Of course, while some supportersmay limit their support to one of these kinds, the
different forms of support can and do also often overlap and interact. Thus, Gestoras
pro Amnistía is mainly a political support group, which also engages in the other
forms of support. And as will be addressed below in the analysis of performative
strategies, it also seeks different kinds of support from specific target audiences.
Support groups often come into existence in response to the practical needs of a
given defendant or convict, such as money to pay for legal counsel. A support group
may help with letter writing or visits to the jail, or gather reliable information about
trial dates and the treatment of the prisoner. As a case drags on, and during the term
of imprisonment, manymoments lend themselves to public outcry andmass rally.
Common activities include demonstrations in front of the prison or the courthouse,
benefit concerts to raise money, ceremonies honouring prisoners and in some cases
hunger strikes for better prison conditions. Indeed, scholars have recognised that
prisoner support activity can become ‘a social movement activity in its own right’45
and can attract the involvement of moderate civil society representatives when the
state is perceived to be ‘overreacting’.46 Criminal justice issues can even come to
replace or overshadow the original political claims.47 A successful prisoner solidarity
effort can turn prisoners into a political issue. Indeed, the many activities of Gestoras
pro Amnistía have contributed to public debate in Spain regarding the amnesty,
reintegration and dispersion of Basque ‘political’ prisoners.
Political solidarity efforts aim to transform the intended effects of criminal
prosecution: incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilitation, retaliation.Many prisoner
support activities, for example, challenge the stigmatising function of criminal
proceedings and the distance they create between the ‘ordinary citizen’ and convicts;
insofar as criminal proceedingsmanifest the character ofwhatGarfinkel called a ‘status
degradation ceremony’,48 well-designed activism can reduce that effect. Prisoner
support may even result in the elevation of a ‘political prisoner’ into a hero. This can
reverse the costs of repression into an asset.49 This is not always the case though.
There is always the danger of internal disagreement among ‘political’ prisoners and
their solidarity groups or with the movement as such. Arguments about the means of
struggle or the question whether or not to negotiate with the government can lead
prisoners to cut ties with the movement as a whole or with their specific support
group. Instances of hero formation and internal splits were also part of the dynamics
of the ‘Basque political prisoners’. As the official prisoner support group, Gestoras pro
Amnistía has been deeply involved in these developments.
430 | carolijn terwindt
The prosecution’s charge that Gestoras and themilitary wing of eta formed a
single organic whole was based on the alleged communication, cooperation and
coordination between them, in combination with their historical relationship and
shared support for armed struggle. The prosecutor relied on the non-juridical concept
of ‘functions’ in order to link the defendants to armed attacks executed by eta
commandos. These functions of Gestoras would include: control over the collective of
eta prisoners; facilitating contact between eta prisoners and the eta leadership;
collecting informationvital for the security of eta; identifying targets and legitimating
their assassination; the publication of pamphlets; the de-legitimation of the Spanish
state and the recruitment of militants. For example, Gestoras pro Amnistía launched a
campaign called ‘Alde Hemendik’ (Get out of here), which called upon the Guardia
Civil to leave the Basque Country. The prosecutor interpreted this campaign as one of
the functions that Gestoras performed within the eta network.
10.3.4. The Gestoras Proceedings
On 31 October 2001 twelvemembers of Gestoras pro Amnistía were detained at the
instructions of judge Garzón. Later another defendant was arrested and extradited
fromFrance. The case is known as Sumario 33/01. On 19December 2001, Garzón declared
the organisation illegal, suspending its activities. On 27 December 2001, the European
Council adopted its Common Position regarding terrorists, terrorist groups and
measures such as the freezing of funds. Gestoras pro Amnistía, together with other
alleged parts of the etanetwork,were included on the list.50 These thirteen defendants
were held in pre-trial detention for four years until they were released after paying
large amounts of bail. In 2003, five Askatasuna representatives who had continued the
activities of so-called ‘support to eta’ were detained.51 They were also among the 27
defendants tried between April and June 2008 at the Audiencia Nacional.
Two of the defendants were active not in Gestoras pro Amnistía or Askatasuna but
in Etxerat, an organisation of family members of prisoners (i.e. more in line with the
category of ‘personal’ support). Etxerat organised and coordinated visits to far-away
prisons.52 Another defendant was the driver of the bus that took family members to
dispersed prisoners. Notably, at the end of the trial the prosecutor dropped the charges
against the two Etxerat defendants. He apparently did not consider this organisation
and its type of support to be part of the eta network.
This notwithstanding, their inclusion in the indictment led the defendants
to claim that it meant a persecution of the entire Basque amnesty movement.
Indeed, the defendants and their lawyers interpreted the dropping of the charges
the 2008 trial of gestoras pro amnistia in spain | 431
as a subtle strategy to lend an air of fairness to a trial the verdict of which—
in their view—had been written before the trial had even started.53 In similar
strategic reasoning, the defendants argued, the court would only acquit those few
defendants who had not spent time in pre-trial detention. Acquitting defendants
who had spent the full maximum four pre-trial years in jail would amount to an
admission of the failure of the justice system to correctly decide on the need for such
detention.54
On 17 September 2008, the judges of the Audiencia Nacional convicted 21 people for
membership of a terrorist organisation, based on article 515.2 of the penal code.Gestoras
pro Amnistía and Askatasuna were designated as illegal terrorist organisations and
their dissolution was ordered. Two of the accused, JuanMari Olano and Julen Zelarain,
received thehighest penalty, ten years, because theywere regarded as leaders (envisaged
in a separate sentencing provision in the penal code). The other 18 defendants were
sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. On 13 October 2009 the Tribunal Supremo
broadly confirmed the decision of the Audiencia Nacional. One other defendant was
acquitted by the Tribunal Supremo.
The following analysis, while taking into account the entire proceedings, is
focussed on the 2008 trial before theAudienciaNacional. It turned into a battle between
competing narratives of (in)justice. Prosecutors, defendants, judges and victims all
employed performative strategies aimed at targeted audiences. Our discussion will
first focus on the dynamics inside the courtroom as part of the official proceedings
and then turn to performative strategies outside the courtroom.
10.4. During the Trial
The Gestoras trial took place not in the courtroom in the centre of Madrid normally
used for sessions of the Audiencia Nacional, but in a larger building on the outskirts
that was equipped to hold the large number of accused and where the necessary secu-
ritymeasures were easier to effectuate. Indeed, those securitymeasures communicated
without words themessage that the defendants in this trial were suspected of being
related to a terrorist network. Everyone entering the building was screened for metal
objects.55
In the following section the prosecutorial performative strategy during the trial
will be analysed as a specific kind of ‘virtual show’. In the succeeding passage, we will
look at the way defendants and their lawyers tried to turn the show to their advantage
in order to expose their grievances.
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10.4.1. Virtual Show
Unlike previous trials against etamembers, themacro-trials were not triggered by
specific violent events. The decisions to launch these prosecutions were pro-active.
The lack of a specific attack for which the defendants were held responsible gave
these trials the character of a ‘virtual’ show. In the introduction to this volume,
Beatrice de Graaf describes such trials as ‘a tool of risk management’, in which
‘crimes under consideration deal with conspiracies and preparations rather than
actual attacks’. What turns the Gestoras trial into a virtual show is not that terrorist
actions have not yet taken place. The virtual aspect lies rather in the fact that
no specific terrorist action or event is attributed to any of the defendants. In the
words of the Audiencia Nacional, their wrongdoing is a ‘permanent crime’.56 As
‘membership’ can be seen as a status crime, it remains unclear exactly what constitutes
the individual criminal conduct. During the trial, the prosecutor had to counter this
virtual aspect of the charge in order to enact a ‘performance of justice’. Specifically,
the performance strategy had to compensate for the absence of a ‘smoking gun’
as evidence, the absence of direct victims of a terrorist attack, and the fact that
criminal liability was not based on any personal or direct involvement in a terrorist
event.
Evidence
For several weeks the prosecutors presented evidence aimed at proving undisputed
aspects of the charge. For example, even though the defendants did not deny their
membership of Gestoras pro Amnistía, the prosecutor presented the confiscated
agenda of one of the defendants to demonstrate his participation inGestorasmeetings.
There was no disagreement about most of the activities organised by Gestoras, such as
ceremonies honouring ex-prisoners.57 At the core, the question was not what the
defendants did or did not do, but whether their actions constituted a crime. Thus,
the questions posed by the trial were whether those activities were coordinated with
themilitary wing of eta, whether they had the goal of furthering and supporting
the armed struggle and, if so, whether this implied criminal liability for Gestoras
members. Proof of such ‘coordination’ or entertaining the goal to ‘support the armed
struggle’ does not come in the form of a smoking gun. Instead, the evidence consisted
for a large part of the expert testimony of police officers about the history of eta,
making the courtroom appear to be a history class.58 Another source of evidence
consisted of public documents—their content undisputed by the defendants—like
Gestoras pro Amnistía press releases.
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Further, the prosecutorial narrative relied on documents found after raids on
underground eta offices and after the detention of high-levelmembers of themilitary
wing of eta in 1993, 1999 and 2001. In the main, they dealt with internal relations and
structures for communication. The apparent use of codewords in these documents (for
example, Gestoraswas allegedly referred to as ‘Adidas’) was interpreted as an indication
that the communication was criminal in nature. A further source of suspicion was
that some documents found at the Gestoras office in Bilbo-Bilbao were marked
‘read and burn’, which the police experts considered to be a characteristic of eta
communications. While the documents and police evidence may have demonstrated
that the military wing of eta was secretive in its communication, they provided no
evidence that the content of the communications concerned specific terrorist actions.
Given, however, that the prosecutor only intended to prove that Gestoras formed part
of the eta network, that was not necessary.
The virtual character of the offence, as opposed to an actual terrorist attack, created
insecurity in the Basque left-nationalist movement about what exactly constituted
the criminal conduct. One interviewee expressed concern that Basques might be
prosecuted because of ‘who they talk to in a bar’.59 In each of the macro-trials the
defendants argued that theywereworking above ground: they assumed thatwhat they
were doing fell squarely within the boundaries of the law. The switch to prosecutions
based on the concept of an eta network was often claimed to have been necessitated
precisely by this perceived abuse, by members of eta and their sympathisers, of
legal spaces offered by the Spanish democracy. For example, investigative judge
Juan del Olmo, in his indictment of a Basque newspaper, clarified that the eta
network
takes advantage of the democratic framework and the establishment in Spain of a
democratic Rechtsstaat, with a foundation in a constitution and a rights-based legal
order and protection of fundamental rights and liberties. This terrorist organisation
has thus generated a plural structure, legal and alegal, in which it has embedded
instruments that are indispensable and serviceable for the strengthening and support
of its terrorist strategy.60
The distinction between legal and illegal had thus become blurred since judge
Garzón introduced the concept ‘alegal’ which he used to denote the space be-
tween legality and illegality. For example, the fact that Gestoras pro Amnistía
did not reject the armed struggle was not a crime in itself. It was, however, pre-
sented in the courtroom in order to support the argument that Gestoras formed
434 | carolijn terwindt
part of the eta network.61 Also, even though attending an honouring ceremony
of an ex-prisoner is not a crime, the way in which the court construed it as evi-
dence of eta membership created insecurity among Basque left-wing national-
ists.
Thus, the evidence for the prosecutorial narrative largely confirmed undisputed
historic relations or public activities, which were interpreted as proof of membership
of the eta network.
VictimOrganisations as Popular Accusers
The lack of a specific violent event also meant that the Gestoras trial did not involve
direct victims. This was the case in all themacro-trials, where defendants were accused
of etamembership, not of a specific crime against identified victims. This stands in
contrast to a trial such as that against twomembers of an armed eta commando,
during which a kidnapped businessman testified at length about his experiences
throughout his captivity.62
This does not mean that victims of eta did not play a role during themacro-trials.
On the contrary, victim organisations were very actively involved. Representatives
of one particular victim organisation, Asociación Dignidad y Justicia (Dignity and
Justice), attended some days of the trial against the Gestoras defendants, one of them
with the name of the organisation printed on his t-shirt, another accompanied by
bodyguards because of death threats from eta.63
The most important form of participation by victim organisations, however, was
the employment of the legal instrument of ‘acusación popular’ (popular accusation).
In Spain, victims of a crime have two formal ways in which they can assume
a prosecutorial role in a criminal trial. A direct victim can claim the role of an
‘acusador privado’ (private accuser). Popular accusation can only be invoked by an
organisation representing a class of victims. Popular accusation is the only form of
victim involvement in those trials where there are no direct victims.64
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Asociación de Víctimas del Terrorismo
(Association of Victims of Terrorism; avt) has employed the instrument of popular
accusation in order to promote the interest of victims of eta. A spokesperson told
me that, due to the initial lack of government attention for victims of eta in those
early days, this was merely a way to ensure that the victim would be notified of the
date of the trial.65 Now the avt and Dignity and Justice routinely participate in
criminal trials as popular accusers. In all the macro-trials, the prosecutors of the
Audiencia Nacional were joined by a lawyer representing the popular accusation.66
Even though the prosecutorial performance lacked a direct victim testifying about
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a concrete terrorist event, the victims and their families were visibly present in the
courtroom.
Selection of the Defendants and Establishing Individual Liability
At the time of the trial, Gestoras pro Amnistía had been around for three decades.
It was a grassroots organisation in which many people were active. Picture a context
in whichmany Basque cafés sport pictures of ‘Basque political prisoners’ above the
bar and the balconies in villages are decorated with flags demanding the return of
dispersed prisoners to the Basque Country. This raised questions about the individual
defendants and their relation to Gestoras. Why did the prosecution select these
particular people? And what did the trial mean for the criminal liability of all
those who were or still are a part of it, but were not indicted? One interviewee,
for example, expressed his surprise that he had not been indicted, despite his long
record of commitment as a Gestoras pro Amnistía lawyer.67 Indeed, he was amazed
that among the defendants were people who had only joined Gestoras or Askatasuna
very recently and therefore had little to do with the early history of Gestoras. He
wondered if younger members could be held responsible for relations that existed
in the past.
Applying the concept of the network to eta, in combination with the charge
‘membership of a terrorist organisation’, had an important consequence. Once the
court considered it proven that Gestoras pro Amnistía was an organic part of eta, it
only had to be proven that a given defendantwas indeed amember of Gestoras in order
to get a criminal conviction. Since the defendants acknowledged their membership
in their opening words, it followed as a matter of course that they would be found
guilty.
For the defendants, this contradicted the imperative that each individual was
to be judged for his or her own actions. Still, the prosecutor strategically discussed
details that showed the activities of each defendant to indicate their membership
of the eta network, such as presence during a specific meeting of the left-wing na-
tionalist movement or attendance at an honouring ceremony for etamilitants. It
was also argued that the defendants had specific responsibilities, such as territorial
coordination for a given province (Gipuzkoa, Bizkaia, Araba or Nafarroa) or for special
functions or fields (law, finance, communication, international relations, relations
with fugitives or prisoners).68
The Gestoras trial risked becoming a ‘virtual show’ as it was not the adjudication
of criminal responsibility for a specific terrorist event. The prosecutorial performative
strategy seemingly relied on the quantity of evidence it presented to compensate for
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the fact that it mostly proved undisputed activities of Gestoras. In the absence of direct
victims whose evidence could form part of the performance, the presence of victim
organisations as popular accusers reminded the audience that many victims of eta
were interested in the outcome of the trial. Finally, the prosecutors paid attention to
the particular roles and responsibilities of each of the defendants as they individualised
the evidence showing the specific conduct warranting individual liability.
The defendants did not, however, view the trial as a ‘performance of justice’.
Together with their lawyers, they used the trial to justify and explain the work of
Gestoras pro Amnistía. Doing so, they defied the roles ascribed to them as defendants
on trial. Instead of defending themselves against the charges, they used the courtroom
to communicate their grievances. Their performative strategies are explored in the
next sections.
10.4.2. Defendants and Their Lawyers Running the Show
In response to what the defendants perceived as ‘pure theory’,69 the defendants and
their lawyers also tried to run the show. Claiming that the verdict was already written
in advance, they explicitly rejected a juridical defence. Instead they chose to defend
themselves ‘politically’, as they called it.70 This section describes the performative
strategies they employed to persuade their target audience of their narrative of
(in)justice. The defendants did not bring any evidence to refute the charges. Instead,
the defendants chose to use the speaking time allowed to them and their witnesses to
express their grievances. The defendants subverted the proceedings and refused to
play the role that they were allotted as ‘defendants’ in a criminal trial. They redefined
the trial as a prosecution of the entire amnesty movement and used the courtroom
and sideshows outside the courtroom to present their narrative of (in)justice. The
sideshows are the topic of the next section. Here, the focus is on their performative
strategy during the proceedings inside the courtroom.
The defendants coordinated their performance collectively. For example, during
their evidence on the first day, each of the defendants took up a different aspect of
state repression.71 Significantly, the judge allowed the defendants to complete their
speeches on this day, even though they did not respond to the charges or questions
posed by the prosecutor and lawyer of the popular accusation. At the end of their
speeches, most defendants said that they did ‘not expect justice; the verdict and the
punishment are already written. I will not defendmyself legally, this trial is a farce
and I will not participate in that. These are my last words.’72 The defendants also
posted online a declaration explaining their posture.73
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The decision not to defend themselves legally was a departure from the performa-
tive strategy in earlier macro-trials. The defendants in those trials had taken the legal
defence very seriously. This also meant that they accepted the Spanish criminal justice
system. The Gestoras defendants decided to stick to their long-time criticism of the
Audiencia Nacional and collectively rejected the jurisdiction of the court.74 Their
team of defence lawyers—from the Gestoras collective—supported that decision. In
taking this stance, the Gestoras defendants came closer to the position usually taken
by etamilitants who had always rejected any defence. After declaring ‘I am an eta
militant and I do not recognise this court’, etamilitants routinely asked their lawyers
to be silent.75 To avoid being associated with eta just for this reason,76 the Gestoras
defendants explained their decision to their constituency in a publication in a Basque
newspaper.77 Gestoras’s position did differ from the general attitude of etamilitants
though, as these would not usually make the sustained effort to use their time in
court for a ‘political’ defence. The Gestoras defendants deliberately staged a show to
communicate their grievances. They chose not, however, to seek open confrontation
with the judges or insult them: not out of respect or fear, but because the court was
‘their playing field’.78 One of the defendants pointed out, for example, that everything
is filmed and the media can choose what they cut and what they show.79
The defendants staged a show by calling upon witnesses who represented their
criticisms of the Spanish state, not witnesses who could disprove the charges. Thus,
an alleged torture victim, Unai Romano, made a declaration80 as did the relative of a
judicially proven victim of torture by the Guardia Civil. Twelve other victims of state
repression gave testimonies before the Audiencia Nacional. While the court allowed
the witnesses time to speak, they were cut short and were asked to come to the point.
In its verdict, the court rejected and discredited the witness testimonies presented by
the defendants as ‘biased’.81
The rejection of a juridical defence ignited a tense battle between defendants,
their lawyers, the prosecutors and the judges. The defendants drew attention to the
longstanding grievances of Gestoras pro Amnistía, such as the perceived illegitimacy
of the Audiencia Nacional, the use of solitary confinement and the torture allegations.
The presiding judge was not receptive to the complaints expressed by the defendants
and theirwitnesses. Instead, she swiftly and snappily drew theboundaries of acceptable
legal arguments and showed her authority over her courtroom. She also demanded
from the defendants a respectful attitude towards the court, at one point telling a
defendant to take his hands out of his pockets while he was speaking.82 Thus, the
trial turned into a competition for recognition and respect. This conflict was played
out in minute detail, for example, as defendants with a perfect command of the
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Spanish language insisted onmaking their declarations in Euskara, while at the same
time publicly correcting the interpreter if they perceived amistake in the Spanish
translation.83
The judge thus excluded the grievances of the defendants from the courtroom.
For example, she told a lawyer to refrain from using certain arguments:
Ms. Attorney, […] you can’t say that there are convictions without evidence. […] You
can’t be gratuitous. […] You can’t offend … […] I don’t like to intervene in your remarks.
Here we are not trying the Audiencia Nacional as a tribunal. That is not the trial.84
The attorney had to speak on the topic of the trial and the judge defined the boundaries
of what belonged to that discussion and what did not. At a later point the judge
warned: ‘Don’t talk about torture again, that is not what we are judging here.’85
Thus, the defendants and their lawyers tried to use the platform of the courtroom
as a way to communicate their narrative of (in)justice. The defendants used their
speaking time to explain and defend their activities as members of Gestoras pro
Amnistía. Instead of denying the charges, they claimed pride in their work.86 The
judges were not receptive to this narrative. The performative strategy, however, aimed
to reach a larger public through the media, a fact which is explored in more detail in
the next section.
10.5. Outside the Courtroom
Themedia play an important role broadcasting the events in the courtroom to a larger
public. But the actors involved in the proceedings also made additional efforts to
bring their perspective to their target audiences in a variety of sideshows.
10.5.1. TheMedia Show
Themedia turned up in large numbers for the first day of the trial with at least eight
cameras and twenty journalists.87 Most of the press, however, only attended the
first and last days of the hearings. The press in Spain has clear political affiliations
which was evident in the reporting choices. Thus, the newspaper seen as closest
to the left-wing nationalist movement (Gara) described in detail the evidence and
grievances expressed by the defendants,88 whereas other newspapers conveyed a
different perspective. For example, El País, the newspaper most closely associated with
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the Spanish socialists, argued that Gestoras had chosen ‘victimismo’ (victimhood)
and that the Gestoras defendants had chosen to present themselves as victims. El
País called their evidence propaganda without elaboratingmuch on the content of
the expressed grievances.89 ElMundo, a right-wing newspaper, concluded that the
defendants ‘showed the same uniformity that they, according to the prosecutor,
imposed on the eta prisoners as the leaders of the prison front’.90
While the media were the most official and constant factor in bringing the trial
into the public debate, the different trial actors also engaged in ‘sideshows’ to influence
public opinion in the formof press releases, public talks, demonstrations and petitions.
Victim organisations staged their performance mainly through participating as
the popular accusation. In addition, they commented on the trial in press releases
and publications.91 Also eta reached out to the media. In its communiqués, eta
warned the Spanish state to stop harassing the left-wing nationalist movement in
criminal proceedings, particularly mentioning the imprisonment of members of the
‘amnesty movement’.92 Most active in the strategic organisation of sideshows were
the defendants. What follows therefore focuses on the efforts of the defendants and
their sympathisers to persuade their target audiences of the veracity and legitimacy of
their narrative.
10.5.2. Sideshows
DefendantMadariaga, in his last word in the Gestoras trial, said that ‘any injustice
creates an antidote which is solidarity. Solidarity is real.’93 Indeed, the sideshows were
an expression of solidarity. For example, during the trial, on 17 May 2008, there was
a demonstration in support of the defendants in the city centre of Bilbo-Bilbao in
the Basque Country. During themarch, Askatasuna stickers were distributed and
many people on the march put the stickers on their chests. In front of the march
demonstrators carried pictures of prisoners. A newspaper reported later that more
than 16,000 people had attended the demonstration.94 In the speech of one of the key
Gestoras defendants during the march on 17 May, the message of their narrative was
taken to the target audience. The speaker emphasised that the struggle should be
continued. If the enemywas chasing them in this way, it showed that Gestoras was
doing good work. He compared the Gestoras trial to the trial of Burgos, a well-known
example of a Franco show trial in 1970 against allegedmembers of eta. He further
claimed that the only difference between the trials was that with Burgos it had been a
military tribunal and now the judges were wearing robes. Those defendants were
executed; he said, ‘we will receive life imprisonment’.95
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As to their motivation to attend the event, someone on the march said that even
though this demonstrationmight not change anything, ‘hay que ir’ (one had to go).
His friend commented that a demonstration with so many people would at least
be mentioned in the newspapers.96 Media coverage of an event can thus spread the
message of a sideshow. This demonstration was just one of the many sideshows that
were organised by and for sympathisers of the defendants. On 28 June 2008, after the
final trial hearings, there was another demonstration.
Such sideshows sometimes lead to a showdown between the different actors. As
both Gestoras pro Amnistía and Askatasuna had been declared illegal by judge Garzón
in the preliminary proceedings and their activities suspended, victim organisation
Dignity and Justice demanded that a demonstration announced by Askatasuna
for 14 September 2008 should be declared illegal.97 The demonstration was indeed
prohibited, which subsequently led to confrontations between demonstrators and the
police and various detentions.98
These sideshows aimed to elicit support for the Gestoras defendants in particular
and the collective of ‘Basque political prisoners’ in general. Their enactment and the
vocabulary for their messages were often strategically adapted to the different target
audiences in an effort to maximise support. Different kinds of support were sought
and given, including liberal support demanding fair proceedings and political support
recognising the defendants as political prisoners.
Typical liberal support was provided, for example, by the Association of Eu-
ropean Democratic Lawyers. Just before the trial started, on 19 April 2008, this
organisation sent a letter from Amsterdam expressing its concern regarding the
macro-trials. It denounced the entrance of Spanish investigators into the offices of
defence lawyers, thus violating the right to professional confidentiality, and the
extensive use of pre-trial detention.99 The Gestoras defendants also strategically
reached out for liberal support by inviting Martin Scheinin, the United Nations
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms while countering terrorism. He attended the trial for one day.
Liberal support for defendants and prisoners is generally regarded as legitimate. A
journalist of the newspaper El País, however, criticised international human rights
organisations such as Amnesty International. According to him, their one-sided
commitment to human rights is naïve and counterproductive when their infor-
mants are etamilitants. He called these human rights organisations ‘Ambassadors
of eta’.100
While liberal support accepts the Spanish state and challenges a specific trial
within the framework of the rule of law, ‘political’ support challenges the Spanish
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statemore fundamentally, rejecting its legitimacy. TheGestoras defendants frequently
said that the court could ‘judge’ them, but not ‘condemn’ them for their activities
and thus self-identified as political prisoners. Many sympathisers from the Basque
Country andMadrid attended the trial in solidarity with the defendants, accepting
this identification as ‘political’ prisoners.101 As a sign of their political solidarity, an
activist group inMadrid organised a dinner for the defendants after one of the trial
days.102 They also co-organised a forum inMadrid with different speakers, including
one of the defendants.103 The trial was further brought back home to the Basque
Country where defendants visited different villages to provide their target audience
with an update. In these talks, the defendants explained to the audience, for example,
why they had chosen to reject a juridical defence.104
The Gestoras trial thus provided an occasion for the differentmedia outlets to
make public their competing interpretations of the proceedings. This media show
was complemented with sideshows outside the courtroom, in which the defendants
and their sympathisers drew on a broad repertoire of support mobilisation activities.
10.6. After the Trial
The trial against the defendants of Gestoras pro Amnistía lasted seven weeks. Three
months after the trial, the Audiencia Nacional issued its verdict. It convictedmost of
the defendants of membership of a terrorist organisation. The terrorist organisation
in this case was Gestoras pro Amnistía as part of the eta network.
10.6.1. The Verdict
In its verdict, the court clearly aimed to enact a ‘performance of justice’. Just like
the prosecutor, it diligently countered the elements that had the potential to turn
this trial into a virtual show. For example, even though the court pointed repeatedly
to ideological similarities between documents from themilitary wing of eta and
documents foundat theGestorasheadquarters,105 at the same time, the court explicitly
declared that it is not resemblance in ideas nor the aspiration of independence that
turns the actions of defendants into a crime.106 Instead, the court argued that the
shared struggle was expressed in a ‘shared operation’, with a clear division of tasks
linked to eta.
The court further made it clear that it cared about individual responsibility. Just
like the prosecutor had done during the trial, the court emphasised the personal
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conduct that demonstratedmembership of Gestoras pro Amnistía and support for
the armed struggle. Proof of this was, for example, that some of the defendants had
attended an honouring ceremonywhere two unknown people with their faces covered
appeared on a stage and held a placard with the symbol of eta.
To justify the selection of the defendants, the court drew a distinction between the
leaders, whowere indicted, and thosewhoworked at the ‘basis’ in the largermovement
for amnesty.107 The court attributed to the leaders knowledge of the eta network
(but not of particular attacks) and thusmens rea (criminal intent) that those at the
margins of the movement did not possess. In a clear example that mere membership
of Gestoras did not automatically lead to criminal liability, the court argued that
while the membership of Gestoras pro Amnistía of defendant Julen Arzuaga had been
proven, there was no further evidence of his involvement ‘in favour of eta’ apart
from the ‘exercise of his profession’ as a lawyer. He was acquitted.108 The court also
recognised the distinction between individual criminal liability andmembership
liability when it adjudicated that recruitment for eta was an individual crime and
not a structural function of Gestoras pro Amnistía as an organisation.
In several instances the court thus specified particular reasons for accusing a
defendant of criminal liability. At the same time, however, the court defended the
logic that membership in Gestoras automatically created criminal liability. This
was implied in its insistence that there was no need to go into detail regarding the
ways in which specific defendants had participated in Gestoras and its criminal
connections and activities as part of the eta network.109 Indeed, the court added
that not punishing people only because proof of concrete action was lacking would
amount to impunity, as then only those who engaged in themost visible activities
would be punished.110
10.6.2. Supporting Prisoners or Supporting Terrorists?
At the core of the charge was the argument that as a prisoner support group Gestoras
pro Amnistía fulfilled a function in eta’s strategy complementary to the armed
struggle and in subordination to themilitary wing. The court’s verdict decided how
Gestoras’s prisoner support activities contributed to the eta network.
The charge raised the question which kinds of communication and coordination
can be considered ‘criminal’ or constitutive of a terrorist organisation. It says a lot in
this regard that no proof was established as to themost obvious forms of criminal
cooperation. Unsubstantiated allegations of financial support were not even addressed
in the final verdict, despite the importance of this claim in the dossier produced by
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investigative judge Garzón that eta financed Gestoras pro Amnistía at least until
1991.111 The court further judged that the alleged structural recruitment of new
etamilitants by Gestoras had not been demonstrated. The proven instances of such
recruitment were not an integral task of Gestoras within the ‘global strategy’ of the
organisation and should therefore be prosecuted as separate offences of ‘individual
conduct’.112 Even the facilitation of communication between eta and its prisoners
could not be proven.113 Lastly, the court judged that it could not be proven that
Gestoras organised specific days of street violence in coordination with eta.
Four alleged functions of Gestoras, however, were considered proven by the
court: (1) maintaining cohesion in the prisoners’ collective; (2) signalling potential
targets to eta; (3) awareness-raising and agitation within the Basque populace; (4) de-
legitimation of the Spanish state. These four functions were further deemed sufficient
to consider Gestoras part of the eta network. The argumentation of the court will be
discussed in slightly more detail.
First, Gestoras worked to keep the collective of prisoners together and to dissuade
prisoners from accepting offers of rehabilitation in exchange for repentance.114
According to the court, if Gestoras pro Amnistía really cared about the well-being
of the prisoners and their families they would not qualify such repentance as an
‘abandoning of the interests of the collective’.115 Gestoras thus played a role in the
disciplining of the prisoners. Such control aimed to prevent ‘individual ways out’,
meaning that prisoners put their own fate above that of the entire collective and the
future of an independent Basque Country. As an example of other forms of control
given by the court, prisoners were not allowed to give interviews without the prior
permission of eta and certainly not about political subjects. The eta leadership further
sometimes took the decision to expel a prisoner from the collective, for example, when
a prisoner had chosen to accept an offer by the Spanish state. Gestoras, as the guardian
of the prisoner collective, would then enforce those decisions.
A peculiar second task of Gestoras pro Amnistía was found to be the activity of
‘señalamiento’ (signalling): pointing to potential targets for eta. In the prosecutorial
narrative, the denunciation of perceived state repression thus obtained a different
meaning. For example, one Gestoras campaign called attention to the so-called
‘judicialisation of the repression’, criticising judges for their rulings. In 2001, eta
killed judge José Lidón after Gestoras had expressed such criticism. The prosecutor
claimed that Gestoras not only ‘signalled’ to eta to kill the judge, but also ‘prepared’
the population by providing a justification.116 The court did not accept that the
judge was killed because of Gestoras’s criticism. It did consider proven, however, that
Gestoras had the task of signalling to eta whom to attack.
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Third, Gestoras was found to be responsible for awareness-raising. According to
the prosecutor, as the ‘prison front’ Gestoras had an ‘internal’ and ‘external’ function.
Internally, it was responsible for prisoners and their families. Externally, it had to
persuade the Basque population that prisoners were ‘Basque political prisoners’ and
that their repression was due only to their ideological convictions.117 When eta
members perished, they were portrayed as ‘patriots’ who had fallen ‘in defence of
the rights of Euskal Herria’. The court declared this to be a ‘distortingmessage’ and
part of the eta strategy of ‘awareness-raising’.118 Thus, Gestoras was said to have a
function in themaintenance of eta: because etamembers were depicted as heroes,
newmilitants were always ready to replace the captured or dead.
A final function attributed to Gestoras was the de-legitimation of the Spanish
state. One of the major ‘tools’ for such discrediting was found to be the allegations of
torture in solitary confinement.119 The prosecutor argued that eta’s ‘yellowmanual’
obliged its members to denounce torture.120 The court held that Gestoras’s reports on
torture did not represent facts, but rather fitted with eta’s claim that prisons were
centres of torture.121 Thus, according to the court, Gestoras executed eta’s strategy
to use torture allegations to discredit the Spanish state. In relation to Gestoras’s
critique on the Guardia Civil’s presence in the Basque Country, the court rejected
the possibility that Gestoras voiced the opinion of a significant part of the Basque
population. Instead, it was said to be part of a strategy to portray the Spanish state
as repressive.122 Similarly, Gestoras’s criticisms that the Audiencia Nacional was a
‘foreign’ and ‘exceptional’ court were interpreted as part of eta’s strategy. Evidence of
this was found in a passage in a document seized from an underground etamember
in 1993. The document addressed ‘Adidas’, the supposed code name of Gestoras pro
Amnistía: ‘We believe that we need to revisit our focus in relation to the trials: the
Basque citizen is judged in foreign courts. We think we need to revisit the profound
significance of not recognising the court.’123 According to the court, Gestoras criticised
the state in order to uphold the perception that therewas a need for armed struggle.124
Thus, the court dismissed all criticisms expressed by the defendants and classified
them as instruments in a larger strategy ordered by eta.
Ultimately, the court was unsuccessful in establishing the Gestoras trial as a
‘performance of justice’. The defendants did not feel recognised and they as well
as many of their supporters did not perceive a neutral application of the law.
Moreover, theymaintained fundamental disagreement about the legal interpretation
of Gestoras’s prisoner support activities. Many of the abovementioned activities are
typical of prisoner support groups elsewhere. This makes the battle between the
narratives relevant beyond this single case.
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10.6.3. The Aftermath
A year after the court’s verdict, it was largely confirmed by the Tribunal Supremo.
Those who were not already detained were arrested to serve their sentences. In the
eyes of members of the left-wing nationalist movement, the trial and the convictions
simply confirmed the existing injustice narrative and the perceived ‘judicialisation
of the repression’. Outside the left-nationalist movement, this trial was simply one
more episode in the macro-trials.125
Legally, the trial confirmed that eta is a network. It also contributed to viewing
terrorism as something that involves more than just guns and bombs. During the
Gestoras trial, the prosecutor built on what had been considered proven during the
previous macro-trials. These trials thus helped to establish a new regime of truth. A
representative of a victim organisation emphasised that this was their significance.126
The trials expanded the reach of criminal law to include socio-political organisations
from the left-nationalist movement. The prosecutor’s office and representatives of
victim organisations further viewed the macro-trials as an important instrument to
destroy eta.127
Indeed, three years after the Gestoras trial, eta released a communiqué declaring
the end of the armed struggle.128 Pressure by older eta members in the prisoner
collective had been a major factor in bringing this about. The fate of 703 eta-related
prisoners has since become one of the main issues at the negotiation table.129 Already
during the previous negotiations in 2006, the government studied the options of
bringing the prisoners closer to the Basque Country and even considered releasing
some of the prisoners.130 Victim associations, however, strongly oppose such lenient
measures.131 On 7 January 2012, a demonstration in the Basque Country in solidarity
with the prisoners attracted 110,000 people.132 Thus, the battle between the competing
narratives of (in)justice continues.
10.7. Conclusion
The performative strategies during theGestoras trial featured elements of three shows:
a virtual show; a show run by the defendants and their lawyers; and amedia show
augmented by sideshows.
Firstly, the trial displayed elements of a ‘virtual’ show. The chargewasmembership
of a terrorist organisation. There was no mention of individual involvement in a
concrete terrorist attack. The tasks of themembers of Gestoras pro Amnistía were
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said to fit into a broader eta strategy. The defendants were said to be subordinated to
the military wing of eta. Specific ‘functions’ of Gestoras—the signalling of potential
targets, the disciplining of the prisoner collective, awareness-raising among the
Basque population and the de-legitimation of the Spanish state—would promote
eta’s maintenance and facilitate armed attacks.
The prosecutor’s performative strategy aimed to compensate for the virtual
character of the charges. Individualised evidence was brought to prove that the
defendants were members of Gestoras, even though this was never disputed. Evidence
was also brought in to prove Gestoras’s functions. Thus, for many days, the audience
was presented with evidence from police experts, telephone interceptions, documents
seized from etamilitants or Gestoras offices, and press declarations. This evidence
narrated the largely undisputed historic relations between eta and Gestoras as well as
public Gestoras activities. The trial thus raised two important questions: when does
communication or coordination withmembers of a terrorist group become a criminal
activity? And howwould that be proven without de facto criminalising otherwise
legal activities?
Secondly, the defendants attempted to run the show by rejecting a juridical
defence. Instead, they used the podium to bring their grievances into the courtroom.
For example, they called upon witnesses that emphasised the role of the Audiencia
Nacional judges in facilitating torture by allowing for solitary confinement. This
performative strategy turned the trial into a battle for mutual respect and recognition
between the defendants and the judges.
Thirdly, the trial displayed elements of a media show. It offered different media
outlets the opportunity to publish their narratives of the eta network and the role
of prisoner support. In addition, the trial event led to the enactment of sideshows.
The defendants and their sympathisers drew upon a repertoire of prisoner support
activities to persuade their target audiences of their narrative of (in)justice.
The Gestoras trial did not become a generally accepted ‘performance of justice’.
Instead, multiple and competing shows were staged in- and outside the courtroom.
Because the Spanish-Basque society is so polarised, the show was run by both the
defendants and the prosecutors (including the popular accusation), but each only for
their own audience. During the sideshows, the defendants were mostly preaching to
the choir, i.e. to their own constituency—a sector in society that ‘fears the Spanish state
more than it fears eta’.133 According to one of the defendants, the target audience
was the ‘Basque and international society’.134 The prosecutors did not make any
particular efforts either to reach out to the left-wing nationalist movement. Without
outreach beyond their own constituencies, the trial confirmed pre-existing divisions
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and pre-existing narratives of (in)justice. The judges allowed the defendants the
opportunity to stage their show and express their grievances. At the same time, they
did not accept the grievances as legitimate and dismissed their criticisms. Obviously,
the defendants and also the victims of eta have a particular constituency. However, it
is the tragedy of the Spanish justice system that the judges were not able to reach out
to all parts of the Spanish and Basque societies.
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11. Performing Justice, Coping with Trauma:
The Trial of Anders Breivik, 2012
Tore Bjørgo, Beatrice de Graaf, Liesbeth van der Heide,
Cato Hemmingby andDaanWeggemans
11.1. Introduction
The sophistication behind the attacks, the extreme brutality, the number of victims
and the fact that 33 of the 77 people killed were under the age of 18, made the 22 July
2011 attacks in Norway one of the major terrorist incidents in the history of terrorism.
Compared to other acts of terrorism conducted by a single actor, they were unique
in their destructiveness. The subsequent trial was also unique for the Norwegian
judicial system and court administration.
At the same time, this was also a highly dramatic and explicit example of a terrorist
suspect’s attempt to turn his trial into a theatre. In the 1,500-page manifesto that
Anders Behring Breivik posted on the internet, he wrote ‘your trial will offer you a
stage to the world’.1 In addition, the Norwegian newspaper Verdens Gang published
extracts of a letter Breivik sent from his cell in which he stated that the court case
looked like a circus; ‘it is an absolutely unique opportunity to explain the idea of 2083
[the manifesto] to the world’.2 He described the attacks in Oslo and Utøya as only the
first part of his ‘operation’. With his trial, or what he called the ‘propaganda phase’,
the time had come to convince the public of his narrative.
This chapter elaborates on the different strategies of some of the main actors in
the Breivik trial, particularly the defendant and his defence team, and the Attorney
General and the prosecution’s team. The main sources are Breivik’s compendium
2083: A European Declaration of Independence, an accurate word-for-word transcript
of the court proceedings, the sentence handed down on 24 August 2012, as well
as selected literature and media sources. The authors were also present in court
during parts of the trial, conducted a survey amongst the population in- and outside
the courtroom regarding their perception of the trial and the strategies of the
actors involved and interviewed the main actors (but not Breivik himself).3 One
of the authors of this chapter (Tore Bjørgo) also appeared as an expert witness in
court.4
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Wewill focus first on the attacks in Oslo and Utøya, Breivik’s early life and the
events leading up to these attacks. Important information on this pre-history has
been gleaned from Breivik’smanifesto and other open sources. Themanifesto provides
valuable insights into Breivik’s underlyingmotives and the pathway to his atrocities.
Then, we will discuss the course of the trial. Thirdly, we will focus on what happened
outside the trial; for instance, what happened in Norwegian society after the attacks
and during the trial. How did the population in- and outside the courtroom respond
to the performative strategies of the actors involved? We will discuss the extent to
which the trial affected coping mechanisms within Norwegian society and what
classical goals of justice were served by it.
11.2. Before the Trial (the Attacks and theManifesto)
11.2.1. The Attacks
The attacks on 22 July 2011 were themost extrememanifestation of violence inNorway
since the Second World War. The fact that an act of terrorism of this magnitude could
happen in a small, homogeneous, highly affluent and stable society of fivemillion
inhabitants was for many incomprehensible.
At 15.25 hours a bomb exploded in Oslo’s government district. The blast damaged
buildings and blew out windows over more than a half-mile radius.5 Closest to
the blast was the 17-storey building where the PrimeMinister had his offices. The
explosion killed eight people and injured at least 209. At about 16.57, approximately 38
kilometres north west of Oslo city centre, a person dressed as a policeman asked a
ferryman to transport him to Utøya Island where an annual youth camp organised by
the youth wing of the Norwegian Labour Party was taking place. At that moment
there were 564 people on the island. The ‘policeman’ told everybody that he had been
sent there following the attacks in Oslo. But after coming ashore on the island, he
opened fire, eventually killing 69 people. People panicked and fled into the woods or
jumped into the cold water, trying to swim to the shore some 600 metres away. One of
the survivors, who had been spared by the shooter because he resembled a right-wing
supporter,6 reported the killer shouting ‘I will kill you all’ and ‘today it is your time to
die’ when he was aiming at the swimming youths.7 The youngest victimwas 14 years
old.8
During the shooting the killer called the police saying, ‘Myname is Anders Behring
Breivik, of the Norwegian anti-communistic resistance movement. I am at Utøya and
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I wish to surrender.’9 The police arrived only after half an hour on the landside. It took
another 35 minutes, and another phone call by Breivik himself, before the first police
ct-team came ashore on the island. Breivik then surrendered, was arrested and his
‘operation’ brought to an end.10
For years, Breivik had been planning the attacks. He claimed to have studied over 600
bomb-makingmanuals,11 among them al Qaeda’s tactics manuals (accessed bymeans
of Google Translate). Breivik considered different scenarios for spreading his ideas. In
the first instance, he intended to raise three million Euros in order to publish and
disseminate his 1,500-page manifesto, ‘2083: A European Declaration of Independence’.
After getting into financial difficulties, he embraced a muchmore violent ‘plan b’.12
This plan involved detonating three car bombs at different locations in Oslo (amongst
these the government district, the Labour Party’s office and the Royal Palace).13 Then,
if he survived the explosions, he would carry out a shooting spree. This plan was
discarded since building a bomb ‘tookmuchmore time than he expected’.14
Instead, he decided to deploy a vehicle-borne explosive device, containing a self-
constructed fertiliser bomb, in Oslo’s governmental district, close to the offices of the
Norwegian PrimeMinister. The idea was ‘to bring the building down’, to destroy the
ministry office and kill all those present there. When this did not happen, he chose to
proceed with the shooting spree at Utøya. Breivik said, ‘If the building had collapsed
then going onto Utøya would have been unnecessary and I would have driven straight
to a police station and surrendered. I had thought of this in advance.’ At Utøya, his goal
was to kill all the leftist youth politicians present at the political youth camp as well
as the former PrimeMinister, Gro Harlem Brundtland, who was visiting the camp
on that day.15 His aimwas to decapitate Brundtland while filming her, achieving
maximum impact with his killings. However, the former PrimeMinister had already
left when he arrived.
11.2.2. Manifesto andMotive
Previously, Breivik had been a prolific internet debater, initiating discussions on
the dangers of Islam and immigration. But only hours in advance of the attack, he
announced his actions by sending his manifesto, written under the pseudonym
‘Andrew Berwick’, to thousands of people.16 He disseminated it amongst sympathisers
and people whom he had randomly found on Facebook,17 and posted a twelve-minute
video called ‘Knights Templar 2083’ on YouTube as well. The video presented an
analysis of the imminent multiculturalist ‘threat’.
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Themanifesto offers some insight into what motivated Breivik.18 The manuscript
contains a diagnosis of everything Breivik considered perverted inWestern society,
and at the same time offers a roadmap to overcome these ills. In his ‘compendium’
of documents, mainly composed by others, he first of all tried to demonstrate the
rationality behind his fear of Muslim immigration. Islam, he wrote, posed a direct
threat to the humanistic, Jewish and Christian cultural heritage of Europe, and
European social democracy did nothing to prevent this, throwing the doors wide
open instead. Hence, the whole European political system had failed in protecting
the core values. Breivik then proceeded to outline a radical reform plan. In historical
analogy to the Battle of Vienna of 1683, when the European powers joined forces
against the Ottoman Empire and started the Great Turkish War, he proposes a similar
campaign to fight the islamisation of Europe. An elite order called the ‘Poor Fellow-
Soldiers of Christ and of the Temple of Solomon’, which hemore often refers to as
‘The Knights Templar’, was to act as a vanguard force.19 Based on the crusader myth,
Breivik claimed to have founded this order anew in 2002, and devised it to act as
‘leaderless network, made to be self-driven cells’. His Knights Templar were ‘to defeat
the cultural Marxist/Multiculturalist Alliance of Europe, seize political andmilitary
control ofWestern European countries and implement a cultural conservative political
agenda’.20
According to the manifesto, the campaign consisted of three phases. The first
phase (from 2009 to 2030) aimed ‘to take the “anti-Jihad movements” to a second
level, approach, cooperate with and/or merge with Christian movements and other
cultural conservative movements (who agree on a set point of principles)’.21 By
means of ‘open source warfare’, combined with ‘military shock attacks by clan-
destine cell systems’, social unrest was to be fomented, leading to citizens ques-
tioning the state of their societies22—a classical right-wing ‘strategy of tension’
approach. The second phase (2030–2070) projected an advanced status for the Knights
Templars’ resistance front. Around this time, when 15 to 60 per cent of the Eu-
ropean population would already consist of Muslims, resistance groups were to
join forces with regular armies while preparing for ‘pan-European coup d’états’.23
The third phase (2070–2083) would culminate in the actual execution of multi-
ple coups d’état. A cultural conservative agenda was to be implemented. Depor-
tation of Muslims would be initiated, and category A (political, media, cultural
and industrial leaders) and category b (people who have actively supported or
stimulated multiculturalism) traitors would be executed.24 Breivik described his
envisaged utopian end state as a society bearing a resemblance to the—in his
words—monocultural, but highly developed and progressive ‘Japanese’ or ‘South
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Korean’ system.25 Politically, a ‘European Federation’ should be created, based on
national sovereignty and completely sanitised of ‘multiculturalism orMarxist prin-
ciples’.26
11.2.3. Breivik’s Life and Pathway towards the Attacks
Themanifesto also contained autobiographical sketches. Breivik was born in Oslo on
13 February 1979 and lived the first year of his life in London. His father, Jens Breivik,
worked as a diplomat at the Norwegian embassy in London (and later in Paris); his
mother was a nurse.When Breivikwas one year old, his parents divorced and hemoved
back to Oslo with his mother and half-sister. He visited his father and stepmother
frequently until he was fifteen, when the contact was broken. According to Breivik,
his father ‘wasn’t very happy aboutmy graffiti phase from 13–16’.27 Breivik’s father,
however, contends that Breivik himself broke off contact.28
Although Breivik stated that he had not ‘really had any negative experiences in
my childhood in any way’, psychiatrists concluded that he must have felt emotionally
abandoned, and thereforemissed an important part of childhood and adolescence.29 In
ANorwegian Tragedy, publicist Aage Borchgrevink revealed the conclusions of different
reports from (child) psychiatrists who observed Breivik in 1983 after his mother had
asked for their help. One expert noticed the peculiar way in which the four-year-old
Breivik smiled, as if he understood how and when to smile, but without the actual
emotional basis of joy.30 Specialists also diagnosed his mother, Wenche Behring, as
having an ‘unstable personality’. She frequently hit her son, while at the same time
sleeping in the same bed.31 Therefore, in 1983, psychiatrists advised the authorities
to transfer Breivik to a different environment, advice that was ignored by the child
protection services.
At a later stage in his life, Breivik attended the Hartvig Nissen High School in Oslo
where he was described as an intelligent student. During this period, he developed his
graffiti skills, which led to an arrest by the police when he was fifteen. He also started
working out and used anabolic steroids.32 Since hewas teased for having an ‘Arab nose’,
he underwent a corrective nose operation when he was twenty.33 In 1997 he joined the
youth league of the Fremskrittpartiet (FrP), a conservative liberal political party known
for its anti-immigration campaigns, and stood as a candidate in the local elections
in Oslo. Breivik said, ‘FrP appealed to me because I had experienced the hypocrisy in
society first hand and I knew already then that they were the only party who opposed
multiculturalism.’34 Breivik was active for the FrP until 2006. He left when he realised
that a ‘democratic struggle against the Islamisation of Europe […] was lost’:
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It is simply not possible to compete democratically with regimes who import millions
of voters. 40 years of dialogue with the cultural Marxists/multiculturalists had ended
up as a disaster. It would now only take 50–70 years before we, the Europeans are in a
minority. As soon as I realised this I decided to explore alternative forms of opposition.
Protesting is saying that you disagree. Resistance is saying you will put a stop to this. I
decided I wanted to join the resistance movement. However, the main problem then
was that there weren’t any alternatives for me at all.35
After dropping out from the Oslo Commerce School (1995–1998), he found a job
at a customer service company before he started his own business in computer
programming, allegedly in 2002. In his manifesto he claims to have expanded his firm
to six employees and registered several offshore bank accounts. Themoney hemade,
and the funds he salvaged after his bankruptcy, were already at that stage intended to
be spent ‘on both writing the book and […] the operation,’ so he says.36 All in all, he
allegedly spent ‘130,000 Euros from his own pocket and 187,500 Euros for loss of income
during three years’.37
Breivik also went travelling, and describes how he (allegedly) visited the opening
meeting of his Knights Templar in London, in April 2002—ameeting that could not
be corroborated by any evidence:
There were only 5 people in London re-founding the order and tribunal (1 by
proxy) but there were around 25–30 attending in Balticum during the two sessions,
individuals from all over Europe; Germany, France, Sweden, the uk, Denmark,
Balticum, Benelux, Spain, Italy, Greece, Hungary, Austria, Armenia, Lebanon and
Russia. Electronic or telephonic communication was completely prohibited, before,
during and after the meetings. On our last meeting it was emphasised clearly that we
cut off contact indefinitely. […] This was not a stereotypical ‘right wing’meeting full of
underprivileged racist skinheads with a short temper, but quite the opposite. Most of
them were successful entrepreneurs, business or political leaders, some with families,
most of them Christian conservatives but also some agnostics and even atheists […] I
was asked, not only once but twice, bymymentor; let’s call him Richard, to write a
second edition of his compendium about the new European Knighthood.38
Data from the customs authority confirmed Breivik’s visit to the United Kingdom,
but the existence of this network could not be proven by anyone.39 Breivik also went
to Liberia, by his own account tomeet a ‘Serbian crusader and war hero who had killed
manyMuslims in battle.’ According to the prosecution, Breivik went there only to
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buy ‘blood diamonds’, and possibly even fell ‘prey to a Nigerian internet scam’.40
As for the other 24 countries, he allegedly visited several other countries (including
China, Mexico, Malta, Cyprus and Nigeria), but not much information is available
apart from his own statements. Flight records, for example, show that Breivik went to
Malta with his mother for a holiday, although he himself claims to have gone there to
study the forefront of ‘Europe’s defence fromNorth Africa’.
In 2006, he moved back to live with his mother in Oslo to write his compendium
while saving money for the attacks. During this period, friends testified, Breivik
becamemore andmore isolated, and addicted to Internet gaming.41 Breivik indeed
considered his skills at ‘Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2’ as ‘part of [his] training-
simulation’, while ‘World of Warcraft’ helped him to detach him from his ‘old life’,
most of his network and prepare him for his campaign.42
InMay 2009 he set up a new company, ‘Breivik Geofarm’, intended as a ‘credible
cover for [his] activities’.43 Through this entity he would be able to obtain the supplies
for the explosives hewanted to fabricate, such as fertiliser. Two years later, in April 2011,
he rented a farm in a village called Åsta, about 2 1/2 hours fromOslo, to cultivate sugar
beet. He started purchasing fertiliser, some six tons in total. During preparations he
came close to the Norwegian Police Security Service’s radar only once, after acquiring
a 15-metre powder fuse worth less than 20 Euros through a Polish website.44 The
Norwegian custom authorities, participating in a transnational customs watch
programme, sent a list of 41 names and suspicious money transactions (what the
people had bought was not revealed) to the security service in December 2010, but
this was not followed up.45 In late August 2010 he went to Prague to buy weapons,
stayed there for six days, but returned empty-handed. He then decided to register for a
weapons permit in Norway and obtained both a Glock pistol and a .223-calibre Ruger
Mini-14 semi-automatic carbine. According to the manifesto, he now entered the
final preparatory stage, which lasted a few weeks, in which he read, wrote, radicalised
further, collected supplies for the attacks, studied history, trained himself in shooting
and learned how tomanufacture a bomb.46
After the massacres in Oslo and Utøya on 22 July Breivik was arrested and taken,
through angry crowds, to a holding cell in Oslo. During one of the first interrogations
he called 22 July ‘the worst day of [his] life’.47 He furthermore expressed surprise that
hewas not being tortured. ‘It ought to be introduced inNorway’, he added.48However,
he did opt for making good use of the Norwegian legal order and prerogatives. Breivik
specifically asked for and got lawyer Geir Lippestad.49 The reason for this is probably
connected to the fact that Lippestad ten years earlier had defended the neo-Nazi
Ole Nicolai Kvisler who, together with two others, committed the racist murder of
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15-year-old Benjamin Hermansen in 2001.50 Breivik had then followed the attorney’s
performance and he actually, by coincidence, worked in the same building as Lippestad
at the time.51 What Breivik probably did not knowwas that Lippestad as late as in
2010 was an active, leadingmember of a local branch of the Labour Party in Oslo, and
as such a representative of the Cultural-Marxists that Breivik so very much hated and
wanted to kill.52 When Lippestad inmid-August 2011 told Breivik about his affiliation
with the Labour Party, Breivik responded very calmly, without surprise or anger.53
Upon accepting Breivik’s request, Lippestad himself received numerous threats.
However, according to Lippestad, ‘No matter how horrible the crime, a defendant has
to be represented. This is just a vital brick in the wall of democracy, and I would say
that 99 per cent of Norway understands that this is absolutely essential to a sound
justice system.’54
11.3. The Indictment
On 7March 2012 the indictment was formally read out to Breivik in his cell at the
Ila Prison, just outside the city of Oslo.55 After some debate and pressure from the
Norwegian public, the director of public prosecutions also included the full names of
the victims and the details of their deaths.56 The statement held Breivik responsible
for:
Having committed a terrorist act in […] bringing about an explosion whereby loss of
human life or extensive damage to the property of others could easily be caused […
and] premeditated murder where particularly aggravating circumstances prevail […]
with the intention of seriously disrupting a function of vital importance to society,
such as the executive authority or seriously intimidating a population.57
Norway had not experienced an offence of thismagnitude since the SecondWorldWar,
nor a perpetrator so fully committed to his crime as Breivik. The prosecutor therefore
felt that ‘new serious offences of the same naturemay recur’.58 The indictment further
reiterated a forensic psychiatric statement from 29 November 2011 by Torgeir Husby
and Synne Sørheimwho had diagnosed Breivik as psychotic at the time of the criminal
actions and during their observation after his arrest.59 The prosecution adopted their
conclusions that Breivik was suffering from the delusion that he was ‘participating
in a civil war where he is responsible for deciding who shall live and die, and that he
expects a power takeover in Europe’.60 Given this diagnosis, the experts assumed ‘that
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a similar scenario might unfold in the future, and believe that there is a significant
risk that people in the subject’s proximity, like prison or hospital employees, may
also become part of his paranoid delusional world and included in his homicidal
thoughts’.61 Breivik himself did not seem to have any insight into his illness.62
Consequently, ‘the requirement that he be judged sane has not been fulfilled’,63 and
the prosecution required ‘a sentence ordering his transfer to compulsory mental
health care’.64
This conclusion became a bone of contention during the next weeks and through-
out the period of the trial. Due to heavy criticism from many experts on forensic
psychiatry as well as from experts on terrorism and right-wing extremism, the ap-
pointed judges decided inmid-January 2012 to order a second opinion, appointing a
new team of psychiatrists to assess Breivik’s sanity. They reached the opposite conclu-
sion to the first psychiatric assessment, finding Breivik to be suffering from serious
personality disorders but not insane. With two conflicting psychiatric assessments, it
became up to the court to decide. Contrary to Breivik’s wishes and strategy, it was not
the attacks or his manifesto that was centre stage, but the trial gravitated around the
question of his sanity.
11.4. The 22 July Trial
The extraordinary dimensions of the trial—the number of victims and relatives,
and the global span of the media attention—took a heavy toll on the authorities.
Presiding judge Wenche E. Arntzen admitted that the case raised both practical and
legal dilemmas for the court system; the court had to acknowledge and illuminate
the gruesome and brutal details, did not want to compromise the legal rights of the
perpetrator, all while being respectful and considerate towards the victims and their
relatives present. An almost impossible combination of objectives.65
The trial started on 16 April 2012, lasting until 22 June. Themain actors present
were the court administration, the defendant and his defence team, the prosecutors,
the two court-appointed psychiatric teams, as well as the legal representatives of the
victims. Expert witnesses, police witnesses, victims and other witnesses prepared their
performance, and both victims and national and international media institutions
were given a number of seats in Courtroom 250 in the Oslo Court House, or in a
number of television-linked courtrooms in Oslo and elsewhere in Norway. Parts of
the proceedings were also broadcast on national television—unusual openness even
by Norwegian standards.
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As explained in this book’s introduction and elsewhere, terrorist trials are often
more about the performance than the verdict.66 This was certainly true of the ‘22
July trial’—as the court sessions were labelled in public, in order to avoid honouring
Breivik’s name. Public tension and expectations around the trial did not relate to
the question of guilt (contrary to other terrorism trials), as Breivik’s culpability was
undisputed. The debates and often emotional interventions concerned rather the
organisation of the trial, the possible behaviour of the defendant in court, and the
plight of the victims and relatives. Public debate, however, focussed predominantly
on the question of Breivik’s mental state. Would the defendant be foundmentally
accountable, or would he be ruled insane, and hence sentenced to compulsory mental
health care—a prospect that inspired quite some public indignation?
The trial attracted massive attention, not only in Norway, but all over the world.
Apart fromBreivik’s evidence and that of hiswitnesses and details about the individual
killings, much of the court proceedings were broadcast live. Only the newspaper
Dagbladet offered a ‘Breivik free zone’, where a click on a black buttonwould conceal all
Breivik related articles.67 The Oslo District Court had estimated that the trial would
attract 1,000–1,400 people on a daily basis and built a new high-security courtroom.
In the main courtroom 190 places were reserved for the victims. About 2,500 people
were able to follow the trial via a live-streamed video broadcast in 18 courts around
the country.68 In addition, facilities were provided for about 1,500 journalists. The
total cost of these arrangements was estimated at 76 million Kroner (€10.5 million).69
Breivik got the stage he was expecting.
11.5. Strategies in Court
On 16 April 2012 Breivik entered the courtroom, clenched his right fist, touched his
heart and extended his arm. The salute was described in his manifesto:
Themilitary salutation of the […] Knights Templar is the clenched fist salute. The
raised fist salute consists of raising the right arm with a clenched fist (preferably with
a white glove). The clenched fist symbolizes strength, honour and defiance against the
Marxist tyrants of Europe while the white glove symbolizes purity, duty, kinship and
martyrdom. Using the right arm symbolizes the tradition of the ‘Right Opposition’.70
Public prosecutor Inga Bejer Engh responded by walking towards him andmerely
shaking his hand.71 Later that day Breivik made it clear that he did not acknowledge
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the legitimacy of the court. ‘I do not recognise theNorwegian courts. You have received
yourmandate frompolitical partieswhich supportmulticulturalism.’72He specifically
denied the authority of presiding judgeWenche Elizabeth Arntzen, whom Breivik
accused of partiality. Arntzen was close friends with the former Norwegian Prime
Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland’s sister, the same Brundtland whom Breivik had
wanted to kill at Utøya. He however refrained frommaking a formal assertion. All
in all, the first day already saw a number of highly performative strategies in the
courtroom. We will discuss below the strategies adopted by the prosecution and the
defence team, including Breivik’s own performance.
11.5.1. The Prosecution’s Strategy
The prosecution’s strategy was threefold. First and foremost, Breivik’s atrocious deeds
had to be put before the judges in full detail. Second, justice should be administered
as normal. And, third, Breivik had to be found insane and sentenced to mental health
care.
The handshakes with Breivik initiated by prosecutors Engh and Holden illustrate
the second point. Whereas international media reported it as ‘a bizarre protocol’,73 a
‘rare sight in the u.s., as well as in neighbouring Sweden and other Nordic nations’,74
Bejer Enghdefendedher gesture. ‘Mygoal has been to treat him like any other criminal,
and I think that’s important’, she said.75
The prosecution’s first goal, however,was to do justice to the victims, their relatives
and their emotions as well. Therefore, a highly detailed account of the course of events
was presented.76 On the first day the names and causes of death of all of the 77 victims
as well as the names and the injuries of the wounded were read out in court by
prosecutor Inga Bejer Engh. Parts of this record were repeated and included by the
judges in the final verdict. Engh and her colleague SveinHolden described the horrible
circumstances of the attacks in full detail: ‘He shot at people who were fleeing or
hiding, or whom he lured out by saying he was a policeman.’77
After that, security-camera footage and recorded mobile phone calls from victims
in Oslo and Utøya were produced, such as the phone call Renate Tårnes made while
hiding in the toilets and whispering to the emergency services, ‘Come quickly […]
There’s shooting all the time.’78 Some of the victims and relatives left the courtroom;
Holden himself later admitted that it had been almost unbearable to listen to these
recordings. The prosecution asked different survivors and family members of victims
to describe what they had endured and what the consequences of the attacks had been
for them. Other stories were read out by the prosecution themselves.
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The third aspect of the prosecution’s strategy proved to be the most controversial.
From the first days onwards, the prosecutors did everything to identify flaws and
errors within Breivik’s stories. By portraying his ‘militant ultra-nationalist’ narrative
as a delusion, the prosecution wanted to convince the ‘mainstream’ Norwegian public
of its point of view, while at the same time undermining Breivik’s possible future
martyr status for other right-wing radicals.79
In line with this, the prosecutors repeatedly tried to refute the existence of the
Knights Templar organisation. When Breivik refused to produce any detail of the
founding session of the organisation in London in 2002, Bejer Engh questioned the
whole meeting:
Engh: ‘[…] but what I think is important that you have inmind now is that you
explain to the court what is true and how you have experienced it. That is what
is important to get, not what youmay remember and have told the police [or]
not told the police, but you have to make a choice now to tell what you believe
is true and how you experienced these events’.
Breivik:—‘Mm. But …’
Engh:—‘This is your chance …’
Breivik:—‘I also understand the role of the police, versus my role. It’s not my job
to investigate this matter. It’s not my job to provide information that leads to
arrests. It is the police’s job. And I do not want to contribute to that happening.
And another thing that I also react to, I know how you and Holden have put
up examination, and that is very special, then, that you and Holden ignore
radicalisation points … [inaudible] that you have found the reason why this has
happened, rather then you have chosen a strategy of delegitimisation to try to
strip me [of my] credibility. Instead of trying to find out the reasons … you see,
or what?’80
Breivik’s trip to Liberia, allegedly to meet a Serbian warlord, was questioned as well.
According to the prosecutors, the only reason the defendant went to Liberia was to
purchase so-called ‘blood diamonds’:
Breivik:—‘I do not want to comment on Liberia or London.’
Engh:—‘No …Why did you try?’
Breivik:—‘I’m not going to comment on it.’
Engh:—‘What is the risk in saying something about this now, Breivik?’
Breivik:—‘No, well, I do not want to make your [delegitimisation] efforts easier. But
I may well help to clarify points related to radicalisation points.’
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Engh:—‘We did a little bit yesterday, we walked a bit through it yesterday, and we
can certainly come back to it later.’
Breivik:—‘It is well that it is essential in this case.’
Engh:—‘Yes, of course. It’s an important part.’
Breivik:—‘Do not try to ridicule me.’
Engh:—‘No, not trying to ridicule you. I am trying to shed light on the matter’.81
These two quotations illustrate that Breivik did see through the strategy of the
prosecutors, and resisted their attempts. The prosecutors put him in a defensive
position though, e.g. when Svein Holden revealed how Breivik sold fake diplomas
and degree certificates and how he lost his long-term job.82 The question, however,
remained whether Breivik really considered himself ‘master over life and death’ and
believed in his own phantasies, or whether he was playing a game and following his
own strategy of mobilising a potential core of followers.
Interestingly, Professor Einar Kringlen, one of the grand old men in Norwe-
gian psychiatry who formonths supported the first report, changed his view after
seeing Breivik in court, concluding that he did not display any signs of being psy-
chotic.83 The first team of forensic psychiatrists who had found Breivik psychotic
and suffering from paranoid schizophrenia did not change their assessment during
the trial. When challenged by the judges on why they had not consulted exter-
nal experts on right-wing extremism and terrorism when they, admittedly, had
no knowledge of this, they stated, ‘If someone had claimed that he was Jesus or
Napoleon, we would not have seen any need to consult a theologian or a histo-
rian.’84
In their closing statement, the prosecution argued for a sentence of compul-
sory mental health care. They acknowledged that evidence presented during the
trial could support the argument that Breivik was not psychotic on 22 July.85 How-
ever, they reasoned that the doubt about his mental state, seen in the light of the
existing legislation and practice, ruled out punishment, and so they called for com-
pulsory mental health care. They argued that it would be far worse to give one
psychotic preventive detention than force a non-psychotic to have psychiatric treat-
ment.86
11.5.2. Breivik’s Strategy
Before carrying out his attacks, Breivik was aware that a trial could provide himwith
a stage to the world. He wrote in his manifesto, ‘If you for some reason survive the
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operation you will be apprehended and arrested. This is the point where most heroic
Knights would call it a day. However, this is not the case for a Justiciar Knight. Your
arrest will mark the initiation of the propaganda phase. […] Your trial offers you a
stage to the world.’87
For his ‘propaganda phase’ it was not only the attacks, but even more so a
subsequent trial that would enable him to communicate with like-minded people
from all over the globe. Illustrative of this intention was his request to wear his
self-made uniform covered with medals of honour, portraying himself as a military
war-hero.88 Breivik did not try to ‘win’ the trial in terms of avoiding imprisonment—
after all, he did not deny perpetrating the attacks—but used the trial to win over
more sympathisers to his mission. He wanted to generate a ‘maximum amount of
sympathisers and supporters’.89 The newspaper Verdens Gang published extracts of a
letter Breivik sent from his cell in which the defendant underscored this point: ‘The
process looks like a circus with 450 accredited journalists from all over the whole
world. I cannot say I look forward to it, but it is certainly a unique opportunity to
explain the idea of 2083.’90
This was also reflected in the letter Breivik sent to Beate Zschäpe, who stood
accused of acting as an accessory on ten right-wing extremist murder counts in
Germany, in May 2012. The letter was intercepted by the authorities and was obtained
by the GermanmagazineDer Spiegel. It opened with ‘Dear sister Beate!’, and discussed
what Breivik thought were the political motives behind the acts of which Zschäpe
was being accused. In this letter he advised her to ‘reveal [her] political motives to
the population’ and that she should use her impending trial ‘to spread right-wing
propaganda’ as he had done as well.91
A Ruthless Hardliner with a Pompous PostureMeeting Psychiatry
For Breivik to use his trial as a podium he needed to avoid being labelled ‘insane’.
From themoment Breivik was arrested he sought to reinforce the fear that he had
caused by his gruesome actions. He did so by claiming that two other cells were ready
to strike and that he was a Justiciar Knight Commander of the European Knights
Templar network; presenting it as an elitist initiative for militant ultra-nationalists
against the Cultural Marxists and the threat from Islam.
Breivik did nothing to moderate this impression for the following weeks and
months. In the first remand hearing on 25 July he demanded that he be allowed
to wear his self-made Commander uniform, but this was refused by the judge due
to the seriousness of the case and because it would be disturbing, provocative and
offensive.92
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His defence team, led by attorney Geir Lippestad, from the start had an agreement
with Breivik that they would take care of the legal issues, while Breivik could do
whatever he wanted with everything else, including the political dimensions.93
Following this, the defence planned a strategy to go for a delusion plea that Breivikwas
mentally ill and not responsible for his actions, with compulsory mental health care
as the outcome of the forthcoming trial. The defendant initially had no objections to
this. At the same time, the court initiated a psychiatric evaluation of the perpetrator,
and on 28 July the forensic psychiatrics Torgeir Husby and Synne Sørheimwere given
the task. Not surprisingly, the question of themental condition of the perpetrator
was of great public interest and it was widely covered in the media.
The two psychiatrists delivered their report on 29 November 2011, concluding that
Breivik was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, and that he was psychotic during the
attacks and the period of observation afterwards. This assessment had a profound
impact on the strategies of Breivik and his defence; as well as the Attorney General and
the prosecution, represented in court by Svein Holden and Inga Bejer Engh.
For the prosecution, the report became the basis for the indictment drafted by the
Attorney General, who concluded that they had no other alternative than to go for
an insanity plea and that he should be sentenced to compulsory mental health care,
which also meant that Breivik could not be held accountable or be punished for his
acts.
For Breivik the report came as a disastrous shock. Even though he knew that
the defence teamwas working for a compulsory mental health care verdict without
objection on his part, he immediately characterised the first report as the ultimate
humiliation.94 This fear of being regarded asmentally ill is not uncommon in terrorists
eager to communicate an ideological message. The Unabomber Theodore Kaczynski is
another example in this regard.95
Breivik was outraged by the first psychiatric report’s conclusion that he was a
paranoid schizophrenic. In a 38-page letter he wrote that it was the ‘worst that could
happen […] as it would be the ultimate humiliation. […] Sending a political activist to
a mental hospital is more sadistic and cruel than killing him! It is a fate worse than
death.’96 If he wanted to inspire future generations of violent right-wing extremists
he needed to be perceived not as a loony who should be locked up in a mental hospital
but as a rational being who was not afraid to rise from the passive masses and express
a widely-shared belief. Breivik therefore requested his lawyer Geir Lippestad from
now on not to plead insanity as a strategy for escaping a long prison sentence. On the
contrary, refuting the insanity imputation should be one of themain goals of the
defence.
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In response to the first psychiatric report Breivik claimed that 80 per cent of
the information regarding the interviews which formed the basis of the report was
‘fictional,malicious or very sophisticated lies’.97He claimed to have found 200 errors in
the report and questioned the integrity of the researchers, stating that ‘their political
viewsmade them obfuscate the accounts of their sessions […]. Their aimwas quite
clearly to create the premises that support the diagnosis they reached early on.’98
In addition to the first psychiatric report there were two other important
factors that made a considerable impact on Breivik. Firstly, he was granted access to
newspapers two weeks after the report, effective from 13 December 2011 onwards. The
defence had collected newspapers from the time after the attacks and it is most likely
that the newsmedia’s description of him did not live up to his expectations. Secondly,
he started receiving letters from sympathisers around the world whomade the point
that an insanity verdict would destroy his chances of being taken seriously andmake
him only a parenthesis in the history books. So in a few weeks the psychiatric report,
the media access and letters from sympathisers affected Breivik profoundly. As stated
by attorney Lippestad, to Breivik the insanity issue now became a question about
politics and not his own personality.99 He therefore decided to change the defence
strategy; a message that Lippestad received on 23 December.100 It seems that the
strategy for a delusion plea was abandoned at this point, although the defence waited
to announce this fact.
Towards a Second Psychiatric Evaluation
The first forensic psychiatric report was controversial from the day the main conclu-
sions were made public in late November 2011. The report was highly confidential but
was soon leaked to journalists who gave experts, and later the public, access to it. The
report and its conclusions came under heavy fire from two different groups of experts.
On one side, leading psychiatrists and psychologists claimed that the diagnosis of
paranoid schizophrenia and psychosis was wrong and not documented in thematerial
presented. From another perspective, experts on right-wing extremism (including
Tore Bjørgo, one of the authors of this chapter) claimed that the psychiatrists clearly
had no knowledge about the ideological context of Breivik’s acts and statements, and
misinterpreted them as expressions of paranoid misconceptions, although they were
quite mainstream amongmilitant right-wing extremists.
In an newspaper article, Tore Bjørgo stated that the report reminded him of two
Norwegian psychiatrists who went into the jungles of New Guinea to assess the
sanity of the locals without any cultural knowledge.101 Both Breivik’s terminology
and his world view were of a typical right-extremist nature. Lacking knowledge
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about this ideological context, the forensic psychiatrists misinterpreted many of
Breivik statements, such as assessing his claims that he was engaging in a civil war as
‘expressions of paranoidmisconceptions’. Likewise, his suspicion that he was under
security service surveillance, and themeasures he took to avoid such surveillance, was
interpreted as ‘expressions of paranoid misconceptions’. However, in this respect,
Breivik was more reality-oriented than his psychiatrists—he should have been under
surveillance by the security services and had every reason to believe that he was. The
psychiatrists relied solely on a psychiatric frame of reference and did not consider any
alternative hypotheses or interpretations.102 These points were later repeated and
elaborated in Bjørgo’s evidence as an expert witness during the trial.103
The fierce public debate and the professional disagreement among leading
psychiatrists in Norway about Breivik’s mental health led to an uncertainty the court
was uncomfortable with. The judges in the case had also noted that the experienced
staff at Ila Prison, who included one ofNorway’s leading experts on forensic psychiatry,
hadnot observed any signs of psychosis. The judges foundno strong arguments against
getting a second opinion, and inmid-January 2012 the court appointed psychiatrists
Agnar Aspaas and Terje Tørrisen for a second evaluation and report.104
However, this unusual move was not well received by the main parties, by
the defence or the prosecution. The Attorney General and the prosecutors had
already stated that the psychiatric report was ‘very thorough’ and had apparently
committed themselves strongly to its conclusions. They saw no point in having a
second psychiatric assessment. Even if it came to the opposite conclusion, the first
assessment had already established sufficient doubt about Breivik’s mental health
state for the court to have no other option than to sentence him to compulsorymental
health care. The defendant should have the benefit of the doubt, and compulsory
psychiatric treatment was considered lighter than a prison sentence and preventive
detention. Breivik’s attorneys appealed the order for a second psychiatric evaluation
all the way to the High Court, not knowing then that the result of the report would
ultimately become one of their best arguments. The defence lost in the High Court on
15 February, and two days later Lippestad stated that they had abandoned the insanity
plea strategy, and instead were going for a criminally responsible plea.105 By the end
of February the new psychiatric team had initiated a three-week long compulsory
observation period of Breivik, who at this point had decided to cooperate, probably
realising he had nothing to lose.
Another thing to note from this period is that the police team interviewing Breivik
noted a clear shift from early March onwards in the way that he spoke about the
Knights Templar and the compendium.106 He altered the time when he started
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planning the attacks, he changed parts of the terminology he used and he played
down the importance of the Knights Templar during police interrogation.107
In their report delivered on 10 April, less than a week before the trial began, Aspaas
and Tørrisen concluded that Breivik was sane at the time of the attacks; in other words,
that he was not suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and that he was not psychotic
during the attacks. They foundhim tohave a dissocial personality disorder and a narcissistic
personality disorder, and concluded that Breivik was fit for a prison sentence.108 This
report was far better received in the media and amongmost experts.109 Breivik was
said to be ‘satisfied with the findings and had counted on it’.110 He felt, however,
compelled to attune his previous ‘pompous’ posture to these new findings, as became
clear during the first day of his stage performance.
Following the debate after the first report and the appointment of the second
psychiatric evaluation team, the Attorney General and the prosecution could have
changed their strategy. The Attorney General stated they would be open and dynamic
in the process towards the trial, but stuck to the original path of an insanity plea
anyway, partly in order to avoid a delay in the trial.111 Critics claimed that the
prosecutionhad put somuch stock on the first psychiatric assessment and the delusion
plea that it could not afford to change its position.
Breivik’s Performance in Court
Breivik started his first day in court bymaking a form of fascist style salute.112 He
also took an hour for his opening statement (twice the time allocated to him), very
much annoying the lawyers representing the victims. The speech was, however, not as
offensive and far-fetched with regard to its content as what he had earlier produced
for the police and in the remand hearings during the first months after his arrest. For
example, hementioned the Knights Templar network just once during the opening
statement, clearly trying to play down its importance.113 Later during the trial he
continued to downplay the elite impression of the network, although continuing to
claim that it existed.
In general, Breivik tried hard to appear less fanatical and ‘pompous’—that was the
word he used frequently—in the trial than he did earlier in the process, following a
strategy that aimed to avoid being found deluded and sent to the ‘madhouse’. He
explained why he previously had used a more pompous style:
If, let us say, you represent a group and want to communicate in a way that will
optimise the propaganda effect, you communicate in a pompous way. Rather than
telling about four sweaty guys in a cellar, you use other ways to describe it.114
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He openly admitted that what he now said in court was influenced by the fact
that there were four psychiatrists present in the courtroom. He wanted to avoid being
sent to a madhouse.115 He argued that the prosecution wanted to make him look
ridiculous, and he got irritated when titles and uniforms of the kt network were
brought up again and again, as he wanted to play down this dimension.116 He also
admitted that he initially didwant to use the uniform in court, but that he realised
it would be unwise due to the psychiatric assessment.117 In general, Breivik stayed
calm throughout the trial, also during the only sequence with some drama, when
an Iraqi present in the courtroom threw a shoe at him, hitting his assistant defence
attorney.118 One of the few times he did seem disturbed was when victims and their
families stood andmarched out of the courtroomwhen he started giving his closing
statement on 22 June.119 Another rare occasion was early in the trial, when he was
moved to tears as his YouTube filmwas played. According to judge Arntzen, his ability
to keep focus actually proved to be beneficial for him, because seeing his performance
and hearing him speak and argue gave the court valuable information as to whether
he was psychotic or not.120
As described, the psychiatric evaluation and the fear of a delusion verdict were the
main constraining factors for Breivik during the trial process; they are the most likely
explanation for the change of behaviour compared to his posture during the autumn
of 2011. Wemust also remember that Breivik hadmedia access during the trial and
that he could play to that as well.
In court, psychiatric experts testified and debated their findings. One of them,
Professor Ulrik Fredrik Malt, told the court that Breivik did not appear to be suffering
from the kind of delusions or hallucinations that indicate schizophrenia, therewith
refuting the conclusions of the first report. However, he agreed that Breivik could
not be treated as a criminal responsible for his actions. He said that he believed that
‘[Breivik] is suffering from something other than just political extremism’.121 Hearing
this evidence, Breivik was clearly insulted. But at the end of the day when he was
given the opportunity to comment he said that he ‘want[ed] to congratulateMalt
with a well-executed character assassination. At first I thought it was offensive, but
eventually it was just ridiculous.’122 As with others who tried to validate his insanity,
Breivik responded by questioning their professionalism.
Breivik lost much time and energy fighting the insanity charges, which inhibited
his real aim, of presenting himself as a right-wing vanguard in ‘the battle against
Islamism and its defenders’. He felt compelled to upgrade his status as a political
activist by calling upon different far-right activists as witnesses, like Tore Tvedt
(Vigrid Group), Arne Tumyr (Stop Islamisation of Norway) and anti-Islamist blogger
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Fjordman. Through these witnesses the defence tried to demonstrate that Breivik
was not a lone lunatic, but indeed represented a broader current of political extrem-
ism.
It had become apparent that Breivik’s strategy would consist of two intertwined
parts. As described above, the psychiatric inquiry forced him to focus on convincing
people of his sanity. But his primary aim was to convince as many people as possible
to consider the plausibility of the ideas he had described in his manifesto, i.e. to
convince others of the dangers of invading enemyMuslims and the ruling of spineless
multiculturalists.123 In other words, to be viewed as sane—by the judges but also by
the general audience—was an important precondition for using his trial as a stage.
How exactly did he try to use the stage and reach his audience? A central part
of this strategy consisted of repeatedly proclaiming the significance of the (future)
number of adherents to his ideology. This tied in with his manifesto, in which he
had constructed an audience, real or imaginative, to whom he could address his
message. For example, Breivik frequently used the collective ‘we’ in his manifesto,
and during his trial to refer to those who shared his right-wing ideas.124 At the same
time, he portrayed people he disagreed with as ignorant or weak. Breivik’s narrative
offered people an opportunity to belong to an alliance whichwould eventually win the
‘European culture war’. In his final statement in court, Breivik once again appealed to
his imaginary audience of potential supporters and sympathisers. With his statement
of regret—cut short halfway through by an irritated judge Arntzen—he wanted to
apologise to ‘all militant nationalists in Norway and in Europe for not having killed
more traitors’.125
During the trial, Breivik regularly illustrated this point as well. His statements
on, and direct salutations to, the Knights Templar are perhaps the most prominent
examples. This alleged secret and exclusive organisation, with members’ cells all
across Europe, would stand by Breivik’s side and would be responsible for future
attacks. In the letter to Zschäpe he wrote for example:
If it is clear that you are indeed amilitant nationalist that chose to contribute this way
than youwill be regarded in a lot of people’s eyes as a courageous nationalist resistance
hero who did everything you could and sacrificed everything to stopmulticulturalism
and the Islamisation of Germany. […] We are both among the first rain drops which
indicate that there is a massive purifying storm approaching Europe. And within
the next decades more andmore Europeans will acknowledge our sacrifice. Western
European prisons will be filled by anti-communist/anti-Islamic resistance fighters
like us. The treacherous cultural Marxists andmulticulturalists will eventually lose
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this European culture-war. In fact, they have already lost, they don’t know it yet,
because multiculturalism is in fact a self-defeating ideology. We are bothmartyrs
for the conservative revolution and you should be extremely proud of your sacrifice
and efforts. Know your sacrifice is being celebrated in northern-Europe by tens of
thousands of cultural conservatives.126
Breivik presented himself over and over again as the European hero who came to the
rescue on behalf of a suppressed European people. He defended his attacks as the only
way to prevent the Islamisation of the continent, saying he would do it all again,
because he was ‘trying to prevent civil war in Norway in the future. I and others in
Europe are convinced we can avert a major civil war. If we wait another 20–30 years,
ethnic Europeans will be in the minority’. In Breivik’s opinion, his actions were ‘based
on goodness, not evil’,127 and he was acting ‘out of necessity’.128 Breivik acknowledged
that the 22 July attacks were barbarian—but on only a limited scale compared to the
acts of a future civil war as caused by Europe’s inevitable Islamisation. He even went as
far as to describe his deeds as ‘gruesome but necessary’. He had ‘acted against human
nature’, and he apologised for innocent casualties, referring to those without political
connections. He also said that he understood the loss inflicted on the victims’ families,
as he had lost his friends and family after the attack as well.129 At the same time,
however, he did not show any emotion or remorse. During the first days of the trial,
Breivik described his attacks as ‘the most spectacular sophisticated political acts in
Europe since the SecondWorld War’.
Another example of Breivik’s lack of anxiety in court was when he commented on
the possible future verdict on the first day of the trial. In his opinion his trial could
have only two possible outcomes: the death penalty or acquittal. Amaximum sentence
of 21 years would be ‘pathetic’. The only exception to this posture of aloofness was
his breakdown during the projection of the propaganda video he hadmade himself.
When asked why he wept, he replied, ‘Because I think that my country is dying and
that my ethnic group is dying.’130
Although the victims’ and survivors’ lawyers received manymessages of protest
from people who felt Breivik’s statements were extremely offensive, and despite the
fact that the judges tried to limit his rampages, Breivik demanded to continue in order
to explain his motives. His legal counsel Geir Lippestad, acknowledged the victims’
suffering, and understood that they did not want the court to turn into a theatrical
performance. However, the defence team did not inhibit their defendant in voicing
his claims, saying, ‘he has a right as a defendant in Norwegian law to give a statement,
and also a human right’.131
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In his final statement Breivik again reiterated that he did not recognise the court
because of its ‘mandate from political parties that support multiculturalism’. He
added that:
By discardingmy allegations of the principle of necessity and sentencing a representa-
tive of the Norwegian resistance movement you have sided with themulticultural
majority in parliament and therefore you also expressed support for the multicultur-
alist ideology. Since I do not recognise this court I cannot legitimize the Oslo district
court by accepting this sentence. Inmy view this sentence and judgment is illegitimate
and at the same time I cannot appeal against the judgment because by appealing I
would legitimize the court.132
Based on his statements and behaviour in court, Breivik’s performative strategy was
to rebel against the Norwegian judicial system in which he was forced to participate
by means of his own trial. It seems clear therefore that delegitimising this system had
become an integral part of his right-wing extremist communications.
Breivik’s Strategy: A ‘Self-evaluation’
After describing some features of the trial, it is interesting to have a look at what
Breivik wrote in his compendium about trial proceedings and defence attorneys.
There he states that a trial is an excellent opportunity and a well-suited arena the
Justiciar Knight can use to propagate his case.133 As such, he clearly sees the court as a
theatre, where the defendant is playing the key role with a unique opportunity to
present his ideology and views to a wider audience. In the compendium, Breivik is
quite detailed about how the defendant should behave and present demands to the
court, presenting the audience with a given scenario, and in so doing prepare both
enemies and the public for what lies ahead, in what he describes as a not too distant
future.134 He especially gives a great deal of attention to the opening statement and
the closing statement, and he provides ready-to-use scripts that any ultra-nationalist
could use if arrested.135
Breivik also devoted more than two pages to finding the right defence attorney for
a trial, stressing that the defendant should reject any appointed public attorney and
search for a patriotic-oriented one.136 He lists three primary tasks with regard to what
to expect from a well-suited defence attorney:137
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1. Willingness to facilitate you logistically.
2. Willingness to facilitate you ideologically.
3. Willingness to facilitate you to build a case against the regime.
As described, Breivik’s priority was to find a lawyer who shared his ideas and ideology,
rather than focusing on professional skills. He acknowledged that finding such a
lawyer might be difficult, but emphasised that it was absolutely necessary in order to
achieve a proper defence.
This begs the question: did Breivik himself act in accordance with the com-
pendium? In some ways he did and in some ways he did not. First of all, even after
declaring that he did not recognise the legitimacy of the court in itself, the de-
fendant gave a great deal of attention to the proceedings, was well prepared for
the meetings, following every sequence closely and made use of his right to com-
ment on statements made by witnesses and expert witnesses. He used the opening
and closing statement rounds as expected, but the content was not the same as
in the compendium, but rather adjusted to his situation. As such, the static and
descriptive nature of the manuscripts in the compendium did not work, due to
the dynamics of the trial. It is like wars, they tend to take on a life of their own
when first set in motion. Likewise, he did not foresee that he would have to con-
centrate on avoiding a delusion verdict, and this constrained him significantly in
court.
Secondly, Breivik also recommended in his compendium appointing a defence
attorney who endorses the defendant’s political agenda. Indeed, Lippestad performed
his duty as a defence attorney in a highly professional manner, actually receiving a
good deal of public credit for his handling of the difficult task, even from the surviving
victims and familymembers. Verymuch so because he did not defend the actions
of the perpetrator, but focused on his legal rights in a clinical fashion, in order to
uphold the values of a society governed by law and justice—precisely the values Breivik
tried to defeat. In other words, Breivik did not at all get the collaborating type of
lawyer he described and recommended in his compendium. The only thing that
really corresponded is that he could choose his own lawyer, but the irony was, as
mentioned earlier, that Lippestad turned out to be an active member of the Labour
Party.
Another irony: one of Breivik’s first demands when he was arrested at Utøya was
that torture and the death penalty should be reinstated inNorway. A couple ofmonths
after he started serving his prison term, he complained about the prison conditions,
among other things that he had to write with a soft rubber pen. According to him,
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this pen he was given was ‘an almost indescribable manifestation of sadism’, and that
it represented a breach of the European Convention onHuman Rights and the un
Convention against Torture.138
11.5.3. The Verdict
As for the court itself, presiding judge Arntzen kept the leash tight from day one,
signalling authority over the courtroom and the parties. She continued to do so for
the duration of the trial and succeeded in keeping an independent and objective
position, not afraid of correcting or asking critical questions to any of the parties
involved, including correcting themedia. Her firm and focused performance probably
contributed to the public acceptance of the trial process and final verdict and
sentencing as being just and credible.
The court found Breivik guilty of the attacks carried out on 22 July. He was
sentenced to 21 years’ preventive detention in August 2012, with 10 years minimum. In
practice this sentence of 21 years may mean that Breivik will be in prison for the rest
of his life. His sentence will be reviewed for the first time after ten years but could
last his life out ( forvaring: preventive detention) if he is still deemed to be a danger to
society, in which case a sentence can be extended every five years. There is no limit to
the number of times the five-year timeframe can be extended. In general, detention
can be prolonged by an unlimited number of additional five-year periods as long as
the court finds that the convicted person still constitutes a danger to society. In the
end, Anders Behring Breivik got the result he hoped for, as his status as a political
militant was confirmed, and he avoided the ‘madhouse’ he feared. It was not an option
for him to appeal, since he would then risk a different outcome in a subsequent trial.
Accordingly, he had to forego a second chance to hold an ideological show-down in
court.
11.6. Outside the Courtroom and the Aftermath of the Trial
De Graaf has argued that terrorism trials offer an exceptional opportunity for
understanding and countering terrorism, because they are the only place where
all actors involved meet: terrorists, state representatives, the judiciary, the audience,
surviving victims, terrorist sympathisers, etc.139 Furthermore, the media will analyse
and broadcast their performances. As a nexus of terrorism violence, law enforcement
and public opinion, terrorism trials thus offer an ideal opportunity to showcase justice
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in progress and demonstrate how the laws of the country deal with terrorist suspects.
A trial provides a theatre, inviting various actors to play out their roles and convince
andmobilise the public to advance their narratives of (in)justice.
The judicial objectives refer to the classic principles of a fair trial: doing justice
and upholding the rule of law, as laid down in the two penal goals of 1) rehabilitation,
2) prevention140—and the three informal goals of a trial: 3) truth finding, 4) re-
establishing stability in society and restoring the democratic rule of law and 5)
providing the need for closure. There are many reasons for this research to focus on
the ‘performative effect’—particularly the various performances of the actors in the
courtroom—on public opinion. Breivik’s trial provided himwith a global stage and
was amedia spectacle which involved andmobilisedmany Norwegians as well as
spectators abroad.
It would therefore be relevant not only tomap the strategies of different actors,
but also to investigate how these strategies affected the copingmechanisms in society.
Coping is defined as the thoughts and behaviour that people use to manage the
internal and external demands of situations that are appraised as stressful.141 Coping
is a complex, multidimensional process that is sensitive to the environment and its
demands and resources, to personality dispositions that influence the appraisal of
stress and resources for coping, and the relationship between these. A trial is thought to
assist coping mechanisms as it is a means of truth finding; it also helps to re-establish
stability and helps those involved to come to terms with the legal offence perpetrated.
It is thus justified to explore how a trial like this affects copingmechanisms within
the public domain. The Breivik trial is an excellent example to test this hypothesis as
it was clear from the start what happened, how it happened and who the perpetrator
was. For research purposes, the public space was narrowed down to the participants
present in and around the courtroom in Oslo during the days before and after the
trial.142
First, for this chapter, quantitative research was undertaken by distributing
surveys inquiring about people’s opinions and attitudes towards the Breivik trial. The
surveys were distributed on the streets of Oslo for two days, 23 and 25 August 2012,
the day before and the day after the final verdict in the trial.143 The total number of
respondents was 246 of which 124 (50 per cent) were female and 91 (37 per cent) were
male (the remaining 13 per cent did not specify gender). The participants’ average age
was 30 and they were approached at several locations: in a central square in Oslo, at a
subway station, at the central railway station, in amall, in a park and on the campus of
Oslo University. Qualitative interviews with parties directly involved in the trial, such
as victims, expert witnesses, members of the 22 July Commission,144 which was set up
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to review and learn from the attacks, and journalists were also conducted. We selected
these respondents based upon their expertise either from our own networks or via
a snowball-samplingmethodology. During these interviews, a number of general
questions relating to the strategies in court and the effects of the trial on society were
asked.
Those surveyed were asked to indicate whether they were present at Utøya or
in Oslo or whether they knew friends/family who were present (most involved) or
whether they learned about the attacks through themedia (least involved) to establish
their level of involvement. The results indicate how intensely penetrating the Breivik
attacks were for the respondents in our sample. But also from amacro perspective:
a country with a relatively small population (5 million) had to deal with so many
people being killed (77) or injured (242) in the attacks. The responses indicate that
many people in our sample personally knew someone who was present at and/or
suffered as a result of the attacks.
11.6.1. Perceptions regarding the Prosecution’s Strategy
The respondents in our sample did not appear to accept the prosecution’s insanity plea
strategy: a large proportion of the respondents disagreed with the idea that Breivik
should receive psychiatric treatment instead of a prison sentence (see table 11.1).
Agree Disagree
I believe Breivik is sane. 24 per cent 42 per cent
I believe Breivik is accountable. 60 per cent 30 per cent
I agree with the prosecution’s strategy 16 per cent 59 per cent
Table 11.1. Opinion on Breivik’s sanity/Accountability
In an interview with journalist BenMcPherson, editor of the newspaper The Foreigner,
prosecutor Bejer Engh responded to this public sentiment by saying that she
understood that people had strong feelings about how to react to Breivik, but that the
prosecution’s strategy needed to relate to the Norwegian legal framework: ‘Otherwise
he’s won. And you know, hewanted to changeNorwegian society and I’m sure he’d feel
it was a victory if we gave up our principles. Right at the moment we’re being tested—
can we hold on to our principles?’145 She also suggested that even though many
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Norwegians disagreed with the prosecutors about how Breivik should be punished,
that should not influence their work, saying, ‘then we could just as easily have put it
to a public vote’.146 Therefore, selling this idea to the public had become a part of the
strategy. Bejer Engh, one of the prosecutors, argued, ‘We havemurderers who have
been sentenced to a psychiatric facility who will probably never get out again.’147 The
prosecutors, however, also emphasised that they were committed to human rights
and that serious doubt as to a defendant’s mental health should not lead to a prison
sentence. The prosecution thus stuck to their argument that Breivik was a delusional
lone operator and should be convicted accordingly.
The prosecutors felt that they had sufficiently responded to the victims’ needs
and the gravity of the attacks by positioning the victims’ stories centrally in their
arguments. Although 59 per cent of the respondents didnot agreewith the prosecutors’
final argument (the insanity plea), an impressive 74 per cent of the participants
surveyed indicated they felt the general prosecutors functioned well.
In short, when relating the prosecution’s strategy back to the goals of a fair trial, it
can be argued that the prosecution adhered to the goal of truth finding, spending
much time reconstructing Breivik’s crimes. Concerning the goal of retribution, an
interesting tension emerged: in a way, trying to have Breivik declared insane and sent
to amental institution would have been ‘the ultimate humiliation’, as Breivik himself
admitted. Thus, the insanity strategy could have served the goal of retribution in
the sense that Breivik would have received exactly what he did not want. However,
Norwegian society strongly objected to the insanity claim andmost people felt Breivik
knew exactly what he was doing when he carried out his acts and therefore deserved
the longest sentence possible, carrying full responsibility for his actions. As for the
goal of restoring social peace, the prosecution seemed not to consider this, given the
widespread objection in Norwegian society to the insanity plea strategy. However,
regarding thegoal ofupholding thedemocratic rule of law, theprosecution’s adherence
to fair trial standards was shared and respected by themajority of the respondents
in our sample. In the end, the collective feeling was that despite the prosecution’s
strategy, the trial itself and the way in which Breivik was treated were the ultimate
counter-narrative to Breivik’s acts of violence.
11.6.2. Perception of Breivik’s Strategy
The survey asked participants whether they thought the media paid too much,
enough or too little attention to Breivik during the. The results (see table 11.2)
indicate that most people in this research felt that the media paid enough attention
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to Breivik’s perspective. Nonetheless, almost a third of respondents felt they paid too
much attention to his perspective.
Themedia paid …
Too little attention 0 per cent
Little attention 2 per cent
Enough attention 32 per cent
Much attention 35 per cent
Toomuch attention 31 per cent
Table 11.2. Opinion on the media
attention to Breivik’s perspective
One specific response to Breivik’s performative strategy was the reaction of the public
in the square in front of the court building. During the trial, many people gathered to
sing the Rainbow Song,148 a song that Breivik had referred to in court as an example of
howNorwegian studentswere being brainwashed byMarxist propaganda.149Displays
of collective mourning and the direct response by the general public to Breivik’s
statements during the trial also demonstrated the involvement of the Norwegian
public in the trial. This could be interpreted as society trying to send amessage to
the government, Breivik and his possible (future) followers. It seemed to stress, in
line with the argument put forward by PrimeMinister Jens Stoltenberg, the need for
a democratic response to the attacks. Similarly, the survey indicated that respondents
wanted a structured and inclusive debate about theNorwegian democratic system and
refuted the exclusion of certain extremist groups from society or from public debate.
Breivik’s aim to use the trial to further his own extremist motives was recognised
by the public present in and outside the courtroom. Throughout the trial, the amount
of time Breivik was given to make his own statements was a contested issue in the
Norwegianmedia. The discussion centred on the possible effect: it could both inspire
and put off potential followers or adherents to right-wing extremism. The copycat
effect of Breivik’s performative strategy became apparent in the aftermath of the trial
when a series of events were in one way or another connected to Breivik. First of all,
Breivik’s manifesto was translated intomany languages, including Russian, Dutch
and German. Also, 13 months after Breivik’s attacks, a ‘Russian Breivik’ was arrested
in Moscow for shooting and killing six colleagues and releasing a hate manifesto
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online.150 Only a week later, a 29-year-oldman in the Czech Republic was charged
over a Breivik-style plot, using the name Breivik online and planning amajor attack
with explosives.151 InNovember of that same year, Polish authorities arrested a radical
nationalist who was planning to blow up the Polish parliament building and who
linked himself to Breivik.152
Finally, Breivik received many love letters,153 as well as correspondence and
drawings from children.154 In a letter he wrote to Tania, a woman who had written to
him, he says, ‘A lot of people around the world have expressed their support for me, in
summary, I have received over 250 letters, most of which are bills, lol [laughing out
loud, social media speak]. About 60% of the letters is positive, 10% is from people who
want me to find Jesus, and 30% from those who hate me.’155
However, overall it seems Breivik’s propaganda has led to different outcomes.
Major newspapers rejected his articles, and several anti-Islamic ideologues he admired,
such as Peder Are Nøstvold Jensen (known as Fjordman), refused his proposals
for cooperation.156 Also, rather than inspiring a new generation of followers or
sparking a far-right-extremist revolution in Europe, his public performance during
the trial appears to have had the opposite effect. Although European white nationalist
movements, of which Breivik represents an extreme fringe, have been on the rise in
recent years, the popular backlash against Breivik and his ideology has put them on
the defensive. Far-right movements such as the English Defence League denied links
to Breivik and dismissed any alleged ideological connections or overlap.157 When
far-right parties held a mass rally in Denmark in April 2012, opposing protesters
actually outnumbered them.158
Finally, the trial was viewed bymany as not sending Breivik’smessage but, instead,
effectively demonstrating the quality of the Norwegian criminal justice system to the
world. Professor ThomasMathiesen of Oslo University was quoted as saying that ‘the
Norwegian system is not about revenge, but sober, dignified treatment’ of even the
worst criminals.159
In short, Breivik’s performative strategy was immediately recognised as such and
vehemently rejected by society at large. The singing of the Rainbow Song and national
discussion in themedia regarding the amount of attention focussed on Breivik during
the trial underscored and defended the importance the Norwegian people ascribe to
the democratic system and the rule of law. Both respect for a fair trial, as a cornerstone
to a functioning democratic system, and for an inclusive debate demonstrated the
Norwegian public’s prioritisation of the judicial goals of stabilisation and upholding
the democratic rule of law,muchmore than a plain yearning for retribution or general
prevention.
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11.6.3. The Breivik Trial as a CopingMechanism?
How has the trial helped the Norwegian people present in and outside the courtroom
in coping with the grief and stress caused by Breivik’s attacks?
Our questionnaire asked which goals of a fair trial people find important, and
whether they feel these were attained in the Breivik trial. The hypothesis is that if
an important goal has been attained by the trial that this then may have helped
respondents to cope better. The goals listed in the survey were more detailed than
the five classical (formal and informal) goals of criminal justice with additional
specifications added:
1. Revenge;
2. Preventing the suspect from committing another crime (specific prevention);
3. Preventing others from committing such a crime (general prevention);
4. Truth-finding;
5. Enabling all the involved parties to present their perspectives;
6. Restoring stability in society;
7. Reaffirming the rule of law and democratic values; and
8. Providing closure.
The outcomes are presented in table 11.3.
Important Attained
Revenge 8 per cent 4 per cent
Prevention 75 per cent 56 per cent
Symbolic function 56 per cent 22 per cent
Truth finding 49 per cent 39 per cent
Present perspectives 40 per cent 49 per cent
Restore stability 43 per cent 29 per cent
Democratic values 61 per cent 57 per cent
Provide closure 56 per cent 44 per cent
Table 11.3. Judicial goals: important and attained
performing justice, copingwith trauma: the trial of anders breivik, 2012 | 487
One interesting result is the very small number of 18 participants (8 per cent) who
viewed revenge as an important goal in a fair trial. Even though revenge, or retribution,
is one of the classical goals upon which criminal justice in the Western world is
based, it appears that for most of the participants in this research, this judicial goal
was not that important. Laila Bokhari, a member of the 22 July Commission160 that
investigated the Breivik attacks and the government’s performance, commented upon
this lack of a perceived need for revenge in Norwegian society:
If you look at the wording in court from the victims, it is not about him [Breivik] or
about revenge. In a sense, this is not about Breivik himself. People do not want him to
have a role in society. The word revenge has very seldom come out. So retribution in
this trial is not so much about revenge, but more about putting back what is right
and wrong and focussing on how can we prevent something like this from happening
again in the future. And that is also part, I think, of the copingmechanism: looking
forward, and not looking back.161
Specific prevention (preventing Breivik from committing another crime) and demo-
cratic values (restoring the rule of law and democratic values) were viewed as the
most important goals of a fair trial. The latter was also confirmed by many of the
interviewees. In general, the trial itself was viewed as society’s answer to Breivik’s
(undemocratic) principles and worldview. Most participants (57 per cent) felt that the
goal of upholding democratic values through the trial had been achieved. The trial
ended with a verdict that declared Breivik sane and legally responsible for his acts. He
was sentenced to 21 years in prison but with a ‘preventive detention’ clause allowing
for his time in jail to be extended as long as he is deemed a threat to society.
Regarding general prevention, the trial also served an important purpose. On a
(inter-)national policy level, the developments and the concerns relating to ‘lone-
wolf ’ terrorists like Breivik revealed the need for serious scrutiny of national security
strategies. The 22 July Commission had already concluded before the end of the trial
that ‘All in all, 22 July revealed serious shortfalls in society’s emergency preparedness
and ability to avert threats […] The challenges turned out to be ascribable to leadership
and communication to a far greater extent than to the lack of response personnel.’162
The idea that (right-wing) lone wolf terrorism posed a new serious threat led to an
increased emphasis, both inside and outside Norway, on communication in times of
crisis, the monitoring of right-wing extremists, but also on the policies that relate to
the purchasing and possessing of certain accessories that could be used for terrorist
attacks. Janne Kristiansen, former head of the Police Security Service—Norway’s
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domestic intelligence branch—said that Breivik represented a new paradigm, ‘A lone
wolf who has been very intent on staying under the radar of the security services by
leading a lawful life’, adding that the unconnected terrorist is ‘one of their biggest
worries’.163 In the United Kingdom, public figures like Home Secretary Theresa
May and one of the founders of the Centre for Fascist, Anti-Fascist and Post-Fascist
Studies at Teesside University, Matthew Feldman, highlighted the growing threat of a
Breivik-style attack in Britain. May stated that there had been an ‘increased focus
on Right-wing groups in the last year or so, particularly since the Breivik incident
in Norway. […] It’s still the case that we’re likely to see a lone actor on the basis of
Right-wing extremism.’164 Feldman concluded that someone like Anders Breivik will
be on the radar ‘sooner or later’.165
However, themost important goal the trial appeared to serve in the eyes of the
respondents—something corroborated by reporting in the media—was the goal of
closure, closely connected to the trial as a symbol for the defence of the Norwegian
democratic system. One of the interviewees, Laila Bokhari, said:
There has been a lot of discussion in themedia whether Breivik’s trial was actually
preventing or inspiring others and about the role themedia has played. What words
did they use to describe him, what pictures did they show, etc. In a way, a lot of people
argued that just by hearing his words, hewould actually fall fromhis platformbecause
everyone could see for themselves that his statements do not make sense. At the same
time, there has been a rising awareness that we as citizens need to be engaged in that
discussion, in themedia, in political parties, in youth groups, to counter his principles.
For example: he used the children’s song, the Rainbow Song, to show his disgust with
multiculturalism and what was our reaction? Everyonemet up in the square and sang
that song. Maybe that is a crazy thing for people to do but I think it is also part of our
copingmechanism and saying: ok, we have given him his platform but at the same
time, that demands us to be active citizens and respond to his views.166
So, the trial did produce closure, but did not end the debate. Some open questions as
to the quality of the Norwegian approach to right-wing extremism and terrorism
remained.
First of all, several experts on right-wing extremism pointed to Breivik’s growing
status of hero within right-wing extremists groups, especially if he were allowed
to communicate his ideas by writing books and corresponding with like-minded
extremists from his prison cell. For example, this was illustrated by the praise Breivik
received during a neo-Nazi march in Germany167 and at several right-wing extremist
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festivals.168 Breivik indeed continued to communicate from his cell. Various letters
sent from his prison cell to sympathisers have been published,169 and in February
2013 he filed a complaint over the prison conditions, which he said were akin to
‘aggravated torture’—prolonged isolation, limited time outside his cell and lack of
movement opportunities.170 From a performative perspective this could be explained
as an attempt to fuel support for his case from other right-wing extremists.
Secondly, on a (inter-)national policy level, the developments and the concerns
about lone wolf terrorists like Breivik revealed the need for serious scrutiny of national
security strategies. In the short run, justice minister Knut Storberget and chief of
security services (pst) Janne Kristiansen, both in charge at the time, resigned—but
for reasons other than their responsibilities for the 22 July failures. In the longer
run, the trial, its ensuing discussions and conclusions led to an increased emphasis,
both inside and outside Norway, on effective crisis communications, the monitoring
of right-wing extremists, but also on the policies that relate to the purchasing and
possession of certain materials and substances that can be used for preparing terrorist
attacks. One example is the European regulation which obliges citizens to obtain a
permit for purchasingmaterials like fertiliser and nail polish remover that could be
used for making explosives.171 The risk of right-wing extremism, or other brands of
lone wolf terrorism, was placed higher on the political agenda, but at the same time
many feared that the outcome of this renewed political interest could have a major
impact on their privacy and personal freedoms.
11.7. Conclusion
This chapter analysed how the Breivik trial was used by the parties involved to further
their performative strategies. All in all, Breivik and his defence team achieved only
partial success. The defendant avoided being sent for compulsory mental health
treatment andmanaged to regain his position as a militant activist (terrorist). To
some extent he was also able to use the courtroom as a stage, but in amore limited
way than he initially thought would be possible. Breivik also missed the opportunity
for a second trial show, as he then again would run the risk of being sentenced to
compulsorymental health treatment. This illustrates that the static strategy regarding
trials and defence procedures prepared in Breivik’s compendium did not foresee the
dynamics of a terrorist trial.
The prosecution apparently put toomuch stock on the first psychiatric report, and
did not adjust its strategy significantly in the months before or during the trial. The
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prosecution’s firm stance did not lead to a conviction in accordance with their primary
view, but at the same time the prosecutors did acknowledge in their closing statement
the difficult nature of the case and that there were numerous complicating factors to
take into consideration. They claimed they were in serious doubt about his sanity and
this doubt necessitated that they went for an insanity verdict. Regarding forensic
psychiatry, the court clearly put more trust in the second report. An extensive debate
on the subject ensued, both inside and outside the professional circles of psychiatry
and psychology.
In our survey, we also asked how these strategies related to classical judicial goals,
how this relationshipwasperceivedwithinNorwegian society andhowthe trial helped
society in coming to terms with what had happened on 22 July. It can be concluded
that the trial did indeed influence the copingmechanisms of our respondents in a
positive way and that most viewed the trial as part of their answer to Breivik’s acts,
perceiving the trial as a counter-narrative to Breivik’s story. Overall, the trial was
viewed as an example of a quality performance of justice and as a trial that focussed on
the democratic values of Norwegian society—contrary to Breivik’s values. One survey
respondent summarised this in the following words, ‘Don’t let one terrorist take our
rights.’172 Paradoxically, Norwegians largely supported the prosecution’s strategy,
with the major proviso that they did not want Breivik to be declared insane.
The prosecution’s strategy to try and have Breivik declared insane and be sent
to a mental institution provoked a variety of reactions in Norwegian society and
revealed a tension between the prosecution’s strategy and the goals of retribution
and/or truth-finding. As Breivik himself had said, having him declared insane would
have been ‘the ultimate humiliation’, and therefore that strategy could have served
the goal of retribution in the sense that Breivik would have received exactly what
he did not want. However, despite the prosecution’s strategy, the collective feeling
was that the trial itself was fair, as was the way in which Breivik was treated—this
being the ultimate answer to Breivik’s acts. In spite of their diverging opinions, the
prosecution’s adherence to fair trial standards was respected by themajority of the
respondents to this research. Norway’s open and respectful attitude was reflected in
the respondents’ views on the importance of judicial goals: prevention and democratic
goals were seen as the most important objectives of the trial, while rehabilitation was
the least important goal for the respondents. The reaction of media around the world
to the trial and in particular to the prosecutor’s handshake with Breivik showed that
Norwaymay be a unique country in this respect.
Breivik’s strategies received widespread attention in the media: both the defence’s
initial plea for insanity, to escape a lengthy prison sentence, and his strategy to
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escape the insanity label in order to be perceived as a rational role model for right-
wing extremists were covered by newsmedia. Many (international) commentators
questioned whether Breivik exerted too much communicative power during the trial.
A substantial number of our respondents (37 per cent) agreed that Breivik received
toomuch attention—in terms both of the amount of time he was given to present
his perspective in court and the attention he received from themedia. On the other
hand, many respondents felt that this attention did not elevate his status, but in fact
undermined his position in the sense that anyone could now see that his statements
were incoherent and nonsensical, as Laila Bokhari has argued. These results again
show thatNorwegians trusted that Breivik’s opinionswould be overruled bymoderate
opinions and behaviour, leading terrorism researcher Tore Bjørgo to say in an overall
assessment of the trial that ‘we don’t think that the trial has or will produce copy-cats,
but we hope that it will instead produce copy-cat trials’.173
The influence of a criminal trial on coping is a highly under-researched topic
in general, but the influence of a terrorism trial on coping with the initial attack is
a virtually unexplored issue. Our survey provides some preliminary evidence for a
positive relationship between a fair trial—with respect to classical judicial standards—
and copingmechanisms in society. When focussing on individuals, a mild positive
influence was found: 32 per cent of the interviewees responded that the trial helped
them to cope better with their feelings. This might constitute an under-estimation
because people are not aware of a direct positive influence of the trial on their feelings,
whilst a negative impact would probably have caused amuch higher negative result. It
canbe concluded, therefore, that a fair and transparent trialwith enoughopportunities
for all actors to demonstrate their viewpoints is a necessary condition for strong coping
mechanisms in society. However, more research is needed to verify these preliminary
findings.
All in all, the Breivik trial could be considered a ‘performance of justice’, in the
broadest, not just formal, but also social sense of the word. As Bokhari points out:
It helped us in the process of understanding what really happened. It put things in
perspective. In one way the trial gives Norwegian society a chance to show its values
as a response to Breivik and in another way it gives people a chance to understand,
gain insight and deal with what happened. In a way we have been forced to ask—and
answer—the question of guilt.174
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12. Conclusion
Beatrice de Graaf 1
In this volume, the intricacies of various terrorism trials have been reconstructed
and analysed at various levels of depth and from a performative perspective. The idea
of looking at terrorism trials as quasi-theatrical performances has led to new insights
with regard to both terrorist and counterterrorist performances and strategies in
the courtroom. Yet to adhere to performative, or even theatrical concepts remains
an uneasy undertaking to those who are accustomed to unquestioningly accepting
existing communicative frames of reference, or to seeing ‘the law’ and ‘courts’ as
solemn institutions and not as objects of lawfare and subject to performance. At the
end of this volume, some reflections on the contested nature of communicatice
frames and performative aspects of terrorism trials are offered. First, the widespread
unease of governments to put terrorists on trial needs to be addressed. Second, a
tentative outline of a typology of terrorism trials will be presented whichmay serve as
a stepping-stone for further research in this field. This tentative typology is developed,
to gain deeper insight into how terrorism trials are perceived as and configured
into socially and politically relevant categories, leaving aside for the moment the
legal questions involved. Since this volume is not intended as a contribution to
legal theory, but written from a historic-political perspective on the phenomenon
of terrorism trials, this approach might benefit from further categorising and
operationalising.
12.1. Why the Unease?
Seeing performative acts in trial as a performance and identifying communicative
strategies requires a specific mindset. In carrying out this research project and
interviewing various actors involved in terrorism trials, the editors and authors
initially were often confronted with scepticism or even resistance to this approach.
This reluctance can be explained by pointing to the unease regarding the question of
putting terrorists on trial under civilian, criminal law. Why are governments often
not at ease with the idea of putting terrorists before civilian courts?
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In the us, after President Barack Obama expressed his preference for trials in
federal civilian courts and promised to close down the Guantánamomilitary tribunals
in 2009, congressional obstruction forced him to back down from this decision. In
early March 2011, the White House announced that it would resumemilitary trials for
detainees at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. ‘I strongly believe that the American system of
justice is a key part of our arsenal in the war against al Qaida and its affiliates, and
we will continue to draw on all aspects of our justice system—including (federal)
courts—to ensure that our security and our values are strengthened’, Obama stated.2
Yet, congressional concern relating to the security risks involved in these terrorism
trials, given that detainees would have to be transferred to and tried in the ‘homeland’,
prevailed.3 Former Vice-President Cheney’s objection to such trials has already been
mentioned in the opening chapter of this volume. In theWall Street Journal, columnist
James Taranto also invoked the association of a ‘show trial’, although he was more
nuanced: ‘These trials will differ from an ordinary show trial in that the process will
be fair even though the verdict is predetermined.’ However, even if it were a fair trial
with just formal proceedings, it would nevertheless contain an element of show:
‘The answer seems to be that the administration is conducting a limited number of
civilian trials of high-profile terrorists for show, so as to win “credibility” with the
international left.’4
Taranto was right in at least one regard: even with legality intact, terrorism
trials are highly likely to turn into a spectacle, because either the prosecution or
the defendants or both cannot resist adopting communicative strategies (compare
the chapters on Breivik and the raf in this volume for example). As indicated
above, the outcome of the first trial against Guantánamo ‘ghost prisoner’ Ahmed
Khalfan Ghailani sparked off a similar debate. Not the final verdict as such, but
the use of civilian courts in combating terrorism, became heavily contested. The
opposition argued that terrorists should never be granted civilian trials, with all the
communicative space and security risks involved, but should be treated and detained
as military prisoners. The administration, on the other hand, claimed that the system
had shown that a terrorist could be convicted even after a judge excluded evidence
gained by coercive interrogations during the Bush administration and by acquitting
one defendant on a number of related charges. The sentencemeted out—20 years—was
probably even stiffer than amilitary court would have given.
In response to this case, Jack Goldsmith, a high-ranking Justice Department
official during the Bush administration, argued that the verdict showed that terrorism
suspects should be held without any trial at all, not even amilitary one. Indefinite
military detention, he said, ‘is a tradition-sanctioned, Congressionally authorised,
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court-blessed, resource-saving, security-preserving, easier-than-trial option for long-
term terrorist incapacitation. And this morning it looks more appealing than ever.’5
Since the attacks of 9/11, this new line of thinking became dominant amongst
executives and was reinvigorated after every new attack and in the wake of military
campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq.6 There is a certain logic to it: in war prisoners
are usually held until the end of the war, and since the war Al Qaeda declared on the
United States twice in the second half of the 1990s is continuing, release would be
premature and, in the case of proven charges of war crimes, might result in a military
court verdict rather than release at the end of the war.
The tendency to resort to measures other than criminal law is not solely reserved
for us officials. In the Netherlands, for instance, the government arranged for other
measures in dealing with terrorism than through criminal law alone. Dutch gov-
ernment officials may pick and choose whether they apply intelligence measures
(observation), immigration law, control orders and other administrative law in-
struments (or a combination thereof) before deciding whether or not a criminal
investigation should be pursued.7
The explanation for governments’ unease regarding civilian terrorism trials is
twofold. First of all, one has to consider the element of risk in relation to the outcome
of the trial. In performative language, this is the aspect of unpredictability and
spontaneity involved in so-called ‘simultaneous dramaturgy’ settings, implying
‘techniques designed to involve spectators in a scene without requiring their physical
presence onstage.’8 From the executive’s perspective—which is often dominated by
national security considerations—handing the suspect over to an independent court
is a risky business. Terrorist suspects can be acquitted, sometimes not because they
are innocent but because certain crucial pieces of evidence are deemed inadmissible,
as was the case in the Ghailani trial. This risk cannot be excluded, at least not at the
cost of turning the trial into a farce for the government. This element of uncertainty
runs against the grain of the principal goal of counter-terrorism actors: eliminating
the terrorist threat. Thus, the executive’s rationale behind an à la carte treatment of
terrorists lies not in contempt for criminal law, but in the priority given to other
(legal) obligations, such as protecting the right to life and the security of the citizen.
This weighing of rights is known as the balance or proportionality response thesis; notable
politicians and scholars such as Michael Ignatieff assume that in order to protect
security public interest must be weighed against human rights. If this means that the
rights of terror suspects are suspended or restricted, according to him that is just
an unfortunate side-effect of protecting national security.9 Critics such as the 2009
Eminent Jurists Panel in its report on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human
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Rights, however, contend that this suspension of terrorists’ rights normalises the state
of exception—thereby one-sidedly strengthening executive powers—and pleaded for
reasserting the value of the criminal justice system, especially in the case of citizens’
rights.10
A second explanation for a government’s difficulty with relying on criminal law
in dealing with terrorists is the fact that the courtroom trial may turn into a ‘political
show’, with the terrorists dominating the scene or even succeeding in breaking
existing communicative frames and presenting new ones. Themain functions of the
criminal justice system are exerting social control, settling disputes and confirming
society’s norms.11 Counter-terrorism verdicts, however, do not necessarily affirm
society’s shared values. Many terror suspects come fromminority groups that oppose
a government they consider oppressive; they are not likely to perceive criminal law or
its implementation by the judiciary as neutral or legitimate at all. Their (perception
of) truth cannot simply be ‘tried away’ in court. Take for example the trial against
NelsonMandela. During the Apartheid regime in South Africa, NelsonMandela, who
publicly supported violent political struggle, was labelled a terrorist partly due to
his conviction in 1964 for conspiracy. Although the trial ended in a legal victory for
the prosecution, it was a political disaster for the regime in the court of national and
international public opinion. The trial was a communicative defeat; it undermined
the legal basis of the adjudication, and even that of the government’s legitimacy as
such. This is exactly what governments are afraid of: although criminal law may
serve immediate political ends (detaining political opponents by sentencing them as
terrorists), the intermediate and long-term communicative and political effects can
be unforeseeable and potentially devastating. Given the possibility of these kinds of
deferred aversive consequences, the element of risk once again enters the courtroom.
Mandela’s trial became a show of injustice; its reverberations undermined the political
credibility and legitimacy of the Apartheid regime, although it managed to survive
for nearly three more decades.12
The events resulting in the killing of Osama bin Laden underscore the salience of
these two points. Indeed, governments are in most cases uneasy about staging major
terrorism trials, both because of the security risks and due to the unpredictable
communicative ‘show’ element involved. At the same time, this show element
is sometimes consciously used by the prosecuting authorities themselves as an
opportunity to showcase to the world that the rule of law has been upheld. Under
the right conditions of legality and with adequate performative strategies, terrorism
trials (like any other trial) confirm the underlying communicative mode of rules and
procedures, and thusmay result in a triumph of justice. We will come to this later,
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but first it is necessary to explore what the ‘show’ element in terrorism trials actually
entails and how this element relates to the concept of ‘show trials’, a category loaded
with heavy historical associations.
12.2. The ‘Show Element’ in Criminal Trials
In this volume we have introduced the concepts of lawfare and performativity (to
be defined below) to enable a broader perspective to be taken on the legal, but also
social and political implications of a terrorism trial. This is warranted since ‘the
Law’ is in itself broader than a mere summary of legal norms and principles; it
incorporates, amongst other things, social norms, values, power relations and social
processes—and offers a constitutive communicative framework in disseminating
these. Then, by applying law, one sets in motion a communicative process. In the
words of Mark van Hoecke, a legal scholar, ‘Law cannot any more be correctly
understood within a paradigm of one-dimensional rationality. […] The dramatic
rise of complexity, both of law and of society, havemade such a scheme obsolete.’13
Many legal theorists of the twentieth century held that facts and norms could be
separated, but this positivist view of the law has come under attack.14 Acknowledging
today’s multi-layered, complex, but also vulnerable societies has unearthed the
weakness of a purely positivist approach to law.15 Law is not (solely) about sifting facts
from opinions or about establishing objective truth; it is also about social control,
communication and the perception of social norms. Trials are one instance in which
the broader public can see law in action. Trials communicate that law is not just
in the books but is implemented in practice. In the narrowest perspective, courts
interpret and apply legal rules. Yet by doing so they contribute to strengthening
certain concepts of justice and inculcate norms and standards to the general public.
In addition, by enforcing the law, courts are linked to the state’s legitimacy as
well as to the elaboration of policy goals.16 Trials thus communicate publicly
and ceremonially to society what a state’s norms and principles are (or ought to
be).17
The law in action is a communicative process, but at the same time also offers a
framework with which to interpret human actions and communication. Trials are
themedium through which this communication process takes place, involving, as
Mark van Hoecke put it, ‘communication between legislators and citizens, between
courts and litigants, between the legislator and the judiciary, communication between
contracting parties, communication within a trial’.18 More importantly, exactly this
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communicational aspect, within the confines of the court and amongst the legal
actors involved, can serve ‘as the ultimate safeguard for a “correct” interpretation and
adjudication of the law’, and in so doing thus legitimises the law.19
Since this communicational process is the principal foundation underlying the
legitimacy of the justice applied, a trial ought to be heavily protected against political
interference andmanipulation. A fair trial is a basic human right, protected not only
by criminal law, but also by international and constitutional law. The principle of
fair trial is recognised in numerous international instruments and treaties, such
as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 10 udhr), the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 14 iccpr) and the European Convention
on Human Rights (Article 6 echr). Besides serving other functions, the fair trial
principle ensures the right of an individual to be informed of themeasures taken, to be
informed about the case against him or her, the right to be heard within a reasonable
period of time, the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent and independent
reviewmechanism, the right to counsel with respect to all proceedings and the right
to have his or her conviction and sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal according to
the law. However, international law does recognise restrictions in criminal justice for
reasons of national security.20 However, such deviations from the ordinary practice of
adjudicationmust always be temporary andmeet standards of legality, necessity and
proportionality.21 The principle of fair trial assures individuals that they have a place
to turn to, should the state or others fail to honour their human rights.22
The relevance of this normative framework that is meant to safeguard the right
to a fair trial can only be understood against the context of its mirror image: the
historical reminiscence of the Stalinist (and, to a lesser, extent National-Socialist)
show trials; these were the very opposite of fair trials, not in the least because of their
one-sidedly executive dominance of the communicative process. ‘Show trials’ and
‘political trials’ are oftenmixed up in public discourse. The overriding characteristics
of a classical show trial in the Stalinist sense are 1) the total exclusion of the element of
chance and/or risk from the trial and 2) the predominant function of the trial as a
tool in ‘educating’ the public at home and abroad in order to strengthen ideological
power. Sometimes such trials are not strictly Stalinist, in the sense that they do not
primarily serve to demonstrate and confirm totalitarian rule behind a façade of justice
administered. However, we do call them political as soon as the executive branch of a
government uses criminal law predominantly to further its own political agenda. Otto
Kirchheimer, in his classic study Political Justice, defines political trials as attempts
by regimes to control opponents by using legal procedure for political ends (Alex
P. Schmid has extensively covered this in chapters 2 and 4).23 Authorities deploy
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criminal law to maintain their dominant power; they eliminate political opponents
by outlawing oppositional voices, making them illegal. In such cases, courts only
serve political powers, not justice.
However, this type of state-controlled show trial is not the association that was
invoked by American comments on theGhailani case quoted earlier. The show element
in the trial they referred to was the risk that the terrorist suspects wouldmanage to
dominate the courtroomwith their narratives of injustice, thereby turning the trial
into a second ‘terrorist show’—the first being the attack they had perpetrated.
There is however even a third type of show imaginable: a show in which the
authorities demonstrate, through the way in which sentences are meted out, that
modern democracies are fully capable of performing a show of justice in a positive
sense. The Nuremberg trials may be regarded as amodernmodel for how a trial can be
a communicative masterpiece and performance of justice. They did so by revealing the
genocidal dimensions of the holocaust, establishing a historical narrative that stood
the test of time and one that is accepted by large majorities of the public in Germany
and inmost of the rest of the world. Nuremberg created a collective memory, fixed
responsibility onGermany and set standards for adjudicating on futuremisconduct by
states and social groups. Indeed, the Nuremberg trial was the example of a convincing
performance by the victorious powers in using criminal law—rather than mere
revengeful force—to deal with war criminals and state terrorists.
In fact, the concept of show trial can refer to totally different types of politicised
trials, depending on the normative charge. In the words of legal scholar Awol Kassim
Allo, ‘What counts is not that a trial is labelled a ‘show trial’, it is rather the end
that the “show” serves.’24 This brings us to the core question of this volume: which
performative strategies were used by the actors in court to convince audiences of the
validity of a specific narrative of (in)justice?
12.3. Performative Strategies in Court: What Kind of ‘Show’ can Terrorism
Trials Offer?
It has been stated by various experts that terrorism is a form of communication.25
Terrorism expert BrianM. Jenkins noted as early as 1975 that ‘terrorism is theatre’.26
Peter Waldmann added to these observations the statement that most terrorists
explicitly want theatre, since they are bent on provoking state power.27 With their
deeds, terrorists seek to communicate their visions of justice and injustice, visions on
the rearrangement of power relations and attempts to rebalance them. However, there
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is another side to this coin: counter-terrorism also involves a form of communication,
it is performative as well.28 In court, the prosecutor has a story to tell as well. After
an attack, or an attempted one, perpetrators are, if and when apprehended, usually
brought to trial. In the courtroom, all parties involved in the drama are brought
together. Within the narrow confinements of this stage, issues of (in)justice are
addressed, retribution is demanded and justice is carried out—at least that is the
theory, to which reality does not always live up. Sometimes terrorists are tried behind
closed doors in secret courts; in some cases, trials are so heavily politicised or even
tampered with that they resemblemore the classic show trial in the Stalinist sense
than any display of justice.29
The question, then, is what strategy do the actors in this theatre of lawfare, which
often amounts to a public drama, follow and what are the legal, political and social
consequences of their strategies? Does politicising a trial, putting on a show, rule out
the risks referred to earlier? Or, on the contrary, does it incite sectors of the public
by violating their sense of justice? Can it placate the public, restore social peace and
prevent further radicalisation? Following the provocation-repression theory,30 a trial
controlled and run by the prosecution without counter-balance from judges could
provide terrorists with new proof of state oppression, strengthening injustice frames
of reference that enable the recruitment of newmembers and initiate new violent
campaigns.
In the introduction, we presented our working definition of the concept of
performativity. This definition, however open-ended it may be, refers to discursive
efforts and actions to construct social realities,31 as applied to terrorism trials:32
Performativity in terrorism trials refers to acts or strategies (coherently or incoherently)
adopted by parties with a stake in the to try to persuade their target audience(s) in
(and outside) the courtroom of the justice of their narrative(s) and the injustice of the
one on the opposite side of the bar.
We have seen that these strategies were restricted by the different historical contexts,
which provided the dramaturgical framework for the trials.
The first element in every stage play was the script, which was to provide for
a plot and for the different narratives and storylines to be heard. The initial script
was triggered by the suspect’s crime, and drafted by the charge(s) brought by the
prosecutor against the accused. Criminal law functioned as a set of guiding principles,
dictating how this script should be written. Were intelligence reports accepted as
evidence in court? Could witnesses give evidence behind closed doors? The script, or
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the ‘director’s clues’, provided the legal rules of the game. By bending or changing
these rules, the authorities could influence the outcome of the trial. At the same time,
manipulating the rules of adjudication during a trial could ‘spoil’ the game and could
undermine confidence in the law.
Secondly, an important question with regard to this dramaturgical element was
the nature of the script: Was it a script within a civil law or within a common law
system? In other words, was the trial inquisitorial in nature or adversarial? Did the
defence need to convince a jury, or was it the judge who heard and weighed the
material? Another structural element that mattered was the amount of evidence that
needed to be presented in court, which impacted on the length of the trial. In the
Netherlands, for example, the charges, evidence and defence’s response were mainly
exchanged and worked out on paper before the actual trial began.
Third, the way the stage was set also affected the unfolding of the drama. Did a
trial take place in a regular court building, or were the defendants transported to a
fortified location where the visitors had to go through heavy security checks? Were
the defendants placed on regular benches or locked in cages, as was the case in several
Italian trials? The courtroom/building could thus enhance or downplay the dramatic
quality of a trial as well.
Fourthly, the play itself was performed by actors, who adopted different strategies,
which will be discussed below. Actors were the prosecution, the defence, the judges,
the witnesses and sometimes also the victims or their families. The play developed
through a contest between the prosecution and the defence over the writing of the
script. Each side attempted to offer its own script as the way to go and try to arrange
its performance so as to advance its truth. Judges often acted both as directors and
audience, depending on the type of criminal justice system of the country involved.
Lastly, we have seen that every play was in need of an audience. In terrorism trials,
as in other trials, the audience was constituted by the judge (in a civil law system)
or jury (in a common law system), but also by the public (including journalists) in
the courtroom and the public outside. What the public saw and heard was, however,
sometimes filtered, if not controlled, by the media’s reporting of the trial. Or it was
broadcast directly to the public in and outside the courtroom itself. This gave the
media, especially the social media, an important, often crucial, role in the play as well.
Within these dramaturgical frames the terrorism trials unfolded, and resulted in
different types of ‘show’, depending on the relative success of the performative and
communicative strategies adopted by the various actors, and on the question which
communicative mode of negotiating legality and justice dominated the trial.
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12.4. A Communicatively Oriented Typology of Terrorism Trials
A highly defining characteristic of terrorism trials is the struggle for communica-
tive dominance, the contest for the communicative mode in which questions of
legality, legitimacy and justice are negotiated. A ‘fair trial’ is usually characterised
by the confirmation and correct and transparant application of legal norms and
rules. However, in case of terrorism trials, more often than not turn into a site of
severe contestation. The parties involved adopt communicative strategies, execute
performative acts; all in order to appropriate, impose and disseminate their version of
justice and legitimacy. Based on the definition of performative strategies in terrorism
trials, we could now try to place the various terrorism trials discussed in this volume
in a graph. The question of positioning is defined by a horizontal axis and a vertical
one, and guided by three questions: 1) To what extent did the actors involved accept
and uphold the legal system as mutual mode of communication in and outside the
courtroom? 2) To what extent did the actors involved tried and succeeded to dominate
the communicative space and impose their version of justice and injustice? 3) To
what extent did the trial attract media attentation and perhaps even resulted in a
‘trial by media’? By answering these question, admittedly in a highly qualitative
and associative way, we have placed the trials in the graph below. The horizontal
axis delineates the different communicative strategies in court. At the left end of
the axis, the executive powers/authorities dominate the communicativemode and
turn the trial into a one-sided ‘show’ of executive prerogatives. This restriction of the
communicative space of the defendants is often justified by security considerations.
On the right end of the pole the terrorist defendants follow a strategy of rupture,
reject the existing modes of communication and law and turn the legal proceedings
into a communicative continuation of their struggle. The vertical axis depicts the level
of media attention generated by the trial, ranging from nothing to a total take-over
of the communicative process by outside forces in the media. Based on a number
of cases that we looked into, the following typology can be developed (the trials’
position is assessed based on the communicative dominance during the last stage
of the trial):
– A status-quo-trial where everyone complies with the existing communicative
framework of applicable law and legal conventions, such as in the Dutch Piranha
andHofstad group cases. This trial can be positioned in the centre of the horizontal
axis and low on the vertical axis. Both sides refrained from adopting explicit
performative strategies. Such trials do not score high on the lawfare scale, and
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Figure 12.1: A communicatively oriented typology of terrorism trials
often indeed offer closure rather than rupture for society at large, if not always for
those accused of serious political crimes.
– A trial as the continuation of the terrorist struggle by legal and communicative means.
The defendants break through existingmodes of communications, reject legal
conventions and challenge the legitimacy of the system as such. They often
generate a good deal of media attention and inspire new rounds of violence by
terrorist sympathisers. The German Stammheim trial (see Chapter 6) in its final
stage would be an example of such a significant performative effort by the defence
lawyers and their clients. Such trials are a theatre of open lawfare, involving
rupture and leading to some kind of closure perhaps only in the long run.
– A trial as continuation of executive counterterrorism practice. Not law, but security
offers the underlying framework and restricts the open, communicative space in
which proceedings take place. Such executive ‘shows’ are in their extreme form
exemplified by the classical Stalinist show trials. Here, the prosecution dominates
the show, sometimes even hand-in-glove with the judge or the jury. This show
can also be a de facto non-show-like trial, closed to the public or the media, but
organised by the state to serve its security agenda. The trial may, however, also
be staged as a virtual show: the trial serves as a tool of risk management, when
justice is subordinated to principles of national security, turning the trial into a
site of ‘actuarial justice’. When crimes under consideration deal with conspiracies
and terrorist preparations rather than actual attacks, it is difficult to draw the line
between habeas corpus and imagination—since without an attack, or ‘smoking
gun’, often only inferences can be drawn, and possible future attack be imagined,
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rather than proven with statistical evidence. The lawfare element depends on the
degree of secrecy involved, but the risk of rupture can be significant.
– A trial may turn into a media show—not run so much by the terrorists or the
prosecution, but dramatised in themedia, often capitalising on public feelings
of vengeance and outrage—often helped by sideshows staged by audiences and
groups outside the courtroom (victims, sympathisers, etc.). Starting point is not
the law, ‘revolution’ or security, but the communicative mode has been taken
over in advance by outside forces in the media. The lawfare element is difficult to
assess here, since media reportingmay fuel the conflict at stake. Closure/rupture
strategies may both be possible, rupture being defined as above as the rejection,
obstruction or undermining of the legal system.
– A performance of justice: a show where the verdict educates the public about the
importance of the rule of law in a democratic society creates a collective memory
and sets standards for future conduct by states and society. This type of show
is run by the judge/jury, but the performative strategy is based on a (perceived)
neutral application of the law, not on partisan politicisation of justice. In the ideal
world, such a theatre of lawfare provides closure for all parties involved, if not
immediately then in the long run. The law as mutual mode of communication
has been confirmed or recaptured.
Nota bene: The trial may change in type during the course of its proceedings. It may,
for instance, begin as a not so dramatic show but develop into amedia show. Other
transformations are also possible. We will elaborate on these types below.
12.4.1. First Type: A Status-Quo-Trial
The first type of trial is not that dramatic at all. A terrorist trial does not always have
to be a social drama. There are indeed instances when terrorism trials created little
spectacle. In the Netherlands, the trial against the Moluccan activists who raided
and occupied the Indonesian Ambassador’s residence in 1970 in order to further their
separatist cause, killing a police officer in the process, proceeded very smoothly. The
defendants pleaded guilty, complied with the court’s demands and raised only one
moral question: they wanted their plight to be heard. They wanted to tell their story
of expulsion from the Moluccan islands, of the apparent promise made by the Dutch
authorities to lobby for their independence from Indonesia and to highlight the
discrimination they suffered in Dutch postcolonial society.33 In this particular case,
those accused of terrorism did address a social grievance, but both the judge and
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the general audience were receptive to their narrative and acknowledged it in their
responses. The defendants’ communicative spacewaswide enough and their causewas
recognised. The judge, himself a former colonial officer, paid tribute to the sufferings
of theMoluccans, their plight after 1950 and their loss of homeland. This, in turn,
appeased the defendants and made them accept the verdict based on Dutch laws.
They did so without protest—the sentence was lenient considering the fact that it
had involved the killing of a policeman.34 If there was a show at all, it showed the
Moluccans’ tragic fate and Dutch society’s feelings of guilt about having let them
down in 1950 and beyond. The law had been violated, yes; a policeman had been
killed as the Indonesian residence was occupied. Nevertheless, there was no clash of
incompatible ethical or communicative frameworks. On the contrary, theMoluccan
activists appealed to their families’ shared history with the Dutch people, recalling
their parents’ loyal service to the Queen, demanding only that the government live up
to its own standards and promises.35
Another example of remarkably little theatre was the latest hearings in the
Hofstad group case, staged in late 2010. When the trial started, following the murder
of Theo van Gogh in November 2004, the defendants, all of whom belonged to a
group around Van Gogh’s murdererMohammed Bouyeri who were charged with
participating in a terrorist organisation and inciting hatred, refused every form
of cooperation with the court. They argued that, first of all, the man-made Dutch
judicial systemwas not in line with the divine rule of law and violated hakimiyyat Allah
(the sovereignty of God). Secondly, they claimed that public and political pressure
prevented them from getting a fair hearing in any case. In the heated and anxious
climate of the months following Van Gogh’s murder, this second complaint had some
merit. Government officials had proclaimed a ‘war’ against Dutch terrorists, public
vigilance campaigns against terrorist attacks were launched, radicalisedMuslims
were spotted everywhere and revenge-fuelled attacks against mosques and other
Muslim sites took place.36 Seven suspects were arrested and charged with being part
of a terrorist and criminal organisation engaged in inciting hatred and preparing
for terrorist attacks. In 2006, they were convicted on the counts of attempting to
murder police officers, the possession of hand grenades and membership of a terrorist
organisation. One suspect, JasonWalters, who threw the hand grenade, was sentenced
to 15 years in prison.37
However, as years passed without any further jihadist attack on Dutch soil, the
Dutch political and social climate changed. In 2008, the Court of Appeal in The Hague
acquitted those belonging to the Hofstad group on the count of membership of
a criminal terrorist organisation.38 The court hearings in 2010 proceeded almost
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unnoticed, until JasonWalters stood up to announce his faith in the Dutch democratic
system and the rule of law. He demonstrated his abandonment of extremist behaviour
by conforming to the norms in court, wearing ordinary clothes and sporting amodern
haircut. ‘I am certain that I will receive a fair trial’, he stated at the end of the pre-trial
hearing in the High-Security Court in Amsterdam on 16 July 2010, thereby following a
strategy of signalling trust in and conformation to the law.39 Although this story is an
exceptional instance of a terrorist’s public conversion, it provides a valuable insight: a
change of times, demonstration of reflective justice and a terrorist conversion caused
the trial to normalise. The charge of membership of a terrorist organisation was later
reconfirmed, but the trial hardly presented a show any more: no party involved tried
to turn it into a drama of conflicting ethical frameworks.
Another example of a rather undramatic case of mutual compliance to applicable
law and legal conventions is the trial of the first and only Dutch female terrorism
suspect, Soumaya S. On 15 March 2011, the Dutch Attorney-General submitted an
advisory opinion to the Supreme Court that stated that the verdict against Soumaya S.,
whohadbeen arrested in 2005 and convicted of participating in a terrorist organisation,
had to be annulled. Soumaya S. had already been sentenced for carrying an Agram
2000 machine gun, but had been put on trial a second time for being a member of a
terrorist group.40 Strangely enough, almost no public attention was paid to all of this.
No front-page newspaper headlines, no interviews with disgruntled politicians or a
disappointed public prosecutor were seen or heard in the national media. No audience
outside or inside the courtroom explicitly applauded the verdict, drew attention to
the outcome or rallied against it. No public outrage was discernible. This terrorism
trial thus ended with a whimper, rather than with a bang.
As has been stated above, the undramatic character of this trial can be explained in
part by the brevity of the trial, the inquisitorial nature of the Dutch criminal justice
system, and the lack of historical precedent. But more importantly: the terrorist
suspects themselves did not follow a strategy of rupture, but of total compliance.
Neither were there enough sympathisers willing to stage sideshows, probably due to
the lack of support for home-grown jihadist terrorism in the years between 2004 and
2010 within the DutchMuslim community.
12.4.2. Second Type: A Continuation of the Terrorist Struggle
Instances like the Moluccan trials in the 1970s, where those accused of terrorism
remain within the boundaries set by the legal system’s rules of court procedures
and share society’s moral values and principles, where the magistrates and general
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public act low key and are receptive to the terrorists’ story, are rare. They mostly
depend on the attacks’ low level of lethality, the short duration of a terrorist campaign
and on the shared historical context in which terrorists and host society operate.
Peaceful debates in court are an exception, rather than the rule. More often than
not, terrorists challenge and contest society’s moral principles in court. This is the
second type of terrorism trial we have identified: the show is staged by those accused
of acts of terrorism, where the suspects and their lawyers play up their version of reality.
To be sure, those accused of an act of terrorism have alreadymade their first point
with the physical attack. Due to the terrorist attack (assuming they were not arrested
for preparatory actions beforehand) theymoved to the national stage and into the
limelight of mass media and public opinion. The terrorist attack itself on a prominent
victim was a kind of kangaroo trial, their own primitive form of justice. Once arrested
and confined to the narrow space of the courtroom, they themselves had to stand
trial.
A major example of an intended show trial staged by terrorists as continuation
of their struggle by legal and communicative means can be found in the history
of the Red Army Faction (raf) in Germany. One of the largest successes of the
founders of the raf (Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Ulrike Meinhof and Jan-
Carl Raspe) was that, together with their lawyers, they succeeded in portraying
their trial—which lasted fromMay 1975 to April 1977—as a political one, conjuring
up an image of political justice in Germany. They tried to portray themselves as
political warriors, and in the end as the ultimate martyrs for the revolution’s cause.
As Jacco Pekelder and Klaus Weinhauer (see Chapter 6) have written elsewhere, their
lawyers sought a direct confrontation with the other parties involved in the criminal
justice system and carried out a ‘political defence’: ‘More than attacking the actual
accusations against their clients these Linksanwälte [left-wing lawyers—a play on
words in German] seemed to aim at undermining the legitimacy of the trial and
the justice system that had produced it.’41 Although in the end justice prevailed,
the West German judiciary damaged its own image of impartiality by reacting so
nervously during the trial. The raf suspects used the court to stage their own
play, which served their own revolutionary agenda. They used the long-drawn-
out period in which the Stammheim trial unravelled to radicalise and mobilise a
second and third generation of new recruits to their cause. These newcomers in turn
initiated a second round of violence, the aim of which was the liberation of their
historical leaders from jail. When this backfired, climaxing in the raid on the hijacked
Landshut aeroplane inMogadishu in October 1977, the Stammheim prisoners’ play
moved to its final act: they committed suicide, but staged it in such a way that it
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looked like politically-motivated murders by the German authorities. With this
final act of vengeance, they wrote their own ending to the state’s judicial script
and turned it upside down. As a consequence, in the eyes of a sizeable segment
of the public, both at home and abroad, it was not the suicidal terrorists, but the
West German authorities who stood accused in the court of public opinion. With
the indispensable help of themassmedia, the raf was able to instrumentalise the
Stammheim trial for its own ends and turn it into a veritable show—with far-reaching
consequences.42
12.4.3. Third Type: The State is Running the Show
However, in many cases terrorism trials are a stage performance by the state,
which leads us to the third type of terrorist show trial: a continuation of executive
counterterrorism practice. Authorities bring terrorists to justice in order to show
that there is a terrorist threat but while assuring the public that they canmanage to
contain and control it. Terrorism trials serve to show that the executive brings peace
to society: the perpetrators are caught, law and order are in good hands but further
vigilance is called for. Sometimes, substantive law and procedural rules are modified
to suit the state’s security needs. The executive selects a particular legal tool to ensure
that the risk of acquittal is minimal. Hence, the authorities may resort to rewriting
the script as well: they sometimes wait until the curtain falls on the criminal trial and
then stage their final punishment beyond the eye of the public. The acquitted suspect
is sometimes expelled from the country or made subject to permanent surveillance
and control orders the moment he or she leaves the courthouse.43 Some people argue
that the Guantánamo tribunals represent a type of trial where the government one-
sidedly runs and rules the show, without muchmedia presence, totally restricting the
defendant’s communicative space.
A variation within this type of state-dominated performance is the terrorist trial
organised as a site of ‘actuarial justice’. Here the prosecution turns a terrorism trial
into a quasi-virtual trial because more andmore often such a trial takes place before an
alleged terrorist attack has been carried out. The trial is a site where not crime, but
risk is being sentenced.44 Contrary to what Foucault stated, it is not the case that
‘law recedes’.45 In fact, as Louise Amoore stipulates, ‘as risk advances […] law itself
authorizes a specific and particular mode of riskmanagement’ which entails that
‘[…] evidence, the judgment of the expert witness, and the legal subject as bearer of
rights are all reoriented in a risk regime that acts pre-emptively and authorizes with
indefinite and indeterminate limits’.46 Competences, provisions andmeasures are
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adapted to make sure the judges (are likely to) render a conviction; either by using
criminal law, or via administrative or immigration law (control orders, administrative
rule or alien’s rights).
Those trials that involve suspects arrested basedmerely on preparatory actions, on
allegations, suspicions or intentions can be termed virtual or ‘what if ’ trials. An act is
put under judicial scrutiny that may only exist in an imagined future—as (pre- or
re-)constructed by the prosecuting authorities. Conspiracy trials, thought crimes,
incitement to hatred: such crimes involve possible deeds in the future, based on
vague plans and/or allegations only. Depending on the assessment of preparatory
evidence, the moment of culpability and the moment of the actual deed are severed.
The relationship between offence and punishment becomesmuchmore indirect.
Pre-emption and premediation replace retribution inquiries, thereby raising new
human rights issues. Rather than assessing different versions of the ‘truth’ about an
incident, judges have to deal with techniques of imagining possible future incidents.
Premediation and security imagination replace responsibility for concrete actions. This
type of terrorism trial serves to placate virtual threats; they have become instruments
in riskmanagement. The swordof justicehas been ‘securitised’.Deterrence, retribution
for present dangers or restoration of social peace—themain functions of criminal
law—give way to a secondary function: meting out sentences to pre-empt future risks.
Under such circumstances, the trial becomes a theatre of imagined terrorist futures,
where the defendants’ communicative space is severely limited.47
12.4.4. Fourth Type: TheMedia are Running the Show
Terrorism trials may turn into show trials throughmedia saturation coverage but
also because the public considers some of these trials to be a spectacle in themselves.
Not law, security or ‘revolution’, but the dramatic potential of the trial becomes the
mode of communication and dominates the narrative. Going back to the pre-modern
age, trials always were often also theatrical performances. The perpetrator was put
on a scaffold and physically punished in full view of all the spectators. The aim of
this performance was not just the carrying out of worldly justice, but demonstrating
the fate of sinners. Public punishments and executions were a directmemento mori,
demonstratinghow the gates of hellwould open for anyonewhodared to violate divine
and human laws. Such trials were often a theatre of horror. Since those days, most
trials have lost such dramatic quality. At their best, they became a theatre of common
sense and civility. Trials should ideally be theatres to stage examples of objectivity
and prudence, based on well-established criteria and procedures. However, terrorism
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and war crimes trials have the tendency to slip back into pre-modern theatres of
terror. Hannah Arendt followed the trial of Eichmann in the 1960s and concluded
that he was triedmore for the suffering of the Jewish people than for his individual
deeds.48 In public opinion, as voiced by the media, terrorists should also be punished
for the fear and shock they inflict upon society. In this way, adjudication based on
concrete criminal acts, individually attributed, disappears behind the front of public
indignation. Public opinion takes over the role of prosecutor, judge and jury alike.
The trial becomes a show of public vengeance and outrage. In fact, those accused
of terrorism are inmany cases already sentenced by themedia, leaving the judges
often hardly any room for manoeuvre, let alone to issue less severe sentences or even
acquittals. If they acted otherwise, they might even run the risk of being (virtually)
lynched by an outraged public.49
Amedia show can also be created by sideshows, as staged by groups outside the
courtroom. The audience—including the victims—has tomake sense of the competing
narratives as well. They sit and listen; or, like a Greek chorus, they comment. They
sometimes have their own agendas. Sympathisers for the defendants may stage
sideshows, organise picket lines outside the court building, submit petitions and
protests in themedia against the treatment of those in jail. On the other hand, victims
may get together and protest against the court’s perceived leniency. Prisonersmay
initiate hunger strikes and defendants may start an (international) lobby effort to win
support for their cause, as the ira did in the case of Bobby Sands. The defendants may
inspire or even appeal to their comrades and followers outside the courtroom to act on
their behalf and initiate new rounds of violence, the aim being to put extra pressure
on the state, blackmailing the authorities to release the suspects or taking vengeance
on the judges, as happened in Germany and Italy in the 1970s when second and third
generation terrorists ‘punished’ judicial representatives for the verdicts being issued
against their leaders.
12.4.5. The Fifth Type: A Persuasive Performance of Justice
The fifth type involves a show where equality of arms exist, where law and legal
procedures offer all parties free communicative space. In these cases, the trial might
come to reveal violations of justice, and the verdict might educate the public about the
importance of upholding the rule of law in a democratic society. As in the Breivik trial,
the verdict shapes a collective memory and sets standards for the future conduct of
both government and society. This type of show is run by the judge or the jury, whose
performative strategy is based on a (perceived) neutral application of the law, whereby
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they refuse to bow to a partisan politicisation. Amongst the competing narratives of
(in)justice, the judges have to try to reconstruct an accurate version of the facts of the
case under consideration and interpret and apply the law to it. They have to probe
deeply into opposing narratives, diverse testimonies and partisan accounts to discover
the various motives and intentions behind the terrorist actions.
From this point of view, judges have first of all an obligation to establish a
thorough, accurate and wide-ranging account of the facts pertaining to the incident
before the court. Secondly, they have to reveal the underlying motives and strategies,
and relate these to the context in which the incident occurred. In carrying out
such a penetrating inquiry, they can make a valuable contribution to the general
understanding of the facts and their background. They can more or less write history.
They may hear the victims, speak on behalf of a terrorised population and thereby
give them back their agency.
Of course, reconstructing the truth is an especially troublesome endeavour when
it concerns a preventive arrest, based on preparatory actions only. Judges are not
there tomake up for the authorities’ shortcoming or failures in gathering enough
compelling evidence; they do not have to protect another branch of government.
They have to settle the issue that falls under their jurisdiction, have to throw new
light on the affair,50 which is difficult when an offence exists only as a possibility.
Carrying out justice in a situation of security risks, of allegations, presumptions and
guilt-by-association runs the gauntlet of turning the trial into a virtual show. The
judges may face severe criticism from an enraged public and security officials if they
acquit the suspects. On the other hand, if they do not, they may face condemnation by
the constituency of the terrorists.
In those cases when the judges manage to keep the balance, a fair trial can become
a performative act in itself. The verdict will not only be perceived as legally justified,
the narrative of guilt and injustice emerging from such a trial can make history,
change existing norms and impact on the prevailing values in a given society. At the
interface of terrorism, law enforcement and public opinion, terrorism trials can offer
an ideal opportunity to showcase justice in progress and demonstrate how terrorist
suspects can be dealt with by the laws of the land.
A convincing performance of justice can, moreover, restore the information
asymmetry that allowed terrorists to win the (tacit) approval of radical constituencies
and can also undermine the narrative utilised to attract support. Most importantly,
terrorism trials are also platforms where victimsmay regain their voice and where
their fate, as a consequence of the terrorist’s offence, is put centre stage. According to
Tom Parker, the former policy director for Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Human
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Rights at Amnesty International usa, it is time to redress the balance and to use
victim narratives to confront the violence of armed groups. Parker specifically refers to
human rights defenders and ngos, but the same contention can bemade regarding
terrorism trials: such trials offer a powerful platform for revealing and challenging
the terrorists’ narratives by confronting themwith the messages of horror, pain and
destruction they inflicted upon their victims.51
12.5. Terrorism Trials as Catharsis
We have extensively described how terrorism trials more often than not involve show
elements. We would like to argue, however, that they have to be theatre as well—in the
sense that they present a performance of justice. As noted earlier, ‘What counts is not
that a trial is labelled a “show trial”, it is rather the end that the “show” serves.’52 The
trial is the nexuswhere countervailing narrativesmeet, wheremoral frameworks clash
and where society addresses, confirms and possibly repairs a fundamental breach. A
trial can demonstrate that trespassers will be convicted and that victims are heard.
It may repair the information asymmetry caused by the terrorists’ hold on their
constituents. The trial and the verdict can undermine the terrorists’ claim to justice
and reveal the horror and destruction they inflicted upon their victims and upon
society. In this sense, it is important that as many people as possible are able to watch
the spectacle unfold.
The question thus becomes: what does it take for a terrorism trial to be considered
a performance of justice in the eyes of the public? First of all, the authorities should
stick to the script. In a structural sense, the script does of course depend on the nature
of the criminal law system; whether it is an inquisitorial or an adversarial system,
whether evidence should be presented in the courtroom at full length, or can be dealt
with on paper before the trial starts. Nevertheless, in both systems—the civil law
and the common law—performative strategies matter. Judges in particular have the
responsibility to take care that a trial does not resemble a ‘Pirandello play’,53 where
each actor follows his own account of events, where themost powerful one decides
what the truth has to be and where the spectator is left totally powerless when trying
to judge what the underlying narrative is, let alone to assess the truth about the plot.
To preserve the integrity of the judiciary, the executive should refrain completely
from tampering with procedural rules during the trial; it should be extremely careful
not to be perceived as trying to exert political control over the conduct and outcome of
a trial.
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Secondly, terrorism trials should not be based on premediation, virtualities, or seen
as a tool of risk management. Magistrates and prosecutors have to make sure the trial
does not develop into a demonstration of maximum security and all-encompassing
risk management, as the trial at Stammheim did in part, or as the military tribunals
in Guantánamo have done fully. The insatiable desire for security should not trump
justice; underlying political conflicts cannot be solved through security measures
alone. Judicial catharsis should not be sacrificed to secure risk management.
Thirdly, transparency matters. In the case of the Indonesian trial against Abu
Bakar Baʾasyir, the court decided to relocate the hearings from the South Jakarta
district court to the larger Agriculture Ministry’s compound in Central Jakarta, so as
to provide more space for the expected number of people. Against critics who feared
that this decision would turn the trial into amedia circus, the court contended that
an open prosecution, visible to as many spectators as possible, demonstrated justice in
progress, underscored confidence in the state’s counter-terrorism efforts and showed
how new laws were put in practice. Thus, the trial would support Indonesia’s rule of
law vis-à-vis extremist challenges.54
Fourthly, a trial should leave room for conflicting narratives of truth and injustice.
Judges should make sure that the ongoing transformation of a political conflict into
a legal dispute takes into account all the narratives. Amongst all these competing
narratives of justice/injustice, the judges have to try to re-establish an accurate
version of the facts and interpret and apply the appropriate law to them. They have
to probe deeply into the differing narratives, evidence and accounts to discover the
various motives and intentions behind acts of terrorism. From this performative
point of view, judges have first of all an obligation to establish a thorough, accurate
and comprehensive account of the facts pertaining to the incident before the court.
Secondly, they have to reveal the underlyingmotives and strategies, and relate them
to the context in which the incident happened. Theymay hear the victims, speak on
behalf of the terrorised population and give them back their agency. Responding to all
this with unemotional adjudication subsequently provides the best meta-narrative of
social and legal resilience thinkable. In this sense, judges have to be aware of sideshows
too, where sympathisers, victims, and other target audiences voice their version of
justice.
The late Judge Cassese’s reflections on the Achille Lauro Affair support this
argument. In his seminal discussion of the lessons the international community
of states could draw from this incident, Cassese pointed to the fact that there are
long-term, mid-term and short-term policy objectives involved in dealing with
terrorism. In the short run, governments may give preference to order and stability,
524 | conclusion
viewing terrorism essentially as an attack on the public order and choosing to deal
with this attack with repressivemilitary or intelligence instruments. However, he
argued, terrorism may also reflect a ‘desire for social change, innovation and the
adaptation of international relations to changing needs, even when, alas, these are
expressed in such perverted and destructive ways’.55 In the mid- and long term,
intransigence to or even denial of this political narrative may alienate the terrorists’
broader constituencies from the political system they are operating in. This is not to
say that the terrorists’ narrative should be accepted or even agreed to, but it should be
countered and responded to rather than silenced by repressive means only. Judges or
juries can have a role in unveiling these minority narratives by paying attention to
the deepermotives or social grievances (without needing to view these as legitimate or
rightful ‘root causes’ for terrorism). Revealing such narratives of social change can do
justice to the political conflict at hand. Denying or only criminalising these narratives
and reducing the trial to a mere dichotomy of legal/illegal narrows reality and could
in the end both backfire against the ‘order and stability’ paradigm of the executive
and undermine criminal law’s legitimacy in the eyes of aggrievedminorities.
When these four conditions are met, a trial will offer a platform on which
narratives of injustice confront each other. A trial not only metes out justice to those
suspected of acts of terrorism, but also assesses their intentions, their motives and
their legitimations. It reveals the ideas terrorists have to offer on questions of rights
and righteousness. If an attack has taken place, or if suspects are arrested in a context of
heavy political conflicts, law cannot fix this situation of political division. But glossing
over the competing narratives, storing them away in indefinite detention does not
serve to solve these conflicts either. Not bringing terrorists to justice out of short
term security considerations may in fact further deepen the political antagonisms. If
the terrorists represent only a tiny faction within a social movement, or even if they
represent hardly anyone at all, letting them tell their story in court may just expose
this narrative as the hysterical, nihilistic or illegitimate argument it is.
After shocking incidents of terror and destruction, society needs to regain a greater
degree of balance. Terrorism trials, well-prepared and properly conducted, can help to
repair the damage by offering a secure, communicative spacewhere clashing narratives
of justice and injustice can be discussed and balanced, where facts and culpability
can be assessed. Such trials can help to prevent a schism from opening up and to
assist the immediate victims of terrorism attacks and society at large to come to
terms with loss, grievances and grief. An open and transparent trial is crucial for
re-establishing what happened and why, and will serve to institutionalise or mitigate
the need for vengeance and retribution. Inevitably, terrorism trials are show trials,
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staging a social drama, revealing narratives of injustice and grievances. They show
how law and legal proceedings—although often lengthy and tiresome—can serve as
mode of communicating and negotiating these narratives. Sometimes, at their best,
they can even provide some kind of judicial catharsis for most, if not all, actors and
audiences involved. Only thenmay the curtain fall.
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